Retired generals break down Iran war strategy after week 6

[0:00] What is your take as somebody who has so much experience with NATO about this alliance and [0:07] whether or not it is frayed beyond repair? I certainly hope it is not frayed beyond repair. [0:15] I think it's the most important alliance in history. It has proven itself repeatedly, [0:20] but it does have limits. And that particularly happens when it comes to what are so-called [0:25] out-of-area operations as was this one. And I very much see the president's perspective here, [0:32] as does the Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, who I knew very well as the Prime Minister of the [0:37] Netherlands, a very skilled and diplomatic leader. And so I think he has expressed rightly the concerns, [0:46] he agrees with the concerns that President Trump has voiced, but also does recognize that we need [0:53] to keep this alliance together. It is hugely important. It is performing magnificently in [1:00] supporting our Ukrainian partners who are fighting economy and enemy in Russia. [1:05] General Petraeus, I just want to make sure I understand what you're saying correctly. Are you [1:11] suggesting that President Trump is right in that NATO should have come in and helped militarily with the [1:18] war in Iran? No, no. I'm saying that individual NATO countries, I wish that they had been more [1:28] supportive. An awful lot of them tried to sort of thread a needle here, saying we could use their [1:35] base for defensive purposes only and so forth. In the end of the day, they actually did make available [1:40] their bases with the exception of Spain. And that's an issue that will have to be dealt with down the [1:46] road. That does have to be addressed. But in this case, we are fighting an enemy who poses a threat [1:53] not just to countries in the Gulf, but to countries in Europe as well. In fact, several NATO countries [1:59] were threatened during this time, Turkey, the UK when it came to Cyprus and so forth. And again, I wish [2:05] that they had been more forthcoming in their support without committing necessarily to the operations we [2:11] were directly conducting against Iran. By the way, some of them have very important mind-sweeping [2:17] capabilities, the UK in particular. And if we get into that down the road, it would be really helpful [2:23] if they would commit to being part of whatever maritime coalition is necessary to ensure that the [2:30] Strait of Hormuz is safe for transitive maritime vessels. I want you to listen to what the Chairman of [2:35] the Joint Chiefs, General Cain, said this week about the military operation. [2:40] On February 28th, the President of the United States ordered the Joint Force to execute Operation [2:47] Epic Fury with the direction to accomplish three distinct military objectives. [2:53] Destroy Iran's ballistic missile and drone capabilities, destroy the Iranian Navy, and [2:59] destroy their defense industrial base to ensure that Iran cannot reconstitute the ability to project [3:06] power outside their borders. Over the course of 38 days of major combat operation, [3:11] the Joint Force achieved the military objectives as defined by the President. [3:16] And the President also said he wanted to take out Iran's enriched uranium. That didn't happen. [3:22] Do you think this was a military success? [3:26] I think our military men and women perform magnificently in this regard. And I do believe very strongly that [3:33] General Cain has been a sober and forthright voice in addressing the country, explaining what we have [3:41] sought to do and what we have achieved. And I think that we have largely achieved the three objectives that [3:46] he set out. Destruction implies something perhaps a bit more than what we have achieved relative to the [3:54] missile launchers, stockpiles, and manufacturing facilities. But I think we're very close to that. [4:01] And the same is true with their defense industrial base and so on. But I think there's a bit of a paradoxical [4:08] question that now is being posed, and we can't answer it yet. We can only answer it when the ultimate [4:15] resolution is achieved here. But that is whether Iran will emerge militarily very weakened. There's no [4:23] question about the fact that all of their different capabilities have been degraded. I mean, [4:27] their navy is basically on the bottom of the Gulf at this point in time. Their other assets dramatically [4:34] degraded or destroyed. But could they somehow, again, paradoxically emerge from this militarily [4:42] weakened, but perhaps actually strategically strengthened? And that revolves around what the ultimate [4:48] resolution is of control of the Strait of Hormuz. And you can argue, though, they don't control it. Well, [4:53] actually, in a way, just by disrupting traffic, they do. Because the measure of merit for those [5:01] who own these ships and own the cargoes in them is whether or not it's not about risk insurance. [5:08] They can get that. It's about the lives of their crew members. And they have to have absolute confidence [5:14] that these ships will not be struck in order to begin the process of clearing out this 700 vessels or so [5:21] they're inside the Gulf, an even greater number outside the Gulf. [5:25] Which is why I'm guessing that in this really tenuous ceasefire that we're in right now, [5:31] whatever is ultimately decided, which I guess is going to begin in talks set for starting on Saturday, [5:40] must include a real deal in the Strait of Hormuz to determine whether or not the U.S. and Israel [5:46] really did sufficiently weaken the regime in Iran. [5:53] Absolutely. And again, that is, I think, the central issue. These others, perhaps somewhat [6:00] negotiable, not certainly the removal of U.S. forces or the right to resume enrichment. But again, [6:06] some of these others, I think, can be worked. But control of the Red Sea, if that be control of the [6:12] strait, if that becomes Iran's Panama Canal and they can issue tolls for that and so forth. I mean, [6:20] if it's $2 million per vessel, which is reportedly what some companies have been paying to transit, [6:27] and you multiply that times 100 or more ships a day, that is a very substantial amount of hard [6:32] currency to enable Iran to repair the extraordinary damage that has been done, [6:38] as General Cain rightly observed. As you probably heard, the Vice President J.D. Vance, [6:43] the Special Envoy Steve Whitcoff, and the President's son-in-law Jared Kushner will all go [6:48] to Islam about Pakistan for talks with the Iranians on Saturday. You think they'll be able to salvage [6:54] the ceasefire deal and end this war? I think that they're going to make a very intense and focused [7:03] effort to do so. But as you've pointed out and other contributors over the last couple of hours, [7:10] this whole ceasefire is incredibly tenuous. And it came into fruition in an atmosphere of ambiguity. [7:20] And I have to emphasize ambiguity is characteristic of any initial negotiations, especially for situations [7:29] such as we have between Iran, the United States, and especially Israel. And there's certain dynamics going on [7:37] that perhaps relate to diverging strategic interests of both the United States and Israel. [7:44] And if we focus on Israel, which is now the pivot point for either maintaining this ceasefire or the [7:53] termination of ceasefire, Israel has a specific set of objectives. And it has a limited time to accomplish [8:00] these objectives. And that is, for at least a good amount of time, several years, a decade or so, [8:08] if Israel is successful in decimating its enemies, both its proxy enemies, Hezbollah and of course Iran, [8:17] it has met and exceeded its objectives. But those objectives are not ours. They're not necessarily all [8:23] of ours. And of course, for our perspective, we had a list of objectives that the president announced. [8:29] And whether we're there or that, there or not, is another question. But these negotiations in Islamabad [8:37] will be difficult. They will take time. But from a speculative point of point of view, I think both [8:43] principal players, the US and Iran, are interested in maintaining ceasefire, meaning no more shooting [8:53] for the present period of time. There's no way any of us with any level of expertise or understanding [9:00] of the Middle East and out and say that this ceasefire will behold and culminate in an actual treaty. [9:08] President Trump says the US military will remain, in his words, in place until a full agreement is [9:14] reached with Iran. Iran's Revolutionary Guard says they will stick to the ceasefire, but Warren, [9:20] they have a, quote, finger on the trigger. Here's what the Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth [9:25] said just yesterday. Listen to this. [9:27] Iran would be wise to find a way to get the carrier pigeon to their troops out in remote locations [9:36] to know not to shoot, not to shoot any longer, one-way attacks or missiles, because this is, [9:42] it takes time sometimes for ceasefires to take hold. We're watching it. We're prepared, if necessary. [9:48] But once a ceasefire agreement is reached, General, how long does it usually take [9:53] typically for word to travel down to ground troops? [9:58] Yeah. It's dependent upon the organization of the respective armies. So if you're addressing [10:05] the Iranian army, none of us have an intricate and deep understanding of the command and control [10:10] systems with the Iranian government. But as the Secretary of War suggested, there are communication [10:16] time lapses, an order initiated at headquarters in Tehran, and the amount of time necessary to get [10:24] to some field unit that is 400 or 500 kilometers away. That does take time, even with electronic tools. [10:32] And I'll say that a similar situation can, under certain circumstances, result in our army, [10:37] meaning that specifics of the commander's objective, our commander being the president, [10:43] working through the SEDCON commander. That message takes a little bit of time. And, [10:52] and to go back to that word that I have stressed even earlier, this whole period is ambiguous and [10:59] challenging. And a lot of defining work has to be done in Islamabad to get clarity. [11:04] General Petraeus, you famously and rhetorically said to a journalist, [11:07] tell me how this ends about the Iraq war back in 2003. Do you think this ceasefire, [11:12] tenuous as it seems to be, is likely to bring the Iran war to an end in the next two weeks? [11:17] Very uncertain, Anderson. In fact, I think the real question that is begged right now [11:26] is whether when it is finally ended, Iran clearly will be weaker militarily, [11:33] but could they actually end up in a stronger position strategically? And the situation with the [11:40] Strait of Hormuz suggests that that is possible. They can use that leverage not only to get America to [11:48] seek this temporary ceasefire, which I suspect will be extended for a period of time. The negotiations can't [11:54] conclude with the parties as far apart as they are. You know, compare the 15-point plan we put forward and [12:01] the 10-point plan put forward by Iran. And there are numerous items on the Iranian plan that there's just no [12:08] way we can accept removal of all U.S. forces, right to enrich, right to control the Strait of Hormuz, [12:14] and apparently they're even going to charge in cryptocurrency to navigate the strait. I mean, [12:20] they want to turn this into their Panama Canal. So there's a lot of very tough negotiating that's [12:25] going to have to take place. But you do see the leverage that Iran is able to wield by this control, [12:33] the Strait of Hormuz, and it could lead to President Trump insisting that Prime Minister Netanyahu [12:39] cease operations in Lebanon. In fact, I think one reason why you saw such intense operations [12:45] today was Israel taking advantage of whatever remaining time they have to degrade Hezbollah as [12:51] far as they can. And they have done a great deal of that to ensure that they can't threaten Israel the [12:57] way that they have in the past. To your point, though, strategically, if, I mean, Iran has de facto [13:04] control over the Strait of Hormuz right now, and if that continues months from now, years from now, [13:11] that puts Iran in a much better position than they were previously. I mean, yes, there has been [13:18] tremendous damage to facilities and weapons. But, you know, they have partners they can get more [13:27] missiles from down the road. Well, it could conceivably give considerable leverage, although [13:34] what the result from this is that the Gulf states are all going to find other ways to get their crude [13:41] oil, natural gas, fertilizer, all of the other products that come out of the Gulf. They're going [13:48] to figure out ways to avoid that control, limiting their ability to export these key items. But that's [13:55] going to take a lot of investment, a lot of time, energy, and so forth. But it is a very different [14:03] dynamic than what prior to the start of this operation, which without question, again, our [14:09] military men and women have done magnificent work in dramatically degrading the capabilities of Iran [14:15] militarily. But this does show, in some ways, this is a real deterrent for Iran against action that they [14:24] don't want visited on them until, at least, the Gulf states have alternative routes to export what now [14:32] goes through the Strait of Hormuz. It is remarkable, though, that what started as whether, I mean, [14:38] there were different sort of propositions put forward about what the U.S. agenda was, but whether [14:44] it was regime change or whether it was the nuclear program and the nuclear threat, that is now seems like [14:51] the primary interest for the U.S. right now is the Strait of Hormuz. And if Iran ends up both with [14:59] no new treaty on the nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz, and though the president [15:08] says there's been regime change, technically, yes, there have been a change of individuals. But [15:15] in terms of the rhetoric, the hard line of this Islamist regime, that continues. [15:23] This is why this is a tenuous ceasefire. Again, I'm pretty confident that the current ceasefire of [15:30] two weeks will end up being extended because there won't be a full resolution of the issues, [15:36] given how far apart the parties are. But we'll have to see what happens in the weeks and even perhaps [15:43] months down the road, whether some of the Iranian desires are so, again, unacceptable to the United States [15:51] that we have to resume military action. How fragile does that mean the ceasefire is? [15:57] It really depends on a simple premise. Do both sides want to go back to fighting, [16:02] or do they want to not fight? Look, these points are ridiculous because they're not meant to be an [16:10] agreement on a ceasefire. Those are the points for the negotiations, which start this Saturday. [16:17] Yeah. And that's the important point. All of this is prelude. And if both sides, all three sides, [16:23] if you include Israel, want to negotiate on these key points where we're very, very far apart right now, [16:31] they will hold to the ceasefire and let it work itself out of the negotiating table. But this notion [16:38] that somehow everybody's going to be walking away from this and going back to a fight because they [16:43] can't agree on what they're going to be negotiating on in a week, I think my view is that the ceasefire [16:52] is fragile, but it will hold at least until they start the negotiations. Who has the upper hand here? [16:58] The United States has thrown the most advanced military in the world against the Iranians for [17:04] the last 25 days. The Iranians still think they're winning. They win because they're not losing. [17:11] What else can we do to the Iranians to try to compel or persuade them to change their views on their [17:19] nuclear program, their ballistic missile program, their proxies, and now the Strait of Hormuz? [17:26] When you add that all up, you've got to say right now the Iranians have the upper hand. [17:30] The administration gives a target list regularly of what they've destroyed. [17:33] But what I notice when I look at that is they never tell us relative to what's there. [17:38] So there's a list of this many launchers have been. At one point, they did say they've only destroyed, [17:42] I think, what, half of the actual missile launchers, right? So they did give us a base there. [17:46] But in a lot of these things, it's sort of like, okay, that's a big number of destroyed drones, [17:51] but maybe it's not big to relative to how many they have or what their production capacity is, [17:55] right? That hasn't been put out. [17:57] Yeah, I think we've been surprised at the resilience of the Iranian military. [18:01] And I think our intelligence has let us down a little bit because we seem to keep [18:04] getting the last launcher. But I've got to repeat, none of those attacks truly matter. [18:11] That's the body count fallacy we had in Vietnam. The more we kill, the more we're going to be [18:16] successful. This notion that somehow knocking out launchers, notching out air defense systems, [18:23] knocking out drones is somehow going to train military victory, translating to strategic victory, [18:29] I think that still is a flawed strategy. [18:31] Do you foresee a scenario in which the U.S. actually goes for the extreme option here and [18:37] actually follows through and strikes energy infrastructure on Karg Island? I mean, obviously, [18:42] that would be an economic destruction, obviously, for the Iranians, because that is where 90% of [18:49] their oil exports come from. They export most of their oil, obviously, to China. But it would be [18:54] a massive blow to the U.S. economy as well, just in terms of oil prices. I mean, it would be literally [18:59] like the final scene of Reservoir Dogs. That would be how bad it would be. Just give us your thoughts [19:03] on that, General. [19:04] Well, I think certainly the bombing of Karg Island raises the issue that you could bomb other things [19:11] on Karg Island. And that's clearly the intent. But it also could be preparatory for, let's say, [19:18] putting the Marines ashore. And there's always been talk about, let's seize Karg Island. I'm not [19:23] a big advocate of that. But if you want to put a raid in on Karg Island and go in there and be in [19:28] there on the ground and control it for a few hours or a few days and get out as long as you're not trying [19:33] to hold onto a position and letting yourself become targets, maybe it makes sense. The other thing is, [19:40] it's just also a part of going back and relooking at targets that have been previously struck. [19:46] Because whenever you're in an air campaign like this, and we're in about six weeks or getting [19:52] close to six weeks maybe, you start to run low on targets. It's just a fact. You can only generate [19:58] so many targets that look valuable. And Karg Island is very valuable. And maybe the Iranians have [20:06] replaced some of the military gear that was struck the last time. So it could be routine. [20:12] But I imagine there's a message to it. And that message is, right now we're striking the military [20:17] and saying, just as you suggest, it won't be very hard to come back and take out the rest of that [20:22] infrastructure there. [20:23] And, General, as we had noted in our previous conversation with Elena and Jim, [20:30] Iran has responded by saying that if the United States does follow through [20:35] on its threats, then it will darken all of the Middle East and the region there. [20:40] Thus far, we have seen GCC countries quite resilient and reticent to join in on this fight. They have been [20:50] defensive only in their response to incoming ballistic missiles and drones. If Iran follows [20:58] through on those threats, do you foresee other Arab countries joining the United States and Israel? [21:07] I do see them joining in some limited and symbolic way. They obviously don't have the full capacity of [21:14] the United States, but they do have modern equipment. They've got some pretty well-trained pilots. [21:19] They've got ordinance, and they can participate in this. And maybe more than symbolically, yes. [21:26] And I think that's a scenario that, honestly, none of us want to see happen. We don't want to [21:32] see these countries hit. We don't want their desalination plants hit and their petroleum [21:38] infrastructure hit. The whole world depends on the resources coming out of this fertilizer, [21:45] helium, as well as crude oil and refined products. And so it just digs us deeper into a hole [21:52] economically for the whole world. So I hope it won't happen. But nevertheless, Iran has to recognize [22:01] that it's intolerable for them to claim that they will keep permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz. [22:08] Our friends in the Gulf will never accept that. They don't want it. They don't want to be under the [22:13] Iranian thumb and they don't trust around larger motivations in the region. So that's not a [22:20] possible end state that's stable. General, there have been several times in the past where a lot [22:28] of people, and I would put myself in this category, have witnessed Trump make certain threats and sort of [22:34] dismissed it as, oh, you know what? He's never going to actually go ahead and do that, [22:39] including threatening to capture Nicolas Maduro or threatening to kill the Ayatollah of Iran. A lot [22:45] of people saw those threats as bluster until they woke up several weeks later, checked their phone [22:51] and saw him actually do it. And so when Donald Trump threatens to obliterate power plants in Iran, [22:58] which would be, of course, devastating to the Iranian civilians, it would leave them in darkness and [23:03] without electricity. Do you actually foresee the president following through on those threats? [23:12] I think there'll be an examination of the power plants and the other infrastructure that is dual [23:18] use. And so the question will be, is that power plant providing electricity to universities that are [23:25] doing military research? Is it providing electricity to factories that are producing military products or [23:31] chemical plants that are producing gunpowder and other things for the military? If there's a connection [23:41] to the military, if it's dual use, it's a legitimate target. And even if it creates [23:48] civilian hardship, it's still a legitimate target. You know, before the United States invaded [23:53] and the Allies crossed the English Channel in 1944, we spent about two months going after infrastructure [24:02] in northern France. We went after bridges and railroads and marshalling yards and everything that [24:09] could have possibly helped German forces maneuver against us. And a lot of civilian casualties were [24:17] incurred. And these were among our French friends. And it's just what happens in warfare. So these are there are [24:25] going to be some dual use targets that are totally legitimate and that no doubt will be struck. Word of this [24:32] new round of attacks on Karg Island, which is right there. We can zoom in and we're being told by various officials [24:39] that the targets were the military sites here, not the oil facilities there. But what would be the point [24:46] of this new round of attacks on Karg General? Well, I could think of two reasons. Number one, [24:54] it would be a preparatory attack, softening it up, so to speak, if there was some sort of land invasion [25:02] to try to secure the infrastructure without destroying it. I wonder if they've actually knocked out any of the [25:08] electrical transmission lines throughout that are connected to the oil infrastructure. As you know, [25:16] the oil has to be pumped into tankers, if they can take out the transmission lines, they can actually [25:23] stop those pumps without significantly affecting the infrastructure and the ability to restart it [25:30] sometime in the future quickly. It was really a remarkable execution of a very high risk operation. [25:37] And I think what a couple of key things that, you know, I've gleaned from this over the last, [25:42] you know, day or two is that first off, you know, all the training that both these airmen had, [25:48] their SEER training leading up to, you know, this sheet down, it worked, right? So they were both able [25:54] to move to an area, one little bit shorter duration than the other to an area that was out of natural [26:00] lines adrift, properly signal the rescue force, and then execute a rescue. Certainly on the second [26:07] recovery, not to downplay the great work of the first airmen, but to get the Colonel Weapon Systems [26:15] Officer out. A lot of just phenomenal interagency coordination, CIA, all of our intelligence agencies, [26:23] and then certainly the Joint Special Operations Command working directly with Admiral Cooper and his [26:28] staff to get this big orchestra in place to enable, you know, a ground force to come in, [26:34] tactical aviation to come in to be able to facilitate his rescue. So very, very impressive. [26:42] And let's just kind of drill down on just what this airman did. First of all, he was injured, [26:48] apparently, when he ejected from his F-15. Then he scrambled up a 7,000-foot ridge line, [26:56] hid in a crevice to avoid detection. You mentioned the training. I would imagine that, [27:02] of course, a lot of it is training, but a lot of it is instinct as well. [27:08] Oh, certainly. It's a combination of the both, Dana. And, you know, there's no higher motivation, [27:13] I'm sure, for this airman, this Colonel. Then, you know, here he is, well behind enemy lines, [27:19] injured. And, you know, it was reliant on his intestinal fortitude and, you know, his perseverance [27:26] to be able to get to a location where he could safely signal back to, you know, his headquarters [27:32] or other, you know, overflight aircraft, et cetera, to let him know that, hey, I'm alive, [27:38] I'm in a, I'm in a secure location, and now I'm going to wait for rescue to occur. [27:43] Your reaction to this news from President Trump, that the service member was, has been rescued. [27:49] As a service member and a U.S. citizen, I am totally elated. This is a wonderful outcome [28:02] in what could have been disastrous for the U.S. in terms of the global perspective of this conflict [28:11] with Iran. I'm curious if you could, you just really punctuate that last point, General, just how [28:20] high, how high the stakes were, not only obviously with the life of the service member hanging in the [28:25] balance, but also what this could have potentially meant diplomatically and militarily for this conflict [28:31] that rages on. If that crew member of that F-15 Strike Eagle had, in fact, been captured by the [28:42] Iranians, there is no doubt in my mind that the Iranians would exploit that capture. That service [28:50] member would see himself paraded in front of social media outlets in Iran, television, and the caption [28:59] on that is, America is weak. Its claim of indefensibility has now been stricken, and we Iranians will prevail [29:11] in this conflict. And then, of course, what was discussed by several of your other commentators [29:18] is the exploitation of that service member in custody, the efforts, and I would certainly assert [29:28] very violent efforts to extract valuable information from that very proud and heroic member of our Air [29:38] Force. Now, thankfully, that was not the case. When you, just in reading over this post from the [29:45] president general, it really does paint a harrowing picture of what the last day and a half had been [29:51] like for the service member, as the president writes that he was behind enemy lines in treacherous [29:59] mountains of Iran being hunted down by our enemies, wrote the president. But also that he, the president [30:06] suggesting here that the military was essentially monitoring 24 hours a day and planning this rescue. [30:13] So based on this post from the president, it seems that it's likely that the Pentagon knew exactly [30:19] where he was, perhaps just waiting for that most ideal moment to mitigate risks, given the small [30:25] arms fire that they experienced recently, to be able to extract them. [30:29] Yeah, I appreciate that, your explanation of the dynamics of a search and rescue recovery mission. [30:37] To get down to the basics, at the moment that that crew member ejected from the F-15, an emergency beacon [30:48] is activated, and that communicates with a satellite system. The signal is sent to command headquarters, [30:56] and that initiates the search and rescue operation. The question I had personally, especially since almost [31:04] 48 hours, has transpired since the ejection, is whether or not that system was either degraded [31:15] or somehow the signal was lost. But based upon what we see now, the signal must have continuously [31:24] emitted, was continuously emitting information about the location of this crew member, [31:31] all of this encrypted under some very, very dangerous and difficult circumstances. [31:37] And you even addressed, and it came up a couple of times, about the geography of this particular [31:43] location. On that west side of Iran, it is mountainous, certainly not near any urban center at all. [31:51] For anyone that is in a situation such as this crew member, he's ejected, he's injured, he has very light [32:02] kit, meaning he has some very few rations, a little bit of water. And here he is in the midst of nowhere, [32:11] trying to evade a multiplicity of Iranians who have been motivated by this offer, this both an inspirational [32:20] offer from the Islamic Republic leadership, whomever that is at this particular point in time, [32:25] plus the alleged incentive of 60,000 US dollars. So putting all this together, it was extremely [32:33] dangerous. And once again, we salute the members of our armed services who conducted this rescue mission [32:41] and were able to extract this service member. The situation otherwise would make tomorrow a very, [32:48] very difficult day, not only for that crew member, if he were apprehended, but more importantly, [32:54] for the whole effort that has been expended thus far in this conflict.