Mideast experts weigh Iran regime’s leverage in negotiations with U.S.

[0:00] Well, for perspective now, we turn to Alan Eyre. He served in the U.S. government for [0:04] four decades and was part of the Obama administration's negotiating team for the [0:09] Iran nuclear deal, which President Trump pulled out of back in 2018. He's now at the Middle East [0:14] Institute. And Miad Maliki was born and raised in Iran. Until last year, he was associate director [0:21] for sanction targeting with a focus on Iran in the U.S. Treasury Department. He's now a senior [0:26] fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy. Thank you both for being here. [0:30] Alan, we'll start with you. I think it might be helpful for our viewers to sort of reset [0:33] the table. Help us understand what exactly has been agreed to and by whom. [0:39] Well, I think what's been agreed to is ceasefire for two weeks. And on the one hand, U.S. and [0:47] Israel have to obey. On the other hand, Iran. It's not clear whether this extends to Israel [0:52] stopping attacks in Lebanon, which is one of the 10 points that Israel had in its proposal. [0:56] Unclear. But to me, the key unknown variable is how much does Iran let loose of its chokehold on [1:04] the Strait of Hormuz, which has become the single most important piece of strategic leverage it has. [1:10] I'm frankly surprised that they agree to this ceasefire. And two weeks from now, we'll see [1:16] whether they're willing to relinquish it in perpetuity, which I would be surprised at. [1:22] How realistic is this in the short term, do you think, Iran reopening the strait? [1:26] I think it is. I would disagree with it. I would argue that they needed a ceasefire more than any [1:34] other party to this conflict. I mean, their economy is bankrupt. They rely on the strait [1:40] of hormones more than any other nations in the Gulf. So I think they wanted the ceasefire. I'm not [1:46] surprised that they agreed to some sort of ceasefire. We don't know what those 10 points are. We've seen [1:53] some reports that some of those 10 points are things that I don't think the U.S. government is [1:57] going to agree to, such as sanctions relief or some kind of a provision of financial kind of [2:02] incentives to Iran for the flow of commerce through Strait of Hormuz. It could be some watered down [2:07] version of the 10 points. It could be a new set of 10 points that Iran proposed. So we're going to have [2:13] to wait and see where those pain points are. But at this point, again, I think the Iranian regime is [2:21] coming out of this in a lose-lose kind of situation. They accept the ceasefire. They have to accept the [2:27] reality of the domestic pressure, a broken economy, and a political situation that is very dire. They've [2:34] lost their top layers of leadership. And it's unclear if they can actually communicate between [2:39] different provinces with different parts of government. And if they did not accept the [2:44] ceasefire, then they're going to keep losing militarily and politically and economically. [2:49] And Alan, in the Truth Social post from President Trump this evening, he says, [2:53] we have already met and exceeded all military objectives. What were those objectives? And is his [3:01] assessment widely shared? Before I answer that, I'd like to point out one thing, and I could be wrong, [3:06] but Iran's ships were still going through the Straits of Hormuz. So they were still making money. [3:11] They were controlling the flow of traffic, but not stopping all of it. So economically, [3:16] they weren't suffering that much. They were, in fact, making more. And your question was? [3:20] When the president says we have already met and exceeded our military objectives. [3:24] He has. I mean, Israel and the U.S. have both said repeatedly, our goal was to deny Iran the ability [3:30] to project power past its borders. They've done that. They've taken out the Navy. They've taken out the [3:35] Air Force. They've hurt much of Iran's defense industrial base, destroyed many of the petrochemical [3:40] plants that made precursors essential for rocket fuel, missile fuel, taken out the nuclear centers. [3:46] But what they didn't do, the unintended consequence is they allowed Iran to discover a new strategic [3:55] lever, and that's control of the strait. So in many ways, control of the strait has supplanted [4:01] the latent threat of Iran going nuclear in terms of a possible future strategic deterrent. [4:08] And the military might, in and of itself, isn't enough leverage to ensure that the strait stays open? [4:14] Who's that? The Western military might? [4:15] Yes. [4:16] No, it's not, because it takes relatively little to close the straits. All you have to do is spook the [4:21] insurance market. And that's, you know, a fast attack craft and a guy holding an RPG, right? [4:26] It doesn't take a massive Navy to threaten the Strait of Hormuz to hit a ship. So that's the [4:33] problem. All it takes is a couple of drones, which are cheap to make. Iran has lots of them. [4:39] Or even worse, as I said, someone in a fast attack craft. And you've so cowed the international [4:45] insurance markets that they're not going to provide insurance, without which ships won't [4:49] go through the strait. [4:51] Mia, do you see a framework here for a lasting peace, something more durable? [4:54] I don't think you can see that with this regime. And just kind of responding very quickly to your [5:02] point, there are some limited number of tankers, Iranian tankers, that move through the strait [5:06] of Hormuz. But the fact is, Iran's Iranian regime cannot repatriate any of this revenue that it [5:12] generates from oil. It's unclear if the oil that moves outside the strait of Hormuz is actually being [5:16] picked up by buyers. There's now Venezuela oil in the market. There's more Russian oil that is now [5:21] available to some of the buyers, given some of the relief that was provided recently. [5:25] So back to your question, I think it's, with this regime, a lasting peace or agreement, it's just not, [5:34] you're not going to see that. I think they're, especially given the fact that they're domestically [5:38] under so much pressure, they're going to have to look for some kind of another conflict. [5:43] If you go back historically, you know, in the 80s, Iran-Iraq war gave Iranian regime some kind [5:51] of a few years of relief domestically to kind of operate in that state of war. They have that right [5:58] now with the ending of the strikes and the campaign. They're going to have to face the reality [6:03] that domestically they're not really considered legitimate by the people. They don't have the [6:08] support domestically. We can see how another round of protests in Iran and the regime might go back [6:15] to posing threat to external adversaries. Well, to your point, as I understand it, [6:20] the last line of the Iranian statement reads, our hand remains upon the trigger, which you would [6:25] interpret in what way? I think they're going to maintain control over the strait of Hormuz. [6:30] They've had this for years. That's not going to change. They're not going to agree to any kind of [6:35] deal that would push them away from what they're able to do in the strait of Hormuz. But as I said, [6:40] their import relies on the strait of Hormuz. Their export getting oil out depends on the [6:46] strait of Hormuz. Regardless of if they can sell the oil or not, they have to get the oil out so [6:50] they can continue to extract oil. So they really depend on the strait of Hormuz. They're going to [6:54] continue to pose that threat. And Alan, what fault lines remain at this point? [6:58] Well, the fact that both sides' minimal demand to the other are so far apart that it will take [7:05] serious and sustained negotiations for any sort of chance of a solution. And this is not something [7:14] the U.S. has really done, this administration, before. They have the type of strategic attention [7:19] deficit disorder. They want to move on to something else. So I just hope that they dedicate the people, [7:25] the expertise, and the time. There was a recent story in the press that said that Mr. Witkoff and [7:31] Mr. Kushner, told President Trump, in essence, yeah, we could probably reach a deal, but it would [7:36] take a few months. Well, that's great. Let's dedicate those few months and get a deal. [7:42] And lastly, what do you make of Pakistan's role in all of this? Why have they emerged as the key [7:45] mediator? Well, there were seven countries trying to mediate. There was Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, [7:50] Qatar, and Oman. That's five, sorry. They did a great job. I mean, to a large extent, [7:56] any country that has the minimal mutual relations with the U.S. and Iran would suffice. Pakistan did [8:04] the job. I mean, what matters is partly who's mediating, but more importantly, the message is [8:09] being passed, not the tube they're being passed in. So I commend Pakistan for doing a great job, [8:16] but the key roles are not going to be whoever mediates. And ideally, I'd like no mediation. I'd like [8:21] both sides talking to each other. That's what we did at the JCPOA, not two or three hours every [8:27] couple of weeks, all day, every day, until you're reaching a agreement. [8:31] Alan Eyre, Mijad Maliki, thank you both for your insights and perspectives. [8:34] Thank you. [8:35] Support journalism you trust. Support PBS News. Donate now, or even better, [8:53] start a monthly contribution today.