Retired generals break down Iran war strategy after week 4

[0:00] I wanted to go through the four different military options the Pentagon is developing [0:05] according to Axios. There's the invading or blockading of Karg Island. There's the invading [0:10] Larak, an island that helps Iran solidify control of the Strait, seizing the strategic island of [0:16] Abu Musa and two smaller islands that are near the western entrance to the Strait, and blocking or [0:22] seizing ships exporting Iranian oil on the eastern side of the Strait. How are you viewing those [0:28] options? All four of those options are going to absolutely result in American casualties, [0:37] not just wounded, but killed in action. Why do I say that? Anytime you put military on the ground [0:44] at a fixed location, remember that Iran could absolutely strike any facility anywhere in the [0:52] Middle East. And so the idea that it is degraded, their capabilities are degraded, is true. They [0:58] still have substantial capabilities. [1:00] As was mentioned by the previous reporter in Tel Aviv. So let's not be, let's not mince words [1:07] here. This would be an escalation of occupying Iranian soil, and it will result in the lives of [1:16] Americans being lost. And of course, the sorrow that will be experienced by American military [1:23] families as well. So when you see these soldiers from the 82nd Airborne deploying, and these two [1:31] additionary units deployed to the region, do you, can you imagine a scenario where they are not used? [1:40] Absolutely. I certainly hope that this is all about posturing. And I understand that because [1:50] that happens through history so many times, is that you pre-position forces, and you have the [1:56] the sense to be able to not exercise them. It's also something where, let's just say, [2:05] that there were 6,500, 7,500 soldiers and Marines. That's a drop in the bucket. Whenever we went [2:12] into Iran, excuse me, Iraq, we had nearly 200,000. So this is completely absurd to think that a small [2:21] number of airborne, which are very, very lightly armed, airborne soldiers, as well as, of course, [2:27] Marines, could do anything other than, I mean, yes, they could take an island, but they will be [2:32] absolutely targets. I was actually in the 82nd Airborne myself as a combat pilot. I was in the [2:36] company commander a long time ago, back in 1979, when the Shah fell, we were on alert to go into [2:43] Tehran to be able to seize the airport. Cooler heads prevailed, and they called off the mission [2:49] because they knew that an airborne brigade dropping into the middle of tens of thousands of [2:55] armed military, we would not have survived. That's really, really fascinating and puts [3:02] that into perspective. Allies of the U.S. and the Gulf are urging the administration [3:08] against the U.S. and the Gulf. They're urging the U.S. and the Gulf. They're urging the [3:08] administration against putting boots on the ground to occupy Karg Island or to remove Iran's [3:12] enriched uranium. That's what a senior Gulf official is telling CNN. They are worried that [3:17] this would prolong the war, that it would result in casualties and high casualties, as you are [3:22] pointing out here, and also that it would trigger Iran to retaliate against those countries there [3:29] in the region, against their infrastructure, which is so key, the long-term effects of that. [3:35] How much do you think that should factor in [3:38] to what the U.S. and the Gulf are doing? [3:38] It will absolutely result. Absolutely. I mean, I'm not a betting man, but this is 100% [3:48] certain bet that if we occupy any of those, Iran will attack our allies in the region, [3:55] and they will probably start to attack power plants. [3:59] And as I've said before on various outlets, my concern, the greatest risk to the region [4:04] is if they were to attack the desalination water facilities in the Middle East, because [4:10] power can be restored fairly quickly, so to speak, maybe weeks. Desalination facilities are [4:18] extremely complex. There aren't very many of them. And if you go without water, the people cannot [4:24] survive. That's just the way that it is. So it can get a hell of a lot worse than it is right now, [4:30] and we need to have cooler heads prevail, the way the president has already said many times, [4:35] declare victory, and then let's negotiate how we're going to reopen the straits for the future. [4:40] Everybody with Iran, and then let's move out. [4:44] What this entire war has begun is based essentially on a miscalculation [4:48] of the will to fight of the Iranian people. These people are being run, the IRGC is being run, [4:58] they're essentially religious fanatics, okay? They're not fighting for Iran. They're fighting [5:05] for Allah. They're fighting for Islam. And that's a profound difference. And 200,000 committed [5:11] fanatics are very, very difficult. And they are not going to be swayed by any kind of an invasion, [5:18] any kind of attack, any kind of shutdown of their oil, or the profits that they're making [5:24] from selling their oil. They don't care, because we are the great Satan, and they're fighting [5:30] against the great Satan. This is a holy war to them, and regime change will not result from any [5:36] kind of a land incursion in sovereign Iran. [5:42] It's not going to result in any of that. Do you see what the strategy could be moving forward [5:48] for the U.S. to get out of this conflict? [5:53] I think that the only possible scenario that can lead to success, I believe, is diplomacy. [6:00] We are not going to do anything to motivate regime change. Sure, we're bombing into [6:05] smithereens, and sure, they're bad guys. We got it. But the problem is that you've got this [6:11] committed enemy that we're fighting. Perhaps 20% of the country, [6:15] that's 10 or probably 20 million people, support them strongly. Sure, there's a lot of people that [6:21] want democracy and all that, but they don't have the power. The IRGC has the guns. They have the [6:28] weapons. They have the power. And they have shown that they are capable of killing their own people. [6:34] The CIA does an assessment on regime change. And one of the first questions they ask is, [6:40] when they do this assessment, is, does the regime, is it capable of killing their people [6:44] at an industrial level? [6:46] Okay, they've already shown they can do that. If the answer to that question is yes, [6:50] then it's not going to lead to regime change. And that's exactly what's going to happen. [6:54] We're going to put American lives at risk for essentially furthering, pushing the football [7:00] down the road, but we're not going to get any closer to regime change. [7:05] Based on what you have laid out, right, and your assessment of the IRGC, for example, the fact that [7:10] the head of the IRGC's naval, rather, navy, we learned yesterday, was killed. [7:15] What is the impact? [7:16] What is the impact, right, of that particular leader being taken out on the IRGC navy, [7:23] specifically because he was basically in charge, right, of this push to close the Strait of Hormuz [7:30] and control it? If he's gone, does it actually change anything? [7:36] It doesn't change a thing, Erica. Someone else will step up. I mean, they still have profound [7:41] asymmetric capabilities. They have mines. They have missiles. If we attack, invade Karg, [7:48] they'll have artillery they can fire at us. They have a committed, they have a naval fleet of [7:54] perhaps a thousand small speedboats, a thousand miles of coastline in which to hide them. [8:00] They've got all kinds of capabilities, cyber capabilities, et cetera. All those things are [8:06] still going to be at their disposal, despite the fact that we've hit a lot of the military [8:10] infrastructure. They've shown already that they've had the capability to continue to fire missiles, [8:15] and it only takes a couple, three a day to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. [8:19] So we're in a, you know, there's really no way out of this other than diplomacy, [8:24] because we are not going to beat them militarily. [8:27] General, when you look at this and you see about the potential for ground operations, [8:33] what's your sense of at least what they're preparing to give themselves the potential to do? [8:39] Well, I think first, the intent of bringing these 82nd Airborne Paratroopers forward is to take the [8:46] slack out of, you know, potential employment of ground forces. Obviously, the Marines, [8:51] two MEUs, are moving into the area of operations as well. Marines and infantry from the United [8:58] States Army, they do a multitude of tasks, but seizing terrain is certainly high on that list. [9:05] I mean, if this, let's say the president does this, and we don't know that he is going to, [9:09] but if he does, what would, I mean, can you explain to us what that would look like in the [9:13] initial phase, at least? Well, what's coming in with the MEU is the rotary wing lift that would [9:24] move forces on Karg Island or potentially on the, you know, the shore of Iran on the north side of [9:31] the Strait of Hormuz, for instance. So, they have the capability to move the force as the RMEU comes [9:37] in, and you've got the ground forces to do that. But you also have to bring in all the enablers. [9:42] So, the good thing is we have air supremacy. So, we have dominance of the air, the ability to [9:47] employ fires to support those forces as they come ashore, probably by a helicopter, [9:54] assault, and then to sustain them over time. Not that it's going to be easy. It's extremely [9:59] high-risk operation, but they have the capability and the enablers to support the force once it gets [10:03] on the ground. But the likelihood of, you know, them being able to do this uncontested is very [10:10] unlikely. While Iran is saying that there are no talks, Trump is saying that there are, and he said [10:16] there's 15 points of agreement with Iran, including that Tehran commits to not having a nuclear weapon [10:23] and also [10:24] this idea of enriched uranium that the U.S. would take possession of. So, talk to us about that. [10:29] Where is most of that held, and what are the challenges in securing that? [10:33] Yeah, so there are a lot of challenges to that, Brianna, and where most of it is held is basically [10:37] in several places here. We have Datanz, which is one of the enrichment facilities. You have [10:42] Fordow, another enrichment facility. And then the rest of them here, Tehran, Arak, Isfahan, [10:48] those are all research facilities. So, the theory is that a lot of that enriched uranium that we [10:53] have is [10:54] probably held in Isfahan. However, there is the distinct possibility that among those 970 or so [11:00] pounds of enriched uranium, that they have been dispersed, that those scuba tank size containers [11:07] of the enriched uranium have been dispersed throughout at least some of these areas and [11:11] perhaps in other areas throughout Iran. So, that is a very difficult problem. [11:14] And the president over the weekend had threatened that he was going to start hitting Iran's energy [11:21] sites, right? And then today, [11:24] he says, actually, five-day moratorium while we're having these talks. But talk to us about [11:29] these big sites and what the big targets would be. [11:32] So, among the big targets that we see in this particular case are the Damavand Combined Cycle [11:38] Power Plant, which produces about 2.8, well, 2,868 megawatts of power. That's the biggest [11:45] plant in Iran itself. Another one is the Shahid Salimi Plant, 2,215 megawatts. And then the third [11:54] plant with about a little over 2,000 megawatts. So, this is basically the group of plants that [12:00] produce a large proportion of Iran's power. However, there are a lot of power plants out [12:04] there and these big three are not responsible for everything. There are about 50 or so plants that [12:10] are major electrical producers. And then we can't forget about this thing right here. This is the [12:15] Bushir Nuclear Plant, which is right in this area right here. So, that would be another place that [12:22] if that were attacked, that would be a big problem. [12:24] A very dangerous thing for the rest of the Gulf and certainly for Iran itself. [12:28] And you can see this cycle happening if this starts to go, right? Because the IRGC has [12:32] threatened that they would retaliate specifically when it comes to Israel and also other regional [12:39] countries and sites where the U.S. has a stake. Talk to us about that. [12:45] Yeah. So, this is what we've seen so far. So, when you look at this, and this is a mix of [12:49] strikes against Iran, as well as Iran strikes against Israel and the Gulf countries. [12:54] So, this is quite numerous. The concentration of strikes has so far been in the western part of [12:59] Iran, the southern part of Iran, and, of course, around the capital, Tehran, right here. So, what [13:04] would have to happen in a case like this is you would have to see a whole bunch of other strikes, [13:10] potentially in this area right here around the Strait of Hormuz, because in this particular case, [13:15] that is, of course, what is of greatest interest from an economic perspective. [13:19] With 20 percent of the oil flowing through this area, this is the area that would, [13:24] get a lot of attention if we were to restrike things. Plus, you have the command and control [13:28] elements in all of these areas. But the real key to all of this is not only what they can do in [13:34] terms of getting commerce through, but also in terms of getting rid of the missiles, getting [13:38] rid of the missile launch sites. And a lot of those are right in this particular area right here. [13:43] There's Trump's insistence that the United States has won the war. Then there's the [13:48] deployment of the 82nd Airborne. Is it all but certain that these troops will see, [13:54] combat or this symbolic in nature? [13:57] I certainly hope that it is symbolic and that it is posturing by the president. Sending in a airborne [14:04] brigade, which is extremely lightly armed and announcing it in advance is not something you should be doing. [14:11] Even for deterrence? [14:13] Even for deterrence. I was actually in the 82nd when the Shah fell in 1979. I was a company commander. [14:20] And quite frankly, even though we were alone and unafraid, [14:25] we knew that it was going to be a very difficult mission to actually capture the Tehran airport. [14:31] And those airborne, that airborne brigade, this is not the proper use of them because of how lightly they're armored. [14:38] Based on your experience, I'm curious, because this regime has remained pretty bullish. [14:41] They don't seem to be shying away from the prospect, at least outwardly and vocally, of the possibility of ground troops in Iran. [14:48] Why is it like the president would go down that route given that? Is Iran just posturing? [14:53] It's probably both sides are posturing. [14:55] I think it's very important that those Marines that are already outside of the straits, [15:02] they could be used hopefully to reinforce after hostilities and reinforce the American bases. [15:08] They could be there to restore order to the consulates and the embassies, which is their primary mission. [15:12] I certainly hope that they are not going to be used for any kind of a boots on the ground situation [15:17] because they will be a huge target by the Iranians. [15:21] Peter, the president says Iran has agreed to no nuclear weapons. [15:26] Is that plausible? [15:29] I mean, Iran agreed to that in 2015 with the Obama nuclear agreement. [15:33] They agreed not to enrich above 3.5 percent. [15:36] Well, you need 90 percent for a nuclear weapon. [15:38] It was Trump that pulled out of that deal. [15:40] It's very ironic that, you know, the deal that he's hoping to get is basically the deal he pulled out of in 2018. [15:46] It's very close to the deal that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were negotiating on February 27th, the day before we went to war against Iran. [15:55] So given that, what would they actually need for that deal? [15:57] Would that be plausible to abandon nuclear ambitions? [16:01] Well, I mean, you know, you have to have inspectors. [16:03] You have to, you know, only enrich to, let's say, 3.5 percent or 1.5 percent. [16:08] You can debate about the percentages. [16:10] But I mean, there's a big difference between 1.5 percent and 90 percent. [16:14] And that is something that inspectors can, you know, can inspect. [16:17] And that's something that they were based on the agreements between Witkoff and Kushner. [16:22] They were getting very close to that. [16:24] Basically used for civilian purposes, medical purposes. [16:27] And, you know, so that's the deal that we may be coming back to. [16:31] Interestingly enough, the sources are telling CNN that Iran would prefer negotiating with the vice president, J.D. Vance, than, say, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. [16:40] Vance apparently is seen as more sympathetic about ending the war. [16:44] What do you make of that? [16:45] Well, Vance said publicly in 2024, a year and a half ago, that the war would be a massive distraction and hugely expensive. [16:54] Well, that turned out to be a pretty good prediction of what happened. [16:56] So, you know, I mean, and obviously he has presidential ambitions. [17:01] He knows that, you know, I mean, it's a kind of tough one for him, you know, maybe to accept this poison chalice because, you know, it may not get solved very quickly. [17:13] But clearly he's seen as more sympathetic. [17:15] You know, Jared Kushner is well known. [17:17] Netanyahu is a friend of the Kushner family, slept at the Kushner family residence back when he was visiting the United States. [17:26] And so, you know, that history is well known. [17:28] They see J.D. Vance as somebody who might be more sympathetic to that cause. [17:31] General, while the president continues to claim that there is victory, you've got the former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis, who warns this. [17:40] Iran right now, if we declared victory, they would now say they own the Strait. [17:45] You'd see a tax for every ship that goes through. [17:49] We're in a tough spot. [17:51] I can't identify a lot of options. [17:54] Can you? [17:55] I think this is one thing where it is actually an act of negotiation with the Iranians. [18:01] The Iranians can keep that Strait closed at any time. [18:05] It's something where they have the capability by missiles or drones to strike any ship that passes through there from anywhere in Iran. [18:14] You don't have to just be in the mountains surrounding the Strait to use a direct fire weapon. [18:19] You can actually hit a ship from anywhere. [18:21] So it has to be something that is negotiated. [18:24] And I certainly hope if they are doing it. [18:26] That's one of those 15 points about how can we do this between the U.S. and Iran to ensure that those Straits are opened up to commerce in the next few weeks. [18:35] Peter, the president insists that regime change has already happened and that he's dealing with a new group, the phrase he's using, willing to strike a deal. [18:44] A group, I should mention, that gave the president a very big oil and gas related gift. [18:49] We don't know the specifics of that. [18:51] What is that all about, you think? [18:53] The gift? [18:54] I mean, who the hell knows? [18:55] It's a bad piece for the apprentice or something. [18:57] It doesn't mean anything. [19:00] I mean, if the gift is that the Iranians basically control the Strait, as the general points out, more or less it will. [19:06] And that they can charge $2 million for every ship that goes through, which an Iranian parliamentarian has just said is going to be the cost of entry. [19:13] Well, doing some rough math, that's about a billion dollars a week. [19:16] That's a pretty big dollar gift to the Iranians from the rest of the world. [19:20] So one thing I think, Laura, is worth pointing out. [19:23] The new generation are all people who fought at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, which is sort of a trivial pursuit question in the United States at this point. [19:31] But for these people, this is the main experience of their sort of teenage and early 20s life. [19:37] A million people died. [19:39] They believed that God was on their side. [19:41] They sent 15-year-old boys into minefields to clear them, believing that they would be martyred. [19:47] That's the people that are now in charge. [19:49] So arguably worse than the people previously. [19:51] Well, when… [19:53] Would a ceasefire be a kind of gift to Iran in the sense of allowing them, general, to regroup, recalibrate, reassess, and all that? [20:03] Well, absolutely. [20:05] The military capabilities of Iran have been absolutely reduced. [20:09] They still have the capability to wreak havoc in the Middle East. [20:12] We have to understand that this has really not gotten as bad as it can get. [20:16] If they were to choose to hit the power plants for our allies in that area, [20:21] to include our U.S. bases, then we would be in terrible trouble. [20:25] And even worse than that, if they chose to hit the desalination facilities for U.S. bases as well as the Middle East, [20:33] that could actually cripple that entire area because they don't have any water in terms of rivers. [20:39] They take it from the ocean. [20:41] So if the U.S. were to bow out now or to allow the status quo to then persist, [20:49] you have said, Peter, that you fear a potential war. [20:51] You fear a potential for history to repeat itself. [20:54] How so? [20:55] Well, I mean, we have this sort of strategic narcissism where we say, you know, we're ending the war. [21:01] Well, other people can have a vote here. [21:04] We said we ended the war in Iraq in 2011. [21:07] Three years later, ISIS was marching almost at the gates of Baghdad. [21:10] So, I mean, the Israelis have different strategic goals than we do. [21:14] They want state collapse. [21:15] We don't necessarily want that. [21:17] And then other players in the region have their own goals. [21:20] And, of course, the Iranian regime. [21:22] We may have something that's even worse that is sort of the next iteration. [21:27] So I just think if we say the war is over, we've seen this movie before, [21:31] it doesn't necessarily mean that the conflict is over. [21:34] Speaking of who has a say, I want to play for a second Secretary Hegseth at the Pentagon [21:38] who says that the Pentagon has a voice in the negotiations. [21:40] Listen to this. [21:41] We see ourselves as part of this negotiation as well. [21:45] We negotiate with bombs. [21:48] You have a choice as we loiter over the top of Tehran. [21:51] That's what the president talked about, about your future. [21:54] The president has made it clear that you will not have a nuclear weapon. [21:58] We negotiate with bombs? That doesn't sound right. [22:01] Very few things in the Secretary of Defense sound right. [22:03] They're not logical. It's bantering. [22:05] It's really reflecting his education and experience as a major in the D.C. National Guard. [22:10] By the way, I was a member of the D.C. National Guard. [22:12] I'm not trying to diminish those young majors that are there. [22:15] But he does not have the experience, and the way that he talks does not reflect anything that's logical. [22:20] Negotiating with bombs? [22:22] What does that mean?