Israel-Lebanon talks ‘performative’, not real peace negotiations: Analysis

[0:00] Let's now speak to Daniel Levy, president of the US Middle East Project and a former Israeli political negotiator as part of the Oslo 2 peace process. [0:07] He joins us from London. Good to see you, Daniel. [0:11] Daniel, is Israel coming to the table to negotiate or is Israel coming to present ultimatums to the Lebanese leadership? [0:16] Well, it's the latter, isn't it? Unfortunately, what we're seeing, what we're going to see is an Israel that has a zero sum approach yet again, [0:30] that has a military strategy, if you like, but has no political diplomatic follow up that is in any way intended to say, [0:42] OK, in a negotiation, it's not a diktat. It's not a one way conversation. It's seeking a win win. [0:50] That's not what they're coming to the table to try and achieve. [0:53] I think the position is best summed up as either we will bomb Lebanon or you bomb it yourself, Lebanese government. [1:01] You go into a civil war. And that's not an offer that anyone can take. [1:05] So it kind of begs the question, how real is this? How performative is this? [1:12] How much is this a kind of intended sideshow that if somehow there is a successful Iran-US ongoing de-escalation, [1:26] which Israel reluctantly is forced to accept, then the US understands that the Achilles heel could be the Israel-Lebanon front. [1:35] And therefore, you try to dial that down, at least to a manageable place where Iran will accept that. [1:43] That may be the best, if one can call it that, outcome. [1:47] But this is not about Lebanon regaining its sovereignty, a mutually acceptable, dignified deal. [1:55] This is about Israel trying to impose humiliating terms on a Lebanese government, [1:59] which, as we just heard, is in no position whatsoever to accept those, even less so after Israel has carried out such a violent, cruel campaign of destruction in Lebanon. [2:14] So that smidgen of legitimacy that may have come before the government going to those talks is even less there. [2:21] And, of course, I'm just looking at the images you're showing, Niamh. [2:24] And, of course, you couldn't have a worse mediator if it's between Israel and Lebanon, Israel, and just about anyone, than the US. [2:33] Right. Daniel, as you say, in many ways you feel that this is performative, a perception no doubt shared by some in Israel and indeed Lebanon. [2:42] Marco Rubio there presiding over those talks, the start of talks at least. [2:48] He has said, Daniel, we understand, that he understands, we understand, he says, that we're working against decades of history and complexities. [2:59] Unfortunately, there's no audio to that video at the moment. [3:01] But just to repeat, Marco Rubio, at the start of those talks, says we understand we're working against decades of history and complexities. [3:09] We can now hear to what he's saying. [3:11] This is a process, not an event. This is more than just one day. This will take time. But we believe it is worth this endeavor, and it's a historic gathering that we hope to build on. [3:20] And the hope today is that we can outline the framework upon which a permanent and lasting peace can be developed, so that, as I said, the people of Israel can live in peace, and the people of Lebanon can live not just in peace, but the prosperity and security that they deserve. [3:34] Okay, thank you. [3:35] Thank you, press. Go out the back door. Out the back door. Thank you, press. Thank you, press. [3:42] Marco Rubio, a few comments made at the start of those all-important talks at the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C. [3:50] Rubio says we hope these talks will be a process and that he understands the history and the complexity of what is before them. [3:56] Daniel Levy is still with me, president of the U.S. Middle East Project and former Israeli political negotiator. [4:02] Daniel, I mean, if this is performative, as you have been saying, what does that performance mean for the United States? [4:15] Well, I think that's part of what we're trying to decipher, perhaps more than will there be some kind of solid ceasefire outcome. [4:29] Remember, there was a ceasefire in November 24. Since then, also, Israeli-Lebanese negotiations did take place in Nakura in Lebanon in December of last year and one meeting in January of this year. [4:47] Those didn't get anywhere precisely because Israel went in with a diktat which no Lebanese government could accept. [4:55] During that so-called ceasefire, Israel continued to hold territory inside Lebanon, continued to conduct strikes in Lebanon. [5:03] If that sounds familiar from Gaza, then it should sound familiar. [5:06] And so the question this time around is, does the U.S. feel that by putting this formula in place, it can get Israel to at least a place where Iran in those other talks can turn around and say that's enough to continue with that other ceasefire if that other ceasefire halts? [5:37] And so I think there is an intimate connection between the two. [5:40] I don't think this is about, unfortunately, a better future on the Israel-Lebanon front, but it is about having something available should you need it. [5:51] The Israeli side is hoping that it doesn't go there. [5:55] It's hoping that the war against Iran with U.S. involvement resumes and that it can continue doing what it's doing in Lebanon. [6:03] But you have this kind of holding pattern, I think, is the best way to understand this. [6:08] Daniel, let's further consider those wider talks in Islamabad to end the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. [6:15] I mean, is the Israeli Security Cabinet's refusal to include the Lebanon invasion and the broader Islamabad ceasefire framework essentially evidence that they view Hezbollah's total degradation as an objective that they cannot trade in any way for nuclear concessions from Iran? [6:32] Look, when there was a nuclear deal with Iran, it wasn't good enough for Israel. [6:43] Israel is a nuclear-armed state. [6:45] Let's not forget that either. [6:46] So, I think, Niamh, what's difficult for you and I and others, perhaps, to wrap their heads around is you do not currently have a government in Israel which looks at diplomatic outcomes writ large as acceptable. [7:04] You've had a Syrian government that was willing to conduct talks, that was willing to perhaps set aside Israel's illegal occupation and annexation of the Golan. [7:15] Man, that wasn't good enough. [7:16] You had a Lebanese government that said, we'll talk with you directly. [7:21] Let us, in our own way, domestically, pursue initially the demilitarization of the South. [7:28] Let us try and deal with this. [7:30] They went very far towards the Israeli position. [7:33] Not good enough. [7:34] You have a Palestinian authority that does somersaults every day to do security cooperation with Israel, to be as anti-Hamas, as anti-resistant as it can be. [7:48] And yet, that's not good enough. [7:51] Any deal with Iran won't be considered as good enough. [7:54] Israel may have to accept those things. [7:55] If the United States says, enough, draws a line under this. [7:59] But this is not an Israeli government that apparently is structurally capable of saying, here's a deal which is in any way acceptable to another party that we would buy into. [8:12] And that makes our conversation, trying to interrogate this, very difficult. [8:19] Because what you have, an Israeli prime minister, government, and unfortunately a broad establishment committed to permanent war, committed to asserting its vision of domination in the region. [8:33] And until that can be deterred and contained and peeled back and held to account, we won't see a change. [8:42] Because Israel has learnt the lesson that it has impunity and that emboldens Israel to keep going further down that path. [8:50] Daniel, on that point, I'm interested to dig deep into this, what you're saying, that you believe that Israel's strategic aim appears to be state implosion in Lebanon rather than any kind of negotiated solution. [9:02] Because you've previously said you believe Israel is pushing Lebanon towards internal collapse. [9:08] So these targeted strikes on civilian infrastructure designed to turn the Lebanese state against Hezbollah during this high-pressure negotiation window now. [9:18] Well, I have argued that Israel's goal in Iran is not regime change but state implosion. [9:27] I think in Lebanon, I think in Lebanon, there may be an element of this where they say we can turn the people against Hezbollah in a way that works for us. [9:40] They may be getting that advice. [9:42] There were things that were done which were really quite appalling. [9:46] During the forced evacuation, over 1 million, over 1.2 million Lebanese displaced since this latest round began by Israeli threats, by Israeli declaring certain areas a target that had to be evacuated from. [10:02] And then Israel laid out certain routes that people would take, certain areas they could go to, which was designed to create greater intercommunal tension in Lebanon. [10:12] Now, no doubt, of course there are divisions in Lebanon, of course Hezbollah is not a consensus movement in Lebanon, far from it. [10:22] But the way Israel goes about doing things is not designed to say, you know what, can we create a situation where Hezbollah can be brought into a process, which is given time, which could create a new political reality where the central state is stronger. [10:44] But no, what Israel is trying to do is to place an impossible choice in front of the Lebanese government at a time when it also generates a public sentiment in Lebanon, which says, you know what, whatever, for those who aren't in the Hezbollah camp, [11:03] whatever we think of Hezbollah, this is just untenable that Israel is going to bomb us, to bomb all kinds of sites, to kill rescue workers, to kill civilians, and then expect us to sign up to its diktat. [11:18] So it creates the opposite conditions to those that would be conducive to creating a political outcome, which it claims to want, but which it clearly doesn't really believe in. [11:30] Daniel, many thanks for taking us through the twists and turns and the implications of what has begun in Washington, D.C. [11:37] Daniel Levy, president of the U.S. Middle East Project, former Israeli political negotiator, who worked, of course, as part of the Oslo II peace process. [11:45] Really appreciate it once more, Daniel. [11:48] Thank you, Neil.