Is the 'special relationship’ between the US and the UK over? — The Global Story

[0:00] King Charles is visiting the United States this week to mark 250 years since America's [0:06] independence from Britain. But the visit comes at a particularly tense moment between the two [0:12] countries. So I consider President Trump's remarks to be insulting and frankly appalling. [0:18] This is not the age of Churchill. I will say the UK has been very, very incooperative. [0:25] Keir was willing to send two aircraft carriers after we won, because essentially there's no [0:31] threat for the aircraft carriers right now. And I said, no, no, we want things sent before the war, [0:38] not after the war is won. I'm not going to change my mind. I'm not going to yield. It is not in our [0:45] national interest to join this war, and we will not do so. I know where I stand. So in this moment, [0:51] is it now in fact Britain that wants to declare independence from America? We are here today at [0:57] the BBC's Maida Vale Studios in London, a legendary recording studio which has seen the likes of the [1:03] Beatles, Beyonce, U2, David Bowie, and now CastFest, the BBC's podcast festival. Here we are with a live [1:12] studio audience. From the BBC in London, I'm Asma Khalid. And I'm Tristan Redmond. And today on [1:26] The Global Story is the special relationship between the United States and the UK over. [1:39] Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have a very special guest today. He's a former ambassador to the [1:47] United States. He's dealt directly with President Trump in the White House. His tenure was cut short in [2:02] suboptimal circumstances. It's Lord Kim Derrick. [2:09] Thank you, Andrew. [2:16] A reminder. [2:17] Lord Derrick, and I should ask, can we call you Kim? [2:21] Kim, please. [2:22] Well, welcome to the show. We've asked you here today because you worked in the British [2:27] government for decades, particularly on foreign policy. Now, there has been a lot going on between [2:33] the United States and the UK. And, you know, we've all heard the term special relationship [2:39] between, and we know that there is a special relationship, or so we're told, between the [2:42] US and the UK. But where did that expression first come from? Because I will say, it doesn't [2:48] feel like the relationship's all that special in this moment. [2:50] Yeah. It's a term, actually, that I and some of my predecessors tended to kind of avoid. [3:01] It's a term coined by Winston Churchill in a speech in the immediate aftermath of the Second [3:10] World War. And one of the real foundation stones of it is the defense and security and intelligence [3:17] relationship, which is closer, I think, than any other two countries on the planet. But if you keep [3:24] talking about a special relationship, it sounds like you're desperate that it is really special, [3:30] and kind of doubtful that it is. It sounds a bit needy to talk about it. [3:33] I mean, do you feel that you hear Brits referring to it more than Americans, for example? [3:38] Absolutely. That's one of the things that you notice all the time. And there is also a sense [3:42] sometimes it's used as a kind of comedy line, oh, a special relationship is too special, [3:46] after something has gone wrong between the two countries, or there's been some disagreement. [3:51] So, you know, we kind of tend to avoid it. [3:53] Well, Asma and I talk about this sometimes, about whether or not when we talk about the [3:57] special relationship, we should preface it with the words, so called or not. I mean, [4:04] as a journalist, it sometimes feels slightly like branding. You were the British ambassador in [4:11] Washington DC. How did you see the ups and downs of the special relationship, [4:16] the so called special relationship during that time? [4:19] Can I give you a little bit of history on this, Tristan, in terms of number 10? [4:22] Okay. If you go back through post-war UK-US history, the first big crisis, 1956 Suez crisis, [4:30] when the Eisenhower administration led the criticism of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt [4:36] in the United Nations. So that was a real trough and arguably the biggest dip in the relationship [4:44] that there's been since the war. But then you fast forward to the 1960s, mid-1960s, [4:50] and LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson very much wanted Europe, UK sorry, to provide even some token [4:59] military presence in Vietnam. The demonstration wasn't America alone there that it was about [5:04] international effort to fight communism in Vietnam. [5:08] There can be only one decision in Vietnam, and that is this. We will see this through. [5:17] We shall persist. We shall succeed. [5:22] And the then British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, absolutely refused to do it. And it led to a couple [5:29] of legendary moments. One when they came to LBJ in the White House and said, Harold Wilson is keen to [5:35] come here on a visit. And he said, what, that little creep, can't be on my doorstep? What makes [5:40] you think I want to see him? And on the other hand, Wilson did get across there for a visit at some [5:46] stage, and he came back to Cabinet. He reported that LBJ had pressed him on sending a British contingent [5:53] to Vietnam and had said to him, anything we'll do. It's about the presence, not about actually war [6:00] fighting capability. Why didn't you send us a platoon of bagpipers? So that, and we didn't even [6:06] send bagpipers. So that was a pretty bad time. And then you go to a sort of peak of the special [6:12] relationship. Sorry, there's a few more to come. The peak of the special relationship, which was [6:16] Thatcher and Reagan. And even then, in 1983, Reagan sent American forces into the island of Grenada. [6:26] The Queen was head of state. So it had been a former British colony, and we were still, [6:31] the Queen was still head of state, without telling or consulting the British government in advance. [6:37] And Margaret Thatcher was furious about this. And she first of all rang up Reagan and said, [6:43] this has got to stop. This mustn't happen. You must call your forces back. Reagan said, [6:48] it's too late. They're on the beaches already. And so she rang up again. Reagan took the call, [6:53] legend has it, in the Oval Office, with a few of his staffers around him. And Reagan reportedly, [6:59] at one point, turned the phone onto speakerphone, so everyone in the room could hear the handbagging [7:04] going on from Margaret Thatcher. And apparently he whispered to them all, he said, isn't she wonderful? [7:10] So with all that context, though, I mean, does this moment really feel all that bad to you? [7:15] It doesn't. It doesn't. Except for one fact, Asma, which is, you can't imagine Reagan or Clinton [7:22] or Obama threatening the UK, whereas President Trump has actually said... [7:28] We can meet that very easily by just putting a big tariff on the UK. So they better be careful. [7:33] If they don't drop the tax, we'll probably put a big tariff on the UK. [7:36] Your arrival in Washington dovetailed relatively closely with the Brexit vote. You watched it from [7:44] Washington DC. How serious, from your point of view, was that in terms of its effect on the [7:51] transatlantic relationship? I was having lunch with a senior inner circle Obama staffer [8:01] just after the Brexit vote. And he was really quite angry. And he said, [8:09] we don't understand why you would call a referendum without being absolutely certain [8:15] that you'll get the right result. You didn't need to call this referendum and you call it, [8:19] and now your prime minister resigned. I mean, how can you do that? How can you do something so dumb [8:24] as that? And the other line that he had that sticks with me is he said, [8:29] if you're not in the European Union anymore, we're not really quite sure what the UK is for [8:37] now. And why did he say that? Because America is very interested in everything that happens in the [8:42] European Union, because the legislation going through every month, which affects American [8:48] interests. So we used to be, when I was in Brussels, I did 15 years of my career on EU business, [8:52] we used to be their window into the European Union. And you would get requests, we hope you will do [9:00] X, not Y, and could you please help to ensure that outcome? And sometimes you would, and sometimes [9:05] we actually wanted Y. So it sounds like they thought that you guys were their sort of inner voice [9:08] into the EU. Yeah. But by contrast, Kim, Brexit may have been something which caused distance between [9:15] Washington and London back in 2016. But if you look at the relationship now, it potentially, [9:20] it's something which actually causes a rapprochement, no? Well, yes, because it all changed when [9:26] Trump came in, because Trump had always supported Brexit. But he thinks that we have messed it up. [9:32] They are, I think, worried that we are now going to get closer again to Europe under this administration. [9:38] And they thought, also hoped that a number of other countries would follow us. And of course, [9:42] the way it has panned out has absolutely dissuaded any other European country from even contemplating it. [9:48] You know what I find so fascinating is during those end years of the Obama administration, [9:53] it appeared like the United States did not think the UK was a reliable partner anymore, [9:58] particularly when Brexit happened. And so it felt like the special relationship, [10:02] if we can call it that, was on the rocks because the US did not find the UK to be a reliable partner [10:09] and wanted to distance itself. And I think what to me is so interesting is now, if we look at it, [10:13] it is the UK that appears to be pulling back from the relationship also and not thinking that [10:18] the United States can be a reliable partner. And that entire dynamic has shifted, but it feels like [10:23] the relationship was already falling apart, if you look at that linear trajectory going back to Brexit. [10:28] I think there's something in that. [10:30] Kim, as I alluded to earlier on, and I hope you'll thank you for humouring me with my introduction to you, [10:37] your time in DC came to an end abruptly. [10:41] Mr Speaker, this morning, I have spoken to Sir Kim Darroch. I have told him that it is a matter of [10:47] great regret that he has felt it necessary to leave his position as ambassador in Washington. [10:52] You called the Trump administration dysfunctional, unpredictable, diplomatically clumsy and inept. [11:00] He also said some positive things. This happens on Sunday, around the 4th of July in 2019. [11:12] On the Monday, President Trump tweeted, [11:15] I do not know the ambassador, but he's not liked or well thought of within the United States. [11:21] We will no longer deal with him. Now, we have seen Donald Trump fall out with people. [11:29] And then, you know, sometimes days later, things, their relationship seems to be repaired. [11:37] Why do you think, why did you think at the time it was impossible to recover from that situation? [11:44] Because when you're doing that job, you are literally in the White House every week. [11:49] You're not seeing the president every week, but you're seeing his senior advisors, [11:52] his national security advisor, his economic advisor, his speechwriter, people like that all the time. [11:58] And even if Trump president himself had sort of said, well, move on to new targets, as it were, [12:08] I didn't think and I resigned. I didn't get fired. I resigned because I just didn't think you could do the job anymore. [12:15] When everyone you were talking to knew what you had been reporting back to London, I just didn't think they would be honest. [12:24] Because the whole point about having an ambassador there, it's crucial that people will tell you what they think and will give you insights. [12:32] And if they are worried that what they tell you will be leaked, they're going to climb up and you can't do the job if you're not getting all those sources of information. [12:41] So that's it. [12:42] With seven years extra hindsight, do you think you would have played it differently knowing that it is possible to repair a relationship with President Trump? [12:51] To be honest, and this is going to sound a bit sort of defeatist maybe, I had done 43 years in the Foreign Service. [13:02] It would be fair to say I was completely knackered and I was six months off the end of my posting and I was done, frankly. [13:12] So, no, I don't think I would play it differently. [13:18] So since those days in 2019... [13:19] It's also, by the way, very nice to be able to come to a thing like this and say what you think rather than what the government's line is. [13:24] We appreciate that. [13:26] So since those days in 2019, during President Trump's first term, the UK and the US's relationship seems to have further deteriorated. [13:34] Now, if we look at the second term, whether it's about immigration, the Chagos Islands, drilling in the North Sea, the Iran War, [13:41] our colleague Sarah Smith actually interviewed President Trump just on Thursday and he told her that he thought that the king's visit could help repair the relationship. [13:52] What would your advice be to the king? [13:54] First of all, I think the king is, I mean, I've met him a few times and he's actually a naturally accomplished diplomat. [14:04] And he has a relationship with the president already. [14:07] They've met several times and he's very, very good at this kind of thing. [14:12] Second, I think President Trump wants this visit to go very well. [14:17] We, the Brits, will have talked endlessly, exhaustively to the White House about the constitutional role of the British monarch [14:27] and the difference between a prime minister and a king and who handles what and how all of this works. [14:36] Because it's different. [14:40] The president, you know, Donald Trump does admire the royal family. [14:42] That's abundantly clear. [14:43] He's made that clear himself. [14:45] He does. [14:45] I mean, it all dates back to his Scottish mother. [14:48] So, you know, things may go wrong still. [14:51] But one thing I'm sure of is that Trump wants this to go well. [14:55] Doesn't the king want it to go well? [14:56] Of course he does. [14:56] Doesn't the king really need it to go well, to be honest, for the British government? [14:59] I'm sure the king, A, he wants it to go well, B, he hopes he can make a difference and to some extent smooth things over in terms of the recent flashes. [15:09] But he's not there to explain British policy on the Iran conflict or to talk about why we aren't drilling as much as Donald Trump thinks we should in the North Sea [15:19] or why we have wind turbines, not windmills, this kind of stuff. [15:23] So what can he do to help smooth over the relationship? [15:26] So what can he do? [15:27] I mean, what's your advice if he is there not to do those things? [15:30] I think they will talk about the state of the world. [15:33] I think the king will raise some of his concerns, explain some of his concerns, which he did at great length when they met during Trump's state visit during the first term in 2019. [15:44] He'll talk about his concern about climate change and the influence of all that. [15:47] But he will want to congratulate the American nation. [15:53] The whole point, reason for this visit is the 250th anniversary of the birth of the United States. [15:58] I will say this all seems very strange to me, that the king is coming to America to celebrate our independence from Great Britain. [16:04] I find it all very strange. [16:06] Bygones are bygones. [16:08] Bygones are bygones. [16:09] We're big hearted people. [16:10] We can look at that. [16:12] Plus, of course, whether we would have won the Second World War without America's support is a huge thing. [16:18] And America has guaranteed our security through the years of the Cold War and everything that's happened since. [16:24] So we owe a big, big debt to America. [16:26] And it's right that the king should go across there and express some of these things, which he will, which he will. [16:32] I think if the subject comes up, he will also say how much we are actually doing in the Gulf. [16:38] But he's not there to argue about Iran policy or that kind of thing. [16:43] That's not his role. [16:44] Kim, there is a parallel between what's happening now with this visit by the king to Washington and something that happened when you were in your role. [16:57] Theresa May, she's the first head of government to come to Washington after Trump's election. [17:02] And during that visit, she invites Donald Trump to the United Kingdom. [17:08] And you say in your book that this was counter to the advice that you had given to London. [17:14] And the advice you gave was that to offer a state visit at this early stage would be, quote, a bit desperate. [17:23] So fast forward to now and does what's happening look like Britain is a bit desperate? [17:33] So I would have waited to see how the first Trump administration worked out for a bit longer and have kept the thing sort of hanging out there as something which isn't firmly offered, but which is sort of in the air. [17:46] Not making it a straight bargaining chip. [17:48] That would be crude and probably counterproductive. [17:52] But pick the moment for her to offer it rather than put it on the table right in the very first meeting. [17:58] And actually, to be honest, I would have given the same advice to Keir Starmer. [18:02] You remember that all of you remember that moment when he offers the president the letter. [18:09] Yes. [18:10] I said, oh, what could this be? [18:12] Present, yes. [18:16] Oh, it's an invitation for a state visit. [18:18] And the story I heard about that was that Starmer actually handed the letter over in the private meeting between the two of them. [18:26] And the president said, no, no, no, I want to open it live on TV. [18:30] So let's do it when the cameras are on. [18:31] Yes, somebody who knows how the cameras work in live TV. [18:34] So I would have held it back a bit. [18:37] But, you know, it's happened. [18:39] So it's done. [18:40] You mentioned the fact that the king is coming to the United States in part to mark the 250th anniversary of American independence. [18:49] And there has been this overarching question that we have had of whether, in fact, it is Britain now trying to declare independence from the U.S. and this relationship. [18:58] Has trust been so lost from the British perspective that the U.K. can really trust the United States ever again? [19:05] I mean, is this just a moment, a blip in time? [19:08] I think that, I mean, America is now called around European circles, you hear a lot of the words, the unreliable ally. [19:15] If there's just been a first term of Donald Trump and not a second term, I think people have thought it was some kind of, you know, blip in history and that America have then gone back to being what we all knew. [19:26] The second term makes people think this is a more permanent shift in American views of the rest of the world. [19:31] I think there is something in that and then I think whoever wins the next American election, whether Democrat or Republican, will still want to shift the center of effort of American security and defense concerns to the Asian theater away from the North Atlantic theater. [19:51] Because there is a consensus, I judge, both sides of the aisle, both Democrats and Republicans, that China is the existential challenge for the 21st century. [20:01] And so I think that's just a reality and Europe has to adapt to it. [20:05] And we have to be more self-sufficient on defense. [20:08] We have to be more autonomous, given the threat that is very clear from Russia. [20:12] You cannot allow America to continue to take 70 percent of the burden of NATO. [20:18] I don't think necessarily you're going to find a future American president who behaves like him and the kind of things he says about some of his partners. [20:25] But I think more focus on Asia and maybe on the American homeland, the backyard, Latin America is just a reality of life. [20:37] And that means we have to do more. [20:38] Whether that leads to more political separation of the two, we'll wait and see. [20:44] But still we have a huge amount in common in terms of values and the way we see the rest of the world and support for democracy and those kind of things. [20:52] So it's not like everything is going off in different directions. [20:57] OK. [20:57] We cannot let you leave this place without asking you about the question of Peter Mandelson. [21:03] Peter Mandelson is a familiar figure to many people in Britain, but maybe around the world less so. [21:09] So I'm going to explain very briefly what the question is. [21:13] In 2024, the British Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, broke with convention. [21:19] He made a political appointment to the U.S. ambassador's job. [21:23] Peter Mandelson was the first political appointment to that job in nearly 50 years. [21:29] Usually they're career civil servants or diplomats such as yourself. [21:34] Mandelson was somebody who'd been in Tony Blair's government. [21:39] His nickname in Britain was the Prince of Darkness. [21:43] That's something he was called in political circles. [21:47] He was then fired from his job, partly over his connections to Jeffrey Epstein. [21:55] Peter Mandelson denies all wrongdoing. [21:58] The BBC understands. [21:59] At the time Sir Keir Starmer appointed Mandelson to the job, do you think it was a genius move or a not-so-genius move? [22:11] Yeah. [22:13] Look, I was, I mean, I would never have called it a genius move, but I thought on balance it was a justified risk by the Prime Minister. [22:21] Obviously, everyone who thought that has been proved completely wrong. [22:26] So, you know, I was wrong on that. [22:29] But I'll tell you why. [22:30] I knew Peter Mandelson when he was British Trade Commissioner. [22:33] He's a trade specialist. [22:35] And all the risks around the Trump presidency were seen as, or most of them were seen as around tariffs. [22:42] He was seen in those days as a very, very effective operator. [22:46] Now, you look at Starmer's decision. [22:48] Why did he take it? [22:49] He always wanted, it seemed to me, to send a politician to Washington to deal with this unique president. [22:59] And, you know, maybe the title Prince of Darkness tells you why he thought that would be a good choice for Washington. [23:07] And then the whole thing blew up. [23:08] And then lots of things about his past with Epstein. [23:11] And, of course, it now looks like it was a terrible appointment. [23:15] And it's not a lot of damage to the Prime Minister, a lot of damage to the government. [23:17] But I can see why Keir Starmer made the choice. [23:20] But I can see also now why it's regarded by all those, by him making it, all those who supported it, like me, as a big mistake. [23:27] Well, I'm afraid that is all the time we've got. [23:29] So all that is left now is to just say a thank you to Lord Kim Derrick for joining us on the show in front of this live audience. [23:36] And thanks to you as well. [23:37] Thank you so much for coming. [23:38] We've really enjoyed having you here. [23:40] Thank you. [23:41] And that's it for The Global Story on YouTube. [23:45] Thanks, as always, for tuning in. [23:46] And if you appreciated our episode, I should mention that our show, The Global Story, it's also available as an audio podcast. [23:54] So you can find us every weekday on BBC.com or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.