Iran used Chinese spy satellite to target US bases: Report

[0:00] Dimitri Soestopolo, I want to ask you, you're the U.S.-China correspondent for the Financial Times, [0:04] and you've got some really important new reporting, which I briefly mentioned at the top of the show, [0:08] but hugely significant. You're reporting that Iran is using a Chinese spy satellite to target [0:14] U.S. bases. Okay, explain what you know and the obvious thing here about why this is so important. [0:22] Well, I think the important point, Aaron, is that in recent weeks and even last year, [0:27] we've had stories about Chinese satellite companies providing satellite imagery to the Iranians, [0:33] but those are actually pictures they then transmit across. What we have here is the Iranians have [0:37] signed a contract with a relatively new Chinese company called Emposat, and that contract gives [0:43] the Iranians, the Iranian military specifically, not only access to the satellite, they essentially [0:49] can control the satellite. They input task orders. They tell the satellite where to look, when to look, [0:54] and, you know, we obtained information showing what they were looking at and what they asked the [1:00] satellite to do. And we found that they targeted or they looked down on American U.S. targets in the [1:07] region, particularly last month. We have data for about a week. And they then hit some of those [1:13] targets after they had looked down on them. And so I think this is very consequential because what we [1:18] know is that the Chinese are providing the Iranians with access to control a satellite themselves that is [1:23] just for them. And that's significant. Yeah, absolutely. As you point out, that is distinct [1:28] from just providing pictures that China may choose to provide, allowing Iran to control the satellite [1:34] to take the pictures themselves to do the targeting. You mentioned that it was U.S. bases, that you were able [1:38] to look at data where you could see that the Iranians were using that satellite to look at U.S. bases that [1:43] they then later targeted. I want to put up a map that you and your colleagues made. These are key sites in the [1:48] region that you saw the satellite look at that were targeted. One of the crucial pieces here is [1:53] that air base in Saudi Arabia, which Iran is targeted at least twice and with devastating precision, [2:00] right? Devastating precision on one of that, those key command and control spy planes, right, [2:04] where they didn't just hit the plane on the runway. They hit the part of the plane where the controls [2:09] were obviously incredible precision on that. How was the satellite used for those? Do you understand? [2:15] Well, what we were able to ascertain, both in terms of information we received, [2:20] which we corroborated by looking at where the satellite was at certain points of time in its [2:25] orbit, is on March 13th, 14th and 15th, that satellite, which is called the T-01B, was looking [2:32] down at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. We believe that the attack on the five refueling [2:38] tankers happened on March 13th. So it gave them a precise look at a big American target. And another [2:45] thing that's worth mentioning is, you know, Iran has some satellite capabilities itself, [2:49] although some have been degraded, but the resolution that they can get is not very good. [2:54] This Chinese satellite has resolution that's at least 10 times better, and in some cases more, [2:59] than the Iranian satellites. It can see down to about half a meter. So that gives you a really [3:04] good ability to target, you know, the things that you want to hit. Yeah, well, and when you talk about [3:09] targeting the exact part of the plane you want to target, which they did, you know. So, [3:14] Captain Shusterman, this is obviously hugely significant. And the White House is specifically [3:20] saying that China's provided no weapons to Iran. And maybe they're being, you know, rhetorical with [3:25] their words, right, to try to not characterize a satellite as a weapon. But the question, Captain, [3:30] is, can Iran use the satellite, as Demetri's describing it, to target U.S. ships involved in [3:37] the blockade of ports? I mean, he's talking about half a meter. It would seem that that would be [3:41] very doable. Well, on the surface, yes. But remember, you have the missiles accuracy as well. [3:50] And when you're walking against a moving target, you've got to pick an aim point that's 10 to 12 [3:54] minutes ahead. And that distance could be 1,200, 1,500 yards. And so if the missile warhead is only [4:03] accurate within 30 meters or 10 meters, then you have a shot. Plus a warship, particularly an age of [4:09] class ship, has the ability to intercept the missile. So it's a threat. I don't want to denigrate [4:15] it. But it's not as serious as for a fixed target like an airfield. Iran's strategy is inflict damage. [4:23] Every critical platform they hit or even near miss delivers a political message back in the United [4:29] States. We no longer produce RC-135s. We no longer produce E-3s. So everyone they take out is years [4:36] away from being replaced. So it's a political message. Think of it that way. [4:40] There's also new reporting that in addition to China supplying or attempting to supply Iran with [4:46] military weapons and missiles, that Iran has been using newly acquired Chinese spy satellites to [4:53] specifically target U.S. bases. So perhaps it is understandable why the president doesn't want to [5:00] address these issues publicly. But in terms of what he needs to do when he speaks with Xi Jinping [5:06] about all of these concerns, what lines need to be drawn about what is acceptable and what isn't? [5:13] And what should the consequences be aside from his consistent tariff threats? [5:19] Well, I think that's a very good question, Brianna. And, you know, I think that President Trump is well [5:23] within his rights when he is speaking to President Xi Jinping to say, look, we're trying to stabilize U.S.-China [5:29] relations. That's the whole point of President Trump's visit there. They want to have a truce on [5:34] tariffs, a truce on supply chains. They want to get back to a more stable commercial and political [5:40] relationship. And I think the U.S. has a strong point to make. The Chinese have denied these allegations [5:46] that they're providing military support for Iran. Well, we hope that those Chinese denials are accurate, [5:53] that they haven't been doing it. I don't know where the truth is here, but the onus is on China now [5:58] not to become a contributing factor to the problems in this war as president, as the U.S. [6:04] administration thinks about a second round of negotiations with the Iranians. [6:09] You brought up an interesting point, Ambassador, in your first answer, this idea that perhaps [6:13] that sort of 10 percent that China gets from Iran, 10 percent of its oil supply that it gets from Iran [6:19] is hopefully, according to the U.S.'s calculations, going to be enough to really put pressure on China [6:25] to persuade the Iranians to come to the negotiating table. Is that likely to happen based on what we [6:31] know about China? I don't think it'll happen in the short term because of the reserves that the [6:37] Chinese have. And some of the vessels that did sail through the Strait of Hormuz in the last few weeks [6:43] before the blockade were Chinese vessels of Costco, the Chinese state shipping company, going with oil [6:50] to the Chinese market. So this will only play out as an action forcing event for the Chinese, [6:57] the lack of Iranian oil in about 30 or 40 days time. So it's a longer time framework here. But I do think [7:05] the Chinese have to think about their larger interests. If they want a stable relationship with the United [7:10] States, they ought not to be giving support to the Iranians and they should be pushing the Iranians [7:15] to agree to a ceasefire, a permanent ceasefire with the United States. And, you know, we do know [7:23] there's a strategic relationship between, among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. That's very well [7:30] known. I don't think the Chinese can have it both ways. The other example of this, China for most of the [7:37] last 20 years was on our side of the table, arguing that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon. The [7:43] Chinese haven't said a word in defense of the U.S. and Europe and Japan and other countries who are [7:50] arguing that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. They've gone silent on that. So I find a basic [7:55] hypocrisy in the Chinese position. Maybe that's not surprising in global politics, but it's still something [8:01] that should be noted. And despite the public posturing, there has to be some concern for Xi Jinping [8:07] to see how quickly the United States was able to act in Venezuela, which had been a partner for China [8:13] as well. And then now closing and controlling the Strait of Wormuz. I'm wondering, again, as Zane noted, [8:21] the perfect guest for this segment, because you also served as U.S. ambassador to NATO, whether it then [8:27] is a gift for Xi Jinping to see the growing rift between the United States and NATO really play out, [8:35] first over Greenland, now obviously only exacerbated with the war in Iran. And Europe, with Germany [8:42] signing off on this, reportedly openly drafting a European NATO fallback plan, if indeed the United [8:50] States starts to pull troops back or play a lesser role in the alliance. What does that mean for players [8:58] like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping? [8:59] It's a really important question. And I think it works both ways, actually. I think on the negative [9:05] side for the Chinese, they didn't stand up for Venezuela, and they couldn't do much to protect [9:11] Iran. They're two strategic partners. And they've also seen the extraordinary effectiveness and [9:16] professionalism of the United States military in both of these theaters. So that has to be kind of [9:21] a lesson for them. But as you say, you know, we've made our own mistakes. I think it's been a major [9:27] mistake by President Trump and the American administration to be so critical of the NATO [9:33] allies. They didn't inform the NATO allies of this war. They didn't even invite NATO to take part. [9:38] It was only when we got into trouble in the Strait of Hormuz they did. So of course the Chinese are [9:43] going to take advantage of this rift in NATO. And it's really in President Trump's interest [9:48] to put aside his grievances with the alliance, form a bigger coalition, try to work with the [9:54] Europeans on what happens after the ceasefire. Same is true of our East Asian allies, Japan and [9:59] South Korea. So the Chinese are trying to exploit that. President Xi Jinping trying to say to the [10:05] rest of the world, I'm now the responsible, stable global leader. President Trump is not. [10:10] So I do think there are positives and negatives if you're looking at where the Chinese are trying to [10:15] gain from this. And we should not be giving gifts to the Chinese by having these, I think, [10:20] quite illogical arguments with the NATO allies. We need NATO and we ought to be more respectful of [10:27] NATO as we go through this. Yeah. And it's worth noting for our international audience that in order [10:32] for the U.S. to pull out of NATO, Trump would actually need Congress. It would need the U.S. Senate. [10:38] But as both you and Biana pointed out, Trump can essentially just sort of contribute less and [10:43] less to the alliance, which is, of course, still a massive problem and something that NATO [10:49] allies, of course, want to avoid. Ambassador, thank you for your very sensible analysis. [10:54] We appreciate it. We hope to have you on again the show very soon. [10:57] Thank you so much. Thank you.