Is the US-Israel war with Iran helping Putin and Russia?

[0:00] Is the war in Iran great news for Vladimir Putin? [0:04] Imagine you're walking around a European city, one with lots of tourists. [0:08] Prague, perhaps. And this happens. [0:11] This isn't Prague, it's Lviv in western Ukraine. [0:18] And it's a beautiful place, big tourist destination before the war. [0:22] Now, you might see a drone strike in Ukraine right now and think, what's new? [0:26] But what's happening in Ukraine at the moment isn't normal. [0:30] One day last week, there were almost 1,000 drone strikes in one day. [0:34] It's been called the biggest drone attack since the beginning of the war, maybe the biggest in history. [0:40] Many Ukrainians believe that Vladimir Putin is doing this right now [0:43] because the United States and the rest of the world is looking elsewhere, towards Iran. [0:48] I'm Tristan Redman in Paris, and this is The Global Story on YouTube. [0:52] I'm Mark Gagliotti. I am, well, frankly, a longtime Russia watcher. [1:02] I'm currently an honorary professor at University College. [1:04] London, and I lead a consultancy called Mayak Intelligence. [1:09] But much of the time I spend writing about Russia, thinking about Russia, [1:12] and looking at it from, admittedly, something of a distance, since I have been banned from going to Russia. [1:17] So, Mark, last week, Russia unleashed on Ukraine what the Ukrainians are calling [1:23] the largest drone attack over a 24-hour period since the war began. [1:30] What's actually happening right now on the ground in Ukraine? [1:33] Well, see... [1:35] The thing is, really, the war is still sort of following its usual pattern. [1:38] We have seen some successful small-scale counter-attacks by the Ukrainians on the ground. [1:45] But when it comes down to it, you know, we are coming out of the winter season, [1:48] where the chief focus really was on these devastating Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. [1:56] Now, Ukraine has weathered that, although it's going to take a lot of time, effort, and money to actually repair the damage, [2:03] and no doubt the Russians will keep. [2:05] So, you know, we are going to have to wait and see. [2:06] But we are now beginning to see, as temperatures slowly rise, a shift towards more activity on the ground. [2:14] But when it comes down to it, this is not a war that it seems that either side has the capacity to actually decisively, [2:21] certainly at the moment, push forward on the ground. [2:25] Well, before the war in Iran started, I mean, there were some signs that Russia and Ukraine might be moving closer to something resembling a peace deal. [2:35] There are some signs that Russia and Ukraine might be moving closer to something resembling a peace deal. [2:35] There are some signs that Russia and Ukraine might be moving closer to something resembling a peace deal. [2:35] There are plenty of people who'd be skeptical about whether that was a real thing or not. [2:41] But I remember seeing this piece in Politico back in February that detailed a day in the life of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner negotiating in Geneva. [2:53] And I just want to read you a little bit about their daily schedule during these negotiations because it gives you an idea of how sort of how preoccupying [3:05] But I remember seeing this piece in Politico back in February that detailed a day in the life of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner negotiating in Geneva. [3:05] And I just want to read you a little bit about their daily schedule during these negotiations because it gives you an idea of how sort of how preoccupying [3:11] They met with the Iranians from 9 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., they met with the Ukrainians from 1 p.m. to 5.30 p.m., and they spoke to the Russians after that. [3:15] They met with the Iranians from 9 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., they met with the Ukrainians from 1 p.m. to 5.30 p.m., and they spoke to the Russians after that. [3:22] And that was followed by a dinner with the Ukrainians and regional partners, including Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Switzerland. [3:29] And the dinner was followed by another meeting with the Russians from 9.30 to 11 p.m., which suggests that the United States were taking all of this pretty seriously, but has a pause now being put on all of that? [3:46] And what should we read into that? [3:47] Yes, for the present, the trilateral negotiations have really been put on pause. [3:55] And frankly, I think that reflects what really happened in the process. [3:59] I don't want to say that these talks were useless. They weren't. [4:02] They were actually very useful in clearing away a lot of the undergrowth, a lot of the secondary issues, and clarifying what were the absolutely core points. [4:13] Really, these talks had reached an impasse. [4:16] And I think what we're going to see is that they will be quietly allowed to die while the war in the Gulf is taking place. [4:24] And maybe we will see a new, perhaps even sort of with a different cast of characters. [4:30] And I think we'll see a negotiation process emerging a bit later in the year, because I think Trump would like to have something nailed down before the midterms at the end of this year. [4:39] If we cast forward to a hypothetical moment in, say, two or three months' time, if and when the Iran war were over, if those talks were to restart again, would they be back at square one, or would they pick up where they left off? [4:52] As I say, I think it is useful that these talks have addressed a whole variety of issues like language laws in Ukraine. [5:00] Which? [5:00] Which had been on the table, but in many ways were red herrings. [5:05] They were not really what this war was about. [5:08] But the point is, so long as they were on the table, they created a certain degree of kind of confusion and such like. [5:14] But I also think that what this has demonstrated has been the capacities, but also the limitations of Trump-style diplomacy. [5:23] I mean, in normal diplomacy, you have all these careful, lengthy negotiations. [5:30] Behind closed doors, by experts, by diplomats, and such like. [5:35] And then you wheel out the national leaders at the end to take the credit, sign the documents, make the press conference. [5:43] In Trump-land, it works the other way round. [5:46] Some grand declaration that comes on truth social. [5:50] And then you have the wonks, the nerds, the specialists, the experts, scurrying around, trying desperately to see if what has been promised can be made into a reality. [6:00] Now, that's just not working. [6:03] So it may be that when we, you know, if, I should say, rather than when, we have a new round of peace talks, perhaps, just perhaps, some of the lessons will have been learned. [6:13] And we won't get a Trump relative and his real estate lawyer somehow thinking that they can instantly cobble together a peace in a very, very complex and fraught conflict. [6:24] So I was talking, Mark, to a friend of mine, a foreign correspondent who was in Ukraine. [6:31] Just last week, reporting on the drone war. [6:36] And he was, you know, sleeping in shelters every night because he was underneath this drone assault. [6:42] And he told me that the consensus among the people he spoke to in Ukraine was that Vladimir Putin was taking advantage of the war in Iran. [6:53] The distraction that that was creating, above all for the Americans. [6:59] Is Vladimir Putin exploiting? [7:01] Is he exploiting this moment? [7:02] And if so, how? [7:04] I mean, of course he's exploiting this moment. [7:06] I mean, on one level, he would be foolish not to. [7:09] The way that this is playing out, though, is quite interesting because, look, he's launched this massive drone strike against Ukraine. [7:16] But we've seen no evidence that in the past he is at all constrained by whether or not the West is paying attention or not. [7:24] The key things are, first of all, clearly, this whole crisis is driving up the price, not just for oil and natural gas. [7:32] But also a whole variety of other commodities in which Russia is a key player, like fertilisers, like aluminium and so forth. [7:38] And look, this is not going to have a dramatic and long-term effect unless the crisis continues. [7:44] But still, they reckon that probably the Kremlin has netted an extra one and a half billion dollars so far through this crisis through just simply oil revenues. [7:54] It sounds like a lot of money, but it's actually relatively minor. [7:57] But still, every little bit helps from Putin's point of view. [8:00] So you have the economic advantage. [8:02] You have the economic advantage. [8:03] You have the fact that it's using up a lot of the kind of high-tech weapons that Ukraine would like. [8:10] You know, there is going to be a direct impact there. [8:13] And finally, this creates inevitable disruption within the West. [8:18] From Putin's point of view, the key problem with the West is its unity. [8:23] And as we see this conflict creating, firstly, division between Europe and the United States. [8:29] Secondly, within Europe. [8:31] Some countries seem a little bit more divided. [8:32] Some seem a little bit more Trump-friendly than others. [8:35] And thirdly is increasing the economic costs on Europe. [8:41] There is a concern in Kyiv. [8:43] As European economies begin to really groan and creak under the burden of increased energy and other prices courtesy of this war, [8:53] it will be harder and harder to get them to commit the kind of resources that Ukraine will need to continue in the long run. [9:00] And that, of course, does embolden Putin. [9:02] It gives him that greater confidence that time will ultimately be on his side. [9:06] In terms of good news for Vladimir Putin and Russia, I just want to go back to something you raised back then. [9:12] Oil. [9:14] If Russia is able to sell its oil again on global markets, how valuable is that to them? [9:21] It is valuable. [9:22] Again, I think we shouldn't overplay it. [9:24] First of all, the Russians were still able to sell oil. [9:27] Yes, they were having to discount it. [9:29] But the market will always win. [9:31] These attempts to essentially strangle Russia's oil exports had had impact, but only limited impact. [9:37] There are lots of countries that still want that lovely cheap Russian oil. [9:41] And as a result, we had the so-called shadow fleet. [9:44] We had all kinds of different ways in which that was being exported. [9:48] And a lot of it gets, for want of a better word, laundered. [9:52] So countries buy Russian oil and gas and then re-export it, claiming that it's not Russian. [9:57] And everybody knows what's going on. [9:59] But because we all need it. [10:01] We all need the oil. [10:03] We turn a blind eye to the Kremlin. [10:05] But it is also political in that the Kremlin is using this in the global south, or what it calls the global majority, [10:13] to underscore its point that you do not need to fear the Americans and the Europeans. [10:20] You can make the deals you want. [10:23] Mark, I have to ask you about NATO because, as is well known, one of Putin's great strategic aims [10:31] is something like this. [10:33] Like achieving the demise of NATO. [10:36] Now, the Iran war has opened up some pretty noticeable cracks in the NATO alliance over the last few days. [10:45] We've seen Donald Trump essentially saying that NATO is useless. [10:49] We've seen him bemoaning the lack of support from NATO allies in helping him keep the Strait of Hormuz open. [10:58] He's been belittling British aircraft carriers. [11:02] British aircraft carriers are essentially toys. [11:05] All of this. [11:06] This is great news for Putin, isn't it? [11:08] It certainly is. [11:09] Now, as regards the demise of NATO, I think we need to distinguish between wants and aims. [11:17] Sure, if Putin had a magic wishing ring, then I'm sure wishing NATO away would be high on his list. [11:25] But on the other hand, I don't think it's actually that he thinks he can destroy NATO. [11:29] And in part, I think he doesn't feel he needs to. [11:31] He can just sit back and watch the spectacle as NATO, to a degree, destroys itself. [11:37] That said, I mean, we shouldn't assume that there's any kind of serious long-term threat to NATO. [11:42] Because it will take years, even after the Ukraine war is over, to reconstitute the Russian military. [11:49] Some people say two years. I think that's ludicrously too little. [11:52] Five is the absolute minimum, in my opinion. [11:55] Eight years is more likely. [11:57] And I think from the Russians' point of view, they actually take NATO seriously. [12:02] Yes, they're very happy to see whatever divisions and disunity within it. [12:06] But even if one looks at European NATO, European NATO, without the Americans and the Canadians, have more troops than the Russians do. [12:13] OK, so the talks between Russia and the United States are officially paused right now. [12:18] But I want to tell you about something that I heard on the BBC last week from Shashank Joshi, who's the defence editor of The Economist. [12:26] He said this. [12:32] What are you hearing about that, Mark? [12:49] Is it something that's happening? [12:51] And if it did happen, what would that quid pro quo actually mean? [12:54] What would the significance of it be? [12:56] I mean, we shouldn't be surprised that the Russians were providing the Iranians with intelligence on targeting and battle damage analysis. [13:02] Because it's exactly what the Americans have been providing the Ukrainians for four years. [13:06] And is this information that the Russians would be obtaining, for example, via satellite imagery and sharing them with the Iranians? [13:13] Imagine it's satellite imagery and a certain amount of technical intelligence gathering through electronic means and such like. [13:20] And in part, that is as a kind of about the least they can possibly do to support their notional partners, the Iranians. [13:27] They clearly do not want to get seriously involved in this conflict. [13:30] There's nothing that they can do, really. [13:32] To help shield the Iranians from the Israeli and US attacks. [13:37] But on the other hand, yeah, it is also to give Putin a card that he can play. [13:41] He can actually say to the Americans, you can actually limit even further your support for the Ukrainians. [13:47] There will be some kind of quid pro quo. [13:52] In terms of the arc of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump's relationship, going back all the way to 2016 until now, [14:02] what do you make of the argument that Vladimir Putin has gotten everything he wanted from Donald Trump? [14:11] Yeah, I'm actually very critical of this and certainly also the notion that somehow Trump is a mere agent of the Russians. [14:18] The end of the first Trump presidency, US policy towards Russia was tougher than it had been at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. [14:26] And I think we have to appreciate that there's a difference between the politics of the rhetoric and the politics of the reality. [14:33] Now, the thing is, yes, there are many aspects of Trump's policies that do benefit the Russians. [14:40] The fact that he clearly has no real concern about the Ukrainians. [14:44] He just wants to end this war, get it off his desk. [14:46] And he's convinced himself that the line of least resistance is to push the Ukrainians into accepting an ugly deal. [14:52] But he's not doing that for Putin's sake. He's doing that for his own. [14:55] So I think it's more that just because Trump is a bull in a china shop, [14:59] because he is at the moment sort of the ultimate expression of a process, [15:04] which, let's be honest, has been happening for a long time, [15:07] which is America pivoting away from Europe. [15:10] And because Trump has this amazingly transactional view, [15:13] I mean, he sees the presidency really as being the chief executive officer of USA Incorporated. [15:18] And it's all about what are the immediate economic gains for America, regardless of issues of international law. [15:26] That contributes to creating a world that is a comfortable one for the so-called strongmen, [15:32] you know, authoritarian leaders. [15:34] Not just Putin, but whether we're talking about Erdogan in Turkey or Xi Jinping in China. [15:39] So Putin is a beneficiary, but in some ways he's an accidental beneficiary. [15:45] Are there any potential negative outcomes for Russia from the war in Iran? [15:51] And I'm thinking particularly of the fact that Iran has traditionally been Russia's strongest ally in the Middle East. [16:00] And here it is getting pounded by the United States and Israel. [16:04] That's bad news for Putin, isn't it? [16:07] Yes, there are downsides. [16:10] First of all, in the short to medium term, Russia gains economically through its various exports and rising prices. [16:18] But actually, if this crisis really does continue, and certainly if it leads to a global economic slowdown, [16:24] that will affect Russia. [16:26] Secondly, there is the fact that from the Russians' point of view, [16:31] they're watching the Ukrainians trying desperately to muscle in. [16:35] We've seen a couple of hundred of Ukrainian anti-drone warfare specialists being deployed to various Gulf states. [16:42] Now, on one level, look, this is just a kind of a desperate attempt to maintain relevance. [16:46] Kyiv is worried precisely about attention being lost. [16:50] But it also gives the Ukrainians the opportunities to actually build relationships with, let's be honest, rather wealthy Gulf states. [16:58] That might be useful to it in the future. [17:01] I think one thing that the Russians have learned is precisely [17:04] how effective President Zelensky's foreign policy can be. [17:07] And so they are a little bit concerned about whether this will give him opportunities. [17:11] And the third sort of downside from the Russians' point of view is [17:18] Iran has historically been, you say sort of an ally, in some ways a frenemy. [17:22] It's an ally against various countries and sort of the global sanctions regime. [17:29] But on the other hand, it's also actually a rival for influence in the Middle East and in the South Caucasus. [17:33] So to a degree, Moscow is quite happy. [17:35] The idea of if this regime survives but weaker, [17:40] then it will be less of a challenger, more of a potential vassal state. [17:44] But what if that doesn't happen? [17:47] What if actually this regime is swept away? [17:50] There is a sense that chaos in Iran will spread. [17:53] They are worried about jihadist terrorism at home. [17:56] They are worried about what the impact might be in terms of, you know, [18:00] how this will destabilize the South Caucasus on their own borders and such like. [18:04] So again, from Russia's point of view, [18:06] there is this odd situation in which they want to calibrate the chaos that comes from this. [18:11] But unrestrained chaos is bad for Russia, just as it's bad for the rest of us. [18:15] So what has watching Putin's approach to the war in Iran told you about his kind of wider diplomatic strategy? [18:23] He is an opportunist rather than a strategist. [18:25] He's neither got the temperament nor the capacity, frankly, [18:29] to manage what happens in terms of wider geopolitical flows. [18:34] So instead, he just sits and sits. [18:36] He just sees what opportunities arise. [18:38] This is classic Putin. [18:39] Again, a judo player, a judo fighter, not a chess player. [18:42] You know, he looks for the opportunities and strikes rather than tries to work things out six moves in advance. [18:48] But the second point about Putin that it really illustrates [18:51] is actually that this is a very risk-averse figure. [18:54] Put aside the macho theatricals of how he's portrayed as this sort of bare-chested figure. [19:01] In practice, when Putin does not really know [19:06] what is the best outcome, he tends to be, frankly, paralyzed. [19:10] And we've seen this in so many different contexts where he just sort of disappears from view, [19:13] doesn't make crucial decisions. [19:15] So actually, on the one hand, he will look for the advantages. [19:18] He's presented himself as a potential interlocutor both to Trump, [19:22] but also to various, you know, Gulf region monarchs and leaders without great success. [19:31] But just simply to illustrate to them that he's not like Trump. [19:34] He will talk to them. [19:35] But beyond that, [19:36] there clearly is no real desire to actually make any tough decisions at all. [19:42] Minimal support for Iran. [19:44] Suitable rhetoric at the United Nations. [19:47] But again, nothing that is excessively critical of Trump personally. [19:52] So, you know, basically he just plays it by ear. [19:55] On the whole, looking for what seems to be the least worst option. [19:58] There's that saying that's been attributed to Napoleon. [20:02] Napoleon is supposed to have said, [20:04] never interrupt your adversary when they are making a mistake. [20:09] Now, is that Vladimir Putin's strategy? [20:13] I wouldn't say it's his strategy, but it's what happens exactly. [20:16] At a time when his adversaries seem to be making one hell of a lot of mistakes, [20:21] in practice, that means that that's what's happening. [20:24] I'm going to give you a little trot through of some of the things which have happened this year, Mark. [20:32] So Nicolas Maduro is on trial in New York. [20:36] The first Ayatollah Khamenei is dead. [20:40] If the war in Iran goes well, [20:44] maybe Donald Trump might go for Cuba after that. [20:49] We will have to see. [20:51] Could Vladimir Putin be worried that he's next? [20:54] I don't think he seriously is worried about that. [20:56] I mean, it's very hard to know. [20:57] This is a man who clearly has certain paranoias. [21:01] You know, if we think of the extraordinary biosecurity bubble he hid himself in during Covid. [21:06] But on the other hand, we are not talking about Venezuela or Iran or Cuba. [21:13] We are talking about what is no longer a great global power, [21:17] but still a nuclear power with certain capabilities. [21:20] And the Russians have made it clear that any attempt to actually do anything to Putin [21:25] would be considered to be an act of war, plain and simple. [21:28] So I don't think it's that he honestly thinks that suddenly he's going to be whisked away in Black Hawk helicopters [21:35] and turn up in a war crimes tribunal. [21:37] Or in the Hague or whatever. [21:39] I think it's more that from the Russians' point of view, [21:42] what they see is almost an American campaign to pick off their allies one by one. [21:48] Whereas in some ways it's simply more frankly fortuitous [21:51] that the kind of countries that Trump wants to pick off [21:54] tend to be the kind of countries that have a relationship with Russia. [21:57] So it's not really an anti-Russian strategy. [22:00] But I think from Putin's point of view, he probably regards it as being something of an anti-Russian strategy. [22:05] Of course, the irony is, [22:06] that although it may be in the short term embarrassing to lose all these various client states, [22:12] in the long term it's actually good for Russia because empires cost. [22:15] If the Venezuelan regime is swept away, [22:18] well, Russia will no longer be having to subsidize it. [22:21] The Cuban regime, likewise. [22:24] In all of these cases, these are actually countries which have cost money. [22:27] The alliance with Iran has cost Russia its frankly very, very good diplomatic relationship with Israel. [22:34] So in all of these cases, [22:36] actually losing an empire doesn't just, as it were, gain a role for Russia. [22:40] It may well actually economize for Russia. [22:43] Is there a case, Mark, that the four weeks that we've seen of the Iran war [22:49] are actually the best four weeks that Vladimir Putin has had since the beginning of the Ukraine war back in 2022? [22:56] It's an interesting question. [22:58] And I think it's one that really can only be answered in hindsight. [23:01] Because obviously, to a degree, it depends quite what happens in Iran. [23:05] You know, if the Iranian regime turns around, [23:07] make a deal with Trump, [23:08] and Trump therefore becomes established not just as the peace broker, [23:11] but the power broker of the Gulf, [23:14] then that's not necessarily good for Russia. [23:17] And especially if then the oil and everything else starts flowing through the Straits of Hormuz freely. [23:23] Whereas we can look at past moments. [23:25] I mean, if one thinks of the extraordinary summit that was held between Trump and Putin in Alaska, [23:31] I mean, in many ways, the two weeks leading up to that seemed to be [23:36] a glorious victory for Putin, even though that actually came to nothing. [23:40] So on the one hand, I am shamelessly sidestepping your question. [23:47] But on the other hand, I would go so far as to say that they have the potential, [23:53] absolutely, to be the best four weeks that Putin has seen since February of 2022. [24:00] And in that respect, ironically, for all the fact Putin is scarcely being a particularly [24:07] generous ally. [24:09] Actually, his prospects are now in the hands of the Iranian Ayatollahs and Revolutionary Guard. [24:15] What do you mean? [24:16] In the sense that it is now up to them how effectively they resist the Americans, [24:20] with what degree of resolve, [24:22] whether or not this can become something of a gravestone of Trumpian foreign ambition, [24:30] or whether in fact they do end up either losing power [24:35] or deciding that they need to make a deal. [24:37] With the Donald, above all, what the Russians want is paralysis. [24:41] What they want is a West and above all, that means the United States that is so consumed, [24:48] whether it's because it's consumed by internal political wrangles [24:52] or whether it's consumed by some kind of quagmire abroad, [24:56] that in many ways it cannot mobilize its otherwise very substantial political, economic, military and moral force [25:05] to any kind of purpose. [25:06] So, yes. [25:07] You know, Trump is useful, but Trump always has the risk of flipping. [25:11] There's always this danger that Trump might decide actually that Putin is his enemy [25:16] and throw his support behind Ukraine, for example, [25:18] although that seems increasingly implausible these days. [25:21] But on the other hand, if you have, let's say, a Trump who is mired in a quagmire in Iran, [25:28] maybe even in Cuba, for all we know, [25:30] and who also perhaps faces serious political losses with the midterms at the end of this year, [25:37] well, what you might get is an America that is so consumed by its own internal divisions [25:43] that it scarcely even remembers that Ukraine exists, [25:46] let alone is able to actually do anything in support of it. [25:49] That was Mark Gagliotti of University College London [25:52] and host of the podcast In Moscow's Shadows. [25:55] And that's it for this episode of The Global Story. [25:58] We're also an audio podcast. [26:00] You can find us every weekday on bbc.com or wherever you listen to your shows. [26:05] We'll see you next time. [26:06] Cheerio.