Iran us crisis explained: Hormuz shutdown, nuclear tensions & why diplomacy is failing

[0:00] Our guests, both of them, also in Washington, D.C., [0:02] Sina Azoudi, director of the Middle East Studies programme [0:05] at George Washington University, [0:07] is also the author of Iran and the Bomb, [0:09] the United States, Iran and the Nuclear Question, [0:11] and Alan Eyre, distinguished diplomatic fellow [0:13] at the Middle East Institute [0:15] and a former senior diplomat on the U.S. negotiating team [0:17] for the 2015 JCPOA Iran nuclear deal. [0:21] A very warm welcome to both of you. [0:23] Sina, if I can start with you, [0:24] because given the IRGC's decision [0:26] to slam the Strait of Hormuz closed again [0:29] just hours after President Trump [0:30] has been signalling, you know, a degree of optimism, [0:33] what do you see as the links [0:35] between what's happening in the Strait right now [0:37] and the apparent progress made on the diplomatic front? [0:45] I'm not sure if I can trust [0:47] what President Trump claims to be true. [0:50] President Trump likes to make a lot of claims [0:53] that are not necessarily accurate at all times. [0:57] In fact, when he said that the Iranians [0:59] will give up their uranium, enriched uranium, [1:03] and so on and so forth, [1:05] Iranians 100% denied it. [1:07] I think Iranian response to Iranian decision [1:11] to reclose the Strait of Hormuz [1:13] is the fact that the American side [1:17] continues to do a double blockade [1:21] of the Strait of Hormuz [1:22] as an instrument of coercion. [1:25] So, Iranians who think that this is their biggest card [1:29] in the negotiations or leverage, [1:32] they are—they've decided to reimpose the blockade. [1:37] We are now seeing that there are some reports [1:40] that the U.S. is preparing [1:42] to board Iranian oil tankers. [1:46] That would be another escalation. [1:48] So, I think, you know, yesterday, [1:50] we were going for de-escalation, [1:51] but today we are in the opposite direction, unfortunately. [1:55] An escalation ladder, it's been called. [1:58] Alan, from what I understand, [1:59] you are well known in diplomatic circles [2:02] as the first-ever Persian language spokesperson [2:04] for the U.S. State Department. [2:06] You come at this from a unique position. [2:08] Is it fair to say you represent the diplomatic track [2:10] currently being tested by the military track [2:13] in the last 48 hours? [2:17] Well, there is no diplomatic track. [2:18] I mean, paradoxically, [2:19] I'm going to be less diplomatic than my friend Sina. [2:23] Yeah, diplomacy never really got started, [2:25] and both sides are stuck in what you referred to correctly [2:28] as an escalatory spiral, [2:30] trying to coerce the other side [2:32] into accepting maximalist positions, [2:35] which they're not going to accept. [2:36] So—and also, let's note, [2:38] the strait was never open yesterday. [2:41] Social media postings are not policy. [2:44] Yesterday, about eight tankers went through. [2:47] Most of them were associated with Iran's shadow fleet. [2:52] Normally, about 130 tankers go through the strait each day. [2:55] So, not much changed yesterday [2:58] other than President Trump's rhetoric, [3:00] which, as Sina said, is often just not factually correct. [3:03] Well, Sina, talking about Trump's rhetoric, [3:05] President Trump remarks this morning [3:07] that Iran got a little bit cute [3:10] by reclosing the strait of Amuse [3:12] that Alan said was never really open in the first place. [3:14] I mean, in the Iranian diplomatic lexicon, [3:17] is there any room for a deal [3:19] when the American president characterizes their survival [3:22] based on—based strategy as some sort of game? [3:28] Well, I think, unlike the Trump V1, [3:31] that you had a diplomatic cadre of Iranian professionals [3:36] who spoke the diplomatic language, [3:38] I think that this time around Iranians [3:41] have adapted to President Trump's approach to policy, [3:45] and all you have to do is to look at all the animations [3:49] or all the Lego animations that they put out there [3:54] or the Iranian embassy accounts [3:55] that are trolling President Trump. [3:58] It seems that they are very— [4:00] they have become very effective at it. [4:02] So, I think Iranians have, as I said, [4:05] they've learned how to talk to Donald Trump. [4:08] Even in the past and prior to the negotiations, [4:11] the tweets that came out [4:14] or the posts that came out [4:15] on Iran's foreign ministry accounts [4:17] or Foreign Minister Araqqi, [4:19] they were really attuned [4:21] to reach President Trump's ears. [4:26] They were not effective. [4:27] It failed. [4:28] But I think now Iranians, as I said, [4:30] they've adapted this new strategy. [4:33] And if I may add one more thing, [4:35] look, it is very unfortunate [4:37] that we're seeing that the President of the United States [4:40] has adopted this language. [4:44] One day he calls the Strait of Hormuz, [4:46] the Strait of America. [4:47] The other day, because he's happy, [4:49] he calls it Strait of Iran. [4:51] I think this shouldn't be something [4:53] that the President of the United States do. [4:56] Yeah, I think Scott Bessett [4:57] of the Treasury Department [4:58] called it the Strait of Vermouth the other day, [5:00] which was an unfortunate gaffe. [5:02] Alan, back to you. [5:03] The JCPOA deal took, [5:05] as you mentioned last time I spoke to you, [5:07] five years to hammer out in total. [5:10] How different are the conditions for peace, [5:13] or progress at least now, [5:14] compared to back then? [5:16] The big variable, of course, [5:17] is Donald Trump as the President. [5:22] Well, much, much harder. [5:22] The big variable is not just Donald Trump's personality, [5:25] but the fact that Iran is on the far side of two wars, [5:30] actually still in the second war. [5:31] Last year's 12-day war, [5:33] and also this Operation Epic Fury. [5:36] And as a result of Israeli and U.S. [5:39] decapitation strikes, [5:40] the leadership in Iran right now [5:42] is far less user-friendly for the U.S. [5:45] than one was back then. [5:47] Back in the Obama administration, [5:48] both sides wanted to deal, [5:50] and there was a sufficient level of mutual trust. [5:54] Right now, the U.S. doesn't want to negotiate. [5:56] It wants Iran to surrender. [5:58] And Iran doesn't trust the U.S., [6:00] doesn't trust Israel, [6:02] looking for security guarantees it can't get verbally, [6:05] and also needs a source of revenue [6:07] to make up for the roughly $300 billion [6:09] to a trillion dollars worth of damage [6:11] that the U.S. and Israel have inflicted on it. [6:14] Much tougher. [6:15] Much tougher, indeed. [6:17] Sina, I want to delve down [6:19] into things that you've written about, [6:20] because you have suggested [6:21] that the U.S. may eventually have to learn [6:24] to live with Iran as a nuclear threshold state. [6:27] I mean, given the current erosion of the JCPOA, [6:30] what specific red lines or transparency measures [6:33] do you believe are still achievable [6:36] that would still satisfy Western security concerns [6:39] without requiring the full dismantling [6:42] of Iran's nuclear program, [6:43] which you describe as non-viable? [6:48] Yes, I'll call it non-viable [6:50] and quite impossible [6:51] because over the past two decades, [6:54] Iran has institutionalized its knowledge [6:57] of nuclear enrichment, [6:58] capacity to produce nuclear weapons. [7:01] They've done studies on everything [7:03] that they had to study [7:05] for the production of nuclear weapons. [7:07] They've mastered the enrichment, [7:09] which is theoretically the key technology [7:12] that you needed. [7:13] So I think the best and only viable option [7:17] for the United States [7:18] and rather anyone interested in non-proliferation [7:20] is to ensure that it does, [7:23] first of all, [7:23] Iran does not have the incentive to go for the bomb. [7:26] And second, [7:27] Iran is subject to intrusive inspections under the IAEA. [7:33] But I don't think that any government in Iran, [7:36] any regime in Iran, [7:38] will at this point agree [7:40] to dismantle the enrichment, [7:44] dismantle the nuclear program [7:45] for two reasons. [7:47] One, it is politically very sensitive in Iran. [7:51] And secondly, [7:52] it's a matter of a national dignity for them. [7:55] That's why I don't think [7:56] they will give up [7:57] on the principle of enrichment. [7:59] Now, if there is a moratorium [8:02] for how many years [8:04] that Iran and the U.S. can agree, [8:06] that's fine. [8:07] But the principle of enrichment [8:09] and dismantling the nuclear program [8:11] for Iranians [8:12] is their brightest red line. [8:15] Just following on that, [8:17] those comments from Sina, [8:18] Alan, I mean, [8:19] the president, [8:19] the U.S. president, [8:20] has vowed to get all the nuclear dust [8:22] from damaged Iranian sites. [8:24] I mean, as a negotiator, [8:26] how do you bridge the gap [8:26] between that kind of maximalist rhetoric [8:28] and the technical, [8:30] granular reality, [8:31] as Sina suggested, [8:32] of IAEA inspections? [8:35] Yeah, I mean, [8:37] the brutal truth is [8:38] that's not going to happen [8:39] in any sort of world [8:41] we live in now. [8:43] But you don't need for it to happen [8:44] in order to put [8:45] the Iranian nuclear program [8:46] in a box that precludes them [8:47] from having a nuclear weapon. [8:49] We did that [8:49] under the Obama administration. [8:51] It wasn't the perfect deal, [8:52] but it was viable [8:53] and it served the need. [8:55] It's going to be far harder [8:56] to do that now [8:57] given the current circumstances, [8:59] but just to add on [9:00] what Sina was saying, [9:02] there's a more exigent problem. [9:05] President Trump [9:05] can kick the nuclear can [9:06] down the road. [9:08] Iran wasn't seeking [9:09] a nuclear weapon [9:10] since 2003. [9:12] Of course, [9:12] they might now [9:13] because they've been attacked [9:14] twice in the last year. [9:15] But every day, [9:16] the strait remains closed. [9:18] As I've said previously, [9:19] the economic consequences [9:21] for the global economy [9:22] are compounding. [9:24] And so, [9:25] yes, [9:25] we need to solve [9:26] the nuclear issue, [9:27] but more important [9:28] than that [9:29] in the short term [9:30] is getting [9:31] the strait open. [9:33] Well, [9:34] many thanks to both of you. [9:35] It's been a pleasure [9:36] hearing your analysis [9:37] on all of this. [9:38] Sina is only director [9:39] of the Middle East [9:39] Studies Programme [9:40] at George Washington University [9:42] and Alan Eyre, [9:42] Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow [9:43] at the Middle East Institute [9:44] and former senior diplomat [9:46] on the US negotiating team [9:48] that, of course, [9:48] hammered out [9:49] the JCPOA deal [9:50] back in 2015.