House intelligence hearing Day 2 questions Gabbard, Ratcliffe and Patel on Iran war

[2:02] yeah morning everyone i call the committee to order without objection the chair may declare [2:09] the committee in recess at any time before we begin today's hearing i would like to provide [2:13] a few important reminders first today's open portion is being broadcast live on c-span [2:18] and streamed on the committee's youtube channel this open portion as part of the hearing [2:24] will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis all participants are reminded to refrain [2:29] from discussing classified or other sensitive information protected from public disclosure [2:34] i will adjourn this open session following completion of one round of questions and [2:37] we'll then move into a closed session where such questions can be asked [2:40] second i want to welcome the audience and inform them that while i fully support [2:45] constitutionally protected rights of speech and protest this is not the time or the place any [2:51] would-be disruptors in the audience who interfere with the committee's business will not be [2:54] tolerated for this event members will have five minutes with the witnesses i ask each of my [2:58] colleagues to keep both your questions and complete answers from the witnesses within [3:03] that allotted five minutes [3:04] any last-minute questions or responses that can't be completed in time will be submitted for the [3:08] record we do expect a vote series at 10 o'clock this morning the vote will be held open so we [3:13] don't plan to recess we'll address that when the time comes additionally in the same manner in [3:19] which the house permanent select committee on intelligence has conducted itself in a recent [3:22] worldwide threat hearings i expect that we will continue to act in a bipartisan and respectful [3:26] manner during today's event i'm confident all members can treat each of our witnesses today [3:30] with due respect consistent with past practices [3:35] thank you for being here today the worldwide threats hearing provides the american people the [3:39] opportunity here directly from our intelligence community leadership on the threats that face our [3:43] nation it's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing director of national [3:48] intelligence the honorable tulsi gabbard director of central intelligence agency the honorable john [3:53] ratcliffe director of federal bureau of investigation the honorable kash patel [3:58] acting director of the national security agency lieutenant general william j hartman [4:02] and director of defense intelligence agency lieutenant general james h adams the [4:06] secretary of security for the state of iran and vice president of the united states [4:15] yes thanks to all of you for coming today we will be having the second congressional hearing [4:20] on 8th of july 3rd thank you all for being here it's a gross understatement to say that a lot has [4:25] occurred since we met at this hearing last year before i addressed the issues i had planned i [4:31] want to address iran once it was clear that diplomacy would not stop iran from developing [4:35] to acknowledge the failure of prior policies it's a simple fact that the consecutive that [4:40] consecutive administrations had exhausted all other options to end this threat our witnesses [4:45] here are tasked with providing intelligence to inform decision makers there's only one person [4:50] in america who has the responsibility and the obligation to act when he believes there is a [4:55] clear and present danger to our safety the commander-in-chief has that duty and i commend [5:00] his decisiveness in this most difficult of decisions i've been in briefings that the [5:04] administration provided to all members to this committee and to the gang of eight the classified [5:09] case is clear even if it can't be fully discussed in the open the president made a difficult but [5:14] necessary decision my democrat colleagues have made it clear that they don't agree what we [5:19] shouldn't disagree on is that the united states has effectively been at war with iranian regime [5:23] for the last 47 years the death to america is not just a slogan on a t-shirt that you buy at [5:29] tehran international airport or at the campus bookstore at columbia university it's their [5:34] ethos and their values and their values and their values and their values and their values and their [5:34] ethos and their policy they are responsible for the deaths of countless americans i want to thank [5:40] the many service members and intelligence officers involved in operation epic fury for their selfless [5:44] service for those who have lost loved ones in this fight please know that you are in our prayers [5:48] most sincerely your loved ones died in service to the united states of america we honor them [5:54] and you for their service freedom-loving people everywhere are thankful for their sacrifice that [6:00] said there are a few other topics it's important for me to address first after four years of biden's [6:05] administration in the united states of america in just one short year the trump administration [6:09] has secured our borders and reasserted america as a decisive leader that commands respect on the world [6:14] stage this administration has secured a stunning number of wins for the united states including [6:20] reasserting the importance of the western hemisphere and disrupting china's predatory belt [6:24] and road activities in our neighborhood negotiating a ceasefire in gaza resulting [6:28] in the freeing of the hostages held by the bloodthirsty hamas terrorists [6:32] and working with our nato partners to more than double their rush their [6:35] defense spending against pressing threats from ccp and russia i thank each of the witnesses here [6:40] today for their parts in the reassertion of american leadership second our role here is to [6:45] both authorize your authorities and resources and oversee their implementation one of those [6:50] authorities is pfizer 702 which expires in just over a month the president is seeking an 18-month [6:56] clean extension to provide more time to assess the implementation of the 56 reform measures included [7:02] in the last reauthorization i'm working with the ranking member house leadership and judiciary [7:07] chairman jordan to support that request we look forward to an update from the panel today on [7:11] compliance efforts arisa implementation and mission value third last year i made clear [7:16] my expectation that we would work together to end the weaponization of the intelligence community [7:20] improve analytic integrity and fix our broken counterintelligence enterprise many in congress [7:25] and across our nation have lost trust in the intelligence community while we have made progress [7:30] there's still much work that remains to be done i hope to continue working with each of you to do [7:37] what we've done to protect our people and to add to the needs of our citizens while regaining their [7:41] trust i also remain committed to tackling the issues that allow hostile foreign powers to [7:45] operate so effectively against us including within the united states specifically foreign [7:49] intelligence threats targeting the united states now surpass levels seen at the height of the cold [7:54] war in both scale and complexity these threats include cyber penetrations of critical infrastructure [7:59] u.s government systems and private sector innovators as well as surveillance near [8:03] sensitive military installations intelligence collection against foreign dissidents living in the [8:07] like in the cold war where conflict often gave way to irregular operations below the level of [8:11] traditional warfare today's adversary tactics have made the homeland a contested environment [8:16] we must properly resource and reform our nation's counterintelligence enterprise to meet that threat [8:22] we must transform our approaches in order to confront adversarial intelligence services at [8:26] scale driving back operational activities in the homeland and forcing our adversaries to rethink [8:30] their risk calculus for operating in the united states unfortunately in recent years the [8:35] counterintelligence enterprise lost a significant amount of credibility with the american people due [8:40] to the actions of those involved in cases like crossfire hurricane and arctic frost for our [8:45] intelligence community to best serve america the ci community and the larger ic must stay out of [8:50] domestic policy debates and focus on unrelenting aggressive mission execution for our intelligence [8:56] community to best serve america the ci community and the larger ic must stay out of those debates [9:02] director gabbett director gabbard i want to particularly commend your efforts [9:06] in this space specifically i want to thank you and president trump for working with us to declassify [9:11] the hipsea majority staff report on the 2017 intelligence community assessment on russian plans [9:16] and intentions in the 2016 election the majority staff report which had been kept from the american [9:21] people for eight years proves that the 2017 ica the public genesis of the russia collusion hoax [9:28] was a politicized document its key assessment on putin's hopes for the 2016 election was built on [9:34] at best abysmal and analytic trade-offs and political and political and political and political [9:36] tradecraft and at worst willful political charge and charged intentions this was a necessary act of [9:43] transparency to begin the process of rebuilding trust with the american people and the ic but [9:49] please know the challenges facing each one of you is that are testifying here is not lost on [9:55] this committee getting a large ship back on the right course is never easy the task can certainly [10:00] be challenged by unforeseen obstacles and obstructions you know you are doing something [10:04] right when all the weapons in the media's arsenal are pointed directly at you thank you all for [10:09] pressing forward we can walk and chew gum at the same time and we must we must have our ic as [10:14] aggressive as ever in pursuing its mission while holding those accountable who participated in its [10:18] misuse i thank each of you for doing this and encourage you to all keep moving on both fronts [10:24] finally now i want to speak to our remarkable ic workforce i'm immensely proud of the incredible [10:31] work that you do especially over the last year to support critical military intelligence and [10:35] law enforcement operations from operations midnight hammer absolute resolve southern spear [10:40] and epic fury [10:41] to the many other operations you've conducted in the shadows with no fanfare americans will never [10:46] be able to fully appreciate all you do to protect this nation i think i can speak for the entire [10:52] committee when i say we extend our deepest gratitude america truly has the best of the best [10:57] in our ranks it's for this primary reason i would like to address the house intelligence committee's [11:02] ongoing investigation into the intelligence community's mishandling of anomalous health [11:06] incidents also known as havana syndrome and the mistreatment of ahi survivors i'm aware of the [11:12] increasing media reporting around this issue and i'd like to first reiterate the [11:15] reiterate the committee's commitment to releasing additional unclassified information [11:20] our team has worked diligently to conduct this investigation with the utmost integrity [11:24] and we cannot be driven by outside timelines i commit to the workforce to release additional [11:29] reports as appropriate but simply it's my clear opinion that individuals in the intelligence [11:34] community were involved in a cover-up manipulating intelligence processes and [11:38] a breach of intelligence community directive 203 to provide a desired outcome rather than a fourth or [11:44] fifth or fourth step in the process of making the most informed decision makers our investigation [11:49] the vast majority of which remains appropriately classified continues to show that the intelligence [11:53] community assessment was constructed upon flawed analytic tradecraft this includes the use of study [11:58] results from the national institutes of health that were manufactured through highly unethical [12:02] means and in collaboration with individuals working for the cia icas carry a great deal of [12:08] weight while typically classified the impact is increased exponentially when declassified and [12:14] was done with the ahi ica as i have repeatedly stated since december of 2024 the ahi ica and [12:21] its follow-on updates caused real serious harm to some of our nation's bravest last month i called [12:27] for its immediate recall and i reiterate my reiterate my position today according to recent [12:32] media reporting director gabbard your office has said your review of the ica will be quote [12:36] comprehensive and complete end quote and that you remain committed to sharing findings from [12:41] your review with the american people thank you for that and separately [12:44] director [12:44] ratcliffe your team is also quoted in recent media reporting saying that you support the odni review [12:49] and look forward to the report thank you so much for that director i thank both of you for your [12:53] commitment to this review's completion and publishing this issue is complex and the [12:58] underlying facts are not as simple as often portrayed in the public no fully informed [13:02] analysis will make everyone happy that said today i call for this review to be provided [13:06] to the committee and strongly urge you to release the public whatever portion of this review can be [13:10] made unclassified this is vital to rebuilding trust moving forward i want to thank our [13:14] witnesses again for being here today and with that i want to recognize the distinguished ranking [13:18] member mr himes for his opening statement thank you mr chairman and a big welcome to all of our [13:25] witnesses i hope that whatever else is said today that you will convey to your workforces our deep [13:30] admiration and appreciation for their diligence their commitment and their sacrifice sometimes [13:37] this moment feels a little bit like that old billy joel song we didn't start the fire north korea [13:41] red china war in ukraine greenland cuba terrorism burning drug boats and of course the moment of the [13:46] massive fire that we did start our latest middle eastern war where to begin our national elections [13:56] are about seven months away and plenty of americans are worried that president trump may indeed [14:00] as he said take control meanwhile we are not receiving the traditional indications or warnings [14:08] of foreign intelligence efforts to interfere in those elections there have been several terrorist [14:13] attacks in recent weeks and meanwhile the fbi our premier counter-terrorism agency has pivoted hard [14:21] with the [14:45] current war situation so while the fed is taking the lead for this it is also going to be the time [14:52] for the mcdonald's government to decide for itself this戦争 it is very important is стороны but i [14:56] risky venture, one that the president of the United States and the director of national [15:01] intelligence have spent years telling us is a terrible idea. The president has said that Iran [15:11] was preparing an imminent attack on the United States. That is not true. As awful as the regime [15:19] is and always has been, not one of your agencies has produced a single report saying that Iran [15:28] posed an imminent threat to the United States. The president also claimed that Iran would soon [15:34] possess a nuclear weapon, perhaps in weeks. That is also not true. It is not supported [15:41] by a single report from your agencies, and it is certainly belied by the repeated claim [15:48] that Iran's nuclear capability was obliterated mere months ago. Second, let's consider the [15:56] consequences, as the Congress should have done. The Congress, [16:02] not one man, should consider whether our constituents in uniform will live or die. [16:10] The Congress, not one man, should decide if Americans will spend an additional $30 a week [16:16] to fill their gas tanks. The Congress, not one man, should consider if it is wise to allow the [16:24] Russians to sell their oil to India so that they have millions of dollars with which to kill the [16:29] Ukrainians that we are now begging for help to defend ourselves against Iranian drones. [16:36] Finally, had the administration chosen to abide by the Constitution, Congress might have considered [16:44] the answer to General Petraeus' all-important question. Tell me how this ends. When the Iranian [16:56] Navy is sunk, and the missile launchers are destroyed, and we have re-obliterated the nuclear [17:03] infrastructure, do we declare victory and sail away? How do we feel about a new supreme leader [17:10] who is more extreme and vicious and dedicated to the [17:14] development of a nuclear weapon than the last one? Do we do a deal with him? How do we get him [17:22] to open the Strait of Hormuz? Do we bomb more? And if we sail away and declare victory, are we back [17:28] there nine months from now to re-sink a rebuilt Navy and re-bomb rebuilt missile launchers? Is [17:36] this going to be an every-nine-month thing, or is it going to be annual? The very core purpose [17:44] of the intelligence community is to answer these questions for the [17:50] president, for us, and for the American people. Right now, as we watch the dignified transfer of [18:02] lost American patriots at Dover, as we watch gasoline approach $5 a gallon, as we watch our [18:11] allies mocking us on the world stage, we need to know, were those questions asked? How did you [18:19] answer them for the president of the United States? And did he listen? I understand that the [18:26] administration may come to the Congress to ask for funding of $200 billion for this war. As you [18:36] answer those questions for us today, I'd ask you to remember that old saying, if you want me there [18:41] for the landing, make sure I'm there at the takeoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [18:48] Thank the gentleman for his comments. Before I turn it over to Director Gabbard, I would like [18:53] to thank General Hartman for nearly four decades of service. I know you're retiring, I think, [18:58] tomorrow. You are here. I just applaud your service to this nation and your leadership at [19:04] the NSA, and thank you and wish you all the best in your retirement. Thank you, Chairman. I think [19:08] you'll do well. All right. Thank you. Director Gabbard, you're recognized. [19:15] Thank you very much. Good morning, Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, members. I'm [19:21] here today to present the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment and joined by my colleagues, the [19:26] directors of the CIA, the DIA, FBI, and NSA. This briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI's [19:34] statutory responsibility. What I'm briefing here today does not represent my personal views or [19:39] opinions, but rather my personal views. Thank you. [19:41] Thank you very much. [20:12] of U.S. policies at the U.S.-Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent [20:18] and drastically reduced illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, [20:23] January 2026's monthly encounters are down 83.8 percent compared to January of 2025. [20:32] The drivers of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like [20:38] Cuba and Haiti risk triggering migration surges. Smugglers who often operate as transnational [20:44] criminal organizations view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will likely continue [20:49] to profit from these illegal immigration flows. These TCOs continue to pose a daily and direct [20:56] threat to the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens, primarily by producing and [21:01] trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths [21:06] have seen a 30 percent decrease from September of 2024 to September of 2025. His aggressive [21:13] efforts to more directly and actively target [21:15] these illegal immigration flows have seen a 30 percent decrease from September of 2024 to [21:15] September of 2025. His aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these [21:16] transnational criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors [21:20] has already had a significant impact, which is likely to continue. [21:26] Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation [21:31] Cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine [21:36] into the United States. Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed [21:42] Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army are responsible for producing and [21:47] trafficking large volumes of cocaine into the U.S. and European markets, with some [21:52] indicators that they are now attempting to expand to the Asia-Pacific region. Colombia [21:58] remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, and Colombian criminal groups have expanded [22:02] their trafficking relationships with neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. MS-13 is well [22:09] established in cells in the United States and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran [22:14] diaspora, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, and drug trafficking. The [22:18] U.S. is also a major source of drug trafficking, firearms offenses, and prostitution, fueling [22:21] increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs present a very tangible and [22:27] individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans and contribute to regional instability. [22:33] As the president increases counter-drug and counter-cartel pressures, they are likely [22:38] to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting and decentralizing production [22:44] locations and trafficking routes and methods. The United States continues to face a complex [22:50] and ever-evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist [22:54] actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as Al-Qaeda [23:01] and ISIS organizationally remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. [23:08] The spread of Islamist ideology in some cases, led by individuals and organizations associated [23:13] with the Muslim Brotherhood, pose a fundamental threat to freedom and foundational principles [23:18] that underpin Western civilization. These Islamist groups and individuals use this [23:22] ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around [23:27] the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing an Islamist caliphate which [23:32] governs based on Sharia. There are increasing examples of this in various European countries. [23:39] President Trump's designation of certain chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign [23:43] terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. [23:49] In response to setbacks of their capabilities of conducting large-scale, complex attacks, [23:54] ISIS assesses that Islamist terrorist groups have shifted towards focusing on executing [23:59] information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located [24:04] in or with access to the West. [24:08] U.S. counterterrorism operations are ongoing, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, [24:14] and have removed key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda [24:18] and ISIS to quickly reconstitute its leadership and launch large-scale attacks against the [24:23] homeland. [24:26] Enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with suspected links to Islamist [24:31] terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some potential sources of future [24:36] terror attacks. [24:38] Since January, U.S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with [24:42] individuals associated with terrorist groups. [24:46] This is a positive trend. However, our interagency-coordinated efforts to identify, locate, and remove known [24:51] or suspected terrorists who are already in the U.S. continues with vigilance. [24:57] In 2025, there were at least 4,000 terrorist groups in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, [24:58] and there were at least 4,000 terrorist groups in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, including [24:58] three Islamic terrorist attacks in the U.S. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 U.S.-based [25:04] Islamist terrorist plotters. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some [25:11] online contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations [25:15] abroad. [25:18] Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests overseas in parts of Africa, [25:23] the Middle East, and South Asia, where these groups operate. In the Middle East, AQAP in [25:29] Yemen. [25:30] ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit [25:44] funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees and [25:49] thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who escaped or were released from prisons [25:54] and displaced persons camps. Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by [26:01] seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. [26:04] The U.S. secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic [26:10] threats. However, the ICS assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan have [26:16] been researching and developing an array of novel advanced or traditional missile delivery [26:21] systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range. [26:26] The ICS assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 [26:32] missiles by 2035. I will be fully aware of these threats as it2020 is approaching. I'll be [26:33] 35 from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. [26:39] The ICSS is that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable [26:44] of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. [26:48] North Korea's ICBMs can already reach U.S. soil. [26:52] The ICSS is that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. [26:58] Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with range [27:02] capable of striking the homeland. [27:05] The ICSS is that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could [27:11] use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before 2035, should Tehran attempt to [27:18] pursue the capability. [27:20] However, these assessments will be observed and updated as the full impact of Operation [27:25] Epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, [27:31] and launch capabilities is determined. [27:34] Shifting to the cyber domain. [27:36] The ICSS is that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable [27:37] of penetrating or bypassing U.S. missile defenses. [27:38] The ICSS is that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will [27:41] continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks, as well as critical [27:47] infrastructure, to collect intelligence and create options for future disruption and for [27:51] financial gain. [27:54] The ICSS's China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and are continuing [27:59] R&D efforts. [28:02] North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. [28:05] In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion dollars from [28:06] the U.S. government. [28:07] The ICSS is that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will [28:08] continue to seek to compromise U.S. government and private sector networks, as well as critical [28:09] infrastructure, to find solutions for anti-imperial forces lethal weapons by its self-destruction. [28:10] The ICSS is that China, China, North Korea, and no-state destruction catastrophic loss [28:11] of N.F.W. [28:12] CTO for its strikes in Japan. [28:13] The ICSS has [28:28] additional [28:31] therapeutic [28:37] features [28:38] to [28:39] fight [28:40] ph Scaps [28:40] effectiveness. For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct data [28:47] extortion against international government, health care, and public health emergency service sectors [28:52] and religious institutions. Shifting to the Arctic, the ICS assesses that Russia, and to a lesser [28:59] extent China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, [29:04] natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the [29:10] Arctic, has long sought recognition of its quote-unquote polar great power status and is [29:15] deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, though not an [29:22] Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its strategic and [29:26] economic interests. On the technology front, artificial intelligence capabilities are rapidly [29:32] advancing and changing the threat landscape, as this is a defining technology that enables [29:37] computers and machines to simulate human learning, comprehension, problem solving, [29:42] creativity, and autonomy. It'll be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is [29:48] used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American [29:52] people across all domains. The ICS assesses that China is the most capable competitor in this [29:59] field and aims to displace the U.S. as the global AI leader by 2030. AI adoption at scale across the [30:06] spectrum of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and [30:13] has been used to develop and develop new technologies. China, which has been a major [30:14] competitor in recent conflicts, has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and [30:17] streamline decision making, underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the [30:22] battlefield. Early developers in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technology [30:28] technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break [30:34] current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, healthcare, and government [30:40] information. The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed [30:45] conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against U.S. interests. The space domain [30:52] is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counter space capabilities [30:57] to challenge U.S. space efforts. The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and [31:02] biological warfare capabilities continues to grow. Turn now to the western hemisphere, [31:08] where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, [31:13] corruption, and narcotics trafficking present a broad spectrum of risks to U.S. interests. [31:17] And where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region. The ICSS says [31:25] that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hotspots of volatility in [31:29] the coming year, with the potential to undermine or distract from countries, some countries, [31:34] from improving economies and living conditions, and tackling illicit drug flows and cartels. [31:40] The U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many Latin [31:46] American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an [31:50] export destination for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the U.S. [31:57] China, Russia, and Iran are seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with [32:02] Latin America. The ICSS says that China's demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued [32:09] economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties [32:14] with Cuba and Nicaragua. The ICSS says that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, [32:23] and technological power to increase its own regional positioning, global influence, [32:27] and to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where [32:32] interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi have enabled progress [32:38] on areas where mutual interests align. The ICSS says that China continues to rapidly [32:43] modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class [32:49] status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being [32:55] capable of deterring U.S. and allied forces in the region and to achieve their stated objective of [33:00] having the capability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the ICSS says that China [33:07] likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan [33:11] short of conflict. An increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern [33:17] regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, [33:23] illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness [33:26] asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to the U.S. and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. [33:35] North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025 Kim took steps to improve ties with [33:40] China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. [33:46] The ICSS says that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased [33:50] North Korean capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st century warfare [33:56] along with equipment. [33:58] Pyongyang continues to [33:59] develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade U.S. [34:05] and regional missile defenses. Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge U.S. [34:11] interests globally by military and non-military means. The ICSS says that the most dangerous [34:16] threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, [34:22] such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, [34:26] including the deployment of nuclear weapons. The ICSS says that Putin continues to [34:31] invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose [34:36] a greater threat to the U.S. homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. [34:41] The ICSS says Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities [34:47] designed to negate U.S. military advantage. Russia is also building extensive counter-space [34:54] capabilities to contest U.S. space dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter-space weapon [35:00] poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. [35:06] During the past year, the ICSS says that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against [35:10] Ukraine. Ongoing U.S.-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv continue. Until such an agreement [35:18] is met, if an agreement is found, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until [35:23] they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict and instability [35:28] will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The ICSS says [35:38] that the U.S. and its allies will continue to defend the region that began with Hamas's attack [35:43] on Israel on October 7, 2023, continued with the 12-day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran [35:50] and its proxies. The ICSS says that the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded [35:57] due to attacks by Israel and the U.S. on its leadership and military capabilities. [36:02] Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, [36:07] leaving limited options. [36:09] The U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional [36:17] pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests earlier this year [36:22] that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, [36:28] internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens. Even so, Iran and its proxies [36:36] continue to attack U.S. and allied interests in the Middle East. If a hostile regime survives, [36:41] it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. [36:48] Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the ICSS says Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to [36:55] its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war. Iran maintained the intention to [37:01] rebuild its infrastructure and nuclear enrichment capability and continued to refuse to comply with [37:06] its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, refusing them access to key facilities. The ICSS says that [37:14] Russia and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. [37:20] Iran has long viewed the U.S. as an adversary and has engaged in active conflict with the U.S. [37:25] as of this writing. These four countries are likely to continue their selective cooperation [37:31] with each other, which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to U.S. [37:35] interests more broadly. However, currently, these relationships are primarily bilateral [37:41] on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, [37:45] divergent situations, and the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. and the U.S. have been [37:45] fighting with each other over the past year, and the U.S. and its allies have been fighting with each other [37:46] over the past year, and the U.S. and its allies have been fighting with each other over the past year, [37:47] and in some cases, concerns over directly confronting the U.S. [37:51] These factors are likely to constrain their relationships. [37:55] Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor [38:00] governance, economic demands, and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, [38:07] which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. Contentious national and federal elections [38:12] in Somalia could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions against [38:16] Al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda [38:22] support to other elements of al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan continues, [38:27] even as external negotiations occur, and ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased [38:32] the intensity of their attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas of [38:37] operation and moving closer to cities with the U.S. presence. African governments will [38:43] use their wealth and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefits. [38:48] Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put U.S. [38:53] citizens at risk and cause further instability. [38:57] In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing [39:01] the president and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence [39:07] to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of the American people. [39:22] I will now turn to the White House press. [39:37] First, I will address the last five minutes. [39:41] Director Patel, our state and local officials are on the front lines of increasingly dangerous [39:45] unrestricted warfare activities being undertaken by Chinese nationals, such as marijuana grow [39:49] footholds. Two states, in fact, New Hampshire and Florida, are now advancing legislation to [39:54] establish offices of counterintelligence, which would bolster states' ability to confront foreign [39:59] adversaries without relying on the federal government. Do you support that? What can be [40:03] done to better support the states and local officials? Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [40:09] So we have infused funding into our entire program, taking on the CCP. And while we are [40:17] well-versed in the fact that we have our capabilities with folks like CFIUS when it [40:22] comes to the purchases of land around military bases, that only extends one mile under the [40:27] current law. So the FBI had to get creative. So what we did was directly engage with our state [40:31] and local partners. And I'll give you two examples. A 400-acre farm in the state of Texas was owned [40:36] by a CCP official. But because he was outside the reach of the CFIUS law, the FBI executed [40:42] an unlawful possession of firearms, a criminal complaint, and received [40:47] it. We seized the land in its entirety. And that CCP national is back in mainland China, [40:52] and we are working to get him back here. In another example, off the coast of Louisiana, [40:56] we worked with Governor Landry's team on drilling sites off the coast of Louisiana because, again, [41:01] they were outside the whole of CFIUS in the one-mile radius. And with the intelligence we [41:05] were able to provide our state and local authorities, they shut down that CCP drilling [41:10] center, which we believe was actually used to provide and steal data and intelligence from [41:14] American lives. So that's just a little bit of an example. [41:17] We have six active ongoing investigations in six multiple jurisdictions for specifically [41:22] taking down CCP-affiliated grow houses from Maine to Georgia and across the country. [41:27] So it sounds like, from your characterization of CFIUS, it's inadequate at this point. Maybe [41:31] we could do something legislatively here in this body to provide some broader authority [41:35] to address that challenge? I would love that. [41:37] Okay, great. Excellent. Thank you. Director Ratcliffe, in January 2021, in your role at [41:43] DNI as the director, you sent this committee a letter outlining your concerns about an [41:47] intelligence community assessment in which, among other things, analysts tailored their [41:51] analysis towards a preferred policy outcome. CIA management pressured analysts to withdraw [41:56] their support from an alternative viewpoint, and the full body of intelligence reporting [42:00] wasn't considered. Now in your role as CIA director, you have retracted several reports [42:05] for political bias and not meeting IC analytic standards. That's good progress. Retracting [42:10] faulty reporting is a critical step, but I remain concerned about that it maybe doesn't [42:14] get to the root of the problem. How many analysts were involved in the products? [42:17] I don't know the specific number, Chairman. What remediation actions have taken place [42:27] as a result? Well, I've made the focus of, as you pointed out, both as DNI and now as CIA [42:34] director, focused on the importance of analytic objectivity. As you pointed out, when I was the DNI, [42:44] when I saw conduct from Russia and China, the exact same conduct result in [42:50] different assessments. That's not a good reflection on the analytic judgments. What [42:58] you referenced in my role as CIA director, withdrawing reports that we went back and [43:03] looked that didn't reflect the analytic standards that we would expect, I retracted those judgments [43:11] because they show bias and influence for political reasons or otherwise. So that has continued [43:17] to be a focus and will be. [43:21] Yeah. My message has been received within our analytic community, within the CIA and really across [43:26] the CIA because this administration has put a focus on taking politics out of our analytic [43:32] judgments. Excellent. Thank you, Director. Appreciate that. I want to, as I make clear in my [43:37] opening statement, I'm just going to try and get this done in the little time that I have remaining. [43:41] The Intelligence Committee Assessment on AHI is deeply flawed and I've called for its recall [43:46] immediately to start for a fresh start. Similar to my question on the AHI assessment on the AHI [43:51] the last year's session, but I'd like to get a yes or no answer from each of you on whether [43:56] you agree this ICA should be retracted. Director Gabbard? Yes. Director Ratcliffe? [44:04] Say it again. AHI? ICA? Yeah. So for the ICA, I understand that Director Gabbard is reviewing [44:13] that and I've deferred all AHI investigations to her review. So if in her judgment, that is [44:19] something that should be retracted, then I would agree with that. Yes. Okay. Director Patel? Yes. [44:27] Thank you. General Hartman? Yes. And General Adams? Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate that. [44:34] Thank you all for your responses. I'm going to recognize a ranking member for five minutes. [44:40] Thank you, Chairman. Director Gabbard, as was well covered yesterday in January, [44:45] you were present at the execution of an FBI warrant at the Fulton County, Georgia election office [44:51] at the direction of the president and to [44:53] all appearances in connection with the president's false claims about the 2020 election the unsealed [44:59] affidavit submitted by the fbi made zero reference to foreign powers or outside interference i don't [45:04] want to re-litigate the reasons why you were there but i do want to know whether as a result of your [45:09] visit there is credible intelligence in your possession pointing to foreign interference in [45:14] georgia in the 2020 election uh thank you for the question uh ranking member um as you know over [45:24] each of the previous elections there is an ongoing effort by different foreign entities ma'am it's a [45:28] very specific question is there intelligence in your possession relative to foreign interference [45:34] in the 2020 elections very simple straightforward question we are continuing to look at previous [45:39] attempts to interfere in our elections and any ongoing threats that may exist for the [45:43] upcoming elections okay but can i assume that the answer to my question is no that you have [45:48] no specific intelligence related to foreign meddling in the georgia election the the um [45:54] we are continuing to look into this matter okay um director the odni has confirmed on the record [46:01] uh that your office took custody of voting machines from puerto rico last may i'm not aware [46:09] of any previous dni taking similar actions did your office promptly notify the committee [46:15] about taking custody of puerto rico's voting machines uh i don't believe we did however [46:22] this was done at the request of uh the puerto rico ausa attorney [46:26] and it's a yes or no question the answer as you have acknowledged is no you did not inform the [46:30] committee about the taking of a territory's voting machines is there a specific foreign threat and [46:36] i've read the reporting that you were looking for possible foreign threats but is there a specific [46:40] foreign threat that drove you to take this action there were questions about whether or not there [46:45] were vulnerabilities that a threat could have taken advantage of and that was the purpose for [46:50] they're requesting us to look into those vulnerabilities where where are those voting [46:54] machines now uh i believe they are held in a situation where they are held in a situation where [46:58] they are held in a situation where they are held in a situation where they are held in a secure facility at odni [47:00] have you or other odni officials taken any other state or territories voting equipment into [47:06] custody not to my knowledge um i want to turn in the subject of elections to a paradoxical thing [47:14] you will all be aware that the u.s government is apparently going to grind to a halt [47:19] the president is going to sign no more bills the senate will spend two weeks [47:23] apparently debating the save act the save act of course would make illegal foreigners voting in u.s [47:30] elections which is already illegal so we are to do no more business because of apparently [47:35] the existential threat to our democracy associated with foreigners voting in our elections [47:40] i am therefore puzzled by the fact that neither the unclassified nor the classified threat [47:46] assessment makes any reference to risk or danger associated with foreigners voting in our elections [47:54] director patel how many non-citizens have been convicted of voting in u.s elections in the last [48:00] 10 years for the freedom of voting as a part of the u.s electoral system or is that something that [48:00] has been a part of the electoral system for the first half of the election which is an issue uh [48:01] years? The conviction stats were are with the Department of Justice. I defer to them on that. [48:07] You are the director of the FBI. Give me a guess. How many convictions in the last one year, [48:13] five year or 10 years? Ballpark. I don't have that with me, sir. Again, it's with the department. [48:17] You don't have that. OK. Director Patel, how many active investigations does the FBI [48:23] have into foreign individuals voting in U.S. elections? We have a number of investigations [48:34] generally speaking ongoing about individuals across the country. I'm asking for that number. [48:40] I don't have that number with me, but I have a number of them. You have a number of investigations. [48:45] OK. Is that number 10,000? Is it closer to 10,000 or closer to 10? It's probably somewhere in [48:52] between. OK. Will you please provide the committee with that number? Yes, sir. OK. Director Patel, [48:58] would it since you don't have the numbers, would it surprise you to know that the Heritage [49:04] Foundation, which is not exactly the. [49:06] Columbia University Faculty Lounge, found only 77 instances of noncitizen voting in [49:14] the 24 years between 1999 and 2023, each of which faced investigation by the appropriate [49:20] authorities. So Heritage has a number of 77 examples in 24 years. Does that number [49:27] surprise you? No, because it's low. I don't I don't understand your answer. You asked [49:34] me if are you disputing? Are you disputing that the number is in the range of 77? I don't [49:39] understand what I'm saying. Do you think that number is low? I did. OK. So the question [49:46] is, are you disputing that number? Do we have 247 examples of non U.S. Citizens voting in [49:50] U.S. elections in a 24 year period? I just said that number is low. You think that number [49:55] is low. OK. So why, if this is a meaningful issue, do we have no and I guess I direct [50:02] this to Director Gabbert, why is there no mention of this thing that will grind the [50:05] American government to a halt for a two week period in the worldwide threats analysis? [50:10] our nation and our nation's interests. [50:12] There are multiple platforms and venues where there have been and there will be reporting [50:17] on threats to our foreign threats to our elections. [50:20] I yield back. [50:22] Gentleman yields. [50:23] Vice Chairman Kelly. [50:24] I'd first just like to say, Director Gabbard, you being in Georgia was a part of your duties [50:33] as DNI to make sure that our elections remain safe, secure and free from every type of influence. [50:40] That was why you were there. [50:41] Is that correct? [50:42] Yes. [50:43] OK. [50:46] I would argue I want to talk about some of the points about the strikes on Iran, the [50:50] current attacks, epic fury. [50:53] And I would say that not only are there imminent threats from Iran, but there are actual threats. [50:59] And I've been on the receiving end of those threats. [51:01] I was in Iran in Iraq in 2005, where Iranian based and manned and equipped units attacked [51:09] American soldiers, including me, multiple times. [51:13] I will also tell you. [51:14] I went back in nine and 10, where EFPs developed by the Iranians struck my soldiers and our [51:21] equipment. [51:22] I would tell you the Houthis have continued to strike Saudi Arabia. [51:26] I will tell you Hamas and Hezbollah has continued to strike throughout the Middle East. [51:31] And although we're not in an armed services here and we had that yesterday, but I will [51:34] tell you, because we took out their ballistic missiles and their ability to defend from [51:39] the air, that Europe is no longer under threat from Iran. [51:42] Who showed? [51:43] They will strike everyone that they can by striking all of their Arab neighbors in Azerbaijan [51:48] and in Turkey and everywhere else. [51:50] With that being said, Director Ratcliffe, I think the CIA has had a great year in providing [51:56] intelligence, whether that's in Venezuela, the initial midnight hammer strikes, or also [52:02] the current strikes in Iran. [52:03] Can you tell us kind of some of the things the CIA has done over the past year that you're [52:08] proud of? [52:09] Congressman, good to see you again. [52:10] Thank you for the question. [52:11] Good to see all of you. [52:12] Be back in. [52:13] Be back in the house. [52:15] I guess I'll start by saying I think you all know there was bipartisan concern when I took [52:21] over the CIA that our human collection was in a downward spiral and had been for some [52:28] period of time. [52:29] And you all wanted a more aggressive CIA, one that was focused on core mission, one [52:35] that was collecting the kind of intelligence and stealing secrets that would provide a [52:40] decisive strategic advantage. [52:42] That can contribute to national security and foreign policy successes. [52:50] I do think that the CIA, I agree with you, has had a great year. [52:55] And that's a credit to our workforce. [52:56] You talked about some of the very public successes like Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation [53:02] Absolute Resolve where our agency contributed to a, frankly, flawless intelligence picture [53:09] that allowed for flawless military operations. [53:12] And I want to thank you for that. [53:13] I want to credit everyone here. [53:14] There's been bipartisan praise from this committee, even from those of you who may disagree with [53:21] the underlying policies. [53:23] But I think those successes are really emblematic of success that the agencies had across the [53:28] board on all national security matters, in all national security spaces. [53:33] And it's not just an opinion, it's reflected in our statistics. [53:37] So when we talk about stealing secrets, you need assets. [53:42] You need other sources on the ground around the world. [53:45] We're up 25% in that regard just in the past year. [53:49] Our foreign intelligence reporting, meaning the intelligence that really matters to you [53:54] as decision makers and the President as Commander in Chief, that's up across the board, 25%. [54:00] Other categories, specific targets and adversaries like China, it's up 100%. [54:07] Areas like technology, it's up 100%. [54:10] Issues like counter-narcotics. [54:12] operations are up by 70%. With regard to counterterrorism, those are classified numbers [54:18] that we'll get into in the classified portion, but those are triple digits. We've accomplished [54:22] more on the counterterrorism front in the past year than in the prior four years combined. [54:28] Again, really a credit to the CIA workforce. Morale at the agency is high because people [54:35] are doing the work that they signed up to do, and this administration is calling on them to do more. [54:41] I would say they're tired but happy. If I can steer back the final 45 seconds, [54:44] I have one question for Director Patel. Director Patel, the current shutdown that is caused by [54:52] us not funding TSA, border control, DHS, and all those things, how hard has that made the job of [54:58] counterintelligence FBI to protect us here in the homeland from threats that came through our [55:04] borders or internally and already existing in the United States, Director Patel? Thank you for the [55:09] question. When it comes specifically to the [55:11] counterterrorism front, I would say they're tired but happy. If I can steer back the final 45 seconds, [55:11] I have one question for you. The combination efforts between the Department of Homeland Security [55:13] and the FBI, we have 59 Homeland Security Task Forces that we have stood up in every single [55:17] state and then some that are co-led by the FBI and HSI. Obviously, having a stopgap in funding [55:24] is hurting those abilities to go out there and fight crime and pick up violent offenders across [55:29] the country. Even though the DHS workforce shows up every day, I think they've gone one month without [55:34] a paycheck now. We also have things like our Southern Border Intelligence Center in Tucson, [55:38] Arizona that is our hub for intelligence collection, [55:41] operations on foreign terrorist organizations, specifically the narco-traffickers down in [55:48] Mexico. Thank you. My time's expired. Mr. Carson is recognized. Thank you, Chairman. The Trump [55:55] administration has justified this war with Iran as necessary to stop an imminent threat. But the [56:01] administration has not provided this committee with any intelligence indicating Iran was preparing [56:06] a nuclear weapon, planning a preemptive attack on the United States, or possess any immediate [56:11] capability to strike the U.S. homeland. That raises very serious questions about what the [56:16] analysis of the I.C. provided before the decision to go to war was made. Directors Gabbard and [56:23] Ratcliffe, is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct a preemptive attack on the United [56:28] States? And I ask this because 13 service members have been killed in Trump's war, including Captain [56:34] Seth Koval, a husband and a dad from my state of Indiana, and my constituents want answers. So is [56:41] there any evidence? [56:41] Is there any evidence that Iran intended to conduct a preemptive attack on the U.S. prior to beginning [56:46] this war? Yes or no? Congressman, the answer to this question needs to be reserved for a closed [56:57] hearing. I will say, however, the intelligence community does provide the assessments of the [57:04] threats that exist to the president so that he can make that determination within the body of [57:09] information and intelligence and activities within the region that ultimately he is responsible for. [57:15] What is an imminent threat? And if there is an imminent threat, what actions need to be taken? [57:21] Congressman, as the DNI said, there's a body of intelligence that we'll be able to cover in the classified portion of this [57:31] hearing that reflects, that does reflect that in the likely event of a conflict between Iran and Israel, that the U.S. [57:40] would be immediately attacked, regardless of whether the United States stayed out of that conflict. [57:46] Shifting gears to ranking, Member Himes' point. [57:49] Let me read to you from the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment under your watch last year. [57:55] Quote, Moscow's malign influence activities will continue for the foreseeable future and will almost certainly increase in sophistication and volume. [58:04] Moscow probably believes information operations efforts to influence U.S. elections are advantageous, regardless of whether they affect election outcomes. [58:14] By contrast, this year's threat assessment makes no mention of foreign threats to elections. [58:19] Meanwhile. [58:19] The I.C. has been publicly warning about foreign powers interfering in our elections for nearly a decade. [58:26] So the omission is very striking. [58:28] And to that point, sitting here today, I'm not aware of any intelligence products in the past year dedicated to foreign plans and intentions [58:37] toward current and future U.S. elections. [58:41] Director Gabbard, yes or no, ma'am, have you directed or been directed to stop or limit dissemination of intelligence reports or finish [58:50] intelligence reporting concerning foreign plans and intentions about upcoming u.s elections or [58:55] foreign threats to the midterms no director patel same question for the fbi sir yes or no sir no [59:02] sir director ratcliffe same question for the cia sir yes or no no general hartman same question [59:09] for nsa yes or no sir no sir general adams same question for the dia yes or no sir no sir i yield [59:16] back chairman gentleman yields miss stefani thank you mr chairman director gabbard um when you begin [59:25] your testimony you stated that your remarks do not represent your personal beliefs that's the first [59:31] time i've heard that at a committee hearing why did you say that or is there anything in the [59:38] threat assessment that you personally disagree with thank you for the question congresswoman [59:44] the reason i've said that is twofold number one is when i uh assumed this [59:49] role as director of national intelligence through the confirmation process and beyond [59:54] many members of congress rightly said your personal views and your politics in this role [1:00:00] get checked at the door and as director of national intelligence my responsibility is to [1:00:05] report the intelligence community's assessments objectively and to make sure that they are not [1:00:10] politicized in any way shape or form unfortunately there are those who uh for one reason or another [1:00:18] have tried to mischaracterize [1:00:19] the intelligence community's assessments and saying well this is just a political view [1:00:24] or uh trying to misdirect from what the intelligence community is reporting so i took [1:00:29] the opportunity to state that from the outset that this is the intelligence community's assessments [1:00:34] thank you i also wanted to ask this because this week there was a high profile resignation [1:00:39] of uh director of national counterterrorism center now i want to be clear from the outset [1:00:44] i've communicated directly with president trump my support for operation epic fury [1:00:49] and i want to be clear about the fact that this is a very um not only disappointed but how [1:00:55] inappropriate this letter was and i want to read a statement that um and get your personal assessment [1:01:01] whether you agree or disagree with that and that's this early in this administration high [1:01:06] ranking israeli officials and influential members of the american media deployed a misinformation [1:01:10] campaign that wholly undermined your america first platform and pro-war sentiments to encourage a war [1:01:16] against us in the face of a war that has been a necessary measure of a new era of [1:01:21] right-wing nationalism in the country and i want to be clear in that i agree with all of our [1:01:24] governments that this letter was used to deceive you into believing that iran posed no imminent [1:01:28] threat to the united states and that you should strike now there was a clear path to a swift [1:01:33] victory this was a lie and it was the same tactic the israelis used to draw us into a disastrous [1:01:38] iraq war now i cannot say how much i disagree with that statement do you agree or disagree with what [1:01:45] this letter was put out by former director kent [1:01:47] assessments. And the president is elected by the American people and makes his own decisions based [1:01:53] on the information that's available to him. But do you agree with does that statement he made [1:01:58] blaming Israel concern you? Yes. My next question is I want to touch on the rise of terrorist [1:02:05] attacks on the homeland in the month of March alone. There were multiple high profile Islamic [1:02:11] terrorist attacks. You had Temple Israel Synagogue in Michigan. You had in Texas, you had an ISIS [1:02:17] inspired attack where they threw an IED in New York City. What is your assessment as to the rise [1:02:23] of Islamic terrorism on the homeland? As you've pointed to, Congresswoman, this continues to be [1:02:30] an extreme concern, not only because of the rise of these attacks, but the mechanisms [1:02:35] which they're carried out and the challenges that the intelligence community has in being able to [1:02:42] try to detect some of these threats and attacks in advance. I'd like to defer to [1:02:47] the president's comments on the rise of Islamic terrorism on the homeland. [1:02:47] I want to turn to the FBI director on some of this because they have been very successful in many [1:02:51] cases over the last year in detecting them and preventing these attacks. But due to the nature of [1:02:58] the challenge in many of these attackers not having contact with known foreign terrorist [1:03:07] entities or individuals makes this a much more challenging threat to deal with. [1:03:13] And I want to turn to Director Patel. I think that's a good, important segue. [1:03:17] To get your assessment. And I also want to add another aspect of the question. We're working on a 9-11 commission review, 25-year review. [1:03:24] What other tools do you need to make sure that we are able to have the most robust, effective CT efforts? [1:03:31] Yeah. Thank you, Congresswoman. Just real quick. So last year we had 2,300 arrests related to foreign terrorist organizations. [1:03:37] We had 700 counterterrorism arrests. And the FBI had 640 counterterrorism disruptions where we stopped attacks on the homeland. [1:03:45] Specifically in December, we stopped the attacks on the homeland. We stopped the attacks on the homeland. [1:03:47] We stopped four in an 18-day span. What I need is specifically highlighted in the Norfolk attack. [1:03:53] In Norfolk, an individual who was convicted of terrorism and sentenced based upon that conviction should have still been in prison. [1:04:02] The Department of Justice in the first Trump administration sought a sentence of 240 months. [1:04:07] The judge in that case downward departed and gave a variance to nearly half that sentence. [1:04:12] If that had not occurred, that individual would still be in prison. [1:04:15] And a member of our uniformed military [1:04:17] service would still be alive. [1:04:19] I want to work with the legislature to figure out how to increase the sentencing for convicted [1:04:23] terrorists and also work on the denaturalization process for someone who should not be in this [1:04:27] country who wants to attack and kill American citizens and American service members. [1:04:32] Thank you. Yield back. [1:04:33] Gentleman Yields, Mr. Castro. [1:04:35] Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for your testimony today. [1:04:39] I want to start with a question about Iran and discuss first how the war began. [1:04:48] You told us that Israel was going to strike Iran regardless and that doing so would have [1:04:53] triggered Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces already in the region. [1:04:57] And Director Ratliff, you seem to affirm that in comments just a few moments ago. [1:05:02] So rather than tell Israel to stand down, the president joined the war. [1:05:06] The Congress and the American people still don't know what the president's actual goals [1:05:10] are. [1:05:11] And yet we have lost 13 U.S. service members. [1:05:16] But here's what we do know. [1:05:18] The president has said that he wants a deal. [1:05:20] He said Iran wants to make a deal and that he's not ready because, quote, the terms [1:05:23] aren't good enough yet. [1:05:25] Yet they just killed Ali Larijani, the de facto leader of Iran, who, while not a friend [1:05:31] of the United States, would have been the person to negotiate any agreement with. [1:05:36] The president explicitly said that the United States did not strike Iran's energy infrastructure [1:05:41] because, in his words, having to rebuild it, quote, would take years. [1:05:46] Yet this morning, Israel struck the South Pars gas field, the world's largest natural [1:05:52] gas plant, triggering Iranian attacks on Qatari gas facilities. [1:05:56] Oil prices are up 15 percent in the last 24 hours. [1:06:00] In San Antonio, my hometown where I represent, the cost of gas has gone up nearly 40 percent [1:06:06] in three weeks. [1:06:09] Last night, the president said that the United States knew nothing about the attack and called [1:06:13] on Israel to stop similar attacks on energy. [1:06:16] Israel denies this and says that the attack was cleared by the United States. [1:06:21] So my question is. [1:06:22] What? [1:06:23] How does the intelligence community assess Israel's goals in this war to be? [1:06:28] And are those goals aligned with the goals of the United States? [1:06:31] I'm thinking carefully here about what can be said in this open setting versus a closed [1:06:45] setting. [1:06:47] Are the goals aligned? [1:06:50] The objectives that have been laid out by the president are different from the objectives [1:06:55] that have been laid out by the Israeli government. [1:06:58] And how do they differ? [1:07:01] We can see through the operations that the Israeli government has been focused on disabling [1:07:07] the Iranian leadership. [1:07:09] And taking out several members, obviously, beginning with the Ayatollah, the supreme leader. [1:07:15] And they continue to focus on that effort. [1:07:19] How does that differ from our goals? [1:07:21] The president has stated that his objectives are to destroy Iran's ballistic missile launching [1:07:29] capability, their ballistic missile production capability, and their Navy, the IRGC Navy [1:07:36] and mine laying capability. [1:07:39] So the death and destruction. [1:07:41] The economic cost to the United States, to Israel, to the Gulf states, and to the world [1:07:46] continues to increase. [1:07:48] So I want to ask you, to the best of your knowledge, do you know whether Israel is supportive [1:07:52] of the president's call to make a deal with Iran? [1:07:58] I don't know the answer to that. [1:08:00] I don't know Israel's position on that. [1:08:03] And to what do you attribute Israel's decision to strike Iranian energy infrastructure, despite [1:08:08] President Trump's call to keep those facilities off limits? [1:08:13] I don't have an answer for that. [1:08:23] So they ignored the president. [1:08:24] Do you agree with that? [1:08:28] I'm not privy to any of their deliberations or what went into their calculus in launching [1:08:36] this or other attacks. [1:08:40] We are not involved in the operational element of this. [1:08:43] We're providing continuously on a daily basis, the intelligence assessments of the events [1:08:48] that are occurring. [1:08:50] I guess I know the FBI can't because they're domestic, but can anybody else at the table [1:08:56] provide any insight into that? [1:08:57] I guess I'm not sure what the question you're asking. [1:09:05] I'm aji but I'm a Democrat, Mr. President. [1:09:08] They will find out what's going on. [1:09:09] Hallelujah. [1:09:10] Congressman Castro, I guess a couple of things. [1:09:14] The goals that the president set out are clearly defined. [1:09:17] The DNI related those. [1:09:19] What was not included as a goal of the U.S. campaign of the U.S. campaign was not a bastion [1:09:24] in regime change. [1:09:25] month. Do you know why Israel decided to strike that infrastructure despite the fact that the [1:09:31] president said it should be off-limits? I wouldn't speak for Israel. What do you guys know? [1:09:39] We're at war. What do you guys know? We'll have to take that for the record. Yes, let's take it [1:09:44] for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the panelists here today. [1:09:49] Um, today is March 19th. On April 19th, FISA goes dark. 702 goes dark. And it's been talked [1:10:01] about many times, but up to 60% of the president's daily briefing is derived from FISA 702. And we [1:10:09] look at the successes that we've had in protecting the homeland and also the conflicts the U.S. has [1:10:15] been involved with. The flawless operation in Venezuela. Operation Fury in Iran. [1:10:22] Troop protection. The successes we've had on the battlefield in Ukraine. The recovery and release [1:10:32] of the Hamas hostages in the tunnels in Israel. All derived from FISA 702. There is not a military [1:10:42] operation that we've been involved with where FISA 702 was not, as Director Ratcliffe has said, [1:10:47] been indispensable to the United States and the protection of our country. Director Patel has [1:10:53] also said, [1:10:54] FISA 702 is indispensable. We're 30 days away from it going dark. Director Ratcliffe, can you clarify [1:11:03] the president's position on an 18-month clean reauthorization and how that's going to proceed [1:11:08] moving forward? Congressman, thank you. Thank you for highlighting this issue. So the president [1:11:15] is in favor of an 18-month clean reauthorization of FISA 702. And I would add to that, I'm heartened [1:11:26] that the chairman of this committee and the ranking member are in agreement with that. And I know [1:11:32] there's bipartisan support for that, and there should be. And I know this is an important vote [1:11:37] for you to take, but I would ask that you all consider when you do that, that when you look at [1:11:43] the fact that former DNIs and former CIA directors and former FBI directors and DIA directors and NSA [1:11:52] directors across Republican and Democrat administrations, [1:11:57] are in support of FISA 702 in its current form. These are the people that are making the decisions [1:12:04] to keep Americans safe. And so I wish the reauthorization was longer than 18 months, [1:12:10] Congressman. I think that this is something that I wish you all would consider for longer than that, [1:12:15] so that regardless of who the president is, who the president is in the future, [1:12:19] he or she would have the benefit of, as you said, a tool that's indispensable across administrations, [1:12:27] and that provides more than half of the important, actionable intelligence that the president and the commander-in-chief relies upon. [1:12:35] Thank you for that. Director Gabbard, you're supportive of the 18-month extension the president's seeking without a warrant requirement? [1:12:42] That is the president's position, and that is the position of the intelligence community. [1:12:46] And you will be supporting that, correct? [1:12:48] I will support the president's decision to execute this. [1:12:51] Correct. Thank you. Director Gabbard, we implemented two years ago a number of reforms, [1:12:58] actually 56 of them, that were part of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, RISA. [1:13:04] And that was done in a bipartisan way. That was a reflection of what we thought were problems with [1:13:10] FISA 702, going back during the first Trump administration and even before that. [1:13:15] These reforms that have been put in place and that you have helped implement, [1:13:20] I'm wondering if you could talk specifically about those reforms, [1:13:23] on the cutting down of FBI agents having access to querying, [1:13:28] the cutting down of FISA information, the fact that there are criminal penalties now for FBI agents [1:13:33] that are engaged in inappropriate activity as it relates to FISA. [1:13:37] Please tell us some of those reforms and how those have been implemented. Director Patel. [1:13:45] Sorry, I thought you were asking Director D and I. [1:13:48] Absolutely. So we've gone above and beyond what RISA requires since I became director 13 months ago. [1:13:54] We not only require supervisory special agents to approve the query request of U.S. persons, [1:14:01] We not only require supervisory special agents to approve the query request of U.S. persons, [1:14:02] We not only require supervisory special agents to approve the query request of U.S. persons, [1:14:02] We also require the General Counsel's Office and lawyers to come in and agree with that request before we can proceed. [1:14:07] Also, we used to, before this, had a default which allowed queries, [1:14:13] when we were utilizing our system, to say it automatically searches 702. [1:14:17] You now have to actually opt in and select that box to make sure that you are intentionally doing so. [1:14:24] On top of that, we've reduced the number of personnel at the FBI from 6,600 before I got there to 3,500 that have access to it. [1:14:32] not that use it but that have access to it and we've also gone above and beyond what what riser [1:14:37] requires in terms of if you misuse it unintentionally or recklessly if you use it [1:14:43] unintentionally misuse it unintentionally like you typed a name wrong in terms of spelling or whatnot [1:14:47] you have to your access is suspended and be retrained if you recklessly use it you're [1:14:51] immediately terminated your access forever thank you um mr crowe thank you chairman director gabard [1:15:01] uh it is your job and the job of your agency and department to assess the views of iranian [1:15:07] leadership their policy beliefs and uh policy positions correct yes uh that includes now deceased [1:15:14] ali komaneh of iran correct yes and is not in the now leader his son mujtaba komaneh correct yes [1:15:21] the son is considered more of a hardliner than his father uh isn't that correct yes uh so hard [1:15:29] line that even some of iran's leaders thought he was too aggressive isn't that correct [1:15:33] that is the intelligence community assessment yes mujtaba the sun is particularly close to the [1:15:38] brutal islamic revolutionary guard corps and their most hardline commanders correct that is the [1:15:43] intelligence community assessment he was involved in ordering violent crackdowns on iranian protesters [1:15:49] including their murder correct yes and we don't know if the sun will continue his father's [1:15:54] religious ban on developing nuclear weapons is that correct it's unknown at this time [1:15:57] you testified before this committee last year that the elder now deceased [1:16:03] komaneh [1:16:03] komaneh uh had in 2003 banned the nuclear [1:16:07] weapons program or suspended it correct there was a fatwa in place that stated that and that [1:16:12] fatwa remained in place last year when you testified before this committee correct yes [1:16:16] and that fatwa remained in place uh um recently correct as far as i know it has not been lifted [1:16:23] yeah you're aware of no information that would lift that fatwa i'm not aware of any intelligence [1:16:28] reporting that states that to to be clear on on the uh mojtaba the sun who has been named to replace [1:16:35] the sun who has been named to replace him it is unclear of his status or his involvement [1:16:40] he was injured very severely through one of the israeli strikes uh and so the decision making uh [1:16:46] is is unclear about what's happening in the iranian leadership it's unclear so we're less [1:16:51] certain of the positions of iranian leadership and their intentions than we were 60 days ago correct [1:16:57] that's an accurate assessment one of your jobs is to create products assessing uh iran and the threats [1:17:06] opposes the United States, correct? Yes. That includes potential outcomes for military action, [1:17:13] correct? It includes potential outcomes of a variety of scenarios. And the likelihood of [1:17:20] those outcomes? Yes. Generally, when you make assessments about threats facing the United [1:17:26] States, you will look at, in Iran in any instance, the likely scenarios that come out of military [1:17:33] action, correct? The intelligence community takes all of those factors into account when they [1:17:38] create these assessments. When you look at the threats posed by foreign countries, [1:17:42] you also assess timelines to those threats, correct? What do you mean by timelines? Like [1:17:49] a breakout time, for example, for nuclear weapons or the development of ballistic missiles. [1:17:54] Yes, based on the information available at any given time. In the timeline also for potential [1:17:58] terrorist attacks, correct? Broadly, yes. It is common practice for the IC to assess the timeline [1:18:07] of all threats, nuclear weapons development, ballistic, right? Yes. [1:18:11] Ballistic weapons development? Based on the information available, yes. [1:18:16] Terrorist attacks? Same applies. Cyber attacks? Timelines for all of those, correct? [1:18:24] When there is information available that point to that, yes. [1:18:27] In likelihood, as well as the timeline, correct? Based on the information available. [1:18:32] Timing is important, is it not? It is an important factor that goes into the assessment. [1:18:39] So it is your position sitting here today that you made no timeline determination, [1:18:46] as to threats that Iran had facing the United States, correct? [1:18:53] That's a very broad statement, but where the information is available, [1:18:56] the intelligence community factors that into their assessment products. [1:19:00] Did you or the IC make any assessments as to the timing of potential threats facing the [1:19:06] United States from Iran in the last 90 days? I'm sure there was timelines factored into [1:19:14] the intelligence assessments that were delivered. Did any of them show imminence? [1:19:18] The imminence? [1:19:20] nature of a threat is determined by the president based on a totality of the intelligence and [1:19:27] information provided to him. Did any of them show that there were attacks anticipated within the [1:19:32] next 90 days from Iran? It's too simplistic of a statement to say that because it depends on [1:19:38] various scenarios occurring or not occurring. Did those assessments show timelines for the [1:19:45] threats that Iran posed to the United States? The totality of threats, yes. There were timelines [1:19:50] involved where it applied and where that information was available. But again, to your [1:19:54] question about the determination of imminence, the president makes that determination based on [1:19:59] the totality of information and intelligence. The bottom line is there was no imminent threat [1:20:04] and you know that and there's no product that shows that. I yield back. Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank [1:20:10] you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today. I want to expand on the questioning from [1:20:14] my colleague, Mr. LaHood. [1:20:16] Regarding FISA 702, obviously it is the imminent issue right before us. It will expire in a month. [1:20:23] Unequivocally, the most critical national security tool our nation has to keep us safe from fentanyl, [1:20:28] from foreign wars, and everything in between. Mainly to, you know, to Director Ratcliffe, [1:20:35] but any of you can answer this. One of the most perplexing debates that I've been subject to in [1:20:40] my time here is this debate over what warrants are and when they're needed. In the two hundred [1:20:47] and fifty year history of this country and going back to the very origins of law enforcement, [1:20:53] we have always had a warrant requirement, always had a warrant requirement on the collection [1:20:57] of evidence. We have never had a warrant requirement on the querying of already lawfully [1:21:05] collected data, which is why we don't require police officers to get warrants when they run [1:21:09] license plates, querying off of already lawfully collected DOT data. It's why we don't require [1:21:16] police officers to get a warrant to enter the evidence locker in their police precincts, [1:21:22] which contains already lawfully collected data, it would literally shut down the system. [1:21:27] And that's not a warrant requirement. That's a secondary warrant requirement. That's a warrant [1:21:31] requirement on steroids. So Director Radcliffe, or any of you, I know you've been subject to [1:21:37] these questions as well. Is it just a confusion over the difference between the collection of [1:21:44] evidence versus the querying of our already lawfully collected data? Is it a lack of [1:21:50] understanding of what incidental collection is, which is a fundamental precept of law enforcement? [1:21:57] But if we have a warrant requirement on steroids, for now the querying of already lawfully collected [1:22:02] data, just by the numbers, that would require an expansion of the federal judiciary by a factor [1:22:08] of 100. It would literally shut down our law enforcement apparatus at perhaps the most [1:22:13] dangerous time in our nation's history. So [1:22:15] Director Radcliffe, or any of you, if you could just walk me through your analysis there. [1:22:19] Well, I'll start, Congressman. Thanks for the question. Again, [1:22:23] thanks for highlighting this important issue. And as has been pointed out, [1:22:29] reforms should be implemented where they're necessary. And I think, speaking for myself, [1:22:35] and I know Director Patel supported the reforms from two years ago to make improvements, [1:22:41] and they did. And so some reforms should be considered. A warrant isn't one of them. [1:22:46] And with respect to the reforms that have been implemented, we're talking about, [1:22:54] when we talk about Fourth Amendment rights and privacy concerns, we're at a 99.9% [1:23:01] compliance rate with respect to that. So I would start by saying, why are you trying to fix what's [1:23:07] not broken with something that I can tell you from this seat, the fix would not work. And I go back to [1:23:16] my comment before, DNIs, CIA directors, FBI directors, the people that have been in all of [1:23:22] these chairs before, on a bipartisan basis, agree that a warrant won't work and don't advocate for [1:23:28] it. Again, Congressman, you're correct. This is lawfully collected information. And these things [1:23:38] come at you very fast. And you have to make decisions very quickly. And sometimes in a matter [1:23:43] of hours, you have to act on them. And I think, as I said, it's a very important issue. And I think, [1:23:46] on the information that you have lawfully, you know, that has been lawfully collected to [1:23:51] interdict drug shipments or terrorist activities, and a warrant requiring you to go to the court [1:23:57] to seek probable cause for information that has already been lawfully collected only prevents [1:24:04] that from happening. I don't understand. I understand that it's well-meaning for people [1:24:08] that are proposing it. But again, I would defer to the people who sit in these chairs [1:24:12] and make these decisions who would tell you that it doesn't work. [1:24:15] Anybody else want to? [1:24:17] Comment on the warrant requirement? [1:24:18] So, Congressman, I'd love to comment. Thanks. Thanks for the question. I do just want to add [1:24:23] a couple of points, agree with everything Director Radcliffe said. You know, not only is this already [1:24:28] collected data on foreign personnel outside of the United States, but the data that is being [1:24:36] queried has also already been analyzed to ensure that it contains foreign intelligence value, [1:24:43] which I think is a very important part of this. And then when we query a U.S. person, [1:24:48] term, we're not querying for U.S. person information. We're querying for foreign intelligence [1:24:54] that has already been evaluated at least once to contain foreign intelligence in the database [1:25:00] that's being accessed. And then the final piece that I think is important is that both the FISC [1:25:05] and the Department of Justice have established robust legal and compliance rules that we adhere [1:25:11] to and that is audited by DOJ for every query that we make. [1:25:17] Thank you. Are you back? [1:25:18] Dr. Barra. [1:25:20] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, we've known each other for a long time. We were both [1:25:25] elected to Congress in 2012 and served together for a while. I may not have always agreed with [1:25:31] your positions, but I respected the consistency of some of your positions. Director Gabbard, [1:25:37] following the January 3rd, 2020 drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, you gave a speech [1:25:43] on the House floor six days later, on January 9th, 2020. In this speech that is currently [1:25:48] in the Congressional record and available for anyone to view, you stated, quote, [1:25:54] Obama's Adams, was named the President of Iraq, a highly influential and inspiring [1:25:55] State department. President Trump has committed an illegal and unconstitutional act of war pushing [1:25:59] our nation headlong into a war with Iran without any authorization from Congress, a war that would [1:26:05] be so costly and devastating it would make our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan look like a picnic. [1:26:11] On February 28th, 2026, the Trump administration, under which you are the President's principal [1:26:18] intelligence advisor, launched another nuclear strike against мне and the Department of Justice. [1:26:19] launched an illegal and unconstitutional act of war pushing our nation headlong into a war with [1:26:25] Iran without any authorization from Congress. This war has already been costly and devastating. [1:26:31] 13 American service members have lost their lives, including Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzen [1:26:37] from my home of Sacramento, California. Approximately 200 service members have been [1:26:42] wounded. The Pentagon reported that the first six days of Operation Epic Fury cost $11.3 billion. [1:26:49] That averages almost $2 billion per day. That was the first six days, and now we're in the 19th day [1:26:56] of this war. That's ballooned into a regional conflict, putting the lives of Americans and [1:27:02] our allies throughout the Middle East in danger. Director Gabbard, do you still believe that [1:27:07] strikes against Iran that don't have congressional authorization constitute an illegal and [1:27:12] unconstitutional act of war? Congressman, thank you for the question. The cost of war [1:27:20] weighs very heavily. [1:27:22] Upon me and my colleagues here, especially for those of us who have experienced and seen the [1:27:28] cost of war firsthand. My own personal and political views, as I mentioned earlier, I was [1:27:36] asked and required by Congress and by the president in this role as the Director of National [1:27:42] Intelligence to check those views at the door to ensure that the intelligence assessments are not [1:27:48] colored by my personal views. And that's exactly what I am responding to. [1:27:52] Do you still believe that war with Iran would be so costly and devastating that it would make our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan look like a picnic? [1:27:59] Once again, in this role, it is essential that I do not allow any of my personal views on any issues to color or bias the intelligence [1:28:08] reporting that we deliver to you and to the President. [1:28:11] Director Gabbard, in this hearing one year ago, I asked some questions. And I'll paraphrase my exact question. That's like, we should keep politics in the [1:28:23] out of this, even if the president disagrees with a directive, if it goes against his personal [1:28:30] wishes, if he's considering an order that potentially is unconstitutional or illegal [1:28:34] or compromises our security, I want your word that you will always provide and give the honest [1:28:41] advice to the president, even if it will make him angry. I asked you that question. I'm going to [1:28:45] read your answer. And to your specific question, the answer is yes. I will inform the president [1:28:52] of that accurate, timely, unbiased intelligence reporting, whether it is something that agrees [1:28:58] with an assumption or a view or an objective or not. That's my responsibility to him and to the [1:29:03] American people. Director Gabbard, there is no imminent threat of nuclear breakout. Did you [1:29:12] deliver that assessment to the president? I have delivered the intelligence community's [1:29:17] assessments to the president. There was no imminent nuclear threat to the United States. [1:29:23] There was no... [1:29:24] There was no evidence of imminence that Iran was going to attack American assets. That was [1:29:30] different from anything they've done over four decades. That was going to attack our homeland. [1:29:35] There was no imminent threat. Imminent is defined in the dictionary as something that is about to [1:29:41] happen, not something that's been happening for four decades, not something that is going to [1:29:45] happen three months from now, not something that's going to happen a year from now. Imminent said [1:29:49] this is about to happen. Did you deliver that assessment to the president? [1:29:55] I delivered the intelligence community's assessments to the president. [1:29:55] I delivered the intelligence community's objective analysis of the threats, the severity of those [1:30:00] threats, and the scope, along with assessments of the different scenarios and contexts that exist [1:30:06] within the Middle East. The president owes it to the American people to go on television to explain [1:30:11] to the American people, to the service members who have died in action serving our country, [1:30:17] why we are at war with Iran. He needs to go on television and explain that directly to the [1:30:22] American people what the imminent threat was. [1:30:28] I would advise members that a vote has been called. It's a single vote. If members want to [1:30:33] shuttle back and forth so we can maintain the continuity of the hearing, we'll do that. If you [1:30:38] start to see it, just to our witnesses, you know how this works. They'll be moving in and out to go [1:30:42] address that vote and then returning to their seat. At this time, I recognize Mr. Scott. [1:30:48] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to submit an article from [1:30:52] Politico dated February 24th, 2026, and the title of it is, [1:30:58] State of the Union Dems Demand Trump Make Iran Plans Public. I think most Americans understand [1:31:05] that if the president of the United States makes those plans public, then the enemies get to see [1:31:10] them without objection. And that was the date of the State of the Union. Director Patel, I'm going [1:31:15] to come to you very quickly and then I'm going to move on. But I listened closely to Senator [1:31:23] Lankford's testimony yesterday about fraud and the other things that are going on. And I want [1:31:28] to bring your attention. [1:31:30] This was in March 25th of 2024. An unsuspecting Uber driver named Lalitha Talanda Hall drove to [1:31:39] a house near Columbus, Ohio, to pick up a package. She had no idea that the 81-year-old man who lived [1:31:43] there had just received a series of phone calls from scammers who had threatened to kill him if [1:31:49] he did not give the woman coming to his house $12,000 in cash. He killed the lady, so she's [1:31:56] dead. He now has a life sentence. Are you aware of any action or investigation that the [1:32:02] Justice Department has taken to pursue justice to bring the scammers and put them and make them pay for what they did? [1:32:11] I think you're referring to, Congressman, scam centers and scam compounds that are wreaking havoc on our citizens. [1:32:16] I'm referring to this individual case. This lady was murdered and a man now has life in prison. [1:32:21] I can't speak to that individual case. I can tell you what we're doing generally if you wish, but as you said— [1:32:25] No, sir. I want to bring that case to your attention. I think that we need to pursue that. Someone is dead and someone else has life in prison. [1:32:32] And it was the scammers that did it. My heart goes out to both families, but the scammers are the ones that need to pay the price. [1:32:39] They're the guilty party here. Director Gabbard, you made a lot of changes at ODNI, changes that I think were necessary that I want to give you the chance to talk about. [1:32:50] So what concrete steps in ODNI 2.0, what are they taking to address politicization, weaponization of intelligence, and unauthorized leaks? [1:33:01] And how will these reforms help rebuild public safety? [1:33:03] Thank you very much, Congressman. I committed to all of you before taking this role that I would execute on that to bring back ODNI's focus on its core mission, to cut the fat, to cut away any detractions away from that, and to ensure that our intelligence community was providing objective, timely, and relevant intelligence to the president and to policymakers. [1:33:30] I conducted a ground-based review. [1:33:33] I don't know if you heard what supposed to be a [1:33:59] report, but there was a идn- Poem. [1:33:59] Click the link in the important to ee- Omega. [1:34:00] I don't know if you love [1:34:01] about ODNI. [1:34:02] The fact that it was released recently Grind僧 [1:34:03] has the full focus of a narrowing of focus and reorganization that consolidated and [1:34:03] coordinated the experts within the ODNI in order to be able to deliver those effects. [1:34:03] capabilities within the zero trust framework to be able to get after those leakers and refer them to [1:34:11] the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. We've seen, we are continuing to [1:34:20] focus on the issue of analytic tradecraft and the integrity of it. Once again, to make sure that the [1:34:26] analysis that's being conducted is not being colored by anyone's political or personal views [1:34:31] on any issue. To that effect, we have and continue to conduct re-looks at different [1:34:39] intelligence products that have been provided in the past. As the chairman mentioned, one related [1:34:44] to anomalous health incidents to identify politicization of these products in the past [1:34:50] and also make updates to intelligence community directives to ensure that these things don't [1:34:56] happen again. Could you speak briefly to China's presence in the Korean [1:35:01] Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere? I'll be able to speak to this more in the classified [1:35:08] setting, sir. Okay. Right, right. Cliff, I'm going to have questions for you there as well. [1:35:13] We do not, we have not heard much about Haiti lately in the news, but it's very close to the [1:35:18] United States. My understanding is that one in four Haitians, about two and a half million people [1:35:23] now live in an area controlled by an armed group. Can you speak to what is happening in Haiti? [1:35:30] Yes, sir. This was something that we talked about within the [1:35:33] international community. We talked about it in the international community. We talked about it in the [1:35:33] annual threat assessment. Haiti, along with Cuba, continue to be areas of volatility. Haiti, as you [1:35:41] mentioned specifically, is being controlled by a gang and we've seen increasing threats [1:35:46] on U.S. persons within Haiti. These two countries continue to create challenges where with increased [1:35:52] instability may be one of those drivers of increased migration flows to the U.S. [1:35:58] Thank you all for your service. Gentlemen, time's expired. Now recognize Mr. Gottheimer. [1:36:04] Thank you. [1:36:06] Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I can start by talking about something I was disappointed in [1:36:14] from the administration about comments made by members of the administration that Israel drew [1:36:18] the United States into conflict with Iran, seeming to buy conspiracy theories that scapegoat Israel [1:36:23] while dismissing that Iran poses a persistent threat to America and our service members and [1:36:28] diplomats in the region. While the president then clarified this is not the case and that [1:36:32] America entered into joint operations with our ally under our own accord, [1:36:36] many still seem confused about what precipitated this conflict and the threat Iran posed to us directly. [1:36:43] So if I could ask Director Radcliffe just a couple questions, yes or no, if that's okay with you. [1:36:47] Is the Iranian regime committed to America's destruction in your opinion? [1:36:50] Yes. [1:36:51] Does the Iranian regime have American blood on their hands since its founding in 1979? [1:36:55] Yes. [1:36:56] Has Iran plotted assassination attempts against Americans on American soil? [1:36:59] Yes. [1:37:00] Was Iran developing a nuclear weapon prior to our military action last June, [1:37:04] and did Iran remain committed to developing a nuclear weapon in the lead up to this conflict? [1:37:07] Yes. So I want to clarify on that, because there's been much talk about a fatwa [1:37:13] against the development of a nuclear weapon. [1:37:15] Can you come back to that one second? Let me finish. [1:37:17] Yes, you bet. [1:37:18] If left unchecked, do you think Iran would have the ability to develop missiles capable [1:37:21] of reaching the United States? [1:37:22] Yes. [1:37:23] Did Israel force the US's hand and make us take action as some have claimed? [1:37:27] No. [1:37:28] Director Gabbard, do you agree with the CIA's director assessment on that last question in [1:37:31] particular? Great. Do you want to go back to that point you want to make? [1:37:35] How much had been made by some about a fatwa against the development of [1:37:38] nuclear weapons? Notwithstanding the fatwa, what we know, and the intelligence community is in [1:37:45] agreement on this, is that Iran possesses at least 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to weapons grade [1:37:53] 60 percent, which doesn't have a civilian use. The only use for that would be the development [1:37:58] of nuclear weapons. [1:37:59] Thank you, Director. [1:38:01] Director Gabbard, I want to raise serious concerns about your recent hiring of Dan Caldwell, [1:38:05] a strict critic of US foreign policy in the Middle East, who's argued that US force [1:38:09] in the Middle East are, quote, more of a burden than a benefit, has claimed that Iran's nuclear [1:38:12] program does not pose a risk to America, despite the ISC's assessment to the contrary. [1:38:17] Dan has also said that our relationship with Israel has no benefit to American national security. [1:38:21] This follows the resignation of Joe Kent this week, a senior ally of yours who is a conspiracy [1:38:25] theorizing white supremacist with a tattooed panzer referring to Nazi tanks. He has made [1:38:29] known his backwards opinions of Israel in his resignation letter, scapegoating them for US [1:38:34] intervention in Iran and Iraq. Director, what role do you anticipate Mr. Caldwell playing in shaping [1:38:39] intelligence assessments or internal discussions related to Iran and Israel? [1:38:42] And can you guarantee to this committee that no individuals in your leadership are undermining [1:38:46] the objectivity of intelligence at this critical moment? [1:38:53] Sir, my understanding is one of my elements sought to hire Dan Caldwell months ago for a [1:38:58] purely administrative role that would not have any position over the intelligence analysis [1:39:04] or assessments on any topic. [1:39:07] Thank you. [1:39:08] Director, as you know, the Iranian regime has been responsible for the deaths that we've talked about, [1:39:12] scores of Americans since coming to power in 79. Iran and its terror proxies must be crushed. [1:39:17] I've been clear on that point in the last weeks and throughout my time in Congress. [1:39:22] I supported the decisive action taken on February 28th to remove key regime leaders and degrade [1:39:27] Iran's ballistic missile and naval capabilities. However, I think it's really important the [1:39:31] administration make its goals clear to Congress and to the American people. [1:39:34] Director, were you in a meeting to discuss a possible strike on Iran? [1:39:38] Congressman, there were several meetings that were held in advance, [1:39:45] I'm sure I was in at least some of them. [1:39:48] Did the intelligence community brief the president on the potential impacts of conflict could have [1:39:52] on global supply chains and on oil and gas prices prior to the outbreak of hostilities? [1:39:59] Were you in any meetings when that came up? [1:40:02] Yes, that is the intelligence community's assessments and those were provided. [1:40:06] Director, did the IC— Director Radcliffe, if I can ask this to you, did the IC brief the [1:40:11] president on who would succeed the Supreme Leader if he was killed and the likelihood [1:40:15] that our placement would be a hardliner? [1:40:20] Say it again. [1:40:20] Was the President— [1:40:21] see brief the president who would succeed the supreme leader if he was killed and the likelihood [1:40:25] that her placement would be a hardliner or could be a hardliner so to be clear uh the president's [1:40:31] objectives with respect to operation epic fury uh did not include regime change that may be [1:40:37] different from what israel's objectives were but you can but yes the president was briefed [1:40:42] in the event that uh supremely good that's great thank you so much i'm sorry to cut you off i just [1:40:46] have 20 seconds director patel does iran pose a threat to the homeland and what specific steps [1:40:51] are you taking to detect prevent detect prevent and disrupt terrorist plots targeting americans [1:40:55] at home iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terror does pose a continuing threat to the [1:40:59] homeland and just last year um our iran threat mission center housed in the fbi our fusion cell [1:41:05] saw a 43 increase in iranian spy actors willing to steal our information and attack our citizens [1:41:11] so that's just one example sir thank you i yield dr jackson good morning um first off i want to [1:41:20] say thank you all for your for your time today and thank you for our service to our country much [1:41:24] appreciate it [1:41:25] um i uh i think the chairman for his opening remarks on anonymous uh anomalous health [1:41:32] incidents ahi um as many of you are aware one of my primary responsibilities in this particular [1:41:40] committee i am the subcommittee chairman of oversight investigations where the investigation [1:41:46] of ahi is and has been a central oversight effort so i am going to ask a quick question about this [1:41:54] director ratcliffe [1:41:56] during the biden administration the cia very poorly in my opinion handled this issue [1:42:01] since then a cia doctor has provided perjured testimony under oath and obstructed our [1:42:07] congressional investigation a quick question for you do you affirm that the cia personnel are under [1:42:13] no direction to make false statements to congress in order to conceal cia equities or activities [1:42:19] related to the handling of ahi during the biden administration yes thank you sir i appreciate that [1:42:24] uh i want to ask uh [1:42:26] mr patel i got a question for you here as a as a member of this committee i also have a regional [1:42:31] responsibility that includes africa i'm very concerned about the radical islamic terror threat [1:42:37] that exists there and is growing by the day whether it's al-qaeda affiliated groups such as jmi [1:42:43] aqim al-shabaab or isis inspired groups such as isis west africa isis shahel isis somalia [1:42:50] or boko haram these are radical dangerous groups that want to kill americans after four years the [1:42:56] lives of americans are direct targets during the biden administration one in cia and um [1:43:08] has been화�visible through frankfurt thulたい Manager Mike Parks used to work with me to [1:43:15] conduct the kimchi провер duty report one day a week or two days every month [1:43:22] 摩 difference between people in campers and on the side is an Okeelah situation is muinees [1:43:25] once again during the bilbo modernization IF imprisonment reasons that we're strapped [1:43:26] with the Department of Homeland Security and our 59 established Homeland Security Task [1:43:30] Forces around the country. [1:43:32] And those officers are now going one month without pay, but they're still showing up [1:43:35] to work. [1:43:36] But, yes, funding would absolutely help us protect the homeland. [1:43:38] Thank you. [1:43:39] I appreciate that. [1:43:42] One more question. [1:43:43] Anyone that feels inclined can answer this. [1:43:45] But according to the Council on Foreign Relations, another Africa-related question, 51 percent [1:43:50] of global terrorism-related deaths occurred in Africa's Shahel region, including the Lake [1:43:54] Chad Basin. [1:43:56] Does the intelligence community assess that Boko Haram, ISIS West Africa, and other terrorist [1:44:00] groups operating in the Lake Chad Basin are a threat to the U.S. interests, whether it's [1:44:04] here in the homeland or a regional U.S. interest? [1:44:07] If so, how does this lack of counterterrorism cooperation that we're currently experiencing [1:44:11] with the allied states of the Shahel, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso impact that? [1:44:16] And tied to that, how does the rise of alternative security forces, such as Russia's Wagner Group [1:44:23] or now Africa Corps, how is that impacting? [1:44:26] How has that impacted our counterterrorism efforts in the region? [1:44:32] Congressman, the continued rise of these Islamist terrorist groups, as you've pointed [1:44:36] out, in Africa, West Africa, and around the world, continues to be a serious concern and [1:44:41] major focus of the intelligence community. [1:44:44] The challenges within the region are very complex because they have to do with governance [1:44:48] challenges in many of these countries. [1:44:51] They have to do with economic challenges as well as external influences, both with funding [1:44:56] and equipping of these terrorist organizations. [1:44:59] So, yes, it has made our counterterrorism, longstanding counterterrorism efforts in these [1:45:05] regions as well as those of our allies in this fight, such as the French and other countries, [1:45:11] far more difficult because of the very real threat within that region to U.S. persons. [1:45:19] If we are not able, if the U.S., if the Department of War is not able to coordinate with and [1:45:24] get the support of the governments of these countries in order to tackle this terrorist [1:45:28] threat, then it's not a safe or operable environment for them to continue that fight. [1:45:34] Thank you. [1:45:36] And the assumption I'm working off of, too, is that the Russian influence via Wagner or [1:45:40] Afrika Korps has made it very difficult for us to develop those relationships and get [1:45:45] those agreements so that we can continue to, you know, make sure that this is not being [1:45:50] brought home to the homeland. [1:45:51] Is that correct? [1:45:52] That is a factor of many. [1:45:53] Thank you. [1:45:54] I appreciate it. [1:45:55] I yield back. [1:45:58] Ms. Houlihan. [1:46:02] Thank you. [1:46:03] My question is basically starting with some H.R. questions in there, first for Director [1:46:09] Patel. [1:46:10] If you could help me a little bit understand, I come out of the military-military family [1:46:14] as well, but I don't know very much about the FBI's H.R. process or the growing up of [1:46:21] an FBI expert. [1:46:23] Could you help me understand how long it takes for a senior counterintelligence expert, especially [1:46:28] one maybe focused on a very narrow threat, to be developed? [1:46:32] How many years, I guess, would be my question? [1:46:35] Thank you, Congresswoman. [1:46:36] That varies. [1:46:37] Sometimes right out of Quantico, new agent trainees are placed on the counterintelligence [1:46:40] mission set, and some people come in from the fraud section. [1:46:43] So the answer varies. [1:46:44] It could take a couple of months to a couple of years. [1:46:46] And the next question is, when a person comes up in your system in the military, it was [1:46:50] always the needs of the Navy or the needs of the Air Force. [1:46:53] It was never the needs of the airmen or the soldier or the sailor in terms of prioritizing [1:46:58] our readiness, in terms of making sure that we have met the mission. [1:47:02] Is the FBI similar? [1:47:03] It is similar, ma'am. [1:47:05] It's a dynamic threat landscape. [1:47:07] So we flux and surge based on the CICT cyber threats and other threats to the homeland [1:47:12] and violent crime mission has seen a surge as well. [1:47:15] So my specific question is that there was a report that came out in February from CNN [1:47:21] that the FBI had let go or fired dozens of agents and staff members from a counterintelligence [1:47:26] unit tasked with monitoring Iran. [1:47:29] And apparently the reason, at least reported in the press, was that these individuals had [1:47:34] been involved in the investigation. [1:47:35] They had been involved in the investigation of classified document handling from President [1:47:38] Trump at Mar-a-Lago and that this was the reason why they were summarily let go. [1:47:45] First of all, are you aware of those firings and are you do you concur with the rationale [1:47:50] or reason for those firings? [1:47:52] I'm aware of that. [1:47:53] And I know there's a pendency of litigation, so I'm not able to comment on them. [1:47:57] Did you yourself order those firings? [1:48:00] The FBI, every time there is someone who violates our code of conduct or ethical standard, conducts [1:48:05] an internal investigation. [1:48:06] With the careers there and they present a decision point to me, the Iranian Threat Mission [1:48:11] Center has seen an increase of 43% in arrests for Iranian spy actors. [1:48:16] So the Iranian Threat Mission Center has never been stronger. [1:48:19] So I'm not asking about, I'm asking about whether those people were fired because they [1:48:25] were involved in the investigation of the document handling by President Trump, not [1:48:29] for any behavior issues. [1:48:31] Is that your understanding as well? [1:48:33] Again, ma'am, I can't comment on them because those are in pending litigation. [1:48:36] I guess I'm a little stymied here, Director, because it feels as though right literally [1:48:44] when there was a possible pending war, I'm outside of this intelligence circle in many [1:48:50] ways, even though I serve on the Intelligence Committee. [1:48:53] You collectively must have been aware when these firings happened that there was a meaningful [1:48:58] chance that the U.S. might be engaged with a war in Iran. [1:49:01] And having these very expert, super qualified folks summarily dismissed at this time, it [1:49:08] just feels like an honor. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] Thank you. [1:49:08] It's such an odd choice in timing. [1:49:10] Were you aware at the time that this was going down, that this may end up weakening the [1:49:15] mission and the readiness of that group? [1:49:18] The mission, as I stated, has never been stronger when you see a 43 percent increase in counterintelligence [1:49:22] arrests and 21 percent increase in cyber arrests against the Iranian threat mission center. [1:49:28] My focus is on providing the American people as strong as the FBI as possible. [1:49:32] I don't work on timelines. [1:49:33] I work on evidence that's presented to me. [1:49:35] I guess my concern is that it feels as though, and I very much honor the audible... [1:49:39] the tone and tenor of this hearing that this is about making sure that um that we depoliticize [1:49:46] um what is the most important thing that we all do which is keep us safe and it feels as though [1:49:52] this issue is a political issue and i just am worried that we are taking really good really [1:49:58] qualified people and picking fights with one another across across um party lines rather [1:50:05] than making sure that we protect ourselves and keep ourselves safe with the remainder of my time [1:50:10] director gabbard i have a question regarding the fact that the secretary of the treasury loosened [1:50:15] restrictions this week on russian oil exports and now that the russians are able to sell oil again [1:50:21] did the ic assess that clearing the way for increased russian oil sales would benefit [1:50:25] moscow possibly i don't believe there's been a formal ic assessment on this topic yet as it is [1:50:34] underway so i would highly encourage that because it feels as though [1:50:38] by easing these sanctions we are directly providing the kremlin with revenue uh the [1:50:43] revenue that will be used directly to kill ukrainian soldiers uh and an increased likelihood [1:50:49] that putin will be successful in his war with ukraine i thank you for your time and i yield [1:50:55] miss wagner i thank you mr chairman and i want to thank our witnesses for uh being with us today [1:51:06] as we sit here in washington our armed forces and our intelligence assets [1:51:13] are engaged in conflict with the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism iran a radical ruthless [1:51:23] and murderous regime that has killed and maimed thousands of united states troops and citizens over [1:51:32] the past 50 years cia director ratcliffe can you elaborate for the american people on the threat [1:51:43] that iran posed to our america [1:51:46] american personnel in the region prior to operation epic fury the extent you can in open [1:51:55] hearing sure congresswoman happy to address that i think is well documented and as you've [1:52:01] encapsulated um iran has been a constant threat for the last 47 years um hundreds if not thousands [1:52:09] of americans killed certainly thousands of americans maimed as a result of activities of [1:52:15] iran and its irgc [1:52:18] over the years but particularly um no cessation with respect to the threats to [1:52:26] u.s interests and forces in the region not just from iran but from its proxies [1:52:30] from iraqi militia groups like katab hezbollah lebanese hezbollah hamas the houthis all of these [1:52:41] proxies if you will of the iranian regime funded by the iranian regime uh committee committing uh [1:52:49] attacks on american interests uh persistently so they did pose absolutely absolute threat a [1:52:57] constant and immediate threat at all times thank you general adams as director of the defense [1:53:03] intelligence agency can you inform the american people about the threat our armed forces [1:53:10] have eliminated thus far yes ma'am representative waggoner thanks for the question and i [1:53:17] will like to go in detail i'm going to cover a little bit here [1:53:21] We will be able to cover more detail in the classified session. [1:53:24] But the goals that the president has set out that have been accomplished and executed by the Central Command were aligned along the DNI's discussion earlier. [1:53:39] One, eliminate their ability to power project. [1:53:42] And that was inclusive of ballistic missiles, but it also includes their UASs. [1:53:48] And so we have been very effective. [1:53:49] We can talk about specific numbers in the closed session. [1:53:55] Their ability to reproduce both missiles and UASs, we've been very effective. [1:54:01] And you can tell from the news, in fact, the chairman talked about it this morning, we have sunk their Navy. [1:54:08] And so those specific objectives have been very well accomplished and will go into great detail in the close-up. [1:54:14] General Hartman, as acting director of the National Security Agency, [1:54:19] can you explain? [1:54:19] How weakening the Iranian regime is impacting the availability of resources to our adversaries like China? [1:54:31] Mike, please. [1:54:34] Hey, thanks for the question. [1:54:36] Obviously not able to go into any classified discussion here. [1:54:40] But certainly weakening the regime and weakening the collaboration between Iran, China, Russia, other adversaries has a global effect of making the world safer. [1:54:52] Yes, thank you very much. [1:54:54] Thank you for all your insights. [1:54:55] And thank you for your time. [1:54:55] Thank you for keeping our troops and our American people safe. [1:55:00] As you know, I chair the first ever subcommittee on open source intelligence. [1:55:05] Over the past year, our subcommittee has been working tirelessly to ensure the intelligence community is leveraging the vast amount of commercially available information to the highest degree of efficiency and cost effectiveness. [1:55:18] Director Ratcliffe, as a CIA, is the functional manager of open source intelligence. [1:55:23] Does the CIA know which data is being used? [1:55:25] Which data has been acquired across all agencies within the IC? [1:55:30] Thanks for the question, Congresswoman. [1:55:31] As you know, the CIA's open source enterprise is driving the open source collection across the entire IC in support of the administration's top priorities. [1:55:44] Two of those priorities I've already talked about, counter-narcotics and threats from adversaries, use of emerging technologies, those collections as a result of our open source are up. [1:55:55] Thank you. [1:55:55] 70% and 40% or 45% collectively. [1:56:00] The CIA does lead the IC in pioneering new uses of AI to extract insights from the vast amounts of open source data that are there that we then share with analysts, warfighters, everyone across the IC. [1:56:17] I thank you. [1:56:17] My time has expired. [1:56:18] I have a lot more questions dealing with open source that we will do in closed session. [1:56:22] So I thank you. [1:56:22] I yield back, Mr. Chairman. [1:56:23] Before I recognize, Mr. Gold. [1:56:25] Mr. Gomez, I want to make sure that all members have had an opportunity to vote because they are prepared to close that vote on the floor. [1:56:30] If you haven't, please go do so at this time. [1:56:34] Looks like we're good. [1:56:35] All right, Mr. Gomez. [1:56:38] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [1:56:39] I just want to get right into it. [1:56:41] Director Gabbard, last year you testified that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. [1:56:45] Do you stand by that statement? [1:56:48] Yes or no? [1:56:50] Context matters with that statement. [1:56:52] Yes or no? [1:56:52] Iran had all of the materials and capabilities to do so. [1:56:56] Mr. Chairman, I reclaim my time. [1:56:58] It's an easy... [1:57:00] It's an easy answer. [1:57:01] You either stand by what you said last year or not. [1:57:03] It is a serious question that requires the totality of the information available. [1:57:07] Director Gabbard, I reclaim my time. [1:57:08] I reclaim my time. [1:57:12] Did you... [1:57:14] When President Trump was asked about your testimony, he said you were wrong. [1:57:19] Were you lying or not? [1:57:22] I stand by the intelligence community's complete assessment. [1:57:25] Director Ratcliffe, when it came to the director's testimony, she said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last spring in Congress. [1:57:36] Director Ratcliffe, when it came to the director's testimony, she said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last spring in Congress. [1:57:37] Director Ratcliffe, when it came to the director's testimony, she said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last spring in Congress. [1:57:37] And so the Supreme Leader has not authorized the nuclear weapons program. [1:57:42] Do you agree with what she said or not? [1:57:44] Yes or no? [1:57:46] The director's right here. [1:57:47] She can speak for herself. [1:57:48] Oh, so I thought this was an intelligence community briefing. [1:57:52] Let's move on. [1:57:56] Trump also said he didn't care what you thought or said. [1:58:00] Should he care about what you have to say when it comes to intelligence? [1:58:04] I continue to provide the president with the intelligence community's assessments on all matters. [1:58:10] So let me just kind of get this straight. [1:58:12] The Department of Defense has a lot of information from the intelligence community. [1:58:14] Well, I don't have much information. [1:58:15] Harman, you said that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon last year. [1:58:21] President Trump said he didn't care what you thought and you were wrong. [1:58:26] They engaged in Operation Midnight Hammer. [1:58:29] He then says it was obliterated. [1:58:31] We hear later reports in open source reporting that it was only set back by a few months. [1:58:39] Then at the beginning of this war, he said that there were weeks away. [1:58:43] I just want to kind of get a sense of were they weeks away of achieving a nuclear weapon? [1:58:52] Yes or no? [1:58:53] Congressman, this is a serious matter and you've made some very serious mischaracterizations here. [1:59:00] Yes or no? Were they weeks away? Yes or no? [1:59:02] It's a service to you and the American people to answer this question with a mere yes or no. [1:59:06] Reclaiming my time, were they weeks away or not? [1:59:09] The American people need to know if this was an imminent threat or not. [1:59:12] If they're weeks away or not. [1:59:14] If they're months away or not. [1:59:17] None of this dodging. Were they an imminent threat? [1:59:21] Yesterday you said that only the president, only the only person who can determine what is an imminent threat is the president of the United States. [1:59:32] Do you stand by that statement? [1:59:34] Yes, I do. [1:59:36] Director Ratcliffe, do you agree with that assessment that the president is the only person that can determine if something is an imminent threat or not? [1:59:46] The president's commander in chief gets to make a decision about what's an imminent threat. [1:59:50] The intelligence. [1:59:50] So no. [1:59:51] Well, no. [1:59:51] Reclaim my time. [1:59:52] The intelligence community has provided a body of intelligence that supports the decision that the president made. [1:59:58] The reason why is that if the president can determine and ignore what you're doing, why do you guys even have a job? [2:00:05] Why do you even advise him? [2:00:07] So you're saying tomorrow the president of the United States can say China is an imminent threat and then he can take his own, no matter what the intelligence says, he can take his own action. [2:00:19] So that's what you're basically saying. [2:00:20] Okay, let's go on. [2:00:21] Director Gabbard, you said that North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the homeland. [2:00:29] Yet the Defense Department said that Iran was at least 10 years away from achieving an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the homeland. [2:00:40] Which one is a more serious threat, North Korea or Iran? [2:00:47] These threats are taken within the context of the total body of intelligence reporting. [2:00:54] So that's it. [2:00:55] It should be. [2:00:57] And that's my point. [2:01:00] It's not just about having the capability of building a weapon. [2:01:04] It's if they can actually deliver that weapon. [2:01:07] If they have the intention of doing that. [2:01:11] How many weeks away are they? [2:01:15] We haven't heard that there were weeks away. [2:01:19] We haven't heard that there are months away. [2:01:22] But that's what we're waiting for. [2:01:26] Imminent to me means that there's... [2:01:28] They're mobilizing troops, they're moving things into position, artillery, they're getting ready to attack. [2:01:37] But everything that we've heard is that this is not the case. [2:01:41] Gentlemen, time's expired. [2:01:43] Mr. Klein. [2:01:46] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:01:47] Thank you all for being here and for the work you do. [2:01:51] To marvel that just one year of strong leadership from the White House has shifted the conversation in this room from that of appeasement and passivity from the Biden administration to that of American strength brought about by the [2:02:00] doctrine in Venezuela. [2:02:01] And I think that's what we're waiting for. [2:02:02] I think that's what we've been waiting for. [2:02:05] And I think that we're waiting for what's going to happen in Venezuela. [2:02:07] I think that the work that's going to be done on the situation in Venezuela, on Operation Epic Fury in Iran, and it's not lost on me that as we sit here, we have one side of the dais talking a big game on threats, and yet they're unwilling to even fund our Department of Homeland Security. [2:02:20] I want to thank President Trump's leadership in each of your efforts. [2:02:23] Because of your efforts, Americans are safer today with two less despots to deal with. [2:02:26] Nevertheless, there remains work to be done. [2:02:29] While Venezuela and Iran are in decline, aggression from adversarial nations like China and Russia and near constant threats of terrorism and cyberwarfare continueto persist. [2:02:32] The Chinese Communist Party in particular remains a top adversary that routinely deals in bad faith, [2:02:39] and this was highlighted most recently by White House Office Director of National Drug Control Policy Sarah Carter [2:02:44] when she delivered recent remarks in Vienna saying, [2:02:47] quote, we know that China's weak export controls and lax enforcement allow its chemical industry to foster friendships with drug cartels. [2:02:54] At the same time, China's overtly, overly effective controls over rare earth minerals wreak havoc on legitimate industries, end quote. [2:03:02] Of course, we're now seeing reports of a new synthetic opioid called cyclorphine [2:03:07] that is said to be 10 times more potent than fentanyl and undetectable on fentanyl test strips. [2:03:12] As you know, President Trump may meet with President Xi in the near future, [2:03:16] where trade and export controls will most certainly be discussed. [2:03:20] Director Gabbard, what is your assessment of the quality and quantity of AI compute that China can indigenously manufacture? [2:03:33] The majority of this question should be addressed in a closing. [2:03:37] The intelligence community's assessment is that China continues to rapidly advance its AI capability. [2:03:46] Do you assess that export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI compute have been effective, [2:03:52] slowing the development and deployment of Chinese AI? [2:03:56] The intelligence community's assessment is that one of the effects of those export controls [2:04:02] is China has increased its focus on developing its own organic capability. [2:04:06] What do you assess would be the effect? [2:04:09] The Board would be aware of the economic and national security impacts if the U.S. decided to loosen export controls [2:04:14] and allow the sale of NVIDIA, Blackwell GPUs, or large numbers of H-200s to China. [2:04:20] I don't believe there is an intelligence community assessment on that specific scenario. [2:04:26] I think that these national security implications should be weighed heavily when conducting these talks. [2:04:31] Considering that fentanyl overdoses are only down in the U.S., [2:04:34] thanks to the President's leadership in securing our borders and taking the fight directly with the cartels in our hemisphere and not the empty words and actions of the U.S. [2:04:40] President's leadership in securing our borders and taking the fight directly with the cartels in our hemisphere. [2:04:41] actions of the Chinese Communist Party. Our adversaries are constantly conducting cyber [2:04:48] operations on U.S. government and private sector networks to steal information and money or conduct [2:04:53] disruptive cyber attacks. We've just been tracking the Chinese typhoon actors for several years. [2:04:59] And just last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that salt typhoon actors, which were [2:05:02] responsible for targeting U.S. telecom, may have accessed sensitive FBI networks. I may have more [2:05:08] to follow up on in the closed session. For now, I want to discuss how the overall U.S. government [2:05:12] posture is going to change based on President Trump's cyber strategy, which was released last [2:05:16] week. I've been frustrated for some time about the unwillingness of prior administrations [2:05:20] to decisively take action, including the use of offensive cyber operations. [2:05:25] Director Patel, beginning with you, what can we expect from the FBI moving forward to be more [2:05:29] aggressive on both defensive and offensive cyber activity? Thank you, Congressman. So as you stated, [2:05:35] the president just launched a new national security cyber strategy. And within that is what [2:05:38] the FBI just launched 60 days ago. It's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:42] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:42] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:42] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] ever seen in the history of the United States. And it's the most comprehensive cyber program we've [2:05:43] called Winter Shield. And what we do connecting pillar one and pillar four of the president's [2:05:47] strategies is go on offense and defense. And so what we've done already is while we are always [2:05:52] going after nation state actors, we also have to engage with the private sector communities because [2:05:57] they are going after the private sector as well. We've held 355 engagements in the last 60 days [2:06:02] with enterprises across America to harden their networks. And as you recall, just a couple of [2:06:07] months ago, our banking infrastructure was hit by a ransomware attack from overseas. In one weekend, [2:06:13] the FBI disrupted and kicked off every one of those bad actors from that network, saving the [2:06:17] American people their valued billions in those bank vaults. So this is some of the things we're [2:06:22] doing, but we need constant engagement with the private sector. Great. General Hartman, what [2:06:27] efforts are underway at NSA to bolster intelligence collection and threat detection in coordination [2:06:32] with other federal agencies to target adversary cyber operations? Congressman, that's a significant [2:06:39] effort to really focus our cybersecurity director. [2:06:43] Working very closely with Director Patel and our Cybersecurity Collaboration Center, which has [2:06:51] thousands of analyst-to-analyst relationships with private organizations across the country. [2:06:57] We need more work, not just from an offensive standpoint, but working across government and [2:07:02] certainly working across private industry. And we're both dedicated and resourced to doing that, [2:07:06] Congressman. Thank you for what you do. You're back. [2:07:08] Gentleman yields, Mr. Quigley. Thank you. Lightning round, please. General, [2:07:12] I understand tomorrow is your last day. I understand tomorrow is your last day. [2:07:14] Last day before retirement? Yes, Congressman. [2:07:16] I can think of better ways to finish things for you, but we appreciate your being here. [2:07:21] I want to respectfully ask you and each of you, if you have full-time personnel dedicated [2:07:27] to analyzing and collecting foreign threats on the 2026 elections, and if so, [2:07:35] just yes or no, and how many personnel we have. Congressman, I'll get yes. I'll get you the exact [2:07:42] number, but certainly we have people paying attention to those threats. Thank you. [2:07:45] Congressman, yes. [2:07:46] We have an election crimes coordinator in each one of our 56 field offices and election crimes [2:07:50] coordinators at headquarters. Thank you. [2:07:52] Yes, we have personnel dedicated both to election security as well as foreign intelligence related [2:07:58] to election influence. Thank you. [2:08:01] Yes, we do as well. I don't know the numbers, but what we do collect and we contribute to the larger [2:08:06] IC coordination. Thank you. [2:08:12] And Representative Quigley, we do not, to my knowledge, have anyone at DIA on that topic. [2:08:17] A question again for all. [2:08:20] Thank you, both of you. Well, first, Director Gabbard, you've seen the reports about whether [2:08:26] or not Russia has helped Iran in targeting in the current war in Iran. Can you confirm that, [2:08:33] or is that something we're going to save for a closed session? [2:08:36] We'll save that for the closed session, sir. [2:08:39] But within that context, on CNBC, Steve Witkoff said on a recent call with President Trump, [2:08:49] Russian leaders denied they were sharing this target information. Shock, surprise. [2:08:53] We saw that they would do that about U.S. military assets with the Iranians. Mr. Witkoff said, [2:08:59] so, you know, quote, we can take them at their word. Let's hope they're not doing this. [2:09:05] Just from your own sense, and for many of you who have been fighting in the Cold War for a long time, [2:09:12] a long lost sense of a Russian, of a Reagan doctrine, just general, it is your sense that [2:09:21] you can take Putin at his word on anything involving military activity. [2:09:28] Diplomatic or intel assessments. [2:09:34] Hey, Congressman, from an intelligence standpoint, we don't take anyone at their word. From a [2:09:39] foreign standpoint, we execute intelligence operations to provide that information to [2:09:46] decision makers. I appreciate that. Patel, Director. [2:09:51] I agree with the General. [2:09:53] Yes, I agree. We don't take anyone at their word. And from an intelligence standpoint, [2:09:58] we don't rely on single sources of intelligence and always look for multiple sources to, [2:10:03] to confirm. [2:10:04] Director. [2:10:05] Yeah, Congressman, I actually answered this question yesterday. I don't take Putin, Xi, [2:10:11] Kim Jong-un, Supreme Leader, any foreign adversary leader at their word, rely on our intelligence [2:10:17] to reflect what those adversaries are actually doing. [2:10:21] General. [2:10:23] We absolutely do not take any of those enemies at their word. [2:10:27] Can I get a hallelujah? [2:10:33] Mr. Gabbard, let me, I understand that you have to put your own personal views [2:10:37] aside in your position. But, [2:10:40] I honestly think that the issue our grandchildren are going to be most upset about us with is climate change. [2:10:47] So, you know, you know your quote, and when you talked about climate change, as a member, it threatens the safety and security of the planet, especially in places like Hawaii, where we are already experiencing its devastating effects. [2:11:00] But respectfully, it's not in worldwide threats. Used to be in worldwide threats. So let me help me, just help me understand, who makes the [2:11:12] final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? Who makes the final decision? [2:11:12] What goes in here? And what is a threat? [2:11:18] Congressman, it's a collection of the intelligence community's assessments that the National Intelligence Council and our experts there work on. [2:11:26] This year, we've structured the annual threat assessment around the president's national security strategy to address the most tangible and direct threats to our security and our interests. [2:11:38] I get that part. [2:11:39] Did you make the case that maybe climate change should be considered a worldwide threat when we are? [2:11:45] This. [2:11:46] In this collective process, did you make the case with what you said not that long ago? [2:11:51] Yeah. Once again, we focused on the most tangible and direct threats, given the complexity of those threats that exist here and on the homeland and around the world. [2:12:00] So that's stating that climate change isn't in any way a tangible threat now or in the future. [2:12:06] It's basically saying we think so little of it as a threat, we don't even mention it. [2:12:12] I think the changing of the climate, the weather, the environment is a factor [2:12:16] that goes into the different intelligence community assessments on effects. [2:12:23] Gentlemen, the time has expired. [2:12:24] Ms. Tinney. [2:12:27] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:12:28] And thank you so much to our briefers and for your service to our country in multiple cases for some of you and everyone who serves in the intelligence community to give the support to everyone that's serving. [2:12:41] I fully support President Trump's efforts through your agencies over the last 18 months, 18 days, 18 days. [2:12:48] We have to emphasize it's only been 18 days. [2:12:50] And I think it was a courageous decision. [2:12:53] And to the American people, I know many have recited this, but for the past 47 years, Iran has been the world's largest sponsor of terrorism. [2:13:03] The Islamic Republic of Iran has operated with impunity. [2:13:07] They've destabilized the Middle East, brutalized their own citizens and have the blood of countless Americans and others on their hands. [2:13:15] And now they're paying the price for that despotism. [2:13:17] And I want to thank our service members and President Trump [2:13:20] and making these difficult [2:13:21] and stunning decisions. [2:13:23] But it is also stunning what the Iranian people and so many in the Middle East and around the world have suffered from the regime. [2:13:29] And I want to point out that in 2022, when Masa Amini was killed in the hands of the so-called morality police by the Iranian regime, [2:13:38] it spurred, I would say, probably one of the most profound women's rights movements of our time. [2:13:47] So many women stood up in the face of certain death or at least [2:13:53] imprisonment, definitely having an eye gouged out like so many others to stand up. [2:13:58] And I am so grateful that these people now have an opportunity to actually have some kind of regime that would be give them a chance at freedom after all these years. [2:14:08] And I want to ask Director Gabbard, [2:14:12] some of these people and many of these people do not seem to have access to outside information. [2:14:17] Can you characterize what the access would be to the Internet or cell phones for those in Iran who have no idea? [2:14:25] About anything and are only receiving the propaganda from the regime. [2:14:29] Congressman, I can expand on this in the closed setting. [2:14:32] But I will say briefly that throughout the period of protest that we saw previously [2:14:38] and during this ongoing conflict, the access of the Iranian people [2:14:43] to basic things like power or Internet or cell phone access is extremely limited. [2:14:50] So I wouldn't ask the general since General James in this same vein, do you think that the suspension, the [2:14:56] Internet suppression by the Iranian regime is is an objective that would be protecting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? [2:15:05] Yes, ma'am. [2:15:06] Ma'am, the it's a TTP and we will go into in great detail in the classified, but it's definitely a TTP to maintain control. [2:15:14] Thank you. I appreciate that. [2:15:15] I look forward to that. [2:15:16] I want to turn to the northern border, which I represent most of the northern border with the state of New York across the Lake Ontario shoreline. [2:15:24] We know that many, many on the. [2:15:27] Foreign terror watch list in 2024, 358 suspects were found and arrested on the northern border fiscal year 2025. [2:15:36] That number has been reduced to 307. [2:15:38] I want to ask Director Patel, how would you characterize the type of those those types of people that you have appeared obtained, [2:15:47] arrested or encountered on the northern border cartels, Islamic terror, organized crime? [2:15:53] How would you characterize those people if you can? [2:15:56] Thank you, Congresswoman. [2:15:57] With the solidification and reinforcement, the southern border, the northern border has become a target of opportunity for foreign terrorist organizations, cartels, [2:16:06] those that wish to conduct espionage activities, basically all of the above. [2:16:10] How would you characterize the partnership of our Canadian friends to the north and their willingness to stop these individuals, especially in the last year or so? [2:16:19] At the FBI, we have engaged with the RCMP and their intel services at levels never seen before to specifically focus on. [2:16:26] The fentanyl productions north of our border. [2:16:29] The cartels have shifted their operations to produce the lethal fentanyl that kills so many Americans. [2:16:35] So that's one example where we're focused and locked in with our partners north of the border. [2:16:39] Thank you very much. Appreciate that. [2:16:40] One last thing I just want to ask. [2:16:41] Upstate New York is now the new home to Micron, [2:16:44] one of the world's three leading memory manufacturers and the only U.S. leading memory company. [2:16:51] Memory produced in Micron is integral, an integral component of the GPUs, [2:16:56] which is the main source of the data that's being used to train America's dominant frontier models. [2:17:01] I'd love to to find out, Director Ratcliffe, what would be the economic and national security implications of China were to catch up on the U.S. [2:17:11] on memory, GPUs, critical minerals, all those things that go into everything leading up to this, including the advent of AI? [2:17:21] Well, what you've seen, Congresswoman, is that when China can take advantage of things in the supply chain, [2:17:27] it can do that. [2:17:30] This is particularly problematic in the area of all emerging technologies and AI in particular. [2:17:36] Obviously, whoever is dominant in the technology fields in the future will dictate the rules in the international marketplace. [2:17:44] It would be devastating if China were ahead of us. [2:17:47] Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back. [2:17:48] Mr. Cohen. [2:17:51] Thank you, Mr. Chair. [2:17:54] Director Patel, you had a question from Dr. Jackson about the shutdown we're in now, [2:18:00] with Homeland Security, and I believe you said that this time this would be harmful to America because of the threat from Iran. [2:18:11] Is that correct? [2:18:12] Do I recall that correctly? [2:18:13] Generally, yes, sir. [2:18:14] How many days before we invaded Iran did you know we were going to launch an invasion? [2:18:20] We can get into those details in a classified setting, but I work with my colleagues across the spectrum here to give me advance warnings so that we can reinforce them. [2:18:28] Was it two days, three days, a month? [2:18:30] It was sometime before that. [2:18:32] Yes, sir. [2:18:33] Sometime before that. [2:18:34] With that knowledge, why did you fire at least a dozen agents in Counterintelligence Unit 12 that specializes in Iran counterintelligence, [2:18:44] which makes us much less secure and safe with this war going on from Iranian attacks potentially against our country? [2:18:51] As I said earlier, Congressman, I don't work on timelines when these terminations occur. [2:18:55] There are internal investigations conducted by the careers of the FBI that highlight unethical or inappropriate conduct, [2:19:01] and it's up to me to make the decision. [2:19:02] But our Iran Threats Mission Center has never been more resourced. [2:19:05] As I've highlighted, a 43% increase in counterespionage arrests from Iran alone and 360 ongoing terrorism investigations with Iran-affiliated individuals. [2:19:14] And the people you fired, those 12 people, they were experts on Iran, were they not? [2:19:17] I don't believe so. [2:19:18] They worked in counterintelligence, did they not? [2:19:21] I'm taking you at your word, sir. [2:19:23] I'm not familiar with every single word. [2:19:25] You're the chief director. I'm not. [2:19:26] You should know the answer. [2:19:27] You fired the people. [2:19:28] Where did they work? [2:19:29] I've... [2:19:30] People were terminated for violating their ethical obligations in the high states. [2:19:34] Was the ethical violations that they dealt with the case of the classified documents that were found at the bathroom in Mar-a-Lago, was that the ethical issue? [2:19:44] As I said earlier, all those matters are pending litigation, so I'm not going to comment on them. [2:19:51] Director Gabbert, are you familiar with CI-12? [2:19:55] I'm not, Congressman. [2:19:57] Let me ask you this question. [2:19:58] In the intelligence community's unclassified annual threat assessment from last year, it said, [2:20:05] quote, Iran's large conventional forces are capable of inflicting substantial damage to an attacker. [2:20:10] Executing regional strikes and disrupting shipping, particularly energy supplies to the Strait of Hormuz. [2:20:19] It seems the IC was entirely correct in its assessment about Iranian retaliation in the Strait. [2:20:25] Did the IC's assessment about the Iranian capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz change in the past year? [2:20:31] No, Congressman. [2:20:32] Does Iran still have the capability to threaten shipping in the Straits of Hormuz with missiles, mines, and small boats? [2:20:40] Their capabilities have been largely degraded, but yes, [2:20:44] Iran will have means to threaten passage through the Strait of Hormuz. [2:20:48] And how long can they keep the Strait closed? [2:20:52] Based on current events, I'd have to get an updated assessment from the intelligence community on that. [2:21:00] Did you have an analysis of the impact of the war on global supply chains and the price of oil and gas? [2:21:08] I believe that assessment may have come from the Department of Treasury or Energy. [2:21:14] It didn't come through your office? [2:21:18] It came from their element within Department of Energy or Energy. [2:21:22] Do you know if the president was briefed on those assessments? [2:21:27] I believe so, but I can't confirm. [2:21:30] He was briefed on those assessments that that was a problem. [2:21:34] The Straits of Hormuz could be shut off and that's causing a great problem in the world's economy [2:21:39] with oil prices going up to like under $120 or something a barrel and an effect on all countries' economies. [2:21:47] Why would the president not have taken actions to strengthen defense around the Strait of Hormuz? [2:21:54] All I can say is that the president ultimately is responsible for making the decisions based on the totality of information and intelligence [2:22:02] that he has available to him. [2:22:05] Intelligence that he has available to him. [2:22:07] That's a scary thought. [2:22:09] Does the IC know where Iran's enriched uranium is? [2:22:15] The IC has high confidence that we know where it is. [2:22:18] And can you tell us that in classified? [2:22:21] We can speak more about this topic in the classified setting. [2:22:24] OK. Could it be we have methods of destroying it? [2:22:30] This is a conversation for a closed setting, sir. [2:22:37] Do you have an idea what the purpose of the Marines being sent? [2:22:41] The units that are being sent over there is the idea that we will put troops with boots on the ground in Iran. [2:22:48] ODNI and the IC is not involved in the operational planning and movements of the Department of War assets. [2:22:56] Thank you. I'll be very honest with you. [2:22:58] When you read us your original comments, it was kind of scary because of all the craziness that goes on in the world. [2:23:05] I can't wait for the classified setting. [2:23:09] Mr. Perry. [2:23:10] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:23:11] It's good to see some of our old colleagues. [2:23:13] I'm going to start. [2:23:15] I'm a service gentleman and ma'am. [2:23:18] I'm going to start with General Hartman, General Adams. [2:23:20] Do you know how many days it's been since Russia went into Ukraine? [2:23:25] I answered for you. [2:23:26] It's fourteen hundred and eighty. [2:23:30] Do you know how much money the United States government has spent? [2:23:32] The taxpayers have spent in the war in Ukraine. [2:23:36] I'm going to round it for you. [2:23:37] It's about two hundred billion dollars. [2:23:38] I mean, maybe it's a lot more. [2:23:39] Maybe it's a little less. [2:23:41] It's hard to tell around the this this place to the best of your knowledge was Russia an imminent threat to the. [2:23:48] United States when they went into Ukraine. [2:23:51] The best of your knowledge, sir. [2:24:01] Congressman, I wasn't in this position. [2:24:03] Understand when when that decision was made. [2:24:06] To the best of your knowledge, I know it goes back fourteen hundred and eighty days. [2:24:09] But so so certainly I don't think it was in the best interest of the United States for Russia. [2:24:15] An imminent threat is what I'm asking. [2:24:17] Not not my decision to make or advice to provide. [2:24:20] OK, how about you, General Adams? [2:24:25] Like General Hartman, I was in a different. [2:24:28] Position many four years ago in in to make that assessment. [2:24:33] Yeah, I guess. [2:24:34] Can I ask you to clarify? [2:24:37] Are you saying was Russia going to attack the United States fourteen hundred and eighty days ago? [2:24:44] Not to my knowledge. [2:24:45] Yeah. All right. [2:24:46] You call who the president was at that time. [2:24:50] General, I'll help you out with President Biden. [2:24:52] Do you know who the Speaker of the House was at that time? [2:24:57] The name Miss Pelosi ring a bell. [2:25:01] Do you recall this Congress declaring war? [2:25:07] Russia and Ukraine fourteen hundred and eighty days ago or any time between then and now? [2:25:12] I don't I don't either. [2:25:15] Do you know, gentlemen, how many American service members have been killed or maimed attributed to Iran? [2:25:25] The IRGC, their proxies, et cetera, roughly. [2:25:29] Any idea? [2:25:30] Could could we say probably a thousand killed, if not ten thousand over ten thousand killed in Maine? [2:25:38] Probably a reasonable assessment. [2:25:41] You know how many? [2:25:42] Uniformed service members have been killed by Russia in the last fourteen hundred and eighty days. [2:25:47] American Uniformed Service personnel. [2:25:49] I'm just asking. [2:25:50] I don't know of any. [2:25:51] But do you know of any? [2:25:55] It seems to me that those are almost like a political narrative being constructed here. [2:26:00] And I just want to, you know, point out this. [2:26:04] It seems like a bit of an irony. [2:26:06] I'm going to go to the director of the FBI. [2:26:09] It's good to see you, Mr. [2:26:10] Patel, Crossfire Hurricane, Round River, Plasmic Echo, Arctic Frost. [2:26:18] Seem to have emanated from the counterintelligence division of the FBI. [2:26:24] Is that a reasonably correct assessment, generally speaking? [2:26:28] Generally speaking, Congressman, I want to be careful here because there are a number of ongoing investigations. [2:26:32] I understand. [2:26:35] There's a filing system that prohibited, well, with prohibited access. [2:26:40] Is it possible that that politicized investigation and filing system violated Sixth Amendment rights to the discovery and Congress's [2:26:49] Article One Oversight Authorities if possible? [2:26:52] Without giving you a definitive answer that rests with the DOJ, let me just talk about prohibited case files real quick. [2:26:58] Sure. [2:26:58] Prohibited case files are basically files that prior directors had created to essentially hide what was going on. [2:27:07] They do not exist in our sentinel systems. [2:27:09] They do not exist anywhere. [2:27:10] And if you search for that specific case, it won't even come up, which is why I, as the first FBI director to do so, have terminated prohibited case files. [2:27:18] And as you know, I'm wed to [2:27:20] professional oversight here at Congress and have delivered 50,000 pages, which is 400% more increase than my two predecessors combined. [2:27:27] Director, would ensnaring individuals or organizations based solely on their political affiliations or viewpoints be a potential violation of the Fourth Amendment? [2:27:36] I believe so. [2:27:37] Have any of the personnel associated with these activities, and I understand that investigations may be ongoing, have they been removed from duty pending the outcome investigation? [2:27:49] Yes, many have. [2:27:51] Okay. [2:27:51] Moving on. [2:27:52] I'm concerned about a lab that was found in a clandestine Chinese biolab that was found in California and then one that was found later in... [2:28:03] Las Vegas. [2:28:04] Yeah, Nevada. [2:28:05] And I'm wondering, are you concerned about a lack of vision or imagination in agents that solely work on a case and can't see that China has the capability and the impetus to do these things all around the country and things like those things? [2:28:21] Have you done anything about changing that training or that operational conduct of agents? [2:28:28] I can only speak to what I've done, and this FBI is keenly aware of it. [2:28:31] We're the ones that figured it out, not just in Las Vegas, but places like Michigan, where we arrested multiple individuals who were pretending to be researchers at the University of Michigan while bringing in lethal pathogens and trying to steal our trade secrets and our agricultural secrets, which is national security. [2:28:44] So this FBI is laser focused on the Chinese threat, especially related to biolabs and agricultural theft. [2:28:50] I appreciate the response. [2:28:51] I yield the balance. [2:28:53] Mr. Fallon. [2:28:56] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [2:28:57] I would be remiss if I didn't mention Operation Absolute Resolve and the arrest and capture of Nicolas Maduro and his wife. [2:29:05] It was incredibly complex. [2:29:06] It was bold. [2:29:07] It was unprecedented. [2:29:09] It was a wild success. [2:29:11] It really hearkens thoughts of Radon and Tebby 50 years ago, except this actually remarkably exceeded that in its success. [2:29:21] It was historic. [2:29:22] And it altered undeniably the geopolitical landscape in the United States's favor. [2:29:28] So our military and our IC should be lauded. [2:29:31] And I want to offer a hearty and deserved congratulations to all of you that are testifying before us today. [2:29:40] Thank you, Director Ratcliffe. [2:29:42] I want to just visit with you a little bit. [2:29:43] First, I do want to take a point of personal privilege. [2:29:45] I attended Coach Holtz's funeral one day. [2:29:48] He was very proud of you. [2:29:52] How long has Iran been pursuing a nuclear weapon director? [2:29:58] Congressman, let me respond. [2:30:01] I appreciate the kind remarks and also want to congratulate the people of the Fourth District of Texas for getting a lot better representation than they ever did from the guy that was previously in that seat. [2:30:12] Notwithstanding, as I talked about, a fatwa that was issued, I believe, in 2004. [2:30:20] Iran has had a dedicated nuclear program. [2:30:25] It's a program beyond civil limits for the development of nuclear weapons. [2:30:30] They currently possess at least 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium at 60 percent weapons grade that would be capable of putting together 10 nuclear weapons. [2:30:43] Director, what nation state has achieved 60 percent enrichment and then not produced a nuclear weapon? [2:30:50] I'm not aware of any. [2:30:52] There's none. [2:30:53] You get to 60 percent. [2:30:54] There's a reason you're at 60 percent. [2:30:56] Because you are pursuing a nuclear weapon. [2:30:57] You're pursuing a nuclear ambitions. [2:30:58] So we have sanctions have been imposed in the past. [2:31:02] And yet that pursuit continued. [2:31:04] Their economy, their economy was teetering. [2:31:06] The pursuit continued. [2:31:08] Their people were suffering. [2:31:09] The pursuit continued under the Bush, Obama, Trump, 45 Biden, Trump, 47. [2:31:14] That pursuit continued. [2:31:16] Then last June, Operation Midnight Hammer nuclear program was dealt a significant setback. [2:31:22] But not only that, the autocratic illegitimate regime in Tehran. [2:31:27] It witnessed firsthand that the American resolve under this administration should be taken very seriously. [2:31:33] I want to read you a few quotes. [2:31:36] Iran will never be permitted to build a nuclear weapon. [2:31:39] Barack Obama, 15. [2:31:41] The message to Iran should be loud and clear. [2:31:43] We will never allow you to acquire a nuclear weapon. [2:31:45] Never. [2:31:46] Hillary Clinton. [2:31:47] Iran will never get a nuclear weapon on my watch. [2:31:50] Iran can never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. [2:31:53] Joe Biden. [2:31:53] Make no mistake, as president, I will never hesitate to take [2:31:57] whatever action is necessary to defend American forces and interests from Iran. [2:32:03] Come up Kamala Harris. [2:32:05] So last June we have Midnight Hammer and not only did they see the resolve. [2:32:11] I mean, they saw that we were committed to actually taking action and not just the words this time. [2:32:17] And even after all of that, did they abandon their pursuit and their nuclear program? [2:32:23] They absolutely did not. [2:32:25] Congressman, I think you point out [2:32:27] the success of Operation Midnight Hammer is that one of the things that we assess [2:32:32] in the intelligence community broadly is that since that operation, [2:32:38] Iran has been unable to enrich a single kilogram of uranium to 60 percent since that operation. [2:32:46] But as you correctly point out, Congressman, notwithstanding that, [2:32:49] our intelligence is also clear that they have not lost their ambition and that the activities to [2:32:57] rebuild or reconstitute their nuclear facilities and centrifuges is something that the intelligence. [2:33:06] There's a body of intelligence that I think confirms that. [2:33:10] Then we had eight months of negotiations and attempted diplomacy. [2:33:13] They proved fruitless. [2:33:15] And yet the pursuit continued. [2:33:17] And then, Director, is there any intelligence or evidence that the supreme leader and his thug, [2:33:23] Mullis, after all that, at the beginning of this year, we're going to finally [2:33:29] stop their pursuit of their nuclear weapon to their program? [2:33:33] No. [2:33:35] So we have some folks here that are splitting hairs about imminent threat. [2:33:39] You know what? Was it a grave threat? [2:33:41] Director, in your opinion, nuclear weapons are a grave threat in the hands of religious ideologues. [2:33:47] 60 percent enrichment. [2:33:49] No nation state that achieved that hadn't produced a nuclear weapon. [2:33:52] We can either talk about it, kick the can down the road and let them get a nuclear weapon and get danger close to it on the precipice. [2:33:58] We can take action now. [2:33:59] And this is what this administration chose to do. [2:34:01] Thank you. [2:34:02] Mr. [2:34:03] Stubbe, thank you, Mr. [2:34:05] Chairman. [2:34:05] Every day, the brave men and women of our intelligence community, armed forces and federal law enforcement work to protect our [2:34:10] homeland from a constant and evolving array of threats. [2:34:13] But since Democrats chose to shut down the Department of Homeland Security, those threats have grown more acute. [2:34:18] Our country has already experienced four terrorist attacks since the shutdown began. [2:34:22] The consequences are no longer hypothetical. [2:34:25] They're unfolding in real time at a moment when the global threat environment is intensifying. [2:34:30] Terrorist organizations are resurging and [2:34:32] adversaries continue to encourage violence against Americans. [2:34:35] Congress should be reinforcing our defenses. [2:34:37] Instead, Democrats have sidelined the very department responsible for keeping the homeland safe. [2:34:42] Not a single Democrat here on this committee voted to reopen the Department of Homeland Security. [2:34:47] That was not an accident. [2:34:48] It was a political decision made at the expense of the safety and security of the American people. [2:34:52] As threats to our homelands rise and our enemies grow more emboldened, [2:34:56] this decision has weakened our defenses and replaced action with dysfunction. [2:35:00] Each day, [2:35:01] the threat environment worsens and with it, [2:35:03] the risk to the American people, which is indefensible. [2:35:06] Do each of you agree that the reckless Democratic shutdown of the Department [2:35:10] of Homeland Security has affected your agency's ability to detect, [2:35:14] deter and respond to threats against the homeland? [2:35:16] Specifically, has it impacted intelligence sharing, [2:35:19] operational coordination or your capacity to prevent attacks? [2:35:22] General Hartman. [2:35:26] Congressman, it hasn't had a significant impact on the foreign intelligence mission of the National Security Agency. [2:35:31] Director Patel. [2:35:32] The shutdown has had a significant [2:35:34] impact on how we protect and defend the homeland. [2:35:36] Director Gabbard. [2:35:38] This has directly affected the intelligence elements within the Department of Homeland Security negatively. [2:35:44] Director Ratcliffe. [2:35:46] I would agree with the Director of National Intelligence. [2:35:48] General Adams. [2:35:51] No significant impact on the Defense Intelligence Agency and the foreign threat that we analyze. [2:35:58] So, Director Gabbard, you, in your opening statement, [2:36:00] talked about the threats to the homeland and the changes that you've made as it relates to the border [2:36:04] and the changes that the president has made [2:36:06] after four years of open border policies under President Biden, [2:36:09] during which cartels and gangs expanded their operations into American cities. [2:36:14] What specific actions has ODNI taken to disrupt these criminal cartels and networks [2:36:19] and stop the fentanyl poisoning and murdering U.S. citizens? [2:36:23] Thank you for the question, Congressman. [2:36:24] We've taken several actions to be able to get after this threat [2:36:28] that the president made a priority. [2:36:31] Number one being making historic shifts in intelligence collection towards [2:36:36] addressing this threat. [2:36:38] I believe it is the biggest shift in intelligence [2:36:41] capabilities that we've ever seen, or certainly in a long time. [2:36:45] The integration and cooperation between our National Counterterrorism Center [2:36:51] with the DEA and other Department of Homeland Security elements is also unprecedented. [2:36:58] We have taken and coordinated the collection of individuals known and suspected terrorists, [2:37:04] known and suspected cartel members, [2:37:06] leaders and inputted that into the TIDE system, [2:37:09] which has radically increased and improved our ability to identify those who are cartel [2:37:14] and gang members trying to enter our country and those who may already be in our country. [2:37:20] National Counterterrorism Center has been working again in coordination with our [2:37:23] interagency partners to get after the financial networks that these cartels [2:37:28] and gangs rely upon to be able to continue to fund. [2:37:33] As Director Patel has spoken about, we have National Counterterrorism [2:37:36] elements that sit within the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and support [2:37:43] the interagency efforts to continue to get after this threat very effectively. [2:37:47] Thank you, Director Patel. [2:37:50] Mr. Cohen was asking you about a recent firing of counterespionage agents with Iranian expertise. [2:37:56] You and the FBI are taking and will continue to take all required steps to keep the American people safe [2:38:00] during President Trump's historic military action against an oppressive and evil Iranian regime. [2:38:05] Is that correct? [2:38:06] Absolutely. [2:38:07] And there's 36,000 people employed at this FBI. [2:38:10] And I reject the notion wholeheartedly that the determination of those that were weaponizing [2:38:15] law enforcement are the only ones that can do the mission. [2:38:17] There's a 43% increase in counterintelligence and espionage arrests just related to Iran alone, [2:38:22] which is a record year for the FBI. [2:38:24] Well, and you plussed up nearly a thousand agents in the field throughout the United States since this has occurred. [2:38:29] Yes, sir. [2:38:29] And there's a document that you posted on X and I think that's what you have in front of you about all of the wins in the [2:38:36] changes that the FBI has made under your leadership and President Trump's leadership during 2025 [2:38:42] and the little time that I have remaining. [2:38:43] Could you just highlight some of that for the American people? [2:38:45] Thank you. [2:38:46] Under the Trump administration, this FBI has literally had a historic year. [2:38:49] We have 112% increase in violent offenders arrested last year alone, [2:38:54] a 20% decrease in homicides, 20% decrease in robberies. [2:38:59] We have disrupted 1,800 criminal gangs. [2:39:01] That's a 210% increase. [2:39:03] We seized enough fentanyl to kill 178 million Americans. [2:39:06] That's a 31% increase. [2:39:07] We have gone after the most vulnerable in our society, protecting children, [2:39:12] a 490% increase in arrests on those that prey on our children online. [2:39:17] We have located, found, and identified 6,200 missing kids. [2:39:21] That's a 30% increase. [2:39:22] We have dismantled and taken down 1,700 child predators. [2:39:26] That's a 17% increase. [2:39:28] And those that wish to traffic our young American citizens and women, [2:39:32] 300 human traffickers have been arrested. [2:39:35] That's a 15% increase. [2:39:36] And seven, seven of the FBI's top ten most wanted fugitives in the world [2:39:43] have been apprehended in the last 13 months. [2:39:45] To put that into perspective, there was four in the prior four years. [2:39:48] So this FBI under President Trump is fully stocked to get after every single fight we have. [2:39:54] And these are just some of the statistics. [2:39:55] So I thank you for letting me highlight those. [2:39:57] Thank you. [2:39:57] My time's expired. [2:39:58] Mr. Crenshaw. [2:39:59] Thank you all for being here in this marathon, two-day marathon. [2:40:06] Appreciate you all. [2:40:07] I want to talk about FISA. [2:40:09] Because we all have scars on our back from two years ago when we were authorized FISA. [2:40:13] I anticipate it being easier this time. [2:40:15] But I still want to go over the myths that the public believes [2:40:20] and that many members of this Congress believe. [2:40:23] Mr. Patel, I'll focus on you here. [2:40:26] Myth number one has to do with 702 versus FISA Title I. [2:40:32] Trump was targeted with FISA 702. [2:40:35] Is that a myth? [2:40:36] That's a myth. [2:40:37] It's not true. [2:40:38] Well, it's just real quick. [2:40:40] How was President Trump targeted under a crossfire hurricane? [2:40:44] Under FISA Title I, Title III authorities, [2:40:47] information was presented to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, [2:40:50] a search warrant, to surveil individuals associated with the Trump campaign, [2:40:54] which was later revealed through the House Intelligence Committee's work, [2:40:57] that the information collected was not only unverified, [2:40:59] but individuals lied in that application, [2:41:01] individuals that were government officials. [2:41:03] I think it's worth pointing out that whether this process was FISA or in regular court, [2:41:09] it was still lies told by the people trying to get the warrant. [2:41:14] It had nothing to do with FISA. [2:41:15] It was simply the people trying to get the warrant were lying. [2:41:17] OK, myth number two. [2:41:19] A query means that we're spying on Americans, [2:41:23] means we're reading in their inboxes, [2:41:25] we're getting inside their text messages, all of that. [2:41:28] Is that true? [2:41:29] No, I'm going to borrow General Hartman's answer. [2:41:31] A query of 702 is pursuant to lawfully collected information of non-US citizens overseas. [2:41:38] Right. [2:41:40] So if you query an American citizen, are you accessing their inbox? [2:41:45] No. [2:41:46] You're just seeing if they have spoken to somebody who is a foreign intelligence officer, [2:41:52] let's say, and you would know they've spoken to them [2:41:55] because they would show up as part of that conversation. [2:41:57] In foreign intelligence collection. [2:41:59] In foreign intelligence collection. [2:42:00] So if and if you wanted to get inside their inbox, [2:42:05] you would have to get an actual warrant under current law, right? [2:42:09] A US person. [2:42:11] A warrant or a subpoena process. [2:42:13] Yes, sir. [2:42:13] Okay. [2:42:13] So that's a really important distinction. [2:42:16] Congressman, if I could just, but you wouldn't use FA 702 to do that. [2:42:21] Correct. [2:42:22] To get in the, I just want to be clear about that. [2:42:24] Yes, you would not. [2:42:25] You would use your regular court process. [2:42:27] No authority under 702 to collect intelligence intentionally against US persons. [2:42:32] Absolutely. [2:42:33] Right. [2:42:35] Yeah. [2:42:35] So when somebody, and let's say their name rhymes with, I don't know, [2:42:39] Tucker Carlson, is claiming that the CIA is spying on him. [2:42:44] I would, I'm going to guess here, because I don't know. [2:42:47] I'm going to guess that the most likely scenario is that in the process of him [2:42:51] speaking with Iranian intelligence officials, it is incidentally collected. [2:42:55] Nobody is spying on Tucker Carlson or his inbox, to my knowledge, at least. [2:42:59] Number three, another myth, a warrant requirement. [2:43:03] Should it be required by law? [2:43:05] For a simple query, that should be easy to get, right? [2:43:10] What's the problem? [2:43:11] It's easy to get a warrant. [2:43:13] We do it all the time. [2:43:14] Would it be easy? [2:43:17] In my opinion, no. [2:43:19] But and the reason it wouldn't be easy is because oftentimes these queries are [2:43:24] part of a very typical analytical process and they would not meet the judicial [2:43:30] standards of probable cause, and I've seen many examples of this. [2:43:33] I would love if you guys had some examples that are declassified. [2:43:37] I've seen them in a classified session. [2:43:40] So I guess my point is, and now that we've debunked these myths, is you put that [2:43:45] warrant process on a simple query. [2:43:48] You're taking away our analysts' ability to connect the dots, to connect the dots [2:43:52] from the outside actors, which we can collect on. [2:43:54] They have no constitutional protections, but you're removing our ability to connect [2:43:58] them with the inside actors, which is kind of where it matters. [2:44:02] It's like giving up when you're right at the goal line. [2:44:06] That makes zero sense to do, and that's exactly what this would do. [2:44:11] I've already heard Director Ratcliffe's answer on this, but 18 months clean reauthorization. [2:44:18] I don't know where that number came from, but would you rather have it longer? [2:44:22] As Director Ratcliffe said, I'd like five or ten years. [2:44:25] Okay, me too. [2:44:31] Quickly and well. I yield back. [2:44:33] Thank you. [2:44:34] Mr. Hill. [2:44:37] Thank you, Chairman. [2:44:37] Thank you, panel, for being with us this morning. [2:44:40] And let me start with Director Gabbard. [2:44:42] You've heard from Mr. [2:44:43] Stubbe, you've heard from Admiral Jackson, you've heard from Miss Tinney, [2:44:47] all this aspect of who we've encountered at our borders, north and south. [2:44:52] And during the Biden administration with the open border that has [2:44:55] been overly discussed today at length, there's this known and suspected terrorist. [2:45:01] And I want to congratulate the Trump administration for getting, [2:45:03] I think, 1,300 people identified out of the country under your 13 months. [2:45:08] So congratulations on that. [2:45:10] But for three years in both classified and unclassified sessions here, [2:45:15] I've raised this issue that we don't have the data and we don't track it [2:45:18] in a fused way, meaning Border Patrol, TSA, FBI and follow up, [2:45:25] DOJ and prosecutions. [2:45:27] And we don't really have that at our fingertips for oversight purposes. [2:45:32] And I asked you last year's worldwide threats. [2:45:35] Would you commit to helping us achieve as the ODNI that fused data? [2:45:41] You agreed, but it was only three days ago I got that commitment from you in writing. [2:45:46] So let me ask you again, can you help drive that process across the bureaucracy [2:45:51] to get that regularly provided to the intelligence committees? [2:45:55] Sir, thank you for the follow up on that. [2:45:57] We have continued to work to improve that consolidated [2:46:03] use of systems that will better help us identify who is in our country, [2:46:08] who are known or suspected terrorists, to include those who are members or [2:46:12] leaders of cartels and gangs and drug traffickers. [2:46:15] And we're continuing to we're continuing to pursue that, particularly with the [2:46:21] Department of State and their screening and vetting practices, as well as [2:46:25] the Department of Homeland Security's. [2:46:27] I will say that there has been a drastic improvement in our own screening and [2:46:32] vetting systems and that coordination is occurring. [2:46:35] But there are still some silos that need to be broken down. [2:46:39] Also, in follow up to the discussion today, I heard my friend from California, [2:46:44] Mr. Barra, assert that President Trump's action in Epic Fury was unconstitutional. [2:46:49] Do you think it was unconstitutional, the decision taken by the president? [2:46:54] That's a legal question, sir, that I believe has been asked and answered. [2:46:58] By the White House counsel. [2:47:00] But don't you think in Article two power on the War Powers Act, the president has [2:47:04] the right to defend American interests, allied interests? [2:47:06] He does. And he can do that for 60 days. [2:47:09] And you did the president and you consult [2:47:12] with the Gang of Eight in Congress before the president took military operations. [2:47:17] My understanding is the secretary of state fulfilled that responsibility. [2:47:22] I think that's clear. [2:47:23] I don't recall President [2:47:25] Obama, for example, declaring war for seven months. [2:47:29] And yet he took up the next two months of operations in Libya. [2:47:32] So I think there's a lot of hypocrisy here as we tried to defend American interests. [2:47:40] Mr. [2:47:40] Klein asked you about and made a good comment. [2:47:43] I thought about any talk to Director Patel about this [2:47:48] on this issue of Winter Shield and doing a better job of coordinating offensive [2:47:54] and defensive cyber here in the homeland. [2:47:58] And I think that's another place, director, [2:48:00] where I think you should play an outsized [2:48:02] of all operations. I'm very concerned that we don't have a fused, I'm going to use that word [2:48:08] again, civil defense posture on cyber defense because we're too compartmentalized. We're too [2:48:16] siloed between who's with the military and not with the military, who's got classifications and [2:48:22] who doesn't. Would you work with me on trying to design a way for our governors, our private [2:48:28] sector, the FBI to work better on countering state actors in our private sector? Yes, sir. I would [2:48:37] look forward to working with you on that. And we'll just comment, this would have to be done [2:48:41] in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security and CISA, given their statutory [2:48:46] responsibilities. The integration and coordination with the private sector remains one of the biggest [2:48:51] imperatives, but also in some cases, challenges for folks who choose not to work with the U.S. [2:48:58] government. [2:48:59] Okay. [2:48:59] I agree. I sit on the CISA subcommittee here and I just, I'm very concerned about it. And I think [2:49:04] our whole committee has been concerned about the assessment we have on offensive cyber. So we look [2:49:08] forward to that. Finally, Director Radcliffe, thanks for you being here and it's wonderful to [2:49:13] see you. Thanks for our decade of friendship. I want to say that I've traveled significantly with [2:49:18] the chairman to Latin America and I want to say your stations throughout the Western Hemisphere [2:49:24] are doing an outstanding job. Would you say that we're back on track countering a great power [2:49:29] rivals in the Western Hemisphere? [2:49:30] I would. Thank you for the compliments for the workforce that I'm privileged to lead. And I do think the [2:49:39] president's policies in making the Western Hemisphere a priority are really clear. Obviously the success [2:49:47] of Operation Absolute Resolve. It's funny, Congressman, no one's talking about Venezuela [2:49:54] because things are going so well in Venezuela. But it really shows the commitment that the [2:49:59] president has to taking care of business for American interests in our own hemisphere. And it's [2:50:04] it's not limited to Venezuela, it's throughout Central and South America. And I think that you'll [2:50:11] continue to see continued progress with respect to that. Thank you. And I thank all of you for your [2:50:15] service to your country. And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Hill. Before we dismiss, I'm going to ask all [2:50:23] members of the audience, all members and staff to remain seated until the witnesses have cleared, [2:50:29] giving them an opportunity to [2:50:31] proceed to our closed setting, which we will reconvene at 1130 to resume in HVC 304. With that [2:50:41] said, please remain seated until the witnesses have cleared. And this proceeding is adjourned.