Middle East experts analyze U.S. and Iran priorities in potential negotiations

[0:00] AMNA NAWAZ- For additional perspective on the state of diplomacy with Iran, [0:03] we turn now to our two Iran watchers. Allen Ayers' work at the State Department focused [0:08] on Iran, and he was a senior member of the Obama administration's negotiating team [0:12] for the Iran nuclear deal. He's now at the Middle East Institute. [0:16] And Miad Maliki was born and raised in Iran. And, until last year, he was associate director for [0:21] sanctioned targeting in the U.S. Treasury Department, with a focus on Iran. He's now a [0:25] senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Welcome back to you both. Good to [0:30] see you. Miad, I'll begin with you. It looks like the U.S. delegation is set to go to Pakistan tomorrow [0:34] to resume talks. The question is, will the Iranians be there? Will they show up? [0:39] Well, based on reportings, I see Iranians are sending a delegation. That's the last [0:44] reporting that I've seen coming out of Iran. You know, it's very obvious that they know they need [0:49] a deal. I mean, they might still shout openly or through the press that they don't really need a [0:53] deal. But economically and politically, they really desperately need a deal right now. [0:58] So they're going in search of a deal. You think they're motivated? [1:01] They're definitely. I mean, their economy is a collapsed, bankrupt economy. They're getting there. [1:06] They have a few days before they run out of gasoline, between 12 to 20 days if they can't import [1:12] gasoline. And last time, they had to change the price on gasoline, increase the price on gasoline. [1:18] They had one of the largest protests in Iran. So they know domestically they're going to have to [1:22] address the state of economy. Alan, did the U.S. attacking and boarding that ship, did it change [1:29] leverage at all for the U.S., change how these talks could go on? I don't think so. I mean, it [1:34] possibly increased, it increased the possibility that the Iranians wouldn't go. But as Miad said, [1:39] they have to show up at the table just to see what the U.S. is doing. So again, both sides, each side [1:45] wants to enter with sort of the marginal additional leverage to increase its position. And the ship [1:52] that was trying to run the blockade, I think, was testing U.S. resolve. But no, it didn't. It didn't [1:58] really move the dial either way in terms of what's going to happen at the table. Well, you saw Liz [2:03] Landers reporting earlier. The president told her if there is no deal at the end of the ceasefire, [2:07] that the U.S. will resume bombing. What do you make of those threats? Do you think the U.S. will make [2:11] good on them? And do they pressure Iranians to come to a deal? I think empirically, I have learned [2:17] not to put absolute credence into President Trump's statements. A lot of them are either to assuage the [2:23] market or to terrify the Iranians. So it could well be the case that if there's not even an interim [2:30] deal that allows them to extend the ceasefire, that there could be a resumption of hostilities. [2:36] But I really do think that the United States is not looking to resume hostilities and start climbing [2:41] up that escalation ladder with Iran again, because Iran will retaliate against regional energy. [2:47] And there could just be, you know, painful consequences. [2:51] Miad, is that how the Iranians see it? Do you think those threats carry weight with the leadership [2:55] there? You know, if I'm in Tehran, if I'm a member of this regime, I would consider President [2:59] Trump's warning to be more of a real threat. I mean, historically, President Trump, you know, [3:04] there are cases that, you know, he changed his mind. He gave Iranians more time. But [3:07] there are a lot of cases that you can point to that President Trump actually went ahead and [3:13] stuck to his threat. So in this case, I think Iranians know that it might end up being, [3:19] things might end up getting worse for them on the, you know, on the Persian Gulf side. But, you know, [3:25] what I disagree with Al-Anon is, you know, that the tanker that was targeted and stopped by [3:30] U.S. Navy, it does send a very strong message to the Iranians that the blockade is serious. [3:36] And the implication of, on the economic side of, you know, oil not being, not leaving Persian Gulf [3:42] and the imports fully stopped through this blockade, I think that's sent a very strong [3:46] message to the Iranians that this is a real blockade. [3:49] Well, the Americans also haven't changed any of the terms or anything they're trying to push for [3:54] in this deal, right? And this was the same deal both sides walked away from last time. What are the [3:58] prospects that there's some kind of successful deal if the Americans haven't changed the things [4:03] they're asking for, Alan? Well, we don't know for certainty, or at least I don't, that they haven't [4:08] changed it. For example, President Trump at one point said, we do not want any indigenous enrichment on [4:14] Iran. Now that's modulated somewhat to a freeze on uranium enrichment for 20 years. The Iranians [4:22] say, well, how about five years? Yeah, there's room to negotiate. A deal is doable, both on nuclear [4:28] issues, on the strength of hormones. But the situation is this, the more you, you know, it's like [4:34] the scale, the more you put into the scale of what I want, the more you have to put in the scale of [4:39] what I'm prepared to give. And I think this part of the scale is where the U.S. might have some problems. [4:45] Where do you think the U.S. is on that part of the scale? What are they willing to give? [4:48] I think possible that they're willing to unfreeze assets. I think it's possible, [4:55] maybe barely possible, they'd be willing to accept down blending of highly enriched uranium, [5:00] as opposed to getting rid of it all. But things like, obviously, what the Iranians want, reparations, [5:05] that's not going to happen. And quick and a full sanctions relief is not going to happen. [5:11] Meal, how do you see it? What would the Iranians agree to? [5:14] I think Iranians would agree to anything that would give them access to some cash. [5:18] That's what they really need desperately. [5:20] The unfreezing of those funds would be key. [5:21] I think that's what they, you know, they brought in. If you look at the delegation, [5:25] members of delegation that went to Islamabad last time around from Iran, they took the central bank [5:30] governor with them, but they didn't take anyone from the Atomic Energy Organization. [5:34] And one of the demands was really access to those funds that are sitting in Oman, [5:38] Qatar and Iraq and elsewhere. And those are funds that they don't really need any kind of sanctions [5:43] relief to be available to the regime. They just really need some letters from the U.S. government [5:48] or some message or signal from the U.S. government. So that's not a really heavy lift for U.S. [5:52] government. And Iranians know that. And they really need that cash right now. [5:55] Meanwhile, we saw the strait declared open by Iranian officials. And the next day, [6:00] it suddenly was not. President Trump says the blockade will also continue. Alan, [6:04] do you see another round of talks opening the strait and ending the blockade? [6:08] No. This is their, again, pardon the pun, their trump card is control of the strait. [6:15] They never opened it. Even when Arakji said, we're going to open it, [6:18] if you had read the fine print, which wasn't in the social media post, it was, [6:21] if you go through Iranian waters, if you coordinate with the IRGC Navy, and if you pay a toll. [6:27] So it was more a question of emphasis. And yes, the IRGC came back later and clamped that down. [6:33] But, no, the strait of Hormoz is their most effective leverage, because every day it stays [6:40] closed, its power increases. [6:42] Yeah. How do you see it? This is a key point for President Trump. He wants that straight open. [6:47] You know, I think this is not a trump card. This was a nuclear option for the Iranian regime, [6:51] the closure of the strait of Hormoz. They deployed it, and it backlash economically. [6:56] I think they're on the clock economically. If the blockade continues, if the state of Hormoz close, [7:02] they're going to see the result on the ground in different provinces in Iran, as far as, you know, [7:07] gasoline prices, food prices. I think they're just trying to wait out a few days, maybe a couple [7:12] of weeks to see if they can get a deal, winning the war of narrative here in the US and in the West. [7:17] But at the end of the day, you know, every time there was a US escalation with Iran, whether it was some [7:24] airstrikes or killing of Soleimani, you know, RGC commanders, Iranians always, Iranian regime, [7:30] they always come back to the negotiations table, because they need a deal. So they might play with [7:35] the words, they might, we might hear rhetorics coming out of Iran that don't really make sense. [7:39] But at the end of the day, they desperately need a deal. And they're going to have to really give up [7:43] some of those, you know, some of the principles they've been sticking to. [7:47] Alan, I'll give you the last word here in the few seconds we have left. If the [7:49] Strait of Hormuz is the Iranians' trump card, what's the best leverage for the US? [7:53] Well, as Biyad said, the great leverage is blockading Iran. The problem is you've got two [7:58] clocks. At the Strait of Hormuz, I'm giving pain clock is moving a lot more quickly than the naval [8:04] blockade pain to Iran. Plus, Iran can take more pain. Iran is not heading into an election year. [8:10] Alan Eyre, Mead Maliki, great to see you both here. Thank you so much. [8:14] Thanks. Thank you.