Iran won’t surrender its only lever – the Strait of Hormuz, analyst says

[0:00] Joining me here in the studio is Alexandru Hulistanu, who's a military analyst with expertise in maritime security. [0:05] Great to have you with us, Alexandru. [0:07] Great to be here. [0:08] So much depends on these talks happening and the outcome of the talks, of course, especially for this region. [0:14] How do you assess where we're at, given the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the fact that Iran has closed it, the fact that the U.S. is still blockading it? [0:25] Where are we at, do you think? [0:26] I think we're not necessarily in a very much different situation that we're here two days before. [0:32] For sure, for the commercial shipping, we are not back at square one. [0:36] We are back at square zero, I would say. [0:39] But between U.S. and Iran, we are back at square one. [0:41] That show of goodwill that Iran tried to do was immediately rescinded, immediately taken back under the idea of U.S. didn't show some form back. [0:52] But we must understand that Iran was never going to let the Strait of Hormuz out of their hands because, in fact, it's their only lever they have under the position of this cease-firing force. [1:03] So unless they would want to escalate, which might break the cease-fire, the only way they can push their point of view in the negotiation is through the pressure of the Strait of Hormuz. [1:13] At the same time, U.S. knows that, and given the fact that they allowed them to run their tankers for the best part of the war, now they are pressuring back in order to create that counter-pressure point back. [1:24] So was that the reason why they set up the U.S. blockade? [1:27] Well, now we've had a matter of time has passed since the blockade, that U.S. blockade was set up out in the Gulf of Oman. [1:33] Has it worked for the U.S., do you think? [1:35] I think it did because the reaction from Iran was quite violent, considering that they opened the Strait for a while, for 20 hours, and then they closed it back. [1:43] I think that particular blockade from U.S. is putting pressure because, again, U.S. needs to respect also the cease-fire. [1:51] So this blockade is actually a move on that list of options that can actually create pressure during this negotiation. [1:56] We are not outside of the register of diplomatic, coercive diplomacy or coercive negotiations. [2:01] We are exactly where we were last week in that sense. [2:04] Just we could notice this tension and this anxiety in the commercial world to try to get out of the Strait, out of the Gulf as fast as possible. [2:15] So most likely the damaging relationship was, the damaged relationship now is on the merchant side more than between U.S. and Iran. [2:25] So Donald Trump has been downplaying Iran's closure of the Strait, hasn't he? [2:29] Does that reflect the reality of the ground? [2:32] Not necessarily. [2:32] It gives them a pretty strong hand, doesn't it? [2:34] Not necessarily, because at the same time, it's not like the closure of the Strait is not hurting U.S. economy as well. [2:41] Oil, gas are some of the most globalized merchandises, commodities. [2:46] That means price is affected regardless if you are a producer or non-producer country. [2:50] So the price is reflected also on the U.S. economy. [2:54] There is a suggestion, isn't there, that it's possible that key issues, like the nuclear program, like the Strait itself, I guess, will be kicked down the road. [3:04] That there will be an agreement here to talk further and that the Strait will be reopened in the meantime, which will satisfy the markets to a degree. [3:12] It will satisfy the global economy. [3:13] It will help it anyway. [3:14] Can you see that scenario unfolding? [3:17] Among the possible scenario of opening the Strait, this, for me, sounds the most plausible. [3:21] Again, for Iran, it's the only pressure lever they have that would make sure that the U.S. will keep their end of the bargain, [3:29] or at least will get them some form of gain in these negotiations, [3:33] because we need to understand that there are some red lines on U.S. side and there are some red lines on Iran's side. [3:39] I don't think the Strait is a red line for Iran, but they know for a fact that this is a red line for U.S. [3:45] having entered this war and the effect it created for the region and for the entire world. [3:49] So they will push this lever as much as possible in order to get something out of the negotiations that convene. [3:54] And I think for Iran, those points are sanctions and no regime change and maybe no form of control going on from here on. [4:02] That includes the possibility of a nuclear program somewhere along the way. [4:07] So I think the contestation problem here is the sequencing between these negotiables, these non-negotiables, sorry, [4:13] and this point of U.S. would want some form of control following this war. [4:19] Iran most likely would not like to have that form of checks on them from U.S. [4:24] There are nations, of course, for whom the Strait is a red line. [4:28] The Gulf nations, Saudi, Qatar, UAE and so forth, who need it for their trade, worth billions and billions of dollars. [4:34] Because it's a key factor for those countries, isn't it, that the Strait gets open as soon as possible and free passage is allowed. [4:41] I think this week we'll cross what I'd like to call the maximum effect from the closure of the Strait. [4:47] Because in general markets, after such cataclysmic maritime events, it takes 7 to 60 days for the full force to hit. [4:56] Because you still have companies that would have stocking in place for the situation of crisis. [5:02] But mostly those reserves will consume in maybe 60 days. [5:07] Also, there were a number of ships still reaching ports, which kind of happened in the past week or so. [5:12] So there's nothing coming out of the Strait now, apart from those bypass routes of oil through the two pipelines towards Fujairah and the east-west in Saudi Arabia. [5:21] So right now, nothing comes out of the Strait anymore and nothing is ongoing towards the destination port. [5:26] So now we're going to feel the full force of the Strait being closed. [5:30] And that is basically the effect that Iran was hoping for. [5:34] That's why they put this in pressure from the very beginning. [5:38] Sure. So worst-case scenario here is that the talks don't work out, that we get back to war, the conflict resumes. [5:45] How would you see that shaping up, given that there's been some time here for both sides to rearm and sort out their military capabilities? [5:53] I would not want to say that I would be surprised for them to return, but I would be surprised for them to return. [5:58] That's too much at stake in the diplomatic track right now for the past two weeks. [6:02] We see now U.S. is signaling that they will send for ceasefire negotiations to extend the ceasefire and to maybe set up that framework that Iran is calling for in order to have this discussion. [6:11] So in case, in the remote case, they will turn back to war, I think it will be in a similar fashion of what we've seen until now. [6:21] U.S., I don't think it will come to a conviction to go there in boots on the ground, so it will still be some form of air campaigns. [6:27] But again, I doubt this scenario. I rather think that there will be a continuation of this ceasefire, maybe some back and forth in messaging and strategic communication, [6:36] maybe some form of pressure from the list of options, the military options that the two parties still have. [6:42] As we've seen, one of them was from Iran with this forceful closure of the strait just 20 hours after they announced opening. [6:50] All right. Well, let's hope more conflict is the last thing anybody needs. Alessandro Huristanu, thank you. [6:55] Thank you so much.