Try Free

Iran's new Supreme Leader 'gravely injured'. Who's really leading Iran now?

April 24, 2026 10m 1,615 words
▶ Watch original video

About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of Iran's new Supreme Leader 'gravely injured'. Who's really leading Iran now?, published April 24, 2026. The transcript contains 1,615 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"Mosh Taba Khamenei running the country in some sense as you describe it. Let's just start, though, with the state, his state. His injuries, you report, are disfiguring. There have been so many rumors, but you now have some facts. Can you tell us about his physical condition? Hi, Iran. Thank you for"

[0:00] Mosh Taba Khamenei running the country in some sense as you describe it. [0:04] Let's just start, though, with the state, his state. [0:06] His injuries, you report, are disfiguring. [0:09] There have been so many rumors, but you now have some facts. [0:13] Can you tell us about his physical condition? [0:18] Hi, Iran. Thank you for having me. [0:20] Mosh Taba Khamenei was gravely injured in the airstrikes on February 28th [0:25] that started the war and killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. [0:30] He has suffered from severe leg injury. [0:35] His leg has been operated on. [0:37] There are suggestions that it may even be amputated, [0:40] and he's waiting for a prosthetic leg. [0:43] His hand has been operated on, and it's gaining functionality. [0:47] And more importantly, his face and lips have been severely burned [0:51] to the point where it's difficult for him to speak, [0:54] and he will require plastic surgery. [0:57] So we know that he's gravely injured. [1:01] We know that there's the president of Iran, President Pazashkian, [1:05] who's a heart surgeon, and the health minister are in charge of his health care, [1:09] and he's mostly surrounded by a medical team in a hiding place. [1:15] And access to him is incredibly difficult. [1:17] And that's probably one of the reasons why we haven't seen the new supreme leader [1:22] in any video messages, nobody has, and his voice has not been heard. [1:27] To the extent that he's communicated, it's been with written statements read on state television. [1:34] I mean, it is incredible what you're reporting. [1:36] And I know, you know, in your article, Faraj, you detail how, as you mentioned, [1:41] he is surrounded by doctors, and to the point that senior leadership of Iran has, [1:47] they're not able to get in to see him, to talk to him. [1:50] You know, is that merely because they're worried about possible assassination [1:55] or elimination that this could find where he is? [1:58] Or is it also because he doesn't want them to see him? [2:01] And do you know about his mental capacity? [2:06] Well, we've heard his mental, all the sources I spoke to said his mental capacity was intact. [2:13] So he was able to engage and communicate. [2:16] Now, we also know that as soon as he was appointed as the successor of his father, [2:23] Israeli officials said that they would assassinate him if they found him. [2:28] And, you know, there's been airstrikes that have killed not just Ayutollah Khamenei, [2:35] the late Ayutollah Khamenei, but also very senior commanders. [2:37] So there is a real threat and risk to his life in the view of the Iranians and from what we can gather. [2:46] So, you know, part of the reason why there's no access to him is because I heard from sources [2:53] that Iranians are worried that if officials try to visit him, their movement might be traced to him [2:59] because we know that also that the movement of senior officials has been sort of monitored. [3:06] So that's one of the reasons. [3:08] And I think you also mentioned his physical condition, right? [3:11] He probably doesn't want many people to see him in this vulnerable and weak physical condition [3:18] and wants to recover. [3:19] Now, you report that he has been working very closely with the IRGC. [3:25] And this goes back in part to his own time with some of these individuals back when he was a teenager in the Iran-Iraq war. [3:33] And so it's personal, but it is an even more solidification and rise of the IRGC, which you're reporting about. [3:39] But on this issue of what sort of control he has, how is he even communicating with them, [3:48] given that you're reporting they can't go and visit him? [3:51] How is the communication happening? [3:54] Well, they can't go visit him. [3:56] There's absolutely no electronics around him because of possible tracing him through electronics. [4:03] So there's no telephone, there's no, you know, email, no video. [4:07] So the only way is sort of the old way, you know, they write handwritten notes, [4:12] they seal it in an envelope and a huge chain of human couriers sort of carries it around. [4:17] I heard on motorbikes, in cars, and it's like handed from one secure trusted source to the other until it makes it to his hiding. [4:26] And then it snakes back out, his replies snake back out the same way. [4:32] So this is not a system where you can communicate every day or in real time, right? [4:37] So one of the reasons that he's delegated so much power in decision-making to the Revolutionary Guards [4:44] is the circumstances of his injuries and his hideout. [4:49] But as you pointed out, because he trusts and has very deep ties with the commanders who are in charge, right? [4:55] So decision-making under, sorry, go ahead. [5:00] No, no, no, I was just, go ahead, finish your sentence. [5:04] Yeah, decision-making under the father used to be really the veto of one man. [5:09] Aytola Khamenei, the father would say yes or no, it was his will, and he had the final say. [5:14] We're saying, we're seeing a very different decision-making system now in the current new era, right? [5:21] We're seeing more a collaborative system where the generals are in charge, [5:25] where they're calling the shots, and they're deciding what key decisions about how far Iran's [5:31] going to escalate the war, about closing the Strait of Hormuz, about accepting a ceasefire, [5:37] and most importantly, diplomacy with the United States. [5:40] These are all decisions that the generals are making. [5:43] We haven't really seen any disarray at the top, although differences of opinions may have, [5:48] you know, are there, of course, but it appears that the decision-making is cohesive, [5:54] and it's in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. [5:57] Yeah, and obviously very significant, because the Revolutionary Guard is obviously not who [6:02] has been leading the negotiations, right? [6:04] That has been Iqbala Bhav, Member of Speaker of Parliament, and others. [6:08] So very significant what you're reporting here, all of it. [6:11] Varnaz, thank you so very much. [6:12] I appreciate it. [6:13] Thank you. [6:14] Seth Jones and Kareem Saad-Japur are here with me. [6:16] Seth, Varnaz reporting so much there, but let's start with Muqtaba Khamenei being disfigured, [6:21] that he needs plastic surgery, a prosthetic limb. [6:24] His inability, at best, to be seen is imperiled. [6:29] What is the implication of all of this, Seth? [6:32] Well, I think, Aaron, there are at least two implications. [6:36] One is that, as you just discussed, the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, is playing [6:44] a very influential role in the decision-making right now, including influencing the negotiations. [6:51] And the second thing, I think, is that we are seeing a very decentralized and diffuse apparatus. [7:00] That means that, despite all of that, we've seen the Iranian military continue to be able [7:07] to fire cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones off from a decentralized perspective, [7:14] even with all of this happening. [7:15] So they still have been able to figure out how to conduct a war, even with all of this [7:21] trouble at the top. [7:23] And Kareem, you know, when we hear that Khamenei is surrounded by doctors, there's absolutely [7:26] no electronics around him, not even to the extent that somebody would bring in a random [7:32] phone to tape a video, nothing, and that no senior leadership have visited him because [7:37] of the fear that they could reveal his location to Israel or the United States and have him [7:40] be assassinated. [7:42] Kareem, what are the implications of such total and utter isolation? [7:46] So, Aaron, the Iranian system already was very inefficient in making decisions. [7:52] It oftentimes took them many months, if not years, to come to a consensus. [7:56] That was when there was one clear leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. [8:00] Now, under these circumstances, when you have a supreme leader who's been badly injured [8:06] and living and hiding under paranoia, totally disconnected from the outside world, you can [8:12] only imagine the additional inefficiencies. [8:15] And I'm reminded of an observation which the great North African historian Ibn Khaldun made [8:21] in the 14th century said that empires are built and destroyed over three generations. [8:26] The first generation build, the second generation consolidate, and the third generation squander. [8:32] And Mosheb al-Khamenei is the third generation of the Islamic Republic's leadership. [8:37] And he is not someone I would bet on to be ruling Iran several years from now. [8:41] You know, and Seth, in that context, it is also fascinating what we're hearing about that [8:47] chain of couriers, right, with this inefficient communication Kareem's talking about. [8:52] You know, she's talking about person-to-person-to-person in sealed envelopes on back roads and motorbikes. [8:58] I mean, it's pretty incredible, Seth. [9:00] And it sort of makes you think about, right, the way that Osama bin Laden was found, right? [9:05] That was one courier. [9:06] That was one guy they were tracking. [9:08] This, you know, they're trying to go to some level of Byzantine sort of communications. [9:14] It is pretty incredible, though, because obviously they are incredibly terrified of an assassination, [9:19] and they're looking at the Osama bin Laden model. [9:22] Yeah, two interesting things from this, Aaron. [9:24] One is that it did make it difficult for Osama bin Laden to actually run his organization [9:29] without the ability to have routine communication with al-Qaeda leadership, [9:35] not just in Pakistan, but also around the globe. [9:38] I suspect the same thing is happening to some degree here, [9:41] which is why we're seeing a lot more of a role of the IRGC. [9:45] The second thing is that it actually made it a little bit more challenging for intelligence agencies to find. [9:51] I suspect if the Americans and the Israelis are trying to target him now, [9:57] that they are really focused on couriers. [9:59] That's human intelligence in addition to imagery and the signals intelligence as well. [10:04] So it does create some challenges if you're trying to track.

Transcribe Any Video or Podcast — Free

Paste a URL and get a full AI-powered transcript in minutes. Try ScribeHawk →