Lasting effects of US wars: From Afghanistan to Iran, the cost of intervention — This is America

[0:00] This is America, and America's war effort in Iran is starting to raise questions over the long-term impact and unintended consequences of the conflict. [0:18] I'll be back a little later in the program with more on that. [0:20] But to start us off, here's Cyril Venier from our Washington studio. [0:25] Manuel Rapalo, thank you. [0:27] The U.S. is the world's military superpower, and it uses that power often to remove a foreign leader, fight an enemy, take out a perceived threat. [0:35] But the American ability to project force around the globe remains unmatched. [0:40] But what happens after the guns go silent, and then after that? [0:44] Today's show is about the second and third order consequences of U.S. foreign policy, the knock-on effects that become apparent over time. [0:52] Another way of asking this, 10 years from now, when we look back at how the U.S. war in Iran ultimately shaped the Middle East and the world, what will we see? [1:00] The U.S. has a long history of using its strength or intelligence capabilities to change the trajectory of other countries and their people, setting off a chain of events with unforeseeable consequences. [1:12] Patty Culhane reports. [1:15] Please. [1:16] The U.S. didn't try to hide its support for the Mujahideen in its fight against the Soviet Union. [1:21] President Ronald Reagan welcomed them to the White House, labeled them freedom fighters. [1:25] The U.S. did give generously to the Mujahideen that included Arabs, hundreds of millions of dollars of advanced military hardware, training, and intelligence. [1:34] But the support came with a price. [1:37] Years of civil war and eventually Taliban rule, who harbored Osama bin Laden, responsible for the 9-11 attacks. [1:44] The U.S. responded by invading Afghanistan. [1:47] But President George Bush did not prepare the nation for a war that would last nearly 20 years, only to see the Taliban sweep back into power. [1:57] During the war between Iraq and Iran, the U.S. quietly sided with Iraq, providing military support and intelligence to Saddam Hussein and his military, [2:06] only to later secretly sell arms to Iran in order to fund rebels in Nicaragua, a scandal that came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair. [2:15] But in 2003, the U.S. once again focused on its short-term goal in Iraq, outstained Saddam Hussein. [2:23] Baghdad quickly fell, and a few months later, President Bush landed on an aircraft carrier to declare major operations over. [2:31] Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. [2:37] In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. [2:45] And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country. [2:50] But an insurgency meant the war would drag on, and U.S. troops would leave almost nine years later. [2:55] But U.S. troops would return to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, evolved from the security vacuum the U.S. left behind. [3:03] The U.S. has a long history with Iran. [3:06] The CIA launched a coup to oust its democratically elected leader, putting in place Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, [3:13] the U.S. helping train the Savaq, the secret police that terrorized the Iranian people. [3:18] When the Islamic Revolution took power and students took the U.S. embassy, [3:24] it began decades of animosity between the U.S. and Iran that has now led to two new U.S. military attacks. [3:31] Changing the Iranian regime is a U.S. goal that started by killing the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. [3:38] It might not end with, apparently, two conflicting wings that currently rule Iran in parallel. [3:44] Patty Culhane, Al Jazeera, Washington. [3:46] And as we speak, the Strait of Hormuz is under a double blockade from Iran and the U.S. [3:52] Barely any ships are getting through, choking off oil and gas supplies to the global market, [3:56] meaning that the conflict is only two months old and already the ripple effect is being felt far beyond the theater of war. [4:03] Here's Alex Baird. [4:04] The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered a domino effect. [4:09] Here in the United States, fuel prices hit their highest levels in four years, [4:13] up by more than a dollar since the start of the war. [4:16] In California, the price has ballooned to more than $6 a gallon. [4:20] For a country of car lovers, the cost of living is becoming eye-watering. [4:24] But the war is having unintended consequences far beyond here. [4:27] The Philippines declared a national energy emergency. [4:32] Government workers were moved to a four-day work week [4:34] and even had to limit their use of A.C., elevators and lights. [4:39] That all happened one week after the war broke out. [4:41] In some areas, fuel started running out. [4:43] Hundreds of gas stations were forced to close. [4:47] Over in Sri Lanka, a few weeks in, the government declared every Wednesday a public holiday to conserve fuel. [4:54] It was a raft of other measures. [4:56] The most intense was fuel rationing determined by your car's number plate. [5:01] If the last digit was an odd number, then you could buy fuel on odd numbered calendar days. [5:06] And vice versa if it was even. [5:08] North East, in Myanmar, the government clamped down even harder. [5:12] The military junta imposed full-blown carless days on March 7th. [5:17] If your number plate was ending in an even number, you could drive on even numbered calendar days. [5:22] You get the drift. [5:23] The following weeks saw even more rationing policies brought in on top of that. [5:30] All over in Europe, Slovenia became the first EU country to introduce fuel rationing. [5:35] On March 22nd, filling up was limited to just 50 litres a day. [5:39] There were even plans to call up the army to help retailers move supplies. [5:44] Those are just some of the examples of what the broader fallout has been [5:47] when with the strait still closed, knock-on effects are likely to be far from over. [5:52] Joining us now, John Nixon, former CIA analyst who, among many other things, [5:58] interrogated, captured Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. [6:01] We'll draw on John's Iraq expertise. [6:03] And Charles Kupchin, former special assistant to President Barack Obama on the National Security Council, [6:08] also with us. [6:09] Charles, what are possible knock-on effects of this war, long-term, that you're most worried about? [6:15] I would say the biggest knock-on effect is the impact on global energy supplies [6:24] and the degree to which that could, number one, lead to political instability [6:29] in places in East Asia, for example, that are highly dependent on exports from the Persian Gulf [6:36] of oil, gas, fertilizer for food, helium, which makes semiconductors. [6:44] And in general, you know, I think that one of the reasons that we've seen the stumbling [6:48] of democracies in the West, in the United States, Germany, France, Britain is the quality of life, [6:55] the cost of living. [6:56] That's getting worse by the day. [6:58] Americans are now going to the gas station and paying something like $4.50 a gallon. [7:03] That just increases electoral discontent. [7:08] So that would be one concern. [7:11] And the other concern is that we just are entering a period of prolonged instability in the region, [7:18] right? [7:18] We saw the U.S. go into Iraq, go into Afghanistan, go into Libya, go into Syria. [7:26] What did we get? [7:27] Big, hot messes that lasted years upon years. [7:30] We're still paying for the mistake we made in invading Iraq in 2003. [7:36] We don't know how the war in Iran ends, but this could be the beginning of a very long period [7:42] of another what we call forever war. [7:45] Yeah. [7:45] As you said, we don't know how this ends. [7:46] And we're not trying in this show to pretend or claim that we know the consequences, [7:50] but we're trying to ask the questions that perhaps and hopefully policy planners are also [7:55] asking themselves. [7:56] In fact, John Nixon, how much do planners, how much does the U.S. federal government [8:01] factor in potential long-term consequences before it goes to war? [8:06] That's a great question. [8:08] And you know something? [8:09] I think that there was a time in American foreign policy and American government where [8:13] our leaders would factor in those things and try to kind of come to some conclusions. [8:19] But I find that more and more, and I speak from experience, having worked at the CIA during [8:25] the Iraq war, that our elected leaders and national security elite tend to have a very [8:32] short-term mentality. [8:34] And they sort of look at everything in terms of the next election cycle. [8:39] And I don't, and I think a lot of times they sort of just sort of want to do this and hope [8:46] for the best and that they don't necessarily look further down the road. [8:51] And that is something that some of our competitors in the world and in the region have a different [8:56] mindset, you know, for example, like China. [8:59] I think that China is going to benefit from what's going on now because they have been developing [9:06] this narrative of a responsible power. [9:09] And it's something that is very much offsets them from the United States because the United [9:13] States is looking like a very irresponsible power. [9:16] So you said that recent presidents, or let me say this, recently the U.S., you feel, has [9:23] factored in long-term consequences less than it once did. [9:28] Do you think that was the case for this Iran war? [9:30] No, no. [9:31] I mean, well, I think that in what's going on, I don't think that these people really thought [9:36] it was going to be as long-lasting as it is now. [9:39] In fact, I think a few weeks ago there was some Trump official who said, oh, well, this [9:44] is probably going to last maybe two or three more weeks. [9:46] And I think we keep on hearing that from the administration. [9:50] A lot of mixed messaging, but a lot of, oh, it's going to end soon. [9:54] We're going to have something ready. [9:55] And it just keeps drifting on. [9:57] And strangely enough, we were talking about this before we got on here, you know, Donald [10:04] Trump was always criticizing his predecessors for not being tough on Iran like he was going [10:10] to be. [10:10] And now he's finding himself in the same position that a lot of American presidents have been, [10:16] in which they're sort of having to deal with a very wily enemy and a very resilient enemy. [10:21] You've both been involved in U.S. foreign policy. [10:27] You, Charles, on your end, in the actual decision-making, the shaping of the decisions. [10:32] And you, John, on your end, the CIA has been the tip of the spear of much of U.S. foreign [10:36] policy. [10:37] Charles, you've been in the room where decisions are crafted, decisions about whether to go to [10:42] war, not to go to war. [10:43] What can you share with our viewers about the kind of thinking? [10:47] Because John's saying it's all short-term thinking now. [10:49] I think that we really have to see the Trump administration as one of a kind in the sense [10:58] that it's a very closed inner circle. [11:02] President Trump has around him a handful of people, Mr. Vance, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Witkoff, [11:08] Mr. Kushner. [11:09] And that's about it. [11:11] And you're not seeing the interagency process work and send up options papers. [11:17] You're not seeing the full analysis that the CIA does coming up and getting to the president's [11:25] desk. [11:26] So on some level, the system isn't working as it's supposed to work. [11:31] My own experience working for Obama, for example, the system was working. [11:37] The options were considered. [11:39] I think there, a couple of different things explain some of the strategic mistakes that [11:45] I think were made. [11:47] One was this kind of problem of sunk costs. [11:51] Once we're in, it's very hard to get out. [11:54] Right. [11:54] And if you're Afghanistan and if you're in Iraq and it's year 10 and you've spent X trillion [12:01] dollars, it's politically painful. [12:05] Politically painful. [12:05] Right, because strategically, I think you could make a strong argument that really cut [12:10] your losses off to year 10 because you didn't get anything from year 10 to year 20. [12:13] Very strong argument. [12:14] But there's always somebody waiting in the wings, probably from the opposing party, to [12:19] come after you. [12:21] You cut and run. [12:23] And then the other, I think, is somewhat more ideological. [12:26] This is not really where the Trump people are, but I think it's where most American presidents [12:30] from before Trump were, there really is this idea that the United States can be a transformative [12:38] power, that it can turn countries like Afghanistan and Iraq into stable democracies. [12:46] And this impulse is actually noble, right? [12:48] This was we can make the world a better place. [12:51] But it's also, you know, the big chunks of the rest of the world would balk at this and [12:56] would say, we didn't ask you to make us better. [12:58] They would balk at it, number one. [13:00] And number two, there's an enormous amount of naivete. [13:04] Right. [13:05] On the U.S. side? [13:05] Yes. [13:06] Right. [13:06] The idea that you can go into Afghanistan, a country that has been the graveyard of multiple [13:12] empires and turn it into kind of a unitary functioning democracy. [13:16] I think this was a fool's errand. [13:19] And I do think that successive American presidents did fall prey to that illusion. [13:25] I want to go through, we want to try and do step by step how this may transform Iran, [13:31] the Middle East, and indeed the world. [13:33] Before we do that, Manuel Rapalow has been looking at how the media is starting to ask [13:39] this question more and more about maybe unintended consequences, though certainly the long-term [13:44] outlook of this war. [13:45] This is what he found. [13:45] Across the U.S. media sphere, a key question is beginning to emerge, not just whether the [13:51] U.S. can meet its objectives, but how long those objectives can be sustained. [13:56] We're going to have a real challenge, not six months for now or 12 months for now, but [14:00] two or three years for now. [14:02] At the same time, others are urging patience. [14:05] A little bit of patience right here, not bombs, but patience on a naval blockade, could get [14:11] the outcome you want, which is no nuclear weapons for the largest state sponsor of terror. [14:15] Beyond that debate, a broader warning is also taking shape, one focused on prolonged instability [14:21] and the lasting global impact of the war. [14:23] Now, the New York Times has this headline. [14:26] It reads, we, the United States, will be paying for the Iran war for a very long time. [14:32] And look at this report from the Washington Post. [14:35] This report reads, after the Iran war, the global economy will never be the same. [14:41] Now, the theme that we're seeing suggests something interesting, that even if the war were to end [14:45] today, the ripple effects would still last for years to come. [14:49] Take energy infrastructure, for example. [14:51] CNBC reports that as much as $58 billion in energy infrastructure has been damaged across [14:57] Iran, its Gulf neighbors, and Iraq, as oil fields, refineries, and export terminals came under attack. [15:04] That same article adds that the amount of equipment needed for repairs is expected to strain global [15:10] energy supply chains. [15:11] And, according to the International Energy Agency, recovery could take years. [15:16] Many of the facilities are badly damaged. [15:21] We are monitoring them, all of them. [15:24] As of today, more than 80 facilities have been damaged. [15:30] Coming back to where we were before the crisis may take some time, maybe up to two years. [15:38] The bottom line here is that this may not just be a temporary disruption, but a long-term shock [15:44] to energy markets and to the global economy. [15:46] Some have also argued that the war in Iran is reshaping international order itself. [15:52] Here's Fox News with that perspective. [15:55] This is also geopolitically setting the tone for future negotiations. [15:59] We can't forget, there are other belligerents in the world that are watching very closely [16:03] at how this incident is being handled, and they will respond accordingly depending on American resolve. [16:08] Across U.S. news coverage, there's a growing notion that this war is evolving into something [16:13] more complex. [16:14] And increasingly, the question is shifting from what the U.S. is achieving in the short [16:19] term to what long-term unintended consequences may already be in motion. [16:25] John Nixon, if we look, first of all, at the direct and foreseeable impact on Iran, is [16:30] Iran going to be any less hostile towards the United States going forward as a result of [16:36] this war? [16:36] I would imagine that Iran is probably going to be more hostile going forward. [16:45] We've wounded it grievously, but we have not really replaced a leadership that, and their [16:51] leadership is predicated on anti-Americanism and galvanizing popular support to the extent [16:59] that they can against the United States, against that big other, the great Satan. [17:04] And so I have a feeling that they will continue to try to utilize this. [17:08] There's about 15 to 20 percent of the population that supports this regime, regardless of whether [17:15] it's the supreme leader Ali Khamenei or his son. [17:18] The IRGC appears to be kind of running the show now, and I have a feeling that going forward [17:24] that they will probably be, you know, more hostile, I think. [17:28] And it's going to have an effect on the Gulf nations, the Gulf Arab nations as well, because [17:34] I don't see how these countries are ever going to feel secure with Iran kind of still wounded [17:41] but ready to hit them when they want. [17:44] So the U.S. went into this wanting to reshape the clerical establishment of Iran. [17:47] I mean, clearly, they assassinated the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and they wanted [17:52] to reshape also the defense establishment, so the Revolutionary Guard. [17:55] All the reporting that we have now, and first of all, on a factual basis, they've replaced [18:00] an 86-year-old Khamenei with a 56-year-old Khamenei. [18:04] I mean, that's just a fact. [18:06] And then the Revolutionary Guard, everything I'm reading and hearing, including here in [18:10] this studio, is that the Revolutionary Guard now have more control over Iran than they [18:14] did before, and that there are more hard lines. [18:16] So the question is, has all of this, the last two months, been counterproductive for the [18:21] U.S.? [18:23] Charles? [18:23] You know, I think the good news is that the Trump administration seems to have backed [18:29] away from regime change. [18:32] There's no question in my mind that when this war began, Trump and Netanyahu thought that [18:38] they were going to topple the Islamic Republic, and that Donald Trump wanted to go down in [18:42] history as the American president who had the guts to do what no one else would do, take [18:47] down this regime. [18:48] It didn't work. [18:49] I think they understand it didn't work. [18:52] And so at least for now, I think they're going to learn to live with a country that is run [18:57] by a bunch of hardline generals in the IRGC. [19:02] Might they be tougher than the previous regime? [19:06] Who knows? [19:07] Might they be more transactional because they are less ideological? [19:11] Very difficult to say. [19:13] I do, however, think that, and this might be a silver lining in the Trump administration's [19:19] so-called America First doctrine, that we're not looking at another long-term American occupation [19:27] of a country in the Middle East. [19:28] I don't think this administration has the stomach for it. [19:32] J.D. [19:33] Vance opposed this. [19:35] The MAGA base was promised by President Trump, we're done with these big, expensive, [19:41] forever wars. [19:41] Now he has given them just that. [19:44] So my gut is telling me that Trump is going to look for an off-ramp. [19:49] He's going to try to cut a deal that will open the strait. [19:53] He will claim it has, quote-unquote, neutralized the threat posed by Iran. [19:59] But I would bet that we're not headed into a war that drags on and on for multiple years. [20:06] So what's going to be the consequence of this for the region if we widen the lens a little [20:10] bit? [20:10] I'll preface my question to you, John, with the Iraq example, which is an example you [20:15] know very well. [20:15] The U.S. goes into war in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. [20:19] You have this short-term goal. [20:20] They managed to do that very quickly. [20:22] But then if you then look at the next two decades, it triggers a civil war. [20:28] It creates a security vacuum that causes the U.S. to go back in to fight ISIL. [20:31] Patty Culhane was reporting on that. [20:33] And the thing we didn't mention is it then creates a country that becomes more susceptible [20:39] to Iranian influence, the very country that they're fighting today. [20:42] Right. [20:42] So my question is, what are the long-term consequences for the Middle East of what's happening now? [20:46] I think we're kind of starting to see the shapes of that occur now, which is a lot of [20:52] the Gulf nations who have traditionally relied on the United States now probably see that they're [20:58] trying to sort of vary their reliances on other powers and certainly diversify their reliance [21:07] on defense needs with other countries as well. [21:10] So I think we might get to see a little bit more of that. [21:13] I think there's also going to be maybe a little bit more wariness about what the United States, [21:19] what the relying on the United States. [21:22] One of the things I think that is really interesting about this is that this has exposed exactly [21:29] what the United States will do and won't do for its Gulf allies. [21:34] And it has shown them that, you know, that they can rely on the United States, [21:39] but the United States also does things that they pay a price that is very, very, very stark. [21:46] And, you know, I mean, when you see that the destruction and the attacks that Iran has been making, [21:53] whether they're using drones from Iraq into Saudi Arabia or, you know, attacking UAE, [22:00] I mean, these resonate in these societies and the leadership has to take that into account. [22:07] Now, even beyond the Middle East, you have foreign leaders, quite a few of them, in fact, [22:11] who are questioning the U.S.'s wisdom when it comes to this Iran war. [22:15] Listen to the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. [22:19] The Americans clearly have no strategy. [22:22] And the problem with conflicts like this is always you don't just have to go in, [22:27] you need to get out again. [22:28] This whole affair is ill-considered, to say the least. [22:32] So this is a little bit reminiscent of post-Iraq war, [22:37] where you have many parts of the world that feel clearly and strongly the U.S. has made a mistake. [22:42] You heard it there from the German Chancellor, the biggest economy in Europe. [22:46] Does it matter if the U.S.'s standing takes a hit, in your opinion, Charles? [22:51] I mean, is that actually a relevant metric? [22:53] Because it makes for a nice headline, but does it matter? [22:56] There's no question that the U.S. image abroad, the sense of American reliability, [23:02] has taken a hit, which will be very difficult to reclaim. [23:07] I don't yet know whether this is a breakpoint or more of a detour. [23:14] Because if you look at the Trump relations with Merz, you just played that quote, [23:19] Maloney, the prime minister of Italy, [23:21] Starmer, the prime minister of the U.K., [23:23] Macron, the president of France, [23:25] we haven't seen this level of animosity ever, [23:30] including during the Iraq war, [23:32] because the Europeans generally opposed the invasion. [23:36] But there was a sense that this is still a dispute within the family. [23:40] I think the view in Europe is that that family either doesn't exist anymore, [23:45] or it's on life support. [23:47] The question, in my mind, is will the Europeans and the Asian allies of the United States, [23:53] and the Gulf allies, for that matter, ride out the Trump era, play the long game? [23:59] Because NATO is still NATO. [24:01] There are still 50,000 U.S. troops in the Gulf, tens of thousands in the Indo-Pacific. [24:07] Trump has started to say, we're done, right? [24:10] He's announced a withdrawal of some 5,000 troops from Germany, [24:14] but it's still only 5,000. [24:17] So we just don't yet know whether he's going to bring down the House [24:20] or just take punitive actions of this sort. [24:24] I'm hoping that the alliance network that the United States built after World War II [24:30] survives the Trump era, because it is one of this country's strongest suits. [24:36] John Nixon, you mentioned China earlier. [24:38] Now, China is the only country in the world that comes even close to rivaling the U.S. economically, [24:42] and soon, militarily. [24:44] What lessons do you think they're learning from this episode? [24:48] I think they're learning a great deal, not only about our warfighting capabilities [24:53] and our modern ways of handling militarily issues in the region, [24:58] but also, I think with China, they're playing a long game [25:03] because they come at it with, especially with the Gulf, [25:06] I mean, the Gulf countries are so important to China's future, [25:10] and they come across as, we're a responsible power. [25:13] We have a different way of doing things. [25:15] We don't want to just bring war to the region and create conflict. [25:19] We want to work with you, [25:20] and we also don't ask a lot of questions about nasty things like human rights or anything. [25:25] So you can rely on us. [25:27] And I think that, you know, they're also seen as being very transactional, [25:31] and I think that's a negative thing. [25:32] But over time, if the United States continues to be so ham-handed [25:36] in the way it sort of deals with countries in the region, [25:39] over time, I think that the Chinese message will resonate greater. [25:43] And they are also a country that is, you know, [25:47] very reliant on the energy resources of the region. [25:51] And as the rest of the world turns away from fossil fuels, [25:55] China is still a big customer, [25:58] and I think that the relationship gets stronger if we allow it to. [26:02] Charles, on the China issue specifically, any thoughts? [26:06] You know, I think in many respects, [26:07] the Chinese and the Russians as well are sitting back, [26:11] putting their feet up on the cushion and watching this with a smile on their face. [26:16] Why? [26:17] Isn't there a saying, [26:18] don't interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake, something like that? [26:21] Exactly right, right. [26:21] I mean, the Russians are getting all this new oil revenue. [26:25] The Chinese are watching the United States mired [26:27] in yet another conflict in the Middle East, [26:30] rather than pivoting to the Indo-Pacific. [26:32] They're watching all of this infighting among the Western allies, [26:37] which they love because they want to see the West [26:40] and its life as a meaningful strategic community. [26:45] So in some ways, [26:46] I think they're just biding their time. [26:49] But let's see what happens when Trump goes to China in a few weeks. [26:53] This is a very important trip. [26:55] My guess is he's going to be asking Xi Jinping, [26:58] please help me with Iran. [27:00] I need your assistance in ending this conflict. [27:04] All right. [27:04] That's it. [27:04] That's a couple of weeks from now. [27:05] That's something we'll be covering, of course. [27:07] I want to thank our guests today. [27:08] John Nixon, former CIA analyst. [27:09] Thank you for being with us. [27:11] Charles Kupchan, former special assistant to President Barack Obama [27:13] on the National Security Council. [27:15] Thank you, gentlemen, to both of you. [27:17] And that's all from the team here in the Washington studio. [27:19] Thank you for joining us. [27:21] Handing back now to Manuel Rapalo [27:22] and to Al Jazeera's global headquarters in Doha. [27:26] Thanks, Cyril. [27:27] And don't forget that wherever you are in the world, [27:29] you can always watch the latest episodes of This is America [27:32] Monday through Friday, 1830 GMT. [27:35] That's 2.30 p.m. Eastern time in the United States. [27:38] From all of us here in Washington, D.C., that's goodbye for now.