Retired generals break down Iran war strategy after week 8

[0:00] I think they're going to continue to shoot us the bird, they're going to continue to stall, [0:03] they're going to go to Pakistan, and it's going to be a new group of folks showing up so they [0:07] can't strike a deal. That's exactly what they want. The Iranians now know they've got a real [0:13] strategic asset, more useful than a nuclear weapon. The blockade on the blockade has seemed [0:20] to be quite effective. They have many dozens, if not hundreds, of very fast attack boats. [0:26] They are a threat in the same way that drones and missiles are a threat. [0:30] Iran, similarly, had been planning to retaliate. You know, as long as we'd had a plan on the books, [0:34] they'd had a plan to respond. The U.S. sending this third aircraft carrier [0:38] to the Middle East, what options does that give the U.S. military? [0:44] Well, it certainly gives the U.S. military a lot more options. One of the great concerns in the [0:49] GCC countries is that their bases not be used for attacks into Iran. So to replace that, [0:56] you bring in an aircraft carrier, that's 90 fighter aircraft that are capable of being [1:02] used. They could also, if it is, as Pete Hegseth says, this is going to take as long as it takes, [1:11] it can also be used for replacement operations. So those other sailors that have been in the [1:16] region for so long can go home. We talk about an aircraft carrier being 500,000 tons of diplomacy, [1:24] and here's a good example of it. To that point regarding what Hegseth was describing as [1:31] the naval blockade growing and going global, practically, what does that part of it mean, [1:38] going global? Well, I think he was referring to the fact that it's not just Iranian tankers, [1:46] it's not just American military forces there, but the fact remains that this is expanding in terms of [1:52] the number of countries that actually have assets in that region or potentially could bring assets in [1:58] the region. Sadly, it also means that the situation is going global as we see this blockade creating [2:05] significant problems throughout the world, not only with petroleum prices, but also with fertilizer, [2:12] with helium, and other items that are so necessary for the world economy. [2:16] It's also notable that President Trump ordered the U.S. Navy to shoot down any Iranian boats that [2:22] are placing mines in the Strait of Hormuz. We've heard the administration repeatedly say that Iran's [2:27] Navy is at the bottom of the ocean, and yet these sort of smaller speedboats continue to be a nuisance. [2:34] What are the implications there regarding what remains of Iran's capacity on the water? [2:41] Well, two things I'd say, Boris. First, he is correct. The Iranian regular Navy is at the bottom of the [2:48] Gulf. The speedboats do not belong to the Iranian Navy, but to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. [2:54] That may be a distinction without a difference if you're on one of the boats being attacked. [2:58] The speedboats do have a significant capability. They're basically manned drones, for lack of a better [3:05] term, on the water. There are hundreds of them. They present a serious threat. It was a speedboat like [3:12] that, which attacked the U.S. as coal in Yemen years ago. So I don't think we can discount the [3:18] danger that they present. But I suspect our U.S. Navy is pretty capable of handling that threat. [3:25] There are still concerns about clearing mines from the Strait even after the conflict ends. [3:31] We understand that briefers from the Pentagon told lawmakers here on Capitol Hill that it could take up [3:36] to six months to fully clear the Strait after the war ends. How do you see the threat of mines still [3:43] lingering? Well, first of all, we've got to understand that there are only a couple of lanes [3:48] that are used for egress and exit from the Gulf and the Strait. So it's not necessarily the fact that [3:57] all of the Strait and the Gulf need to be cleared of mines, but at least as a minimum to get [4:04] international traffic going again, you've got to have two, three kilometer lanes, one for coming [4:11] in and one for leaving. But that's a narrow case for restricted traffic, but that will at least open [4:19] up the Strait. But to get rid of all of them, it's going to take a significant amount of time. [4:23] How are you seeing this, General? News that Whitcoff and Kushner, without the vice president, [4:28] are traveling to Pakistan. I think what this really speaks to is the notion that [4:35] Iran is not sending its primary engagement partner, if you will, to link up with Vice [4:42] President Vance. And what you have going forward is an opportunity to really get their arms around [4:49] the defining issue in this fight, which is highly enriched uranium. That is the red line that we're [4:56] not prepared to cross and they're not prepared to cross. So in order to move forward with some type [5:02] of existing or a new relationship with Iran that does not entail the dynamic targeting like you just, [5:10] potentially, that dynamic targeting that might take place, is you've got to take the highly enriched [5:16] uranium piece and kind of move it to the side and say, look, OK, this isn't going away. But there are a [5:20] whole bunch of other things we can do right now to unscrew a number of problems, but we've got to be [5:25] able to focus in on that. So I think this is taking the highly enriched uranium, moving it to the side. [5:31] That's what Kushner and Whitcoff will address as those other pieces fall into place with next step [5:38] options. So as you're looking at a real asymmetry here with these small boats that can do so much [5:47] damage, these Iranian boats, even as Iran's Navy has been decimated, what should the U.S. plan, [5:55] the targeting look like to target those small attack boats? The key thing is freedom of navigation [6:03] through the straits. That's number one. The Navy has the capacity to do that, has the ability to do [6:09] that, is doing that right now. We're boarding ships that pose problems that aren't communicating [6:15] clearly with the U.S. Navy craft. So they're being boarded by Marines. Marines are doing an absolutely [6:21] superb job. That doesn't speed up the process of exiting the strait. It's a very deliberate, very [6:27] disciplined process, but it's not like uncorking the straits. These small boats that the Iranians have [6:33] clearly act on mission orders. They may not be in direct command and control with any naval operational [6:42] headquarters. They're not. So they're operating on what they understand the intent to be, which is to [6:48] be disruptive and to have a presence. The U.S. Navy has every opportunity now and right to go after [6:54] these ships. I would see that when the U.S. Navy identifies these small craft that are about to [7:01] engage with tankers, which they've done before, or the assumption is they're going to lay mines into the [7:06] straits, the Navy's going to act. They will target those ships and go after them. [7:10] When you hear the president emphasizing the lack of a timeline here, there's obviously a desire on [7:19] the part of negotiators to make some progress there. He's saying, don't rush me. But you also [7:25] have the third U.S. aircraft carrier in the region, the president ordering to shoot mine-laying ships, [7:33] Secretary of Defense Hegseth emphasizing that U.S. troops remain locked and loaded. How are you seeing [7:38] all of that? All of that is necessary preparation. I mean, that needs to be done. We would expect that [7:45] to be done. I think the thing we have to look at this challenge that we have right now through the [7:50] lens of what has the United States been able to accomplish over the course of six-plus weeks in [7:57] terms of epic fury and the targets that they've serviced in Iran. It's phenomenal. It's absolutely [8:01] unprecedented what we've been able to achieve. Simultaneously, what's unprecedented is the ability [8:07] of the Iranian regime as screwed up and naked as it is, upside down, who's in charge kind of a deal. [8:13] They're still incredibly resilient. So the application of more military force should lead [8:18] you to the conclusion that we're really not going to move these guys off the dime. I think they're [8:23] going to continue to shoot us the bird. They're going to continue to stall. They're going to go to [8:27] Pakistan. And it's going to be a new group of folks showing up so they can't strike a deal. [8:31] That's exactly what they want. The key to this is let's get the traffic flowing, maintain the blockade, [8:37] make it very difficult on the regime economically. That has a much longer tail in terms of results, [8:43] but they will be able to feel that. That, I think, is the approach. Diplomacy and economics at this [8:49] point with the incredible threat and the capability to do some additional damage. But we have to keep [8:54] that with our eyes wide open and realize the causality of more military damage and the result we're [8:59] looking for is not necessarily going to be there. General, how real is the possibility [9:04] of a resumption of just an all-out conflict again at this point? [9:11] Well, I mean, it could happen. Again, I think we'd have to measure what is it we're trying to [9:17] achieve. And right now, what we have not heard clearly is what is that strategic end state? [9:23] Look, we have neutered their nuke capability, their missile capability, and their proxies. [9:28] And those are the three red lines. We need to stay on those things like white on rice. [9:32] It just makes it very difficult. So I would hope this would be a transition [9:35] to a more sustained engagement against those targets. If it was an all-out challenge or an [9:43] all-out air tasking order, we're going to go back and start hitting all these targets. [9:47] Again, I don't think we know exactly what the result's going to be. I would have to assume [9:51] they're still going to stand in there and say, keep hammering us, but we're not going anywhere. [9:56] So to answer your question, we've got the capacity. The strategic risk is with all the other [10:02] combatant commanders who look at their readiness, mandatory readiness posture. And it may be [10:07] getting challenged now because of the use, the stockpiles that all of those combatant [10:12] commanders rely on in order to execute their tasks are now being diminished based on the [10:19] high-op tempo in Iran. [10:21] This Trump threat against the Iranian mine boats, what he is saying about time being on the [10:27] side of the U.S., but not on Iran. How are you seeing his rhetoric in light of negotiations? [10:38] Well, actually, you've labeled it very properly. It's rhetoric. It's propaganda. [10:42] He tweeted that, or excuse me, on Truth Social, he said that we control the strait. [10:49] The U.S. controls it. The reality is, no, the U.S. does not control it. The Iranians do not control [10:54] it. It requires literally a collaboration to be able to open this back up again. So this [10:59] never-ending saber-rattling is not the way to proceed into negotiations. It's interesting that [11:07] the president recently said he could end the Vietnam War in one day if he was president then, [11:12] yet here he is. It started a war and it's still dragging on. It's very unfortunate. [11:16] And this threat against, I mean, we have to be clear, the Iranian government does not have a [11:24] navy in terms of a big, bad navy, right? But there are these smaller boats that are quite effective, [11:30] and that really demonstrates the asymmetry that the U.S. military has to confront. How do they do [11:38] that? [11:40] So actually, again, that is completely accurate. The idea of a large vessel, 5,000 to 40,000 tons, [11:48] those are all sunk. The reality, however, is that they have many dozens, if not hundreds, [11:55] of very fast attack boats that they can either lay mines, they can board vessels, [12:00] they can swarm different types of freighters and tankers in the area. They are a threat in the [12:07] same way that drones and missiles are a threat. It is asymmetric, and it's something, quite frankly, [12:12] that the president said, we sank everything. But the reality is, the Iranian military is still, [12:18] very potent and has the capability to cause harm in the strait and in the region. [12:23] General Schwartz, I mean, you spent a lot of your military career in the Middle East. You dealt [12:27] with special forces. So when you have an indefinite ceasefire going on, and you have, [12:32] therefore, an indefinite blockade being, you know, enforced right now by the U.S. Navy, [12:36] what toll does that take on the U.S.? [12:38] Well, certainly if it extends over, you know, a significant number of weeks and months, it will [12:44] have an effect on readiness. But right now, you know, if the president decides that they're going [12:49] to reinitiate lethal operations, airstrikes and, you know, activity from the, you know, [12:55] in the Persian Gulf or up in the Gulf of Oman beyond the blockade, the forces will be ready to do it, [13:01] most certainly. But, you know, over an extended period of time, readiness does have a tendency [13:06] to atrophy, but we're not even close to that yet. [13:08] Seth Jones said yesterday from CSIS that, you know, the analysis they have is Iran has been [13:13] digging out their missile launchers in preparation for the end of the ceasefire, [13:17] that they've got, what, 40, they've got 40 percent of the drains and 60 percent of their [13:21] missile launchers are still intact. That is pretty incredible when you consider the force [13:25] of the air campaign and the daily target lists that we were given, that they could still have [13:31] 60 percent of their missile launchers. [13:33] Absolutely. It gives you the sense of the amount of capability Iran had, you know, prior to the [13:36] 28th of February. And, you know, they're expert at deeply burying and hardening the capabilities [13:45] that they know that are going to keep the regime in place. So I'm not surprised. I'm confident [13:50] that, you know, given our capabilities, we're monitoring very closely Commander CENTCOM and, [13:55] you know, our national intelligence agencies are looking very closely at what's going on inside [14:00] of Iran right now. So we'll be prepared if directed to, you know, to take the appropriate [14:06] strikes in order to eliminate if these capabilities end up being unearthed and brought out. [14:11] It is even more stunning the lack of planning that went into or coalition building or kind of run up [14:19] to this. Just in terms of what we've seen over the weekend, the firing on the ship in the strait, [14:25] what do you make of what you've seen? [14:27] So I think I would say there's probably a lot of military planning that went just to [14:31] your earlier comment. [14:32] And for years. I mean, they're obviously, obviously, yes. [14:34] And Iran, similarly, had been planning to retaliate. You know, as long as we'd had a [14:38] plan on the books, they'd had a plan to respond. So they were well prepared for this as well. [14:44] I think, but to your question about the actions against ships this week, it really, even though [14:51] it's playing out in a military dimension, it almost seems to be like economic brinksmanship. [14:56] And so the Iranian, you know, hit on a couple of ships demonstrating that they do in fact still [15:03] have their hand on the neck of the global economy via the Strait of Hormuz, that it's still an [15:08] incredible leverage that they have, and they can exert a lot of economic pain. And then the U.S., [15:13] the strike that you showed at the beginning of this hour and taking and seizing the tanker that [15:20] was bound for Iran, demonstrating that we have the will and the commitment, as well as the capacity [15:27] to truly enforce the blockade that we're there to perform. It's not just a performative deployment [15:33] of naval assets. So I think both actions by Iran and the United States are not surprising. [15:39] Whatever happens, is it likely there will be a U.S. military presence in the Strait for a long time [15:46] to come? I think there probably will be. You know, as Ambassador Sherman has said, it's going to take [15:50] a long time to work through the technicalities of an agreement when we reach that. And I should back up [15:57] and say the purpose of the blockade, while it is in fact to deny Iran the vast majority of money that [16:05] it gets. Most of their revenue comes from things that transit the sea. The reason we want to strip [16:10] them of revenue is to compel them to make greater concessions at the negotiating table. And so until [16:18] those concessions are made, we'll need to sustain that kind of pressure on them. And that's being [16:24] done through the U.S. military. So until we reach some final agreement, I don't see how we can ease the [16:30] pressure on Iran there in the Gulf. Ambassador General, are you optimistic about this round? [16:38] I think the base case is that the vice president gets on a plane, the Iranians then decide, OK, they [16:44] probably need to go to Islamabad as well, and that the decision is made on some kind of memorandum of [16:51] understanding that can enable at least the discussions to continue. And therefore, you extend the current [16:57] ceasefire a bit further. Clearly, the pressure on Iran is fairly substantial. You know, not 80 to 90 percent [17:04] of their economy goes into or out of their ports. That is not happening right now. They do have 35 [17:11] billion in reserves they can still use. They have 180 or so million barrels of oil floating around out in [17:16] the Asia-Pacific and so forth. And they're keenly aware of the pressures on the United States as well. [17:22] And I think the bottom line is that both sides would like to see a resolution to the ongoing [17:28] conflict. The question is, of course, will they give in on the Strait of Hormuz? And I agree fully [17:34] with my old diplomatic partner, the greatest any soldier ever had, Ambassador Crocker, who was just [17:39] on and noted that this cannot stand. This cannot become the Strait of Iran. And our pressure, our [17:48] block on the blockade has seemed to be quite effective, including, of course, the boarding [17:56] of the Chinese ship that reportedly had dual-use chemicals on it. They're very, very substantial [18:02] quantities and a very professionally carried out operation. So I think, again, both sides would like [18:08] to continue the process. I think they'd both like to resolve the issue, especially in the United States, [18:14] of the Strait of Hormuz. It has to go back to what it was, an international body of water through which [18:20] there is freedom of navigation allowed and no country can lay claim to it. That's an important [18:26] issue that has to be resolved. And in return, there may be some trade space on the frozen assets of [18:33] Iran around the world that could be unfrozen in some kind of phased fashion and give them a bit more [18:39] of a lifeline going forward. And, of course, in the background is always the threat of additional [18:44] violence from the United States, as we then start to address the really thorny issue, which is, of [18:50] course, the thousand pounds of 60 percent enriched uranium that is in one or two locations deeply [18:57] underground in Iran, and for which we need to get that out. Ideally, perhaps, with the International [19:06] Atomic Energy Agency overseeing this, we can trust them on this kind of operation, dilute it, ship it [19:13] out, whatever it may be, and then talk about whether Iran will have a right to enrich anything at all [19:19] going down the road. And there's going to have to be backs and force on that, needless to say, [19:23] a hugely challenging issue. So do you agree with Ambassador Crocker that the status quo, [19:31] basically a return to the status quo previous to this conflict on the strait, is the most that could [19:38] be hoped for, and maybe the best case, like realistic scenario for any kind of current negotiations, [19:45] that the nuclear issue is simply too complex for anything other than some sort of, as you said, [19:52] memo of understanding? It could be that even the strait is a bit too complex or too complicated or too [20:00] thorny for right now. But again, let's get back to the table, get talking. Of course, [20:06] you have an issue as well that we saw in evidence over the weekend, where it's not clear that all [20:12] parts of the Iranian government are on the same song sheet. The foreign minister said the strait is [20:16] open. The Revolutionary Guards Corps said, no, the strait is closed. You have the speaker who's the [20:21] negotiator. And so there's going to be some issues with that as well. Can he actually deliver what it [20:27] is he agrees to with the United States? So again, it would be phenomenal if the strait was reopened as [20:33] a result of these upcoming talks. And then with some other quid pro quos in there, that would be [20:39] fantastic for the global economy, fantastic for the Gulf states, our partners, and frankly, for Iran as [20:46] well. But keep in mind, we're going to have to demine it first. We have to be very confident that any mines [20:51] are out there are found and exploded. And we're going to have to ensure that there's no rogue elements [20:56] in Iran that are going to pepper these ships as they go by and undermine the confidence that is [21:02] essential. This is not about risk insurance. This is about confidence that they will not lose crew [21:06] members. Do you, I mean, if there was any, the president has said that Iran has agreed to, [21:13] you know, jointly removing its enriched uranium, Iran says that that's not the case. If there was a [21:20] scenario in which the U.S. was considering attempting to remove it without Iran's permission, [21:27] do you have any belief that that could be done from a just militarily and without tremendous loss [21:35] of life? I mean, how long, it seems like an operation like that could take a very long period [21:39] of time in a hostile environment. It would be incredibly complex. Could our U.S. military do it? [21:46] Sure, it could. It can do just about anything. How many casualties would we sustain? Can we sustain a [21:53] force on the ground? Can we even get a force on the ground with all the earth-moving equipment and [21:57] excavators and expertise and barrels, whatever is required for this? And can you even sustain them [22:03] logistically, protect them against drones and missiles and ground fire and everything else? [22:09] That's a very, very tough question. So this would be an enormously complex issue. And by the way, [22:15] we're not sure that it's all underneath the rubble of Esfahan or one or two other locations. There's [22:21] not 100 percent certainty, as we understand it right now, that it is all there. So again, [22:28] think of the operation that was required, quote, just to rescue one downed aviator and all the hardware [22:34] we left behind and so forth. And now think about what it would take. And by the way, in roughly the [22:40] same area, think about what it would take to put a force on the ground that has the capability, [22:45] the expertise and the equipment to do this and how we would be able to protect them. A very, [22:50] very tall order. General McCarley, thanks so much for joining us. Given everything that's [22:54] happening right now, and a lot is happening in Iran's threat to retaliate against the U.S. [22:59] over that ship being seized. How do you expect this to play out in the next few days, at least? [23:04] Well, I think it's really important to say that the optimum, the best course of action right now [23:15] would be that these anticipated talks materialize and something comes from those. But you have two [23:25] different sets of objectives. Iran wants to maintain its uranium arsenal. Iran wants to control the [23:36] Strait of Hormuz. And of course, U.S. has significant interest in completely degrading and removing the [23:45] uranium supplies and as well opening the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. So what we see [23:54] is there is no clear definition. I would say that if you go through what I call the analysis of what [24:03] could occur next, if the talks either don't take place or they collapse, as they did a couple of [24:11] days ago, then the U.S., from the U.S. perspective, is left with either maintain this sort of quasi status [24:20] quo, in which we have the blockade, we have the Strait still closed, and we have threats [24:29] of further retaliation on both sides. The Iranian expressed statement about retaliation this morning, [24:35] but also the U.S. statement from President Trump that we're going to bomb, bomb, bomb civilian [24:43] infrastructure, power generation, bridges, all those sorts of things that allow a civilian population [24:51] in Iran to continue their daily lives. That's one. The second would be that the U.S. takes an even more [25:00] aggressive stance, and that would be that it considers sort of an amphibious assault on four or five [25:09] islands that are sort of contiguous, that are indeed contiguous to the Strait of Hormuz. To control those [25:17] islands would be very effective and would help to break the closure by the Iranians. But the challenge [25:27] there, of course, is whether the U.S. is willing to commit soldiers' and Marines' lives in something that [25:34] will be one heck of a contest. And then the other alternative, the other alternative, quite frankly, [25:41] is that we do what we did in 1987, as some of us recall, and that is that we flag the ships, ships that [25:49] are certainly within our scope of allies, and flag them as U.S. ships, and then commit a significant number of [25:59] naval resources to escort those ships through the Straits and further up into the Persian Gulf. But [26:07] the situation, as you have explained multiple times, is very risky, and there is no clear-cut end-state now. [26:16] And as you have noted, Iran is now promising major retaliation for the U.S. seizing of that Iranian ship. [26:23] Between that and keeping the strait closed, what military leverage does Iran actually have [26:28] available at this point? [26:30] I think the strongest tool, and you've asked for military leverage, and I'm going to say [26:38] that Iran's most powerful element, its source of strength, is that shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz. [26:47] Because the economic, already, economic devastation, the impact around the world because of the absence [26:56] of oil supplies, whether that be in Western Europe or even China, has been significant. We have stories [27:04] coming out of countries around the world in which food supplies have been jeopardized because you don't [27:10] have the transportation assets, that people are hungry. And of course, from a manufacturing, industrial [27:17] standpoint, the absence of petroleum products is truly significant and quite harmful to that process of [27:26] maintaining the economies of these countries. Can Iran, to get to your point, launch further ballistic [27:32] missiles? Sure. But its strength is a shutdown of the Strait.