Senate Intelligence Committee holds hearing on worldwide threats

[0:00] National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General William Hartman, [0:06] and the DIA Director, Lieutenant General James Adams. Thank you all for your appearance today [0:11] and for your service. I also want to offer a special thanks to General Hartman, who is about [0:16] to enter a well-earned and well-deserved retirement. General, on behalf of the committee, [0:21] thank you for your lifetime of service to our nation. I'd first like to take this opportunity [0:27] to commend the thousands of men and women in our intelligence agencies whom our witnesses [0:32] represent. Our intelligence professionals are second to none. Because of their service, [0:37] their dedication, and their sacrifice, Americans are safer at home and around the world. [0:41] But because of the nature of their work, grateful Americans don't buy their lunch at restaurants or [0:46] even have a chance to say thank you. So on their behalf, let me simply say thank you. [0:52] I want to make two basic points this morning. First, the world is always a dangerous place, [0:59] especially for America. But thanks to your agencies and President Trump's leadership, [1:03] the world isn't quite as dangerous. [1:05] for Americans as it was a year ago. Thanks to the efforts of our military and intelligence [1:10] personnel, including my fellow Arkansans who are now serving in the Middle East, [1:15] the Iranian revolutionary regime that terrorized the world for 47 years is finally knocked on its [1:21] back foot. Last summer, we devastated Iran's nuclear facilities. In recent weeks, we've [1:27] eliminated Iran's top leadership, pummeled its military, sunk its navy, destroyed its missiles, [1:32] neutered its proxies, and left its economy. [1:35] After 47 years of indecision and timidity, America has finally put our foot down. [1:43] I'm also pleased to report that things have improved a lot in our own backyard now that [1:47] Venezuela's illegitimate communist dictator, Nicolas Maduro, is rotting in a New York prison. [1:53] Only the United States could execute a military and intelligence operation [1:57] of this difficulty without a single American life lost. [2:02] Our military is awesome, but these operations wouldn't have succeeded and they'd probably have [2:07] probably wouldn't have even been tried without timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence [2:12] from your agencies. [2:14] These successful operations are a testament to our intelligence professionals' ability [2:19] to expose and uncover critical details about America's enemies. [2:24] So let this be a warning to those who wish America harm. [2:27] We leave no stone unturned. [2:30] And there's no one or no thing close to you that might not betray you. [2:37] Today's hearing is an opportunity for the American people to hear an unvarnished and [2:40] unbiased account of the remaining threats we face. [2:43] From communist China, North Korea and Russia, to the East, to narco-terrorist cartels here [2:48] at home, these threats truly do span the globe. [2:53] And for my second point, your agencies have improved over the last year thanks to reforms [2:59] that has gotten them back to basics. [3:01] Of course, my two points are related. [3:05] When our intelligence agencies return to their core mission, stealing the secrets of [3:09] our adversaries to deliver timely and needful intelligence, America is safer for it. [3:14] These efforts are already bearing fruit. [3:17] For example, last year, the CIA increased its foreign intelligence reporting by 25 percent. [3:23] This year, the CIA is on track to hire and deploy more officers than at any point in [3:28] the last quarter century. [3:29] While I'm greatly encouraged by the progress, more remains to be done. [3:34] We must always equip our intelligence personnel with the tools they need to do their jobs [3:39] well and execute their mission. [3:40] That's why I fully support President Trump's request for a clean reauthorization of FISA [3:46] Section 702. [3:47] And it's why I expect a healthy intelligence budget request in the administration's supplemental [3:53] appropriations request to fund operations against Iran and narco-terrorists. [3:58] No doubt our military needs supplemental funding, but our intelligence agencies need it just [4:03] as badly. [4:05] Moreover, I urge each of you to continue to make personnel and institutional reforms [4:09] that will cement these changes for the future. [4:10] Thank you. [4:12] Thank you very much. [4:44] Namely, by growing our cadre of collectors, making generational investments in core capabilities, providing new capabilities to defend our space assets, and further codifying reforms to guard against any future return of bloated and biased bureaucracy. [5:00] I look forward to working with you towards these ends. I now recognize the Vice Chairman. [5:05] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me also offer a good morning to our witnesses. [5:09] Let me also join you, Mr. Chairman, and begin by thanking literally the tens of thousands of men and women across America's intelligence community who work every day to keep our country safe. [5:24] Their work is by necessity secret. That is the nature of intelligence. But that is also why hearings like this one matter so much. [5:34] Over the past year, we have seen a series of developments that raise serious concerns about the erosion of safeguards [5:43] that protect our security. [5:44] And nowhere is that more worrying than when it comes to the integrity of our elections. [5:55] For decades now, our intelligence community has warned that foreign adversaries, including Russia, China, and Iran, are actively seeking to shape the outcome of American elections. [6:09] These efforts have included cyber-intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and covert influence operations designed to divide Americans [6:17] into different groups. [6:18] We've heard that cyber-intrusions fall into many groups and undermine our confidence in our democratic institutions. [6:20] Protecting our elections from these threats should be one of the intelligence communities' highest priorities. [6:28] The DNI is supposed to be coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference. [6:37] Warning the American people about adversaries seeking to undermine our democracy. [6:43] Ensuring that federal, state, and local officials have the information they need. [6:47] Congress even required the creation of a foreign militia alliance. [6:48] How could that happen? [6:49] How could that happen? [6:50] OHو [6:51] of a foreign malign influence center inside the office of the DNI to coordinate the intelligence [6:59] community's response to foreign election interference and ensure that these threats [7:04] are properly shared across the government. [7:08] That is the mission Congress assigned to the DNI. [7:12] But while foreign adversaries are actively probing our democratic institutions, the DNI [7:18] has eliminated the foreign malign influence center and does not have a designated official [7:24] coordinating the response to election threats. [7:28] And for months, the committee has repeatedly requested briefings from the IC, briefings [7:36] that are required by law on legitimate foreign threats to the midterms. [7:42] We have received no response. [7:45] Now, that silence, I believe, should concern every member of the committee, because it [7:51] clearly demonstrates the DNI is not interested in protecting American democracy by combating [7:57] foreign influence. [7:58] Instead, unfortunately, we have seen the DNI involve herself in purely domestic matters. [8:07] Last month, we saw Director Gabbard personally participate in a law enforcement raid to seize [8:13] election ballots and voting machine records in Fulton County, Georgia, a raid tied to [8:21] an election that the president lost six years ago. [8:25] When the warrant supporting the raid was unsealed, it showed something deeply troubling. [8:31] There was no foreign connection. [8:33] There was no foreign connection. [8:34] The DNI had neither. [8:36] The DNI had neither. [8:37] The Supreme Court had neither. [8:38] Neither did the court, the Supreme Court or the DNI. [8:39] But the habrid party always had the power to play on foreign interests. [8:40] The gurney, the big, big does not do anything, but does do that to protect American democracy. [8:42] But the Department of Justice did not do anything, it just simply did not do anything [8:43] to protect the Constitution from going to court and from seeking to [8:46] the Supreme Court to justify the involvement of our nation's top spy. [8:48] Instead, the predicate for the warrant was a slop of debunked conspiracy theories that [8:49] have already been rejected repeatedly by courts, by independent investigators, and by even [8:51] by Georgia's own Republican secretary of state. [8:52] Yet the nation's top intelligence officer official was personally involved in this operation. [8:54] In this case it is a very serious question. [8:56] top intelligence officer official was personally involved in this operation this raises one very serious question if the intelligence community is not being deployed to mobilize against foreign threats why is it being deployed at all on a domestic issue the DNI's appearance at this rate as well as their involvement in seizing seizing voting machines from Puerto Rico suggests something that should also alarm every American I believe in [9:29] organized effort to misuse her national security powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially provide a pretext for the president's unconstitutional efforts to seize control of the upcoming elections don't take my word for it the president has repeatedly pushed for the nationalization of our elections calling for federal government to override the state election laws and quote take over voting while continuing to make false statements about election [10:03] voting. [10:03] fraud and we have heard troubling rhetoric from senior officials that reinforce these concerns as former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem said publicly we've been and this is a quote we've been proactive trying to make sure we have the right people voting electing the right leaders to lead this country at the same time the administration has brought into government individuals promoting conspiracy theories about our elections the so-called White House director of election security [10:39] and integrity Kurt Olson played a key role in efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election now Mr. Olson holds a position inside the federal government with the authority to refer criminal investigations and access our most sensitive security information all supposedly doing his witch hunts around elections matter of fact according to the court filings he helped trigger the FBI seizure of the ballots in Fulton County so it is worth asking what is the [11:13] why is someone whose career has been devoted to undermining the legitimate results of a democratic election now operating from inside the federal government with access to law enforcement and intelligence authorities what exactly has he been empowered to do as members of our committee know this create as members know this committee was created in the aftermath of the unconstitutional abuses exposed after Watergate the guardrails have been built around our intelligence and law enforcement authorities. [11:47] listen I I as an kirch send companies has ever developed a [11:51] moralguards force called cops orよう serotic [11:53] understand law enforcement agencies over the past several decades access for a reason. Without them. America begins to look more like adversaries emphasize in this year's and you are threat assessment China. Russia. [12:07] Iran North Korea [12:11] and last like a democracy. any confront confronting these very clear and present threats to American security requires experience professionals in X intelligence agn [12:18] フ Company clearly those to our [12:19] Dr. C def lat invented special [12:21] European Konrad [12:21] Mr. Ivanov [12:21] year, we've seen actions that only serve to weaken them. [12:26] Politically motivated purges at the FBI has resulted in the exodus of hundreds of agents [12:33] and the reassignments of hundreds more from key national security areas like counterintelligence, [12:40] counterterrorism and cyber, and where they've been redeployed to immigration enforcement. [12:46] In one troubling case, agents working on a task force focused on threats from Iran, clearly [12:54] something that's pretty damn important right now, were dismissed because they had previously [13:00] participated in the investigation of the president's mishandling of classified information. [13:07] Elsewhere, the bureau's budget is being slashed. [13:10] Last year, it cut over $500 million, with the largest decreases from cyber, counterterrorism [13:18] and counterespionage. [13:21] And the remaining scarce resources are being squandered on things like a $60 million jet [13:26] for the director's personal travel, so we can go golfing in Scotland. [13:29] Or partying with athletes in Milan. [13:32] In fact, according to a whistleblower account, those flights became so frequent they even [13:37] delayed the bureau's response to major incidents like the Charlie Kirk assassination or shooting [13:42] at Brown University. [13:44] Credible reports also indicate that highly trained FBI agents from elite SWAT units have [13:50] been reassigned to chauffeur his girlfriend, an unprecedented use of personnel whose training [13:58] are actually intended for hunting violent criminals and neutralizing terrorists. [14:02] Unfortunately, this dysfunction has not been limited to the FBI. [14:08] Both the National Security Agency and the Defense and Intelligence Agency—and this [14:12] is no reflection on the two gentlemen sitting in front of us—were both left leaderless [14:18] for months after the president fired their directors, one at the behest of a 9-11 conspiracy [14:25] theorist and the other for providing a fact-based assessment that contradicted the president's [14:33] claims about obliterating Iran's nuclear weapons. [14:34] That's what I'm saying. [14:36] That's what I've been saying. [14:36] The president has been abusing Iran's nuclear program. [14:39] Clearly, if the program had been truly obliterated, the president wouldn't be bombing again right [14:43] now. [14:45] And again, more than one-third of the personnel at CISA, created by Congress to protect critical [14:53] infrastructure like power, water, and election systems, have been forced out. [14:57] That seems like a real mistake as we still grapple with the intrusion called CYTOON and [15:04] the recent Iranian cyberattack on Stryker. [15:08] And we are now seeing, in real time, the cost to the statespeople of the country. [15:10] And we also have to make lessons learned about the nature of the cities. [15:10] We have to make lessons learned about the cities. [15:10] We have to make lessons learned about the cities. [15:10] We have to make lessons learned about the cities. [15:10] We have to make lessons learned about the cities. [15:11] to the State Department, thousands of American citizens were trapped in a literal war zone [15:16] with little assistance from their own government. [15:19] For a time, those calling the State Department hotline for assistance were greeted with a [15:23] prerecorded message that said, quote, Please do not rely on the U.S. government for assisted [15:30] departure or evacuation. [15:33] This was a foreseeable security crisis. [15:37] When you start a war of choice, when there was no imminent threat, you should be able [15:43] to prepare to make sure you get Americans out of the war zone. [15:50] That same attitude—pushing some of our closest friends into the arms of our most capable [15:55] foes—has profound consequences. [15:58] Two of our most significant allies, Canada and the U.K., are currently working to sign [16:03] trade deals with China because they no longer believe the United States is a dependable [16:10] partner. [16:12] That's a remarkable statement in 2026. [16:15] And in the president's war of choice with Iran—a war that has already killed more [16:20] than 13 service members, cost American taxpayers billions of dollars, and scrambled supply [16:27] chains from oil to fertilizer to aluminum—nobody answered the call when the president asked [16:34] our allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. [16:38] As the president's own counterterrorism chief acknowledged in his resignation yesterday, [16:44] Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States. [16:49] Unfortunately, our allies have been alienated and distracted by the administration's [16:56] unilateral threats, like invading Greenland. [16:59] And the result is clear. [17:01] Americans have been left more exposed in an already dangerous conflict. [17:05] Now, what I say—what I just outlined is quite a list, and it's a partial one at [17:11] that. [17:12] Matter of fact, we've got a full list we'd like to share with all the press. [17:15] So what does this all mean? [17:17] It matters because I believe the warnings contained in this year's annual threat assessment. [17:24] I believe our I.C. when they say the global security environment is becoming more complex. [17:30] And that armed conflict is becoming more global. [17:35] And I also agree with the assessment when it says that to succeed, we must think prudently [17:40] and prioritize our efforts. [17:43] On the topic of the annual threat assessment, I want to close where I began, by noting that [17:49] since the first time since 2017, in the aftermath of Russia's intervention in our 2016 elections, [17:58] the annual threat assessment includes nothing—nothing—about adversary attempts to influence America. [18:05] I agree with that. [18:07] Now, I don't believe this omission means that the threat has disappeared. [18:14] It means that the intelligence community is no longer being allowed to speak honestly [18:19] about it. [18:21] And it raises serious questions. [18:23] And I will be asking about your priorities, Director Gabbard, in terms of what you're [18:27] choosing to prioritize instead. [18:28] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [18:30] I yield back. [18:31] GABRIEL GABERDIN, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [18:32] Before we go to the witnesses, now that we have a critical mass of members, I would simply [18:34] like to remind members that we will handle questions as we did last year—seniority, [18:39] At the time of the gavel and alternating between Democrats and Republicans will have one round of questions, seven minutes per round. I will not entertain questions after seven minute time has expired. Furthermore, I expect to convene the closed session in our usual location promptly 30 minutes after the open session begins. Director Gabbard, the floor is yours. Thank you, Chairman Cotton by sure Warner members of the committee. Good morning. I'm here today to present the 2026 annual [19:12] threat assessment joined by the directors of the CIA, FBI, DIA and NSA. Before I continue on behalf of the intelligence community want to extend our thanks to General Hartman for his 37 years of service in uniform and closing out his 37 years with tremendous leadership of the NSA. This briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI statutory responsibility. I'd like to remind those who are watching what I am briefing here today conveys the intelligence communities. [19:44] assessment of the threats facing U. S citizens are homeland and our interests. [19:49] Not my personal views or opinions in this assessment. We're following the structure of priorities that were laid out [19:56] in the president's national security strategy, starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting [20:02] to global risks. [20:04] The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people, and efforts by this administration have shown over the last year, the results of bolstering homeland defense. [20:15] In the states and SAMAS. [20:16] To imagine someone frontal [20:16] and далее [20:16] breaking the drie [20:16] mapped [20:16] security of the American people. For example, the strict enforcement of U.S. policies at the [20:22] U.S.-Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent, drastically reducing illegal [20:27] immigration. Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, January 2026's monthly encounters are down [20:33] 83.8 percent compared to January 2025. Encounters declined 79 percent compared to 2024. The drivers [20:45] of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and [20:49] Haiti risk triggering migration surges, and smugglers who have long operated as transnational [20:55] criminal organizations continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will continue to [21:02] look to profit from illegal immigration flows. These transnational criminal organizations continue [21:08] to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens, primarily [21:14] and directly by producing and [21:16] trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths have [21:22] seen a 30 percent decrease from September 2024 to September 2025. President Trump's aggressive [21:29] efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations and reduce [21:34] the inflow of fentanyl precursors has already had a significant impact, which is likely to continue. [21:40] We've seen fentanyl potency also decrease, likely due to disruptions to the production [21:47] supply chain. [21:48] U.S. efforts to work with China and India to halt the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to North America are demonstrating some improvement. [21:59] But there is more work to be done, as sadly, there are still tens of thousands of fentanyl-related deaths in America every year. [22:06] Mexico-based TCOs like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, meth, [22:14] and cocaine into the United States. [22:17] Colombia-based DCOs and illegal arms companies like the United States have a deep impact on the worldwide ecosystem of fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine deaths in the United States. [22:19] Colombia-based TCOs and illegal arms companies have a deep impact on the international community, and they're also incredibly important to the United States and the United States as a whole. If we're to do more to follow that trend, we can certainly support them and multiply the focus of the American economy with time. [22:20] groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army [22:25] are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to the U.S. and European [22:30] markets, with now some indicators of attempts to expand their market to the Asia-Pacific [22:36] region. [22:37] Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, and Colombian criminal groups [22:42] have expanded their trafficking relationships with neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian [22:47] gangs. [22:49] As you know, MS-13 is well established in cells within the United States and uses violence [22:54] to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, [23:01] firearms offenses, and prostitution, fueling increased violence and instability. [23:06] These and other TCOs continue to present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent [23:11] crime to everyday Americans and contribute to regional instability. [23:16] As the president increases his focus on counter-drug and counter-cartel pressures, [23:20] they are likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting production [23:26] locations and trafficking routes and methods. [23:28] The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically [23:35] diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm [23:41] Americans, even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain weaker today than they were at their respective [23:47] peaks. [23:49] The spread of Islamist ideology in some cases led to the rise of extremism and extremism [23:51] in the United States. [23:51] The threat posed by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood poses [23:56] a fundamental threat to freedom and the foundational principles that underpin Western civilization. [24:03] Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist [24:08] groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing [24:14] an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia. [24:18] There are increasing examples of this in various European countries, and President Trump's [24:22] designation of Islamist caliphate has been a major threat. [24:22] The designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations [24:26] is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. [24:30] In response to setbacks to their capabilities of conducting large-scale, complex attacks, [24:36] Islamist terrorist groups have shifted toward focusing on executing information operations [24:40] to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the [24:46] West. [24:49] U.S. counterterrorism efforts primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria in 2025 have [24:51] been an incentive to promote military cooperation and economic development. [24:52] The United States continues to force its state-owned sanctions against Islamist terrorists, including [24:53] terrorism and terrorism. [24:54] in 2025 were instrumental in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading [25:00] the ability of Al Qaeda and ISIS to quickly reconstitute its leadership and plan large-scale [25:06] attacks against the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. [25:10] Strict U.S. border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with [25:14] suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed [25:19] some potential sources of future terrorist attacks. [25:23] Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with [25:27] individuals associated with terrorist groups. [25:30] This is a positive trend. [25:32] However, our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to identify, locate, and remove [25:37] known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States continues with vigilance. [25:44] In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States. [25:49] Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based Islamist terrorist plotters. [25:55] Roughly half of the U.S.-based terrorist attacks were in the United States. [25:55] Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist terrorists [26:01] inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. [26:04] For example, in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan, the shooter had familial [26:09] ties to a Hezbollah leader. [26:12] Al Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, [26:17] the Middle East, and South Asia, where these groups operate. [26:21] In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among [26:27] the most important terrorist groups in the Middle East. [26:27] ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit [26:37] funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees and [26:42] thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who were either released or escaped from prisons [26:47] and displaced person camps that were previously run by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast [26:52] Syria. [26:54] Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities, including [26:58] the U.S. military, and the U.S. military's military capabilities in kinetic and cyber [27:00] warfare. [27:03] The United States' secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland [27:08] against strategic threats. [27:10] However, the intelligence community assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and [27:14] Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional [27:19] missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland [27:24] within range. [27:26] The I.C. assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 [27:31] missiles by 2035, from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. [27:38] The I.C. assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant [27:42] to be capable of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. [27:46] North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil, and the I.C. assesses that it is committed [27:52] to expanding its nuclear arsenal. [27:56] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with a range [28:01] capable of striking the homeland. [28:02] The I.C. assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant [28:04] to be capable of penetrating the homeland. [28:05] The I.C. assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology [28:09] it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before 2035, should Tehran attempt [28:16] to pursue that capability. [28:17] However, these assessments will clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic [28:24] Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch [28:29] capabilities is determined. [28:32] These nations collectively will likely seek to understand U.S. plans for advanced missile [28:35] defense for the homeland. [28:37] Probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs and assessing [28:41] U.S. intentions regarding deterrence. [28:44] Shifting to the cyber domain, the I.C. assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and [28:49] non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and [28:54] private sector networks as well as critical infrastructure to collect intelligence, create [28:59] options for future disruption, and for financial gain. [29:03] The I.C. assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and [29:08] are continuing their R&D efforts. [29:11] North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [29:14] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole $2 billion, which the [29:20] I.C. assesses is helping to fund the regime and include further development of its strategic [29:25] weapons programs. [29:27] Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, with ransomware [29:33] groups shifting to faster, high-volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate. [29:37] The I.C. assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and [29:39] are continuing their R&D efforts. [29:40] Russia's artificial intelligence will likely accelerate these threats in the cyber domain. [29:46] The I.C. assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators [29:50] and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. [29:54] For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct a data extortion [30:00] operation against international government, healthcare, and public health emergency service [30:05] sectors, as well as religious institutions. [30:10] Moving to the Arctic, the I.C. assesses that Russia — and to a lesser extent, Russia's [30:10] computer-based intelligence — will likely accelerate these threats in the cyber domain. [30:11] The I.C. assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators [30:12] and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. [30:13] extent, China aimed to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, [30:17] natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline [30:23] in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its polar great power status and is deploying [30:29] more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, though not an Arctic [30:34] country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its own strategic and economic [30:39] interests. The IC assesses that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial [30:49] intelligence. The IC assesses that AI capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat [30:54] landscape. As this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human [31:00] learning comprehension, problem solving, creativity, and autonomy, it will be critical [31:05] to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is used and of the machines that may threaten [31:11] to autonomously violate the interests of the American people. [31:13] Across all domains, AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. [31:22] AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and has been used in recent conflicts [31:27] to influence targeting and streamline decision making, underscoring the risk and likely threats [31:32] that could manifest on the battlefield. Early developers in quantum computers will give [31:40] countries an extraordinary technological advantage over others to quickly process national security [31:45] information. [31:46] And break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, [31:51] healthcare, and government information. The global security landscape is volatile [31:58] and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against [32:03] U.S. interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming [32:07] more willing to use force to pursue their interests, heightening the risk of conflict. [32:12] The IC assesses the space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia [32:18] developing counter space capabilities to challenge U.S. space efforts. [32:23] The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological [32:27] warfare capabilities continues to grow. I'll turn now to our neighborhood and [32:32] the Western Hemisphere where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive, organized crime, [32:37] migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, all of these, present a spectrum of risks to U.S. [32:43] interests, and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region. [32:50] that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hotspots of volatility in the coming year. [32:57] Since Maduro's arrest, the IC assesses a shift in Venezuela's leadership [33:02] towards cooperating with the U.S. to open its economy, [33:06] to develop the country's oil and gas extraction capability, [33:09] and we've seen their movement in releasing political prisoners. [33:13] The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty [33:18] in many Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico [33:22] as an export destination for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. [33:29] China, Russia, and Iran are likely seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America. [33:37] The IC assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its economic outreach, [33:43] while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. [33:48] The IC assesses that... [33:51] The IC assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power [33:55] to increase its own regional positioning and global influence to fend off threats to their interests. [34:03] While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, [34:06] President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to work towards U.S. interests [34:10] have enabled progress where those interests align. [34:14] The IC assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces [34:18] across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status [34:22] by mid-September. [34:23] This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring U.S. and allied forces in the region [34:29] and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. [34:37] However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions [34:41] for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. [34:46] The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. [34:51] Its weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military, [34:55] its military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities [35:00] poses a threat to U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. [35:06] North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing. [35:10] And in 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, [35:14] still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. [35:19] The IC assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine [35:22] has increased North Korea's capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience, [35:27] in 21st century warfare, along with equipment. [35:30] In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk. [35:37] Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, [35:42] including missiles that can evade U.S. and regional missile defenses. [35:46] It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile [35:50] and maintains biological and chemical weapons capabilities. [35:54] Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. interests globally, [35:59] by military and non-military means. [36:02] The IC assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. [36:06] is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, [36:12] or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons. [36:18] The IC assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, [36:23] as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the U.S. homeland [36:27] and forces abroad than conventional weapons. [36:30] Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, [36:33] and undersea capabilities designed to negate U.S. military advantage. [36:37] Moscow also relies on other tools to exert pressure, [36:41] using gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed conflict. [36:46] Russia is also building an extensive counter space capabilities to contest U.S. space dominance. [36:53] Its development of a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. [37:01] During the past year, the IC assesses that Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. [37:07] U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv are ongoing. [37:11] Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition [37:16] until they view their objectives have been achieved. [37:20] In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. [37:26] The IC assesses that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region [37:32] that began with Hamas's attacks on Ukraine, [37:34] followed by an attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, [37:38] and continued with the 12-day war last year, [37:41] resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. [37:45] The IC assesses the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded [37:49] due to attacks on its leadership and military capabilities. [37:53] Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, [37:58] leaving limited options. [38:00] Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded. [38:03] The U.S.-led maximum pressure capabilities [38:06] and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure [38:09] to an already bleak Iranian economy, [38:11] resulting in mass protests earlier this year [38:14] that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. [38:19] Even if the regime remains intact, [38:21] the IC assesses that internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens. [38:27] Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. [38:35] The IC assesses that if a hostile regime survives, [38:38] it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort [38:41] to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. [38:45] Prior to Operation Epic Fury, [38:48] the IC assesses Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage [38:51] to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war [38:55] and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, [38:59] refusing them access to key facilities. [39:02] The IC assesses that China, Russia, and North Korea [39:06] see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. [39:10] Iran has long viewed the U.S. as an adversary [39:13] and is engaged in active conflict with the U.S. as of today. [39:17] These four countries, the IC assesses, [39:20] are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other, [39:23] which could bolster their individual capabilities [39:26] and threats to U.S. interests more broadly. [39:28] However, currently these relationships are primarily bilateral [39:32] on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, [39:36] divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases, [39:39] concerns over directly confronting [39:41] the United States. [39:43] These factors, the IC assesses, [39:45] are likely to constrain their relationships. [39:48] Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa [39:51] are likely to persist through 2026 [39:53] due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support. [39:58] Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, [40:01] which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. [40:03] Contentious national elections in Somalia [40:05] could distract the federal government [40:07] away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab, [40:10] which continues to conduct terror attacks [40:12] while providing funding and propaganda support [40:15] to other elements of al-Qaeda in Yemen. [40:17] The civil war in Sudan continues, [40:20] even as external negotiations occur. [40:23] ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel [40:26] have increased the intensity of their attacks [40:28] against local security forces, [40:30] expanding their areas of operation [40:32] and moving closer to cities with the U.S. presence. [40:35] The IC assesses that African governments [40:38] will likely use their wealth and critical minerals [40:40] to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. [40:43] Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent [40:47] will continue to put U.S. citizens at risk [40:49] and cause further instability. [40:51] In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, [40:55] we remain committed to providing [40:57] the president and policymakers [40:59] with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence [41:02] to inform decision-making [41:04] and to ensure the safety, security, and freedom [41:06] of the American people. Thank you. [41:08] Thank you, Director Gabbard. [41:10] General Adams, Camden, Arkansas [41:12] is the home of brand-new production lines [41:14] for the Israeli missile defense interceptors. [41:16] Could you please explain [41:18] how critical Aero and Iron Dome systems [41:21] being built in Camden [41:23] are for not only Israel's defenses, [41:26] but the defense of hundreds of thousands [41:28] of American citizens and troops in the region? [41:31] Chairman Cotton, thank you for that question. [41:34] And I have to say that the Aero system [41:37] and the Iron Dome system [41:39] are critical defensive systems [41:41] that prevent adversary power projection [41:44] from impacting the targets [41:49] and the friendly areas in Israel. [41:51] The Aero system itself is the high altitude [41:55] primarily against MRBMs, [41:58] and it's proven to be very, very effective [42:00] against those systems. [42:02] The Iron Dome is more of a closer-in system, [42:06] protecting against rockets and things of that nature. [42:08] But the combination of those two [42:10] with U.S. systems [42:13] creates a shield to prevent those attacks [42:16] from the Iranians impacting key areas [42:19] in areas where they're protecting. [42:22] Thank you, General Adams. [42:25] I was recently in Camden with Secretary Hegsath [42:27] as part of his Arsenal of Freedom tour, [42:29] and they are Greater Arkansans [42:31] who do great work to keep our nation safe. [42:33] General Hartman, we've often spoken [42:35] about our pressing need [42:37] for more cybersecurity manpower [42:39] and part-time formation, [42:41] such as the Arkansas Air National Guard's [42:43] 23rd Cyberspace Operations Squadron [42:45] are a great way to grow the force. [42:48] What recommendations do you have [42:50] to grow these cyber protection teams [42:52] and develop more capacity [42:54] for local and national missions? [42:58] Chairman Cotton, thanks for the question. [43:00] I did hear a little bit about [43:02] the great team in Arkansas there, [43:04] and I know 855 CPT operates from that formation. [43:07] And so for us, certainly looking at [43:09] a number of different initiatives, [43:11] one, ensure that we can share [43:13] all of the relevant, top-secret, [43:15] classified information [43:17] and other sort of indications and warning [43:19] that the organizations need. [43:21] But I will tell you, I'm an advocate [43:23] for an ability to establish [43:25] some sort of joint reserve [43:27] cyber organization, and so that [43:29] at CyberCom, we can ensure that [43:31] those organizations have [43:33] all of the advanced training that they need [43:35] to ensure that those organizations [43:37] have access to all of the intelligence [43:39] that they need, [43:41] and to ensure that we control some level [43:43] of funding at both CyberCom and NSA. [43:45] That can be used to mobilize [43:47] those personnel to handle the most [43:49] difficult problems that we're faced with. [43:51] And we have been working with Congress [43:53] on some of that language and the department, [43:55] and we appreciate it, sir. [43:57] Thank you, General Hartman. [44:00] As I said in my opening, we only have [44:02] this one public hearing a year, [44:04] even though the committee hears from each of you [44:06] several times a year in classified settings, [44:08] so we don't often have a chance [44:10] to tell the American people [44:12] what great work their intelligence professionals [44:14] are doing for them. [44:16] Could you take the opportunity [44:18] to maybe join in [44:20] the excellent briefings that Secretary [44:22] Hegseth and General Kane have provided [44:24] on a regular basis [44:26] over the last couple months [44:28] on the military aspects of both the Maduro [44:30] raid and Operation Epic Fury to explain [44:32] the CIA's contributions [44:34] to those operations? [44:36] Thank you, Senator. [44:38] You know, last year when I was here [44:40] in my confirmation, [44:42] I promised you all, and you got all [44:44] asked for, a more aggressive [44:46] approach to the CIA, [44:48] one that was focused on core mission, [44:50] getting back to the business of stealing [44:52] secrets, to be able to provide [44:55] our policymakers with [44:57] a decisive strategic advantage [44:59] that would allow and advance [45:01] and contribute to foreign [45:03] policy and national [45:05] security successes. [45:07] To the credit of the CIA workforce, [45:09] the CIA has delivered. [45:11] Some of those [45:13] successes have been very public. [45:15] As you mentioned, Senator, [45:17] Operation Midnight Hammer, [45:19] Operation Absolute Resolve, [45:21] flawless military [45:23] operations like Pied Briefings [45:25] contributed in myriad ways [45:27] to the success of that. [45:29] But what I would say to you is [45:31] those successes are just emblematic [45:33] of the phenomenal progress and success [45:35] really by every measure, [45:37] every metric, every standard [45:39] across every national security space [45:41] with regard to the work [45:43] of the CIA. [45:45] Senator, you mentioned some of it in your opening. [45:47] The increase of our [45:49] assets stable and our [45:51] human sources up by 25 percent, [45:53] our FI collection across the board, [45:55] our foreign intelligence collection [45:57] up by 25 percent [45:59] overall, and in important [46:01] categories like China, for instance, [46:03] up 100 percent. [46:05] In areas like tech and AI, [46:07] up 45 percent. [46:09] On the counter narcotics front, our operations [46:11] up by 70 percent. [46:13] And with regard to counterterrorism, [46:15] those are classified [46:17] numbers that I'll share with you in the [46:19] classified portion of this hearing, [46:21] but they're off the charts good. [46:23] The best way I can summarize it, [46:25] Senator, is I had a 32-year [46:27] veteran of the agency retire [46:29] this year, and he said to me, [46:31] I hate to go. I don't know [46:34] if this is the best year that the CIA's ever had, [46:36] but it's the best year I can ever remember. [46:38] And I think that reflects the current [46:40] morale of the CIA. [46:42] It's a workforce that knows it's doing a great job. [46:44] It knows that [46:46] it's being allowed to do [46:48] what they signed up to do, which is [46:50] provide that decisive strategic [46:52] advantage to our [46:54] country for great successes that [46:56] everyone can see. So I thank you for the opportunity [46:58] to let me recognize the CIA [47:00] workforce. Thank you. [47:02] Director Ratcliffe, I want to address [47:04] one specific threat from Iran, [47:06] the threat of an intercontinental missile, [47:08] which is really just the combination of [47:10] two technologies, one thrust to [47:12] get something into space and a reentry vehicle [47:14] to get it back to Earth. [47:16] Iran has always had a space [47:18] launch program, which is flimsy cover [47:20] for the first part of that intercontinental [47:22] missile program. I haven't seen any Iranian astronauts [47:24] in space lately. And [47:26] second, they have medium-range ballistic missiles, [47:28] which already have a reentry vehicle. [47:30] So if you crudely married those [47:32] two technologies together, [47:34] I've heard some analysts say that [47:36] Iran could have had a [47:38] functioning intercontinental missile [47:40] to threaten the United States in as few as [47:42] six months. Would you agree with [47:44] that assessment? Well, you're right [47:46] to be concerned about Iran's development [47:48] of longer-range ballistic missiles, [47:50] Senator. If Iran were allowed [47:52] to develop at the [47:54] IRBM ranges, [47:56] which is 3,000 kilometers, [47:58] it would threaten most of Europe. [48:00] And yes, as you mentioned, [48:02] we know that [48:04] Iran is gaining experience in these larger, [48:06] more powerful [48:08] booster technologies through its [48:10] so-called space [48:12] launch vehicle program. [48:14] If left unimpeded, [48:16] yes, Senator, they [48:18] would have the ability to [48:20] range missiles to the continental [48:22] U.S. It's one of the [48:24] reasons why degrading Iran's [48:26] missile production [48:28] capabilities that is [48:30] taking place right now in Operation [48:32] Epic Fury is so important [48:34] to our national security. Thank you. [48:36] Vice Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [48:39] Director Gabbard, [48:42] the whole country knows that you were [48:44] recently involved in a [48:46] FBI operation to seize [48:48] ballots in Fulton County, Georgia. [48:51] This was despite the fact that the [48:53] warrant showed no foreign [48:57] interference or nexus. As a matter of fact, the [48:59] warrant was based entirely on [49:01] conspiracy theories that have already been [49:03] examined and rejected [49:05] repeatedly. Now, where is the [49:08] authority for you to involve yourself [49:10] in a domestic law enforcement [49:13] activity? Thank you, Vice Chairman. I [49:17] appreciate the question. As you know, [49:19] I've addressed every issue you've raised [49:21] in detail in a letter, but I'm grateful [49:23] for the opportunity to do it in this forum. [49:25] As you stated, [49:27] Congress provided by [49:29] statute, ODNI, with [49:31] the responsibility of election security [49:33] and counterintelligence [49:35] in 2021. As you [49:37] also know, ODNI has purview [49:39] and oversight... Ma'am, could you... I know the [49:41] history very well, but could you just address where... [49:43] I am addressing the question. ODNI [49:45] also has purview [49:47] and overview over two [49:49] domestic-related agencies, the Department [49:51] of Homeland Security and the FBI, both [49:53] of which have purview over [49:55] election security responsibilities. [49:57] To ensure the integrity of our elections. [49:59] I want to correct [50:01] one of your statements that you've made multiple [50:03] times, which is false. I did not [50:06] participate in a law enforcement [50:08] activity, nor would I, because [50:10] that does not exist within my authorities. [50:12] You were present on the scene. [50:14] Are the photos of you on the scene [50:16] false? I was at Fulton County, sir, [50:18] at the request of the President [50:20] and to work with [50:22] the FBI to observe [50:24] this action that had long [50:26] been awaited. I was not aware of what [50:28] was in the warrant or was not in the warrant. [50:30] And what was the President's specific request for you to go to... [50:32] What was the specific request that was made [50:34] by the President for you to show up in Fulton County? [50:36] To go and observe the FBI's [50:38] activities on this issue. [50:40] When you look at the fort, your question is served. [50:42] Do you have the answer why the President was [50:44] knowing about this affidavit before it was [50:46] even served? I'm not aware that the President [50:48] knew about an affidavit before it was served. [50:50] Then why was he sending you to Fulton County? [50:52] This occurred the day [50:54] that the FBI had it approved, [50:56] their warrant approved, by a local [50:58] judge, and they began to execute [51:00] this. To address your question, [51:02] sir, about the foreign nexus question. [51:04] In order for us to better understand [51:06] the vulnerabilities in our [51:08] election systems that may exist today, [51:10] as we look to 2026, [51:12] and yes, we are very focused [51:14] on trying to make sure that this election [51:16] is one that the American people have... [51:18] Director Gabbard, I've got a number of questions. [51:20] Director Gabbard, I have a number of questions. [51:22] Let me ask my next question, please. [51:24] You have not provided [51:27] any of the required reports [51:29] or briefings to this committee [51:32] on foreign [51:34] interference. This is the first [51:36] threat assessment [51:38] since 2017 [51:41] that didn't even mention foreign [51:43] interference. Last year [51:45] when you were already [51:47] confirmed, it mentioned it at high [51:50] level. Are you saying there is no foreign [51:52] threat to our elections in the midterms [51:54] this year? As I stated in the outset [51:57] of my remarks, this year's [51:59] annual threat assessment matches [52:01] the prioritization of threats [52:03] and... Please answer the question, yes or no. Is there [52:05] foreign threat interference [52:07] to our elections this year? [52:09] Please allow me to answer the question, [52:11] sir. The intelligence community has been [52:13] and continues to remain focused [52:15] on any collection and intelligence products [52:17] that show a potential [52:19] foreign threat for those [52:21] who are... So far, there has been none [52:23] then, because you've made no reports... [52:25] Excuse me, ma'am. If you want to ask the questions, [52:27] you should have stayed in Congress. [52:29] Please answer the questions. I didn't ask you a question, [52:31] sir. I'm trying to answer your questions. [52:33] So you're saying the failure to provide any reports [52:35] or the failure to have [52:37] any mention of a foreign threat [52:39] assessment, I would draw the conclusion [52:42] there must be no foreign threat to our [52:44] elections in 26. So that brings me [52:46] a question that I have for both you, ma'am, [52:48] and Director Patel. There are [52:50] reports that [52:52] in 2020, the President was [52:54] preparing an executive order to potentially [52:56] seize ballots [52:58] or bring in federal forces. [53:00] There is a published report that [53:02] there is a similar EO being drafted [53:04] right now about 2026, [53:06] citing China. Director Patel, [53:08] do you have any knowledge of that draft EO? [53:10] Thank you, Vice Chairman. [53:13] I do not, sir. Director Gabbard, do you have any? [53:15] I do not. Thank you. [53:18] Let me move to Iran. Now, I understand [53:20] and I appreciated Director [53:22] Gabbard's comments yesterday [53:24] about agreeing that the [53:26] President has sole authority, [53:28] I guess in his bones, to declare whether [53:30] something is an imminent threat. [53:32] I didn't agree with [53:34] your friend, [53:36] Mr. Kent, but I didn't, again, [53:38] I agreed with him yesterday on the [53:40] fact that there was no imminent threat. [53:42] I guess what I'm [53:44] concerned about one thing is [53:46] even in your [53:48] printed testimony today on page [53:50] six, and your [53:52] last paragraph on page six, as a result [53:54] of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear [53:56] enrichment program was obliterated, [53:58] there's been no efforts to try to rebuild their enrichment [54:00] capability, you [54:02] omitted that paragraph from your [54:05] oral opening [54:08] was that because the President [54:10] had said there was an imminent threat [54:12] two weeks ago? No, sir, I [54:14] recognized that the time was running long and [54:16] I skipped through some of the portions [54:18] of my oral delivered remarks. [54:20] You chose to omit the parts that [54:22] contradict [54:24] the President. The President [54:26] continues to say as well [54:28] that he had no idea, was [54:30] shocked that the Iranians [54:32] had moved to take over the Strait of Hormuz. [54:34] Did you provide [54:37] any intelligence that would say that [54:39] it would be [54:41] that it was not likely that the Iranians [54:43] would try to move on the Strait? I'm not [54:45] aware of those remarks, and I think those of [54:47] us here at the table can point [54:49] to the fact that historically [54:51] the Iranians have always threatened [54:53] to leverage their control [54:55] of the Strait of Hormuz. Why would the President say he was amazed? [54:57] I'm not aware of those remarks. What about the comments [54:59] the President made that thought that he was [55:01] surprised again, reports [55:03] that Iran struck the adjacent [55:05] Gulf states? Again, I'm not aware [55:07] of those remarks. We have been [55:09] trying to provide the intelligence. Let me ask you this. Did you brief [55:11] the President? Did you brief the President? [55:13] Did you brief the President [55:15] if he starts a war of [55:18] choice that the likely [55:20] result would be that Iran would [55:22] strike adjacent Gulf nations [55:24] and close the [55:27] Strait of Hormuz? Did you brief him on [55:29] those two facts that I think have been [55:31] consistently the [55:33] assumptions of the intelligence community? [55:36] I have not and won't [55:38] divulge internal conversations. [55:40] I will say that those of us within [55:42] the intelligence community continue [55:44] to provide the President with all of the best [55:46] objective intelligence available [55:48] to inform his decisions. [55:50] Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [55:52] Director Gabbard, [55:55] you just testified [55:57] that ISIS [55:59] and Al-Qaeda [56:01] are significantly [56:03] weaker. And reflecting [56:06] that view, [56:08] you have [56:10] devoted declining [56:12] budgets, personnel, [56:14] and emphasis [56:16] on countering terrorism. [56:18] Yet, the fact [56:21] is that ISIS [56:24] is growing and operating [56:26] in Somalia, Afghanistan, [56:28] Syria, Pakistan, [56:30] and Iraq. [56:33] Al-Qaeda is surging [56:35] in Afghanistan, the Arabian [56:37] Peninsula, and [56:39] throughout Central Africa. [56:41] The Houthis [56:43] in Yemen and the rest [56:45] of the Iranian proxies [56:47] remain a serious [56:49] threat. Focusing, [56:52] as you have done, [56:54] on great power [56:56] competitors seems [56:58] to have diverted [57:00] resources from the [57:02] fight against terrorism. [57:04] A fight that's [57:06] very much still [57:08] going on. As I [57:10] have said repeatedly, [57:12] it is terrorists who [57:14] want and can [57:16] kill Americans [57:18] today. We've just [57:20] seen the terrorists [57:22] in Michigan attacking [57:24] the synagogue. In [57:26] addition, it appears [57:28] that a more stovepiped [57:30] effort in the Intelligence [57:32] Committee has returned. [57:35] How are you ensuring [57:37] that Americans [57:40] are safe [57:42] and that you are [57:44] countering counterterrorism [57:46] threats to our [57:48] homeland and to U.S. [57:50] citizens abroad? [57:53] Thank you, Senator Collins, [57:55] for your question and the [57:57] opportunity to clarify the [57:59] comments in my opening statement. [58:01] My reference to the size [58:03] of ISIS and Al-Qaeda [58:05] organizationally is smaller [58:07] and weaker than it was during [58:09] its peak over a decade ago. [58:11] However, I completely concur [58:13] with your remarks about the [58:15] threat of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and [58:17] other Islamist terrorist groups [58:19] around the world and the threat [58:21] to our homeland. [58:23] Our ODNI National Counterterrorism [58:25] Center has been at the forefront [58:27] of ramping up and I believe [58:29] is more active today than it has [58:31] been certainly in a long time. [58:33] We are dedicating every resource [58:35] that they ask for as well as the [58:37] counterterrorism elements across [58:39] the IC to make sure that we are [58:41] never taking our eye off of this [58:43] persistent threat to the American [58:45] people. The change [58:47] in tactics based on the current [58:49] environment is something we continue [58:51] to be most concerned about. [58:53] Increasingly we are seeing [58:55] less indicators of large [58:57] scale organized complex [58:59] threats or attacks and [59:01] instead efforts focused on [59:03] individuals either who [59:05] have been radicalized by [59:07] Islamist propaganda and [59:09] may not have ever had contact with [59:11] ISIS or Al-Qaeda for example [59:13] and others who have had contact [59:15] of which [59:17] we are able to have more [59:19] indications of. [59:21] This remains and will be and [59:23] as we come to present our budgets [59:25] to you a foremost and primary [59:27] priority the integration across [59:29] the intelligence community on the [59:31] counterterrorism threat occurs [59:33] every single day with our teams [59:35] working very effectively together [59:37] to thwart terrorist attacks as we [59:39] have over the last year. [59:42] Director Patel I'm going to follow [59:44] up on this issue with you. [59:46] ISIS targets potential recruits [59:48] online through [59:50] social media [59:52] gaming platforms [59:54] encrypted messaging [59:56] apps. ISIS even [59:58] facilitated a network online [1:00:00] to smuggle [1:00:02] illegal immigrants [1:00:04] into the United States [1:00:06] since April [1:00:08] 2021. [1:00:10] There have been more than 52 [1:00:12] jihadist [1:00:14] inspired cases across [1:00:16] 30 states. What [1:00:18] measures [1:00:20] is the FBI [1:00:22] taking to prevent [1:00:24] foreign terrorist organizations [1:00:26] from recruiting [1:00:28] or influencing [1:00:30] Americans while [1:00:32] also ensuring the protection [1:00:34] of individuals [1:00:36] right to privacy? [1:00:38] Thank you Senator and I think you [1:00:40] said it best. They have [1:00:42] transferred [1:00:44] their capabilities in terms of [1:00:46] personal recruitment to online [1:00:48] recruitment which makes any terrorist [1:00:50] organization including ISIS all the more [1:00:52] powerful. What we have done is [1:00:54] extended and expanded resources to [1:00:56] environments like the threat screening center [1:00:58] which allows us to collect biometric [1:01:00] capabilities from all over the world. [1:01:02] We've had a double digit increase in that [1:01:04] and a double digit increase in intelligence production. [1:01:06] But what we've also done in the [1:01:08] CT space specifically [1:01:10] is expand the number of agents and [1:01:12] intel analysts that go online [1:01:14] and detect based on our [1:01:16] biometric capabilities and intelligence that we have [1:01:18] from the interagency. And what that [1:01:20] leads us to is what we saw in December of last [1:01:22] year, Senator, where we at the FBI [1:01:24] stopped four [1:01:26] terrorist attacks. Four in [1:01:28] California, Texas, [1:01:30] North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. [1:01:32] Three of which were ISIS inspired. [1:01:34] We were able to detect these individuals [1:01:36] both online and in person using [1:01:38] our covert platforms and we [1:01:40] shuttered a bombing campaign in Southern [1:01:42] California and two mass casualty [1:01:44] events for New Year's Eve. [1:01:49] Director Gabbard, the intelligence [1:01:51] community did not detect [1:01:53] an [1:01:55] extremely serious breach [1:01:57] affecting our [1:01:59] telecommunications industry [1:02:01] due to the Chinese [1:02:03] typhoon incursions [1:02:05] for a very [1:02:07] long time. In addition, [1:02:09] the Chinese [1:02:11] vault typhoon threat [1:02:13] poses a terrible [1:02:15] threat to U.S. critical [1:02:17] infrastructure. [1:02:19] Specific sectors throughout [1:02:21] the United States have been [1:02:23] overlooked and [1:02:25] underprotected. What are [1:02:28] you doing to deal [1:02:30] with the threat to [1:02:32] critical infrastructure, [1:02:34] our electric grid, [1:02:36] our communication systems, [1:02:38] given this huge [1:02:40] mess by [1:02:42] our talented [1:02:44] intelligence community? [1:02:46] Thank you, Senator Collins, for the question. [1:02:48] You know, working with [1:02:50] our partners at NSA [1:02:52] and others to detect [1:02:54] these threats and how they may be [1:02:56] evolving or developing is something [1:02:58] we're continuing to work on. [1:03:00] Building strong partnerships [1:03:02] with the private sector, whether it be in the [1:03:04] telecom industry, the financial sector, [1:03:06] the healthcare sector, the energy sector, [1:03:08] is something that I am rebuilding. [1:03:10] We've seen some of these [1:03:12] ongoing relationships [1:03:14] falter over previous years. [1:03:16] I've personally been astounded by some [1:03:18] of the conversations I've had with leaders [1:03:20] from these industries who are [1:03:22] just as concerned as we are about these [1:03:24] threats to our critical infrastructure. [1:03:26] And yet, don't feel [1:03:28] that they have the connectivity or the [1:03:30] information to be able to secure [1:03:32] their own infrastructure. [1:03:34] So in short, building those stronger [1:03:36] partnerships, integrating [1:03:38] and being able to share information and intelligence [1:03:40] where we can, is critical [1:03:42] for us to be able to secure our country [1:03:44] from these threats. [1:03:47] Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Wyden. [1:03:49] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:03:51] Director Gabbard, last year your agencies [1:03:53] testified, and I quote, [1:03:55] Iran's large conventional forces [1:03:57] are capable of inflicting substantial [1:03:59] damage to an attacker, [1:04:01] executing regional strikes, [1:04:03] and disrupting shipping, [1:04:05] particularly energy supplies, [1:04:07] through the Strait of Hormuz. [1:04:09] In other words, every [1:04:11] problem we're seeing now [1:04:13] was not only foreseeable, [1:04:15] but was actually predicted [1:04:17] by the intelligence [1:04:19] agencies. So, Director, [1:04:21] in the lead up to the start [1:04:23] of this war three weeks ago, [1:04:25] did the intelligence agencies [1:04:27] stick to their assessment [1:04:29] that in response to an attack [1:04:31] the Iranians had the capability [1:04:33] to shut down the Strait of Hormuz? [1:04:37] Thank you, Senator Wyden. The intelligence [1:04:39] community has continued to provide [1:04:41] the President and his team [1:04:43] with the intelligence [1:04:45] related to this operation in Iran [1:04:47] before and on an ongoing basis. [1:04:49] So, right now [1:04:52] we're in a global energy [1:04:54] crisis. We're paying more for gas, [1:04:56] the economy is in danger, [1:04:58] and it seems to me, and I heard you [1:05:00] discuss this with Senator Warner too, [1:05:02] that there's a lot of hedging [1:05:04] going on with respect [1:05:06] to entirely foreseen [1:05:08] consequences of the war. And that [1:05:10] strikes me, Madam Director, as [1:05:12] what amounts to a historic [1:05:14] mistake. Now, my second question [1:05:16] is, did the intelligence agencies [1:05:18] assess that the Iranians could [1:05:20] respond to a regime change attack [1:05:22] from us by attacking U.S. forces [1:05:24] and other Americans [1:05:26] in the region? The ICA [1:05:28] assessment has always taken [1:05:30] very seriously the threat [1:05:32] of the Iranian regime's missile [1:05:34] capabilities and how [1:05:36] our American troops within the [1:05:38] region may be put at risk. [1:05:41] Again, you know, it seems to me [1:05:43] with Americans dying [1:05:45] in the war, it's hard to see how you can [1:05:47] sit here and say that the intelligence [1:05:49] agencies couldn't provide [1:05:51] a clear warning that [1:05:53] if attacked, the Iranians would [1:05:55] respond by attacking our people. [1:05:57] Now, on Monday, Madam Director, [1:05:59] Donald Trump was asked about Iran [1:06:02] strikes on the Gulf states. [1:06:04] He said, and I quote, [1:06:06] nobody, nobody, no, no, no, [1:06:08] the greatest experts, nobody thought [1:06:10] they were going to hit the Gulf states. [1:06:12] You all are supposed to be the greatest [1:06:14] experts. That's what we have you there for. [1:06:16] Director Gabbard, did the intelligence [1:06:18] agencies assess that Iran [1:06:20] could conduct strikes on our own [1:06:22] partners in the region if it was attacked? [1:06:24] The intelligence community has [1:06:26] continued to assess the [1:06:28] potential threats to the region, the existing [1:06:30] threats to the region, and providing [1:06:32] those assessments to the policy makers [1:06:34] and decision makers. [1:06:38] Let me move on to several [1:06:40] others of you with respect to 702 [1:06:42] of FISA, and I'm just going to start with you, [1:06:44] General Hartman. When Congress last [1:06:46] reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, [1:06:48] it included a provision that [1:06:50] expanded the type of companies and [1:06:52] individuals who could be forced [1:06:54] to assist the government [1:06:56] in its spying. Has this [1:06:58] expansion resulted in any [1:07:00] intelligence, General Hartman? [1:07:03] Senator, thanks for the question. [1:07:05] Just to be clear, this provision [1:07:07] provided us an [1:07:09] ability to collect [1:07:11] foreign intelligence on personnel [1:07:13] outside of the United States. [1:07:15] What is the major [1:07:18] 702 issue in terms of [1:07:20] expansion? What was the effect of [1:07:22] what was done? Senator, I would [1:07:25] prefer to talk to you about [1:07:27] exact specifics in the closed session. [1:07:29] I'm happy to do that. Let's understand [1:07:31] though, this is a [1:07:33] dangerously broad provision [1:07:35] that could be used to [1:07:37] rope in anybody [1:07:39] with access to a cable box, [1:07:41] a Wi-Fi router, or a server. [1:07:43] It was jammed into the [1:07:45] 2024 reauthorization bill at the last [1:07:47] minute. Senators were told they [1:07:49] had no choice but to [1:07:51] support it. And now, two [1:07:53] years later, we've just had [1:07:55] testimony from a very respected [1:07:57] individual who's saying, [1:07:59] so far it has had no value. [1:08:01] So colleagues, we are getting ready [1:08:03] to have another discussion on this, [1:08:05] and this ought to be a warning to every senator [1:08:07] that not every new spying power [1:08:09] that is sold is urgent and [1:08:11] critical actually is. [1:08:13] Senator, could I please respond to that? [1:08:15] Of course. So Senator, I just [1:08:17] want to be clear. It provided [1:08:19] us no additional authority [1:08:21] that doesn't involve [1:08:23] collecting intelligence on foreigners [1:08:25] that are outside of the United States [1:08:27] of America. Fine. Director Patel, [1:08:29] a question for you. In [1:08:31] 2023, your predecessor testified [1:08:33] that, and I quote, [1:08:35] to my knowledge, we do not currently purchase [1:08:37] commercial database information [1:08:39] that includes location data [1:08:41] derived from internet advertising. [1:08:43] Is that the case [1:08:45] still? And if so, [1:08:47] can you commit this morning to not [1:08:49] buying Americans' location [1:08:51] data? Thank you. The FBI [1:08:56] uses all tools, Senator, thank you for [1:08:58] the question, to do [1:09:00] our mission. We do purchase [1:09:02] commercially available information that's [1:09:04] consistent with the Constitution and the laws [1:09:06] under the Electronic Communications Privacy [1:09:08] Act, and it has led to [1:09:10] some valuable intelligence for us to [1:09:12] be utilized with our private and partner sectors. [1:09:14] So you're saying that [1:09:16] the agency will buy [1:09:18] Americans' location data? [1:09:20] I believe that that's what you've said [1:09:22] in kind of intelligence lingo, [1:09:24] and I just want to say, as we start [1:09:26] this debate, doing that [1:09:28] without a warrant is an outrageous [1:09:30] end run around the Fourth Amendment. [1:09:32] It's particularly dangerous [1:09:34] given the use of artificial intelligence to [1:09:36] comb through massive amounts of private [1:09:38] information. This is exhibit [1:09:40] A for why Congress needs [1:09:42] to pass our bipartisan, [1:09:44] bicameral bill, the Government [1:09:46] Surveillance Reform Act. I have time, [1:09:48] I believe, for one more question. Director [1:09:50] Patel, you, three weeks ago, [1:09:52] indicated you were dissatisfied [1:09:54] about having your phone records [1:09:56] subpoenaed. Do you think the government ought to get [1:09:58] a court order to collect phone records? [1:10:00] Senator, in my experience, the government does [1:10:03] get court orders to obtain [1:10:05] phone records. [1:10:07] One last question. [1:10:11] General Adams, for you, in 2021, [1:10:13] your agency confirmed that it had purchased [1:10:15] and searched domestic location [1:10:17] data. Is it still your agency's [1:10:19] position that you can buy Americans' location [1:10:21] data without a warrant? And if so, [1:10:23] are you still doing it? Senator, thanks [1:10:26] for the question. With regards to commercially [1:10:28] available information and publicly available [1:10:30] information, the purchases [1:10:32] that this agency, that my agency [1:10:34] makes, is it in alignment with the [1:10:36] Constitution and protects U.S. persons' [1:10:38] information? But you're [1:10:40] buying location data, correct? [1:10:42] I mean, we've now had that [1:10:44] referred to twice, and I [1:10:46] don't think there's any question that you're doing it. [1:10:48] All of the [1:10:50] purchasing of [1:10:52] commercially available information by [1:10:54] the agency is passed through legal [1:10:56] channels and is in complete compliance with [1:10:58] laws. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Hartman, [1:11:01] I want to give you a chance to answer more [1:11:03] specifically what Senator Wyden said. You did answer [1:11:05] it indirectly. Does anything [1:11:07] in Section 702 [1:11:09] give the government the authority [1:11:11] to target any [1:11:13] American with a cable box or a white [1:11:15] Wi-Fi router? Chairman, [1:11:19] nothing in 702 gives us [1:11:21] the authority to target an American with a [1:11:23] cable router or a Wi-Fi [1:11:25] device. Thank you. And I would observe [1:11:27] about commercially available [1:11:29] data that the keywords are commercially [1:11:31] available. If any other [1:11:33] person can buy it, and [1:11:36] the FBI can buy [1:11:38] it, and it helps them locate [1:11:40] a depraved child molester [1:11:42] or savage cartel [1:11:44] leader, I would certainly hope the FBI [1:11:46] is doing anything they can [1:11:48] to keep Americans safe. It's not [1:11:50] much different from longstanding Supreme Court [1:11:52] precedent that, for instance, says [1:11:54] law enforcement can go through trash [1:11:56] that you put on the side of the curb because [1:11:58] you no longer have a privacy interest [1:12:00] in it. Senator Cornyn. Thank [1:12:04] you all for your service to our [1:12:06] country and the people you represent. [1:12:08] You have our [1:12:10] we are in debt to all of you. I want [1:12:13] to ask you, Director Ratcliffe, yesterday [1:12:15] the head of the National [1:12:17] Counterterrorism Center resigned [1:12:19] saying that [1:12:21] Iran did not represent an imminent [1:12:23] threat to the United States. [1:12:25] Is there anything to indicate [1:12:28] that Iran had ceased [1:12:30] in its nuclear ambitions [1:12:32] or in its desire to continue [1:12:34] to build ballistic missiles [1:12:36] capable of threatening [1:12:38] American troops and allies [1:12:40] in the Middle East? Senator, no. [1:12:44] In fact, intelligence reflects the contrary. [1:12:46] So you disagree [1:12:49] with Mr. Kent? [1:12:51] I do. I would think [1:12:53] any fair-minded assessment [1:12:55] of the situation, even based on [1:12:57] open sources, would reflect [1:12:59] the danger Iran [1:13:01] regime poses to the United States. [1:13:03] Isn't it true they've basically been at war [1:13:05] with the West since 1979 [1:13:07] during the Iranian Revolution and have [1:13:09] American blood on their hands? [1:13:11] That's absolutely correct. [1:13:13] I think Iran has been a constant [1:13:15] threat to the United States for an extended [1:13:17] period of time and posed an immediate [1:13:19] threat [1:13:21] at this time. The [1:13:25] threat assessment says that Al-Qaeda [1:13:28] and ISIS maintain the intent [1:13:30] to launch operations targeting the [1:13:32] U.S., but it's most likely to occur [1:13:34] through U.S.-based [1:13:37] lone offenders. [1:13:39] I want to ask you, Director Patel, [1:13:41] it seems like there's been [1:13:44] a raft of [1:13:46] incidents recently. [1:13:48] On March the 1st in [1:13:50] Austin, Texas, where I live, [1:13:52] a lone gunman wearing a [1:13:54] sweatshirt saying, property of Allah, [1:13:56] and who the T-shirt [1:13:58] he wore underneath had an Iranian flag [1:14:00] killed three innocent [1:14:02] people and injured twelve [1:14:04] more. [1:14:07] And then we know in Virginia, [1:14:09] the old Dominion shooting, [1:14:11] somebody who [1:14:13] unbelievably was sentenced to 11 years [1:14:15] in federal prison for attempting to support [1:14:17] ISIS, but then was released [1:14:19] only to commit another terrorist [1:14:21] attack. We all are familiar with [1:14:23] what's happened in Michigan, [1:14:25] in New York, [1:14:27] and I applaud [1:14:31] the important role [1:14:33] that the FBI has played in [1:14:35] stopping some terrorist [1:14:37] attacks, but obviously the FBI [1:14:39] can't be everywhere all the time. [1:14:41] Would you please talk [1:14:43] about your [1:14:45] cooperation and collaboration [1:14:47] with Homeland Security [1:14:49] Investigations in countering [1:14:51] terrorist attacks against the United States? [1:14:53] Thank you, Senator. Absolutely. [1:14:56] It is essential that the FBI [1:14:58] cooperates with the entire [1:15:00] interagency, but as to your question about DHS [1:15:02] specifically, what we have stood on [1:15:04] around the country are 59 Homeland [1:15:06] Security Task Forces in 59 [1:15:08] separate locations. These are joint terrorism [1:15:10] task forces? Essentially, the JTTF [1:15:12] model was expanded, [1:15:14] so the FBI owns [1:15:16] 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in each of our [1:15:18] field offices. On top of that, we have [1:15:20] 59 HSTFs, [1:15:22] which are co-led by the FBI [1:15:24] and DHS. [1:15:26] And what that allows us to do [1:15:28] is things like we did down in New Orleans [1:15:30] just over the holiday period where we [1:15:32] served for a six-week period of time, [1:15:34] and where we dropped the murder rate [1:15:36] by double-digit points, and also [1:15:38] it was the first time that Mardi Gras in its entire [1:15:40] history had not one homicide. [1:15:42] So when you bring the powers of the Homeland Security [1:15:44] folks, DHS, and the FBI together, [1:15:46] this is the purpose of it, to get after [1:15:48] not just the terrorism threat, but the [1:15:50] violence and the criminal activity [1:15:52] in our cities. And that's why we're in 59 cities [1:15:54] across the country, and it's working in places [1:15:56] like Memphis and every other city [1:15:58] we have it. Are you aware of the [1:16:00] fact that Homeland Security [1:16:02] Investigation is a major [1:16:04] directorate within Immigration and Customs [1:16:06] Enforcement? Yes, sir. [1:16:08] And are you aware that [1:16:11] Senate Democrats [1:16:13] have uniformly voted not [1:16:15] to fund the Department of [1:16:17] Homeland Security, including [1:16:19] Homeland Security [1:16:22] Investigations, TSA, [1:16:24] FEMA, and [1:16:26] other functions of the Department [1:16:28] of Homeland Security? Senator, I'm aware [1:16:30] that employees of DHS [1:16:32] are one month without pay. [1:16:34] They're not being paid, right? Yes, sir. [1:16:36] What's happening at airports, [1:16:38] where people are having to wait hours [1:16:40] at a time because of the [1:16:42] fact that these [1:16:44] TSA agents are overburdened, [1:16:46] but what I wanted to [1:16:48] focus on with you [1:16:50] is the refusal [1:16:52] to fund the functions [1:16:54] of the Department of Homeland Security, [1:16:56] including Homeland Security Investigations, [1:16:58] making Americans [1:17:00] less safe? Absolutely. [1:17:09] So give us an example of some of the [1:17:11] cooperation that [1:17:13] you all have engaged in [1:17:15] with, the FBI has [1:17:18] engaged in with the Homeland Security Investigations. [1:17:20] I'm looking at an [1:17:22] article here that talks about the [1:17:24] 190,000 [1:17:26] Afghan nationals [1:17:28] that were admitted to the United [1:17:30] States, literally unvetted, [1:17:32] and [1:17:34] there are examples of individuals [1:17:36] within that [1:17:38] 190,000 who [1:17:40] committed terrorist attacks [1:17:42] against the United [1:17:44] States and against American [1:17:46] citizens. Is that [1:17:48] the sort of thing that you are [1:17:50] investigating with HSI? [1:17:52] Senator, that's one of the many things we're [1:17:54] investigating with HSI, DHS, [1:17:56] CBP, ICE. Give me some other examples [1:17:58] of the collaboration on [1:18:00] what other topics, including [1:18:02] in addition to [1:18:04] terrorism attacks. What we're allowed to do [1:18:06] with our DHS partners, Senator, [1:18:08] is enable their massive [1:18:10] workforce to supplement ours, and what they're [1:18:12] allowed to do is share intelligence on what you just [1:18:14] talked about, about the [1:18:16] 100-plus thousand [1:18:18] illegals that came in from Afghanistan [1:18:20] during the Afghanistan [1:18:22] withdrawal. Unfortunately, they weren't [1:18:24] vetted thoroughly, so what we're doing is going [1:18:26] back with our DHS partners and [1:18:28] vetting absolutely every single one of them to the best [1:18:30] that we can. But unfortunately, we're [1:18:32] not able to go out into the country and find every [1:18:34] single one of these individuals. [1:18:36] But we need more than [1:18:38] 12,000 FBI agents to do that job, [1:18:40] which is why we are utilizing [1:18:42] the 100,000 or so [1:18:44] 1811s at the Department of Homeland [1:18:46] Security to give us the information they have [1:18:48] from their immigration records, from [1:18:50] their travel records, from their travel logs [1:18:52] overseas and within the country. And [1:18:54] what we're able to do is remove [1:18:56] these individuals off the streets in every [1:18:58] single state across the country to include [1:19:00] violent gang members, to include [1:19:02] Trende Aragua, to include ISIS-affiliated [1:19:04] individuals, to include al-Qaeda-related [1:19:06] affiliated individuals. And hopefully, [1:19:08] we do it before [1:19:10] and not after, like the tragedy that we [1:19:12] witnessed in Washington, D.C., [1:19:14] where an individual from Afghanistan was allowed [1:19:16] to enter into our country and shot multiple [1:19:18] members of our uniformed military service. [1:19:20] Thank you. [1:19:23] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do need to point out in [1:19:25] response to some of the previous comments, [1:19:27] twice in the last two weeks, as recently [1:19:29] as last Thursday, [1:19:31] Senator Patty Murray, the Appropriations [1:19:33] Committee, put a bill on the floor [1:19:35] that would have fully funded TSA, [1:19:37] FEMA, CISA, and the Coast Guard [1:19:39] for the rest of the year, leaving [1:19:41] the focus on the dispute [1:19:43] that we have with the conduct of [1:19:45] ICE [1:19:47] as separately. So, [1:19:49] inexplicably to me, [1:19:51] that bill was blocked [1:19:53] by my Republican colleagues. [1:19:55] It would have, as I say, fully funded [1:19:57] TSA, FEMA, CISA, Coast [1:19:59] Guard, and then focus the [1:20:01] attention on [1:20:03] the situation with ICE. So, [1:20:05] I just want to be clear on who's blocking [1:20:07] funding for those four [1:20:09] agencies. [1:20:12] I'd like to ask [1:20:15] Ms. Gabbard and [1:20:17] Dr. Ratcliffe, Director, both [1:20:19] of you, were either of you [1:20:21] in the room, or your designees, [1:20:23] when the President was making the [1:20:25] final decision about [1:20:27] taking this action against [1:20:29] Iran on February [1:20:31] 27th, 28th, was there [1:20:33] an intelligence committee [1:20:35] intelligence [1:20:37] community present in [1:20:39] those deliberations? Mr. Ratcliffe, [1:20:41] your response? [1:20:44] Senator King, probably [1:20:47] in dozens and dozens [1:20:49] of briefings with the President. [1:20:51] I don't know if there was a [1:20:53] single meeting where there was a [1:20:55] single time where a decision [1:20:57] was made. Were those dozens of meetings [1:20:59] right during the lead up to this [1:21:01] war? [1:21:03] I know you've met [1:21:05] many times, but I'm talking about in the [1:21:07] two weeks or so before the decision [1:21:09] to go into Iran was made. Again, [1:21:11] countless meetings [1:21:13] with the President. During [1:21:15] that period? During that period. [1:21:17] Director Gabbard, were you [1:21:20] present in those discussions? [1:21:22] Likewise, yes. The reason I'm asking the [1:21:24] question is there seems to be a discrepancy [1:21:26] between what the intelligence committee [1:21:28] community has reported over the years [1:21:30] and what the President [1:21:32] has said in terms of his [1:21:34] of this action. For [1:21:36] example, Senator Wyden read [1:21:38] the report from a year ago [1:21:40] that strikes against neighboring [1:21:42] states and [1:21:44] action to close the Strait of Hormuz was [1:21:46] predicted by the intelligence community. [1:21:48] And yet the President says nobody knew [1:21:50] and my question is, did you tell him? [1:21:54] Anybody want to answer that question? [1:21:57] Senator, [1:22:00] I'll answer the question. [1:22:02] So, with [1:22:04] regard to briefings, [1:22:06] the President gets briefings [1:22:08] constantly about intelligence. Now, the [1:22:10] comments that you talked about, I had [1:22:12] not heard, but what I can tell you is [1:22:14] that Iran [1:22:16] had specific plans to hit [1:22:18] U.S. interests in energy [1:22:20] sites across the region [1:22:22] and that's why the Department of War [1:22:24] and the Department of State took measures [1:22:26] for force protection and personnel [1:22:28] protection in advance of Operation [1:22:30] Epic Fury. I think that's [1:22:32] what's most important. Any [1:22:35] predictions to the President about the Strait of Hormuz? [1:22:37] All you got to do is look at a map [1:22:39] and you'll see that the vulnerability [1:22:41] of the Strait of Hormuz. Was that [1:22:44] part of the briefing, [1:22:46] Director Gabbard? I think the [1:22:49] Director Ratcliffe made the point here [1:22:51] is that this has [1:22:53] long been an assessment of the [1:22:55] I.C. that Iran [1:22:57] would likely hold the Strait of Hormuz [1:22:59] as leverage. And my question is, was that [1:23:01] communicated to the President in the lead up [1:23:03] to this action? And it's because of that long standing [1:23:05] assessment that the I.C. has [1:23:07] continued to report that the [1:23:09] Department of War took the preemptive [1:23:11] planning measures that it did. Well, [1:23:14] they've stated that they did not [1:23:16] plan for the Strait of Hormuz. The President [1:23:18] said, who knew that was going [1:23:20] to happen? Anyway, let's move on. [1:23:22] Does the President take a [1:23:24] daily brief from the intelligence community? [1:23:26] This is a yes or no [1:23:31] question, I think. Yeah, the President, [1:23:33] I would say, Senator, [1:23:35] in my estimation, on average, I [1:23:37] brief the President of the United States [1:23:39] on intelligence [1:23:41] probably on average [1:23:44] 10 to 15 times a week [1:23:46] where I have conversations with him about [1:23:48] specific, discrete issues. [1:23:50] Sometimes there [1:23:52] are dedicated sessions that [1:23:54] last hours in length. Sometimes [1:23:56] I'm briefing him on specific issues. [1:23:58] Sometimes three or four times [1:24:00] a day. But I would say on average, [1:24:02] my interactions where I'm briefing [1:24:04] the President on important national security [1:24:06] matters happens probably [1:24:08] on average 10 to 15 times [1:24:10] per week. Thank you. Could [1:24:12] you update us on the intelligence [1:24:14] on Russian intelligence [1:24:16] sharing with Iran in the current [1:24:18] conflict? What do we know? [1:24:21] Senator, if [1:24:23] there is that sharing going on, [1:24:25] that would be [1:24:28] an answer that would be appropriate for [1:24:30] a closed session. Well, it's been [1:24:32] in the public press. This is [1:24:34] open source that it's occurring. [1:24:36] Is it occurring? [1:24:38] Again, if it is occurring, [1:24:41] that would be an answer appropriate [1:24:43] for a closed session. [1:24:45] What I can tell you is that [1:24:47] according [1:24:49] to the Department of War, [1:24:51] any support that Iran may be receiving [1:24:53] is not inhibiting [1:24:55] their operational effects. [1:24:57] Okay, that's sort of the [1:25:00] first cousin of a yes, I guess. [1:25:02] According to intelligence [1:25:05] analysis, can regime change or [1:25:07] the elimination of the [1:25:09] estimated 1,000 pounds of [1:25:11] highly enriched uranium [1:25:13] be accomplished [1:25:16] without boots on the ground? [1:25:22] Senator, the discussion [1:25:24] about the Iranian nuclear [1:25:26] capability, we intend [1:25:28] in the closed session to talk about that [1:25:30] in great deal. With regards to [1:25:32] revealing any [1:25:34] information about the ability [1:25:36] to do that, I would have [1:25:38] to defer that to closed session. [1:25:40] Okay, I'll see you in an hour. [1:25:42] Finally, there was [1:25:45] very little, if anything, in the [1:25:47] report, in the assessment [1:25:49] about climate change, and that's [1:25:51] been in past reports. [1:25:53] There is a lot of discussion about migration. [1:25:55] The estimates are that [1:25:57] climate migrants, because of [1:26:00] the changes in the [1:26:02] climate and the atmosphere [1:26:04] and particularly in the center [1:26:06] equatorial area of the Earth, [1:26:08] will range from 200 million [1:26:10] to a billion people by 2050. [1:26:12] Do you believe that is a [1:26:14] national security threat that should be [1:26:16] addressed? The Syrian [1:26:18] refugees were about six million [1:26:20] and they upset the politics [1:26:22] of Europe for several years. [1:26:24] We're talking about 200 million to [1:26:26] a billion people on the move. [1:26:28] I believe that's something we should [1:26:30] be discussing and that the intelligence community [1:26:32] should be assessing. Director [1:26:35] Gabbard? Yes, Senator. [1:26:37] There are a number of drivers of things [1:26:39] like migration. [1:26:41] It would be an extensive [1:26:43] and voluminous annual threat assessment [1:26:45] if we included every single one. [1:26:47] This annual threat assessment is focused [1:26:49] again on the priorities laid out [1:26:51] by the President's [1:26:53] national security strategy and [1:26:55] on the effects that [1:26:57] we can take action [1:26:59] operational action [1:27:01] to protect U.S. interests. [1:27:03] Well, I would suggest combating climate change [1:27:06] is something we can take action on. Thank you, [1:27:08] Mr. Chairman. On the matter [1:27:10] of media reports [1:27:12] about Russian or Chinese [1:27:14] collaboration with Iran, [1:27:16] I would point out that the media [1:27:19] is not a classification authority [1:27:22] and that kind of story, [1:27:24] whether true or not, might be better suited [1:27:27] for the FBI to investigate [1:27:29] on whether there's been unlawful [1:27:31] disclosures of classified information. [1:27:33] I would also say it sounds like [1:27:35] something Russia and China would do. [1:27:38] Communist Russia used to do it during the Cold War [1:27:40] and Communist China has always done stuff [1:27:42] like that. On the Patty Murray legislation, [1:27:44] not only would it have defunded [1:27:46] ICE and CBP, it would have also [1:27:48] defunded Homeland Security investigations [1:27:50] which do critical work on our streets [1:27:52] to protect our communities from [1:27:54] financial crimes, from predators, [1:27:56] from transnational gangs as well. [1:27:58] So while we would all like to see [1:28:00] the TSA and the Coast Guard and other [1:28:02] critical parts of Homeland Security as well, [1:28:04] we do not want to defund the police, [1:28:06] this time the immigration police. [1:28:08] Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you. [1:28:10] I believe that it's in the [1:28:12] U.S. national interest, [1:28:14] our security interest, [1:28:16] for Ukraine to be successful [1:28:19] in defeating the Russian invasion. [1:28:21] I'm concerned with the consequences [1:28:23] of Operation Epic Fury [1:28:26] on that ability of Ukraine to succeed [1:28:28] in defending its borders. [1:28:30] And General Adams, [1:28:32] in broad terms, not necessarily [1:28:34] not classified terms, [1:28:36] what are the consequences to the [1:28:38] supply chain, to the capability [1:28:40] of the United States to supply [1:28:42] NATO allies [1:28:44] and Ukraine [1:28:47] as a result of Operation Epic Fury? [1:28:50] My question is [1:28:52] that usual problem [1:28:54] how do we do both? [1:28:56] Are we doing both? [1:28:58] Is U.S. support maintained or diminished [1:29:00] for Ukraine as a result of [1:29:03] Epic Fury? [1:29:06] Senator, thank you for that question [1:29:08] and we do continue to [1:29:10] beyond Epic Fury [1:29:12] observe what is [1:29:14] happening across the world [1:29:16] in crises like [1:29:18] Russia and Ukraine. [1:29:20] Unfortunately for [1:29:22] the situation [1:29:24] there now, just based on [1:29:26] the force composition and the [1:29:28] delta between the Russian forces [1:29:30] and the Ukrainian forces, [1:29:32] the advantage is [1:29:34] to the Russians. [1:29:36] As we get into the classified [1:29:38] hearing, we can talk a little more specifically [1:29:40] about the items [1:29:42] with regards to supply chain [1:29:44] and with [1:29:46] regards to the [1:29:48] information that the Defense Intelligence Agency [1:29:50] collects, we look at the foreign [1:29:52] threat and what their capabilities are [1:29:54] from a [1:29:56] multi-int perspective. [1:29:58] We look [1:30:00] a little bit less at friendly capabilities. [1:30:02] I would defer questions with regards [1:30:04] to U.S. supply [1:30:06] chain limitations [1:30:08] with regards to logistics and the [1:30:10] effort that the Secretary of War is having [1:30:12] with regards to trying to boost [1:30:14] the U.S. defense industrial base. I would defer those [1:30:16] to the Department [1:30:18] to discuss. [1:30:21] General, please be prepared for the [1:30:23] classified session for me to [1:30:25] continue to pursue this. [1:30:27] Our supply chain issues are not [1:30:29] classified in the sense that [1:30:31] every hearing I'm in as a defense appropriator [1:30:33] has officials from the [1:30:35] Department of Defense testifying [1:30:37] about the need for further assistance. [1:30:39] Really, I'm asking [1:30:41] for the facts [1:30:43] of what has happened [1:30:45] as a result of Operation [1:30:47] Epic Fury [1:30:49] in the last few weeks in [1:30:51] our supply [1:30:53] to Ukraine and our NATO allies who [1:30:55] are supplying Ukraine. [1:30:58] Yes, sir. The Department [1:31:00] is executing a comprehensive [1:31:02] in fact, the SEC war [1:31:04] has gone around the nation [1:31:06] to boost the defense industrial base. [1:31:08] We know for a fact that [1:31:11] we have to increase our defense [1:31:13] industrial base capability. [1:31:15] Its impact [1:31:17] based on the munitions expended [1:31:19] during Epic Fury will [1:31:21] be an impact, but [1:31:23] we need to boost it. The efforts [1:31:25] are underway to boost it. [1:31:27] Well, I'm [1:31:30] interested in helping accomplish that goal. [1:31:32] Director Ratcliffe, [1:31:34] perhaps along the same line, [1:31:36] I assume among [1:31:39] let me first of all compliment you on your [1:31:41] public service. I appreciate you. [1:31:43] And that's not my usual town [1:31:45] hall meeting when I get a compliment from somebody [1:31:47] who then follows it with a but. [1:31:49] I am [1:31:51] interested in being of help, and I [1:31:53] in regard to your [1:31:56] conversations in preparation for Epic [1:31:58] Fury, I'd be interested [1:32:00] in knowing if the consequences [1:32:02] to our abilities to defend [1:32:04] the United States against [1:32:06] Russia or China or other adversaries [1:32:08] was taken into account. [1:32:11] How was that diminished or [1:32:13] increased by Operation Epic [1:32:15] Fury, and particularly in [1:32:17] this instance about what it means [1:32:19] was the conversation had about [1:32:21] what it means to our ability [1:32:23] to help Ukraine defend itself. [1:32:25] U.S. [1:32:28] support for Ukraine [1:32:30] includes [1:32:32] military and other assistance [1:32:34] but also we've undertaken economic [1:32:37] sanctions against Russia [1:32:39] for their invasion of Ukraine. [1:32:41] And Epic Fury has caused [1:32:44] a significant increase in oil prices [1:32:46] and the administration has [1:32:48] waived sanctions against Russian [1:32:50] oil companies [1:32:52] which are reported to [1:32:55] say that Russia is receiving [1:32:57] $150 million per [1:32:59] day, additional dollars [1:33:01] as a result of the waiver. [1:33:03] What can you tell me about [1:33:06] our plans, [1:33:09] or your [1:33:11] understanding of what's transpiring [1:33:13] as a result of Operation [1:33:15] Epic Fury in regard to those [1:33:17] oil revenues that are now [1:33:19] being generated in favor of Russia [1:33:21] and the lifting of the sanctions [1:33:23] at least for a temporary period of time? [1:33:26] Senator, thanks for the compliment [1:33:28] I think. [1:33:30] I'll start [1:33:32] with a couple things. What I would tell [1:33:34] you is the same [1:33:36] military and intelligence [1:33:38] professionals who delivered [1:33:41] not just for the administration [1:33:43] but for the American people [1:33:45] a flawless intelligence [1:33:47] picture and flawless military [1:33:49] operations in Operation Midnight [1:33:51] Hammer and Operation [1:33:53] Absolute Resolve are the same folks [1:33:55] involved with Operation [1:33:57] Epic Fury. And so [1:33:59] I hope that provides you some measure of [1:34:01] comfort with regard to [1:34:03] how detailed, how thoughtful [1:34:05] the approach was [1:34:07] to the current [1:34:09] operation. [1:34:11] And that's why I think that to [1:34:13] mischaracterize it as it is [1:34:15] being done in the media is a [1:34:17] disservice to the folks involved in [1:34:19] what is a [1:34:21] very specific campaign [1:34:23] that is different than the two that I mentioned [1:34:25] before. It's why the President came out [1:34:27] and said this isn't over in a matter of hours [1:34:29] this is a four to six week campaign [1:34:31] and that it would come [1:34:33] at some cost [1:34:35] because the [1:34:37] goal of the President and [1:34:39] the administration is [1:34:41] to address a 47 year [1:34:43] problem. The most destabilizing [1:34:45] force in the Middle East for the last 47 [1:34:47] years. One that has frankly [1:34:49] been [1:34:51] watered, fed and nurtured [1:34:53] by policies [1:34:55] of prior administrations that has [1:34:57] allowed them to become the threat that they have. [1:34:59] So I say all of that sort of in [1:35:01] context to understanding [1:35:03] that we have to address that but at [1:35:05] the same time to your point on [1:35:07] what's going on with regard to Russia [1:35:09] and Ukraine and [1:35:11] you mentioned the oil issue. [1:35:13] Sometimes policy makers [1:35:15] have to [1:35:17] take steps that while they may benefit [1:35:19] adversaries like Russia or China [1:35:21] do so because [1:35:23] they also think it will benefit [1:35:25] US citizens and in this [1:35:27] case with respect to keeping [1:35:29] the economy on track [1:35:31] and keeping oil prices low. [1:35:33] So what I can tell you is [1:35:35] the intelligence is thoughtfully considered [1:35:37] and I think the policy makers have [1:35:39] taken that and [1:35:41] I'm confident that [1:35:43] we can walk and chew gum at the same time [1:35:45] pursue objectives [1:35:47] in the Middle East and [1:35:49] provide support [1:35:51] with regard to the conflict in Russia [1:35:53] and the Russian aggression [1:35:55] in Ukraine. Senator Bennett. [1:35:58] Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. [1:36:00] Mr. Director Ratcliffe [1:36:03] you just described [1:36:05] the specific campaign [1:36:07] that the President is engaged in [1:36:09] the country is engaged in [1:36:11] with respect to Iran. I think the [1:36:13] campaign has been won [1:36:16] in my view without a [1:36:18] specific rationale for the American [1:36:20] people. 19 days [1:36:22] into President Trump's [1:36:24] unauthorized war with Iran [1:36:26] and by which I mean there has been [1:36:28] no congressional approval [1:36:30] at least 13 American service members [1:36:32] are dead and many others [1:36:34] are injured. President Trump has [1:36:37] offered no credible justification [1:36:39] for the [1:36:41] imminent threat [1:36:43] no clear goals, no strategy or [1:36:45] timeline. His message keeps [1:36:47] changing I think in really [1:36:49] damaging ways. President Trump [1:36:51] said Iran's nuclear facilities [1:36:53] had been quote totally obliterated [1:36:55] in June 2025 [1:36:57] but when he launched [1:36:59] this latest war he said we need [1:37:01] to eliminate the imminent [1:37:03] nuclear threat of those totally [1:37:05] obliterated nuclear [1:37:07] facilities. President [1:37:09] Trump has threatened to seize Iranian oil [1:37:11] and demanded our allies [1:37:13] reopen the Strait of Hormuz [1:37:15] he said that I'm demanding [1:37:17] that these countries come in and protect [1:37:19] their own territory because [1:37:21] it's their territory. It's the [1:37:23] place from which they get their [1:37:25] energy. By the way he wasn't just asking for our [1:37:27] allies to protect or to [1:37:29] bail them out in the [1:37:31] Straits of Hormuz. He was asking [1:37:33] China to bail them out in the [1:37:35] Straits of Hormuz. And then he [1:37:38] said maybe we shouldn't even be here at all [1:37:40] because we don't need it. We have a lot [1:37:42] of oil. And [1:37:44] he said we do not need the help of [1:37:46] anyone. President Trump has [1:37:48] declared we've won the war. [1:37:50] We won it in the first hour. [1:37:53] But then he said we're not leaving [1:37:55] until the job is finished. [1:37:57] He said that there is practically [1:37:59] nothing left to bomb [1:38:01] but then threatened to bomb Iran [1:38:03] again quote just for [1:38:05] fun. I think words that probably [1:38:07] have never come out of a military [1:38:09] leader in the history of the United [1:38:11] States of America. [1:38:13] It shouldn't come out of the mouth [1:38:15] of a civilian leader. President [1:38:17] Trump said he will end the war when I [1:38:19] feel it. Feel it in my bones. [1:38:22] And any time I want to [1:38:24] end it, it will end. But Director [1:38:27] the war is not ending. It is [1:38:29] escalating with thousands of U.S. [1:38:31] Marines reportedly [1:38:33] sailing toward Iran [1:38:35] on an unclear mission. A mission [1:38:37] that's become less clear over days [1:38:39] not more clear. Our airstrikes [1:38:42] wiped out Iran's missiles [1:38:44] and supreme leader. [1:38:46] Nobody here, and certainly [1:38:48] me, is shedding a tear [1:38:50] for him. But the Iranian people [1:38:52] now live under martial law [1:38:54] and by the way, no surprise [1:38:56] to our intelligence agencies [1:38:58] that that's the case. [1:39:01] And the first of [1:39:03] a puppet leader who's chosen [1:39:05] by the IRGC. [1:39:07] No surprise to [1:39:09] anybody on the Intelligence Committee. [1:39:11] Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz [1:39:13] and is holding the global [1:39:15] economy hostage. No surprise [1:39:17] to anybody who knows anything [1:39:19] about U.S. intelligence [1:39:21] launching drones [1:39:23] at our embassies and military bases. [1:39:25] No surprise. The President is [1:39:27] surprised. Nobody who has looked [1:39:29] at our intelligence is [1:39:31] surprised. Iran's nuclear [1:39:34] program is damaged, to be sure. [1:39:36] But it still has a uranium [1:39:38] stockpile. We heard [1:39:40] today from the DNI at the very [1:39:42] beginning of this conversation that [1:39:44] the regime is in place and they are [1:39:46] going to rebuild their [1:39:48] military capabilities. The ones that [1:39:50] we are destroying right now. [1:39:52] The question I think is raised, [1:39:54] Director, about your specific engagement [1:39:56] is whether it will become a [1:39:58] perpetual war because [1:40:00] what Iran will do is exactly [1:40:02] what they have always done. [1:40:05] And which the DNI is saying they will do again. [1:40:07] In its briefings to the committee, [1:40:10] the Intelligence Committee has been [1:40:12] clear-eyed about what would happen [1:40:14] in the Straits of Hormuz. [1:40:16] Has been clear-eyed about [1:40:18] whether or not our military [1:40:20] bases, our embassies, [1:40:22] and our personnel [1:40:24] in the region would be placed [1:40:26] at risk and in harm's way [1:40:28] even though the administration did [1:40:30] very little to protect them. [1:40:32] I know, Director Radcliffe, [1:40:36] that [1:40:38] you warned President Trump [1:40:40] that if Israel [1:40:42] assassinated the Supreme Leader [1:40:44] the RRGC would replace [1:40:46] him with potentially [1:40:48] a harder-line puppet. [1:40:50] In fact, I think what was clear [1:40:52] is that the likelihood was [1:40:54] that it would be a hard-line puppet. [1:40:56] Do you disagree with that [1:40:58] characterization of the intelligence? [1:41:02] To that specific question, [1:41:04] what we knew was [1:41:06] first of all, I guess I have to address [1:41:08] up front [1:41:10] so much of what you related [1:41:12] in there, the difference between [1:41:14] political rhetoric versus... [1:41:16] Not political rhetoric. I'm quoting the President of the United States. [1:41:18] Political rhetoric versus military... [1:41:20] Director, I'll... [1:41:22] The difference between that [1:41:24] military and intelligence execution [1:41:26] but here's the most important thing. [1:41:28] You mischaracterize this as saying [1:41:30] there aren't clearly defined goals. [1:41:32] The defined goals are very clear. [1:41:34] Degrade and destroy the missile inventory [1:41:36] and drone inventory. Delay and [1:41:38] degrade the military [1:41:40] industrial base and factories [1:41:42] that produce that. [1:41:44] Degrade and destroy the IRGC [1:41:46] Navy that could control the... [1:41:48] These are all defined goals [1:41:50] that were set out specifically. [1:41:52] The premise of the question is that... [1:41:54] May I have my time back, Mr. Chairman? [1:41:56] I can't get a word in edgewise. [1:41:58] He won't answer the question and then [1:42:00] he's taking a minute of my time. [1:42:02] You're both big boys. You can handle it yourself. [1:42:04] Okay, well, Director, I agree [1:42:06] that you are and I appreciate [1:42:08] what you're saying and [1:42:10] I would... I'm not... [1:42:13] My point is not what your characterization [1:42:15] of the war is. My point is [1:42:17] what the character... [1:42:19] Your question about regime change? I'm not asking you anymore [1:42:21] Mr. Director. I'm sorry because [1:42:23] I'm out of time because of how [1:42:25] you use the time. The complete [1:42:27] lack of clarity [1:42:29] should matter to everybody. [1:42:31] President Trump, most of all, [1:42:34] he is the person that got elected [1:42:36] on the criticism that [1:42:38] we had fought two wars [1:42:40] in the Middle East that had lasted [1:42:42] for 20 years. [1:42:44] And now we're hearing the testimony is [1:42:46] to get their ballistic missiles [1:42:48] to not even get [1:42:50] to the nuclear stuff, we're going to [1:42:52] have to be in a perpetual war with [1:42:54] Iran. And I don't think that's [1:42:56] where the American people are on this. [1:42:58] This is a serious threat. [1:43:00] This is a serious [1:43:02] threat to us and to Israel. [1:43:04] The question is how to handle it. [1:43:06] And President Trump said [1:43:08] we are not the policemen of the world. [1:43:10] He ran on that. And now [1:43:13] he's turned us into the world's policemen, [1:43:15] into its jury, [1:43:17] into its judge, [1:43:19] into its executioner. [1:43:21] And just because we have the most [1:43:23] advanced military in the [1:43:25] world, it doesn't mean [1:43:27] that we should be in a perpetual [1:43:29] war all around. [1:43:31] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:43:33] Senator Rounds. [1:43:36] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:43:38] I'd like to maybe follow up a little bit [1:43:40] the same line of questioning, [1:43:42] but I want to do it in a little bit different manner. [1:43:44] I've had the opportunity, [1:43:46] like all of the other members on this committee, [1:43:48] to see the threats [1:43:50] that we discuss regularly [1:43:52] in the classified settings. [1:43:54] I also, sitting on the [1:43:56] Armed Services Committee, have the opportunity [1:43:58] to see what our capabilities are [1:44:00] and what we have to do in order [1:44:02] to respond to those threats. [1:44:04] Director Ratcliffe, [1:44:06] let me just begin. [1:44:09] I think it's been very clear [1:44:11] from the beginning that even though there were [1:44:13] supposedly diplomatic activities [1:44:15] going on, behind the scenes [1:44:17] it was very clear, and I just ask [1:44:19] if you would disagree or agree with me on this, [1:44:21] it was very clear that Iran, [1:44:23] while they were talking, they had [1:44:25] no intentions of following through [1:44:27] diplomatically with eliminating any of their [1:44:29] nuclear aspirations. [1:44:32] Correct? [1:44:34] That's correct, [1:44:36] and in the classified session we can go into detail, [1:44:38] but you've characterized it right. [1:44:40] Diplomatically, they were saying one thing. [1:44:42] The intelligence was [1:44:44] reflecting quite the contrary. [1:44:46] Okay. Second of all, with regard to [1:44:48] the capabilities earlier [1:44:50] in the 12-day war, a lot of [1:44:52] their defensive capabilities [1:44:54] had been taken out. Their air defenses [1:44:56] had been taken out. [1:44:58] The use of our [1:45:00] aircraft in that area was safer [1:45:02] because those defensive capabilities [1:45:04] most of them had been [1:45:06] significantly reduced, meaning [1:45:08] our young men and women [1:45:10] who are flying those aircraft [1:45:12] were safer. Is it fair to say [1:45:14] that they were rebuilding their [1:45:16] defensive capabilities as well [1:45:18] at that time? Yes. [1:45:20] So I'll just comment on that. [1:45:22] So much is being made. [1:45:24] Any characterization that [1:45:26] Operation Midnight Hammer was anything but a [1:45:28] wild success is [1:45:31] wildly inaccurate. [1:45:33] Um, [1:45:35] so as a result of [1:45:38] Operation Midnight Hammer, at the [1:45:40] time of that, in the [1:45:42] preceding four years as is well documented [1:45:44] and admitted to [1:45:46] by the Iranians, they [1:45:48] enriched uranium [1:45:50] at least 440 kilograms [1:45:52] at 60% [1:45:54] for use that could be used [1:45:56] for weapons grade to deliver [1:45:58] a nuclear weapon. [1:46:00] As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, [1:46:02] we sit here today with [1:46:04] Iran having [1:46:06] exactly the same amount of [1:46:08] enriched uranium to 60%. [1:46:10] Meaning, they have been unwilling [1:46:12] and incapable [1:46:14] of enriching uranium [1:46:16] to 60% as a result of [1:46:18] Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:46:20] Okay, let me go on because I think this is an [1:46:22] important part of this. You also [1:46:24] have to have a way of delivering a weapon. [1:46:26] It's fair to say that they have [1:46:28] short term and intermediate [1:46:30] range ballistic missile availability [1:46:32] today. Were they [1:46:34] building additional short [1:46:36] range and mid range [1:46:38] ballistic missiles? [1:46:40] Yes. Were they continuing [1:46:42] to develop them? Continuing to [1:46:44] develop them and at rates [1:46:46] that were alarming. [1:46:48] And what about our ability [1:46:50] to respond to those? We [1:46:52] have very good defensive capabilities [1:46:54] but it takes time for us to [1:46:56] build our defensive capabilities. [1:46:58] Were they building their offensive capabilities [1:47:00] while they were negotiating with us [1:47:02] at a faster rate than we could [1:47:04] build defensive capabilities? [1:47:06] Yes. Were they continuing [1:47:10] to work at and deliver [1:47:12] additional resources to terrorist [1:47:14] organizations that were affiliated [1:47:16] with them in the region? Yes. [1:47:18] So in other words, while they were supposedly [1:47:20] diplomatically working with us during that entire [1:47:22] time, they were continuing [1:47:26] with regard to their nuclear [1:47:28] intentions. They were building [1:47:30] additional missile systems [1:47:32] to deliver or conventional weapon [1:47:34] systems to threaten their neighbors. [1:47:36] Their defensive capabilities were going [1:47:38] to be increased making our [1:47:40] young men and women at risk when at some [1:47:42] point in the future we would have to [1:47:44] basically go in and clean the mess up. [1:47:46] I think there was an opportunity [1:47:49] here and I think the President made [1:47:51] the right choice when he decided [1:47:53] at this time that [1:47:55] simply for our advantage [1:47:57] and for the young men and women that [1:47:59] have to go in and do this, that [1:48:01] this was a safer time, if there ever is [1:48:03] such a thing as a safer time, but the [1:48:05] right time for our nation [1:48:07] to respond to this threat. [1:48:09] Is that an appropriate way of putting it, sir? [1:48:11] I agree with that. [1:48:14] Thank you. I think the President made [1:48:16] the right choice. It is never a good [1:48:18] time for a war, [1:48:20] but at some point you've got to look at what your [1:48:22] best possibilities are for protecting [1:48:24] those young men and women who are in harm's [1:48:26] way. Let me move on [1:48:28] for just a minute. Director Radcliffe, [1:48:30] let me just ask you this because there's been a discussion [1:48:32] and we've never been able [1:48:34] to talk about this in an unclassified setting [1:48:36] and I recognize it's sensitive, but [1:48:38] 60 minutes, there's been a report [1:48:41] about Havana Syndrome and about [1:48:43] individuals who are within [1:48:45] the agency and within state departments [1:48:47] that have actually had [1:48:49] significant illnesses, some [1:48:51] attributed, they believe, to [1:48:53] outside sources. [1:48:55] I don't think we have [1:48:58] been able to, in an unclassified [1:49:00] setting, at least acknowledge [1:49:02] that we take these issues [1:49:04] seriously. Is there anything you can share in this [1:49:06] unclassified setting to assure [1:49:08] the people of the State Department and [1:49:10] your agency that this is [1:49:12] not something which is being ignored? [1:49:15] Thanks for the question. I can. [1:49:17] I appreciate the opportunity [1:49:19] to address that. [1:49:21] Yes, we have to be careful about [1:49:23] what we can say. [1:49:25] We can go into further detail in the classified [1:49:27] session, [1:49:29] but this is something that [1:49:31] when I became the Director, [1:49:33] as you're aware, Senator, [1:49:35] there are disparate opinions [1:49:37] across the IC about [1:49:39] what the cause of these AHIs may [1:49:41] or may not be. [1:49:43] Otherwise known as Havana Syndrome. [1:49:45] Havana Syndrome, yeah. [1:49:47] And the question of whether or not [1:49:49] they could be the result of a [1:49:51] directed energy weapon from a foreign [1:49:53] adversary. So when you, [1:49:55] having been the DNI, understanding [1:49:57] the role of the DNI is to coordinate [1:49:59] across the IC when there are [1:50:01] disparate opinions among agencies. [1:50:03] Director Gabbard and I had a conversation [1:50:05] where she agreed [1:50:07] that she would undertake [1:50:09] a comprehensive review [1:50:11] of that issue across the IC [1:50:13] to make sure that it is getting the attention [1:50:15] that it deserves. And I know that she has [1:50:17] undertaken that and will be able to [1:50:19] brief you in further detail in the [1:50:21] classified session. Thank you. [1:50:23] And one last thought, this is only a comment, but to [1:50:25] General Hartman, [1:50:27] your time in service [1:50:29] has been very, very special. [1:50:31] Working with you on the Cyber [1:50:33] Security Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, [1:50:35] I commend you for everything you have done. [1:50:37] You are truly a hero. [1:50:39] And you have served your country [1:50:41] very, very well. Thank you [1:50:43] for your service. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chair. [1:50:45] Senator Kelly. [1:50:48] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and [1:50:50] thank you for being [1:50:52] here today to all of our witnesses. [1:50:54] So for more than a decade, [1:50:56] the United States has tried [1:50:58] to make a pivot to Asia [1:51:00] in its national defense strategy [1:51:02] in order to confront [1:51:04] significant threats from China. [1:51:06] For years, administrations [1:51:08] of both parties have identified China [1:51:10] as the top threat facing our country [1:51:12] and worked to build relationships [1:51:14] across Asia and deter [1:51:16] Chinese aggression. [1:51:19] At the same time, we have bolstered [1:51:21] our European allies and asked them [1:51:23] to contribute more to their defense [1:51:25] to deter Russia. [1:51:28] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:51:30] would you agree that [1:51:32] China and Russia are our [1:51:34] primary geopolitical rivals? [1:51:36] Director Gabbard. Yes, they [1:51:40] are our primary strategic competitors. Thank you. [1:51:42] Director Ratcliffe. [1:51:45] I would agree with that, although I don't think [1:51:47] they're equal in terms of the threats that they pose. [1:51:49] Understand. Thank you. So that brings us to the [1:51:51] war with Iran. So this has [1:51:53] created one of the largest [1:51:55] ever supply shocks [1:51:57] to the global oil supply, [1:51:59] which has sent gas prices [1:52:01] skyrocketing for Americans. [1:52:03] But not everybody is losing. [1:52:05] Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, [1:52:08] is it accurate that Russia has gained [1:52:10] billions of dollars in additional oil [1:52:12] revenue due to price spikes [1:52:14] as a result of the war and [1:52:16] loosened sanctions? [1:52:18] Director Gabbard. [1:52:24] That is what has been reported. [1:52:26] I defer to the Director of [1:52:28] Secretary of Treasury and Energy [1:52:30] on that front for details. [1:52:32] Director Ratcliffe. Yeah, I'm not an economist. [1:52:35] Not going to try and [1:52:37] do those calculations. But as I [1:52:39] talked about earlier, sometimes there are decisions [1:52:41] made that will benefit adversaries [1:52:43] at the same time policymakers think that [1:52:45] it will benefit the American people. Sanctions. It's clear. [1:52:47] I think we'd all agree that sanctions were [1:52:49] loosened and that means [1:52:51] more money into [1:52:53] the coffers of Vladimir [1:52:55] Putin. Would you agree [1:52:57] that if he has more funding, he [1:52:59] is likely to put that to his [1:53:01] war effort against Ukraine? [1:53:03] Director Gabbard. I would defer [1:53:07] to an actual intelligence [1:53:09] assessment on what they would believe his [1:53:11] intentions are. Director Ratcliffe. [1:53:14] Yeah, I wouldn't speculate on that. You wouldn't speculate? [1:53:17] Okay. Okay. And is [1:53:20] it accurate that China is continuing to receive [1:53:22] preferential oil flows from Iran [1:53:24] despite the conflict as Iran allows [1:53:26] its own tankers to [1:53:28] transit the strait? Director Gabbard. [1:53:32] I'm going to go back and forth between the two of you. [1:53:34] There has been some reporting [1:53:38] of China, [1:53:40] India, and other countries [1:53:42] being able to move their tankers [1:53:44] through the strait. However, [1:53:46] it is unclear [1:53:48] the volume or the measure of that. [1:53:50] Okay. So it sounds like it's accurate. Thank you. [1:53:52] I'm going to move on. Director Gabbard, you [1:53:54] tweeted yesterday that President [1:53:56] Trump concluded there was [1:53:58] an imminent threat and [1:54:00] made a decision to attack Iran after [1:54:02] carefully reviewing all [1:54:04] of the information before him. [1:54:06] I think the country deserves to know [1:54:08] what the information was. [1:54:10] I'm going to ask a series of questions and [1:54:12] just want a yes or no. [1:54:15] We don't need any explanation, just [1:54:17] yes or no, starting [1:54:19] with were you [1:54:21] asked, I'm not asking if you did brief [1:54:23] this, were you asked to [1:54:25] brief on whether Iran [1:54:28] would close the Strait of Hormuz? [1:54:30] I'm not going to comment [1:54:33] on what the President did or didn't ask me [1:54:36] on any topic. I'm not even, I'm not asking [1:54:38] if you briefed it. I'm just asking if there was a [1:54:40] request by the White House. I understand. [1:54:42] Director Ratcliffe, were you asked [1:54:45] to brief on whether Iran [1:54:47] would close the Strait [1:54:49] of Hormuz? The briefings [1:54:52] to the President of the White House [1:54:54] typically don't come at the request of the White House. [1:54:56] So typically when we [1:54:58] get intelligence that we want the President [1:55:00] to be aware of, the intelligence community brings [1:55:02] that to the President. Did you produce [1:55:04] the analysis for the Straits [1:55:07] of Hormuz? There has been and continues to be [1:55:09] analysis with respect to that. [1:55:11] Were you asked to brief on how [1:55:13] our adversaries and allies [1:55:15] would respond to the war in Iran? [1:55:19] I imagine I'll get the same answer. [1:55:22] So, it's [1:55:25] just to point out here, it's challenging [1:55:27] to forget about actually what was in the [1:55:29] brief for a second. We're having a hard time [1:55:31] finding out, not only if you [1:55:33] briefed the President on something, [1:55:35] but even if the White House [1:55:37] asked if they could be [1:55:40] briefed on something, or if analysis [1:55:42] was produced. So, [1:55:44] I just want to point out here, this is about [1:55:46] six days. Can I comment on this? [1:55:48] I'll go back to the point. [1:55:50] It's the same approach that [1:55:52] we took to the prior operations, [1:55:54] which to your credit, Senator, [1:55:56] you have praised the [1:55:58] intelligence and military [1:56:00] communities in Operation Midnight Hammer [1:56:02] and Operation [1:56:04] Absolute Resolve. It's the same approach [1:56:06] and the same professionals in terms of how [1:56:08] they approached this particular operation. [1:56:10] We're trying to figure out if the President [1:56:12] knew what the downside [1:56:14] was of the [1:56:16] Straits of Hormuz being closed. [1:56:19] And I'm having a hard time finding out [1:56:21] whether the White House asked, or whether there was a [1:56:23] brief, whether the President knew. [1:56:25] Did he know [1:56:27] this was going to happen, or did he just [1:56:29] disregard it? And I just want to point out something [1:56:31] that was released about six days [1:56:33] ago. This is a fundraising [1:56:36] email from the President, [1:56:38] from the President of the United States. And in this [1:56:40] email here, where there's multiple [1:56:43] links to donate money, it [1:56:46] says, as a national security [1:56:48] briefing member, you'll receive [1:56:50] my private [1:56:52] national security briefings. [1:56:54] Director Gabbard, or Director [1:56:59] Radcliffe, do you think the [1:57:01] public should be able to, [1:57:03] supporters of the President should be able to pay [1:57:05] and receive his private [1:57:07] national security briefings? [1:57:09] I assume these are briefings, [1:57:11] Director Radcliffe, that you provide to the [1:57:13] President, that is now going to be [1:57:15] provided to somebody who makes [1:57:17] a donation. Regardless of what that [1:57:19] I don't know what that document is, [1:57:21] but regardless of what it says, it didn't happen. [1:57:23] Well, no, this is new. [1:57:25] But what I'm telling you is [1:57:27] that the Hatch Act would prevent [1:57:29] me, in an apolitical role, [1:57:31] from engaging in that. I'm not aware that anything [1:57:33] like that happened. Yeah, this says [1:57:35] unfiltered updates. [1:57:38] So, Director Gabbard, [1:57:40] do you have any comment on whether unfiltered [1:57:42] updates of private national [1:57:44] security briefings should be [1:57:46] made to individuals that donate [1:57:48] to the President? I'm not [1:57:50] familiar with that document. [1:57:52] It's been made [1:57:54] very public six days ago. [1:57:57] We'll get you a copy [1:57:59] here, because I agree with you, [1:58:01] Director Radcliffe, that [1:58:03] the Hatch Act should prohibit [1:58:05] this type of conduct. Thank you. [1:58:07] Senator Lankford joins us from [1:58:09] what I gather is a very exciting confirmation [1:58:11] hearing for Senator Mullen. It is, [1:58:13] actually. For all of you, thank you. [1:58:15] Thank you for the time that you give to the [1:58:17] country, to be able to serve for your families, and the [1:58:19] sacrifice that you make to be able to do this, and all the [1:58:21] professionals that work around you. Please pass [1:58:23] on our gratitude to them, because they work incredibly [1:58:25] hard and difficult tasks in this. [1:58:27] I want to talk about something that's a little closer [1:58:29] to home on this. [1:58:31] A lot of Oklahomans that I talk to, [1:58:33] and quite frankly, folks even outside the state on it, [1:58:35] when they think about threats, [1:58:37] as strange as this may sound to those [1:58:39] of us that deal with missiles and [1:58:41] ballistics, [1:58:43] they think about the threat to their family, [1:58:45] and to their income, and to who they [1:58:47] are. And a lot of it is international [1:58:49] scammers that are now [1:58:51] reaching into the United States to [1:58:53] be able to gather data, or to be able to [1:58:55] steal money from them. [1:58:57] AI has accelerated this dramatically, [1:58:59] and I know the Worldwide Threats has [1:59:01] mentioned this, and some of the challenges that we face [1:59:03] on it, but the challenge is getting [1:59:05] bigger. FBI had noted [1:59:07] that in 2024, [1:59:09] it was almost $17 billion [1:59:11] that was assumed lost [1:59:13] to scammers, a lot of those internationals. [1:59:15] Some estimates are as high as $50 billion [1:59:17] on it. AI [1:59:19] continues to be able to accelerate the capabilities [1:59:21] on it. OpenAI even [1:59:23] noted now that [1:59:25] they're putting online ads [1:59:27] saying, if you've been scammed, [1:59:29] here's a way to recover your money, [1:59:31] and that is actually a [1:59:33] scam. It's taking them to a [1:59:35] fake FBI page [1:59:37] where they can then turn in and [1:59:39] to say, if you've been scammed, here's how [1:59:41] the FBI is going to actually come help you [1:59:43] to recover it, but even that page [1:59:45] is fake, and they're going to be able to steal their information. [1:59:47] This is accelerating [1:59:49] at a pace that's pretty dramatic [1:59:51] with the use of AI on this. [1:59:54] Director Patel, I know that you guys [1:59:56] are on it. I know that there's multiple [1:59:58] entities on it, but this is a big challenge, [2:00:00] and a lot of Americans are very, very concerned [2:00:02] about the threat to their families. They may [2:00:04] have their parents [2:00:06] that are more vulnerable at this time [2:00:08] and being targeted. How do we take [2:00:10] some of this on to be able to confront what's [2:00:12] happening online to be able to [2:00:14] attack people and to be able to scam them? [2:00:16] Thank you, Senator, and it's with any other [2:00:18] high-priority [2:00:20] operation that the FBI runs, whether it's [2:00:22] CICT or we're talking about [2:00:24] scamming and scam centers here, one, you have to [2:00:26] drown and get online with your [2:00:28] online covert employees and platforms, [2:00:30] and we've increased funding, and we've also [2:00:32] what we've done strategically is move [2:00:34] people out of Washington, D.C. on the [2:00:36] intel analyst front and the support staff front [2:00:38] to places like Oklahoma. Actually, every [2:00:40] single state across the country has received [2:00:42] a plus-up because of that, [2:00:44] and what we've created is the [2:00:46] Internet Crime Complaint Center, the IC3, [2:00:48] which I know you're familiar with and referenced. So what [2:00:50] we're doing on the homeland is going out [2:00:52] into the streets of America on the online platforms [2:00:54] in America and shutting down [2:00:56] those networks and shutting [2:00:58] down the capability of AI to interfere, [2:01:00] but I think the bigger term project, what we're doing [2:01:02] overseas, that's the key to this. [2:01:04] The scam center compounds [2:01:06] are largely located in Cambodia and Burma [2:01:08] and on the Thai border. I've already engaged [2:01:10] with the premiers of each and every one of those countries. [2:01:12] We've done so to switch [2:01:14] off access to the Internet [2:01:16] with those governments to make [2:01:18] sure that those compounds, they're literal [2:01:20] compounds that are being built, and we can get into that [2:01:22] in the classified center, that are [2:01:24] fleecing Americans and senior citizens [2:01:26] all the way from Southeast Asia [2:01:28] because they are backed by the [2:01:30] CCP to build those compounds because [2:01:32] they know it's going to hurt everyday Americans. [2:01:34] So us, which we have successfully already [2:01:36] eliminated and scuttled, [2:01:38] excuse me, numerous compounds [2:01:40] in Cambodia and Burma and Thailand, is [2:01:42] the big picture, the big part of the [2:01:44] lift overseas. What we're going to do [2:01:46] is go into those countries [2:01:48] and shut down every single [2:01:50] scam center compound. [2:01:52] Which is very helpful, and every [2:01:54] American is thinking about this and talking [2:01:56] about it. Director Patel, I'm going to stay with you [2:01:58] on that. The counter narcotics work has been [2:02:00] phenomenal in the past year and a half. [2:02:02] The amount of methamphetamine [2:02:04] and fentanyl that had been [2:02:06] seized coming across our border [2:02:08] has been dramatic, and [2:02:10] that has a real effect to what's actually [2:02:12] coming at families in my state [2:02:14] on it. What I'm interested [2:02:16] in is, how are you partnering with local [2:02:18] law enforcement to continue to accelerate [2:02:20] this process? What does that [2:02:22] look like for FBI? Absolutely [2:02:24] Senator, the counter narcotic mission can't [2:02:26] be complete without state and local law [2:02:28] enforcement. So we are embedding more task force [2:02:30] officers across the country on the specific [2:02:32] counter narcotics mission. We've also [2:02:34] stood up with our interagency partners [2:02:36] in Tucson, Arizona, [2:02:38] the Southern Border Intelligence Center [2:02:40] specifically on the counter narcotic mission [2:02:42] so that we can utilize the Department of War [2:02:44] and interagency capabilities on the law enforcement [2:02:46] front. That's why we seized [2:02:48] enough fentanyl in 2025 [2:02:50] to kill 178 million Americans. [2:02:52] That's a 31% increase year [2:02:54] over year. And here's a statistic that [2:02:56] everybody should be proud of. [2:02:58] Opioid overdose deaths from [2:03:00] last year dropped 20 points. [2:03:02] 20 points from across the country. [2:03:04] And in Oklahoma [2:03:06] specifically, Senator, we seized enough [2:03:08] kilograms of cocaine [2:03:10] to include a 232% [2:03:12] increase in the state of Oklahoma [2:03:14] alone, and enough fentanyl to kill [2:03:16] 500,000 Oklahomans. [2:03:18] We can't do that unless we [2:03:20] have great police partnerships, which has [2:03:22] been a priority of mine, which is why [2:03:24] I've embedded police officers [2:03:26] here at headquarters from around the [2:03:28] country to make sure we have that connectivity. [2:03:30] And I've shortened the task force officer [2:03:32] onboarding pipeline from one to [2:03:34] two years to 90 days. [2:03:36] We need them. Yeah, we do. [2:03:38] Director Ratcliffe, the annual [2:03:40] threat assessment highlights this year [2:03:42] the Muslim Brotherhood [2:03:45] in particular, and [2:03:47] calls out some of their financial material support [2:03:49] on this. That [2:03:51] may be surprising to some folks here, [2:03:53] but it's not surprising to folks all across [2:03:55] the Middle East in the threat [2:03:57] that the Muslim Brotherhood continues [2:03:59] to pose to so many [2:04:01] governments and entities across the world [2:04:03] on that. How is the Muslim [2:04:05] Brotherhood financing [2:04:07] itself and its acts of [2:04:09] terrorism, and [2:04:11] is there something that we need to do [2:04:14] here to be able to [2:04:16] make sure that we're protecting Americans in [2:04:18] the threat? Senator, [2:04:21] I think [2:04:23] with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood [2:04:25] abroad, [2:04:27] we view that, just as we do other [2:04:29] proxies [2:04:31] across the Middle East, [2:04:33] the Houthis and other [2:04:35] groups, and I can [2:04:37] relate to you that the CIA [2:04:39] is very focused [2:04:41] on the counterterrorism [2:04:43] front. You weren't here before. [2:04:45] I said in the classified portion [2:04:47] I would get into [2:04:49] the CIA's [2:04:52] success with regard to groups like [2:04:54] the Muslim Brotherhood in a classified [2:04:56] setting where I can [2:04:58] share with you the [2:05:00] impact that we're having. But what I [2:05:02] like, and across the board [2:05:04] with regard to [2:05:06] terrorist [2:05:08] groups and our counterterrorism [2:05:10] activities, I can publicly [2:05:12] characterize it as saying [2:05:14] we've accomplished more in the last [2:05:16] year than in the four years [2:05:18] of the prior administration combined. [2:05:20] So hopefully it gives you [2:05:22] some measure of comfort about [2:05:24] how we're approaching things and the [2:05:26] effectiveness that we've had in the last [2:05:28] year in that regard. [2:05:30] And I look forward to getting into [2:05:32] detail in the classified portion. [2:05:34] Look forward to that. Thank you. Senator Reid. [2:05:37] Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. [2:05:39] Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. [2:05:41] The Washington Post reported earlier [2:05:43] this week in their words [2:05:45] the U.S. intelligence assessments say [2:05:47] Iran's regime likely [2:05:49] will remain in place for now, [2:05:51] weakened but more hard-line, [2:05:53] with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary [2:05:55] Guard Corps security forces [2:05:57] exerting greater control. [2:05:59] Director Gabbard, [2:06:01] do you stand by that reported [2:06:03] intelligence community assessment? [2:06:06] I don't stand by any leaked [2:06:08] so-called intelligence to the media. [2:06:10] I do stand by [2:06:12] the intelligence communities assessment [2:06:14] that was included in the annual threat [2:06:16] assessment that speaks directly [2:06:18] to this issue that as of this moment [2:06:20] the regime maintains [2:06:22] power within [2:06:24] Iran even though they are [2:06:26] vastly degraded on almost every front. [2:06:28] Do you think that the [2:06:31] killing of the Ayatollah [2:06:33] and his wife and [2:06:35] other family members [2:06:37] and key people contributed [2:06:39] to the picking of a hard-line [2:06:41] successor? [2:06:46] Senator, the intelligence communities [2:06:48] assessment [2:06:50] has pointed to [2:06:52] a number of different [2:06:54] scenarios [2:06:56] that went into [2:06:58] play with the selection of the successor. [2:07:00] The details [2:07:02] of that we can discuss in a [2:07:04] closed hearing with regard to the intelligence [2:07:06] reporting. Is the [2:07:08] regime in [2:07:10] Iran now trying to [2:07:12] promote the [2:07:15] deceased Ayatollah [2:07:18] as a martyr [2:07:20] who should be followed [2:07:22] and does that help them [2:07:24] consolidate support? [2:07:26] Senator, the Iranians [2:07:30] are certainly using that [2:07:32] as a call to action. [2:07:34] The effects of that [2:07:36] from an intelligence [2:07:38] standpoint [2:07:40] remain to be seen. [2:07:42] There is a tradition in Shia though to [2:07:44] honor martyrs. One of their [2:07:46] greatest celebrations is the [2:07:48] martyrdom of [2:07:50] the grandson of Muhammad. Is that [2:07:52] correct? That's right. So we might have [2:07:54] played into their cultural [2:07:56] biases erroneously. [2:07:58] General Adams, [2:08:00] what conditions the USS would need [2:08:02] to be present to make the regime [2:08:04] collapse or [2:08:07] necessitate, excuse my voice, [2:08:09] unconditional surrender and [2:08:11] can it be done with air power alone? [2:08:15] Senator, we have at the [2:08:17] Defense Intelligence Agency put together a [2:08:19] number of scenarios [2:08:21] coordinated across the IC with regards [2:08:23] to what we would forecast [2:08:25] the future would be. [2:08:27] One of the, there are four [2:08:29] specific goals that we've been [2:08:31] told to track and analyze [2:08:33] with regards to the goals of the [2:08:35] US effort. [2:08:37] They've been articulated earlier [2:08:39] in the hearing, so I won't hammer [2:08:41] on those. But with regards to [2:08:43] the collapse of the regime, [2:08:45] specific perpetuation, [2:08:47] like what would precipitate that, [2:08:49] we would like to, I would [2:08:51] prefer to talk about that in the [2:08:53] classified hearing. Well, [2:08:56] I understand, but [2:08:58] there's a very basic question [2:09:00] here. Will air power alone [2:09:02] be able to [2:09:04] destroy this regime, given [2:09:06] the culture, the politics, [2:09:08] the temperament [2:09:10] of these people? The Iraq [2:09:12] Iran war lasted for eight [2:09:14] years with a million casualties [2:09:16] Do you [2:09:19] think air power alone will do it? [2:09:25] Senator, the capabilities [2:09:27] that our joint force brings to bear [2:09:29] can accomplish [2:09:32] many missions. To [2:09:34] forecast exactly what [2:09:36] can and can't accomplish [2:09:38] this goal, [2:09:40] I prefer not to [2:09:42] guess or [2:09:44] prognosticate on that. [2:09:48] I'll recognize your professional [2:09:50] position. [2:09:52] US Special Envoy Steve [2:09:55] Witkoff recently stated that Russian [2:09:57] leaders told Trump on a call [2:09:59] that they were not sharing intelligence [2:10:01] with Iran. Witkoff says, [2:10:03] quote, we can take them at their [2:10:05] word. Director Gabbard [2:10:07] and Radcliffe, do you take [2:10:09] President Putin at his word? I'll go ahead [2:10:13] and answer. No, I don't take [2:10:15] Vladimir Putin [2:10:17] at his word. [2:10:19] Are they [2:10:23] providing intelligence to the Iranians? [2:10:25] Well, we talked about this before. [2:10:27] Yes, sir. In the [2:10:29] classified session, what we can [2:10:31] go into is [2:10:33] that the Iranians are requesting intelligence [2:10:35] assistance from Russia, [2:10:37] from China, [2:10:39] and from other adversaries [2:10:41] of the United States, and [2:10:43] whether [2:10:45] or not those countries [2:10:47] are is something [2:10:49] we can talk about in the classified portion. [2:10:51] But you've made an assessment. [2:10:54] You've analyzed traffic [2:10:56] communications and you can... [2:10:58] I know the answer and happy to discuss [2:11:00] that with you in the classified portion. [2:11:02] Yes, sir. [2:11:04] Go ahead. Go ahead. [2:11:07] Thank you. [2:11:09] One of the aspects of this is [2:11:11] the collateral effects, [2:11:13] particularly in Russia and Ukraine. [2:11:15] We were just talking about [2:11:17] Russia probably or possibly [2:11:19] providing intelligence, [2:11:21] maybe interfering or inflicting [2:11:23] casualties on our forces. [2:11:25] Russia is also benefiting from the [2:11:27] lifting of sanctions [2:11:29] on their ability to sell oil, [2:11:31] and I heard one estimate of [2:11:33] a $20 billion surge [2:11:35] in their potential revenues. [2:11:37] Ukraine, on the [2:11:39] other hand, is facing [2:11:41] perhaps a [2:11:43] disrupted supply chain of [2:11:45] missiles and other equipment because [2:11:47] they're being devoted to this operation. [2:11:49] So, General Adams, can you [2:11:51] just give me your [2:11:53] impression of the effect [2:11:55] of the battle on Russia [2:11:57] and Ukraine at the moment, of this battle? [2:11:59] Well, from our collection [2:12:03] of weapons, [2:12:05] the effect of the [2:12:07] epic fury on [2:12:10] the Russian-Ukrainian [2:12:12] battle [2:12:14] has been [2:12:16] indirect, [2:12:18] not direct. [2:12:21] We do [2:12:23] track very carefully [2:12:25] what benefits or, [2:12:27] as you alluded to, [2:12:29] the collateral effects of [2:12:31] what we're doing [2:12:33] and how it impacts. [2:12:35] There is a lot of, [2:12:37] from both the Russians and the Chinese, [2:12:39] observations of what we're doing [2:12:41] and figuring out [2:12:43] what they can learn from that. [2:12:45] So I think that's a collateral effect [2:12:47] as we expose what the [2:12:49] joint force displays [2:12:51] on the battlefield. [2:12:53] And [2:12:55] I think we can talk [2:12:58] in a little more detail [2:13:00] as we move to the classified session [2:13:02] some of the things that we're collecting [2:13:04] specifically about [2:13:06] what those effects are. [2:13:08] Thank you very much, sir. [2:13:10] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:13:13] Thank you all for being here. [2:13:15] Before I ask you a few questions, [2:13:18] I want to call everyone's attention again [2:13:20] to this fundraising email [2:13:22] signed by the President [2:13:24] that Senator Kelly mentioned earlier [2:13:27] in which the President of the United States [2:13:29] invites his campaign donors [2:13:31] to, quote, [2:13:33] claim your spot, [2:13:35] claim your spot, [2:13:37] join now to receive [2:13:39] security briefings [2:13:41] to his political donors [2:13:44] featuring a photo of the President [2:13:46] at a dignified transfer [2:13:48] ceremony with a flag [2:13:50] draped coffin of an American [2:13:52] service member killed in action [2:13:54] returning to their family. [2:13:56] And the American people need to know [2:13:58] that the President of the United States [2:14:00] is fundraising for his political campaign [2:14:02] and his PAC [2:14:04] using images of American [2:14:06] service members killed in action [2:14:08] and it's a disgrace. [2:14:14] So, Director Gabbard, [2:14:16] I'd like to reground this [2:14:18] in your core responsibilities. [2:14:21] Under the law, you are responsible [2:14:23] for providing national intelligence [2:14:26] to the President, correct? [2:14:28] Yes. [2:14:30] And to the heads of executive branch departments [2:14:32] and agencies, yes? [2:14:35] Yes. [2:14:37] And to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [2:14:39] and Senior Military Commanders? [2:14:41] Across the IC, yes. [2:14:43] And to the Senate and the House [2:14:45] and relevant committees, correct? [2:14:47] Yes. [2:14:50] And you noted in your opening statement [2:14:52] you're here fulfilling a statutory responsibility [2:14:54] and that your testimony, quote, [2:14:56] represents the IC's assessment [2:14:58] of threats, correct? [2:15:01] That opening statement as submitted [2:15:03] to the committee in advance of this hearing [2:15:05] stated that as a result of last summer's [2:15:07] airstrikes, quote, [2:15:09] Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:15:11] was obliterated, end quote, correct? [2:15:13] That's right. [2:15:16] And is that in fact the assessment of the intelligence community? [2:15:18] Yes. [2:15:20] And the opening statement you submitted [2:15:22] to the committee last night also stated, [2:15:24] quote, [2:15:26] there has been no effort since then [2:15:28] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability, [2:15:30] end quote, correct? [2:15:33] That's right. [2:15:35] And that's the assessment of the intelligence community? [2:15:37] Yes. [2:15:39] The White House stated on March 1st of this year [2:15:41] that this war was launched and was, [2:15:43] quote, a military campaign to eliminate [2:15:46] the imminent nuclear threat posed [2:15:48] by the Iranian regime, end quote. [2:15:50] That's a statement from the White House. [2:15:53] Quote, the imminent nuclear threat [2:15:55] posed by the Iranian regime. [2:15:57] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:15:59] that there was an imminent nuclear threat [2:16:01] posed by the Iranian regime? [2:16:03] The intelligence community assessed that Iran [2:16:07] maintained the intention to rebuild [2:16:09] and to continue to grow [2:16:11] their nuclear enrichment capability. [2:16:13] Was it the assessment of the intelligence community [2:16:15] that there was a, quote, imminent nuclear threat [2:16:17] posed by the Iranian regime, yes or no? [2:16:19] Senator, the only person who can determine [2:16:21] what is and is not an imminent threat [2:16:23] is the White House. [2:16:25] And he made that determination. [2:16:27] False. This is the worldwide threat [2:16:29] searing where you present to Congress [2:16:31] national intelligence, timely, objective [2:16:33] and independent of political considerations. [2:16:35] You've stated today [2:16:37] that the intelligence community's assessment [2:16:39] is that Iran's nuclear enrichment program [2:16:41] was obliterated and that, [2:16:43] quote, there had been no efforts since then [2:16:45] to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. [2:16:47] Was it the intelligence community's [2:16:50] assessment that [2:16:52] nevertheless, despite [2:16:54] this obliteration, there was a, quote, [2:16:56] imminent nuclear threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:16:58] yes or no? [2:17:00] It is not the intelligence community's responsibility [2:17:02] to determine what is and is not an imminent threat. [2:17:04] That is up to the president based on a volume [2:17:06] of information that he receives. [2:17:08] It is precisely your responsibility [2:17:10] to determine [2:17:12] what constitutes a threat [2:17:14] to the United States. [2:17:16] This is the worldwide threats hearing [2:17:19] where, as you noted in your opening [2:17:21] testimony, quote, [2:17:23] you represent the IC's [2:17:25] assessment of threats. [2:17:27] You are here to represent [2:17:29] the IC's assessment of [2:17:31] threats. That's a quote from your [2:17:33] own opening statement. [2:17:35] And so my question is, as you're here [2:17:37] to present the IC's assessment [2:17:39] of threats, [2:17:42] was it the assessment of the intelligence [2:17:44] community that, as the White House [2:17:46] claimed on March 1st, [2:17:48] there was a, quote, imminent nuclear [2:17:50] threat posed by the Iranian regime, [2:17:52] yes or no? Once again, Senator, [2:17:54] the intelligence community has [2:17:56] provided the inputs that [2:17:59] make up this annual threat assessment. [2:18:01] You won't answer the question. It is the nature [2:18:03] of the imminent threat that the president [2:18:05] has to make that determination [2:18:07] based on a collection and volume [2:18:09] of information and intelligence that he is [2:18:11] provided with. You're here to be timely, [2:18:13] objective, and independent [2:18:15] of political considerations. Exactly what I'm [2:18:17] doing. No, you're evading a [2:18:19] question because to provide a [2:18:21] candid response to the committee [2:18:23] would contradict a statement [2:18:25] from the White House. Let me ask [2:18:27] you about your presence in Fulton County. [2:18:29] On January 28th [2:18:31] of this year, [2:18:34] you were present at [2:18:37] the FBI's raid on the Fulton [2:18:39] County elections office on January 28th, [2:18:41] correct? I was present for part [2:18:43] of the FBI exercising [2:18:45] a warrant approved by a municipal judge. [2:18:47] Yes, and the FBI was there [2:18:49] executing, the FBI was there [2:18:51] executing that warrant to seize ballots [2:18:53] and materials associated with [2:18:55] the 2020 election, correct? Yes. [2:18:57] And are you aware that members of this [2:18:59] committee have already opened up [2:19:01] inquiries into your election related [2:19:03] activities? Yes. And are you [2:19:05] aware that your general counsel and deputy [2:19:07] general counsel have already provided testimony [2:19:09] to this committee regarding those activities? [2:19:11] Yes. On February 2nd, [2:19:14] you sent a letter to Senator Warner regarding your [2:19:16] presence at the raid. Was that letter accurate? [2:19:18] I don't recall the exact date, but if [2:19:21] I sent a letter that had my signature, it was accurate. [2:19:23] You stated in the letter that your [2:19:25] presence at the raid was, quote, requested by [2:19:27] the president, correct? Yes. When did the [2:19:29] president request your presence at the raid? [2:19:31] Uh, the day of [2:19:33] the raid, uh, the warrant [2:19:35] execution commencing. The day of [2:19:38] the raid? Yes. He called you on the phone? [2:19:40] I'm not going to disclose how the [2:19:42] message was delivered, but it was a request [2:19:44] from the president and his administration to go and [2:19:46] help oversee this [2:19:48] warrant being executed along with the deputy [2:19:50] director of the FBI. Is it your role [2:19:52] to oversee? And to thank the FBI agents who were [2:19:54] conducting this warrant? Is it your role to oversee the [2:19:56] execution of criminal warrants? It is my [2:19:58] role, uh, based on [2:20:00] statute that Congress has passed to have [2:20:02] oversight over election security [2:20:04] to include counterintelligence. [2:20:06] But you said you, you over, you oversaw [2:20:08] the raid, correct? You just testified you [2:20:10] oversaw the raid? Portions of it. [2:20:12] Okay. Did you handle any ballots or election [2:20:14] related materials? No. You were inside [2:20:16] an FBI evidence truck, correct? [2:20:18] You were photographed inside an FBI evidence truck? [2:20:22] It was an empty truck, yes. [2:20:25] The president stated, quote, you looked at [2:20:27] votes that wanted to be checked out. The senator's time [2:20:29] is expired. Did you look at votes as the [2:20:31] president stated? Senator Ossoff, your time [2:20:33] is expired. You respond to the record? You can have her, [2:20:35] no, she cannot respond because [2:20:37] No, for the record, will the, will the [2:20:39] director please respond for the record to that question [2:20:41] is my, my question. I'm happy to respond to [2:20:43] questions for the record. Thank you, Director Gabbard. [2:20:45] Thank you. Vice Chairman? [2:20:48] I just want to, I'm not going to go back to this [2:20:50] issue. I'm sure we'll address in the, um, [2:20:52] in the closed setting. [2:20:54] But I am very disappointed. [2:20:57] Uh, this is the only [2:20:59] one time a year the public [2:21:01] gets to hear from you guys in this kind of [2:21:03] setting. And the fact that we have [2:21:05] repeated public reporting, including [2:21:09] a major story in the Wall Street Journal [2:21:11] today, about China [2:21:13] and Russia assisting [2:21:15] Iran, which seems [2:21:17] obvious and evident, [2:21:20] and none of you would confirm that publicly, [2:21:22] I think, doesn't [2:21:24] give the American people the full [2:21:26] challenges of this war. [2:21:28] I would add, what I said [2:21:33] earlier, that the media is not a [2:21:36] classification authority, but [2:21:38] certainly sounds like something Russia and China [2:21:40] would do, and they have done for decades [2:21:42] in the past to Americans. Uh, to [2:21:44] wrap up a little business here before we adjourn, [2:21:46] the open session, we will [2:21:48] reconvene in 30 minutes [2:21:50] in our usual location for the [2:21:52] closed session. That's at 1256 [2:21:54] promptly. [2:21:56] Um, I do want to note, uh, [2:21:58] for the record, that Senator Young cannot join us. [2:22:00] He is at Dover Air Force Base [2:22:02] for the dignified transfer of remains [2:22:04] for one of our fallen heroes, [2:22:06] a Hoosier. Um, and I would invite [2:22:08] everyone to join Senator Young in [2:22:10] praying for the family and friends [2:22:12] of that soldier and all the soldiers who [2:22:14] have given their life in the defense of our freedom [2:22:16] and security. Uh, [2:22:18] General Hartman, I want to again acknowledge you, [2:22:20] uh, given your impending retirement since this [2:22:22] is your last appearance for the committee. [2:22:24] I'm sure you hope, and I'm sure [2:22:26] that the thing you'll miss most about [2:22:29] your long career in uniform is [2:22:31] testifying before Congress. [2:22:33] Uh, I remind members that questions for the record [2:22:35] will be due by the close of business [2:22:37] on Friday, March 20, [2:22:39] and the audience will remain seated [2:22:41] for a moment so that our witnesses [2:22:43] and members may exit and proceed [2:22:45] promptly to the closed session. [2:22:47] This open session is adjourned.