How rebels teamed up to shake Mali and the Kremlin’s grip — The Take

[0:00] today. A wave of attacks, a minister killed, and a capital under siege. [0:05] We have surrounded Bamako. No trucks, cars or even animal-drawn carts will be allowed to [0:11] enter the city. [0:12] What's behind the recent surge of violence in Mali? I'm Oliga Bilal, and this is The Take. [0:18] Hey everyone. If this is your first time catching an episode of The Take, [0:28] stick around. There is much more like this in the pipeline. [0:31] And if you're a tried and true viewer or listener of the podcast, [0:35] we're really glad you're here. Either way, we want to hear from you. Let us know what types of [0:41] stories you want us to cover more of, and what angles you think we should explore. [0:46] Use the comment section to leave your thoughts or reach out on social media. [0:50] We're at AJEPodcasts, and I'm at MMBilal. Now, here's today's show. [0:56] On the morning of April 25th, 2026, people in Bamako woke up to explosions. [1:05] Mali's army says armed groups launched surprise assaults, targeting key military positions in [1:11] Bamako and other regions. [1:12] By the end of that day, Mali's defense minister had been killed, alongside his wife and children, [1:19] when a suicide bomber drove a car into their home. [1:23] During the intense fighting, he was wounded and then transported to the hospital, [1:28] where he unfortunately succumbed to his injuries. [1:30] Mali's army said in a statement, it had killed, quote, several hundred assailants and repelled the [1:49] assault. [1:49] But before a single shot was fired, more than five million people in Mali were already [2:07] in humanitarian need. To understand what's unfolding in Mali, I spoke to someone who's [2:13] been following it all closely. [2:15] I'm Beverly Ochen. I'm a senior analyst. I work with control risks, doing political analysis, [2:21] looking at the Francophone region. And I'm based in Senegal, in Dhaka. [2:25] Well, Beverly, it's good to have you back on The Take. Welcome. [2:30] Thank you. [2:30] As you mentioned, you consult organizations that work in the broader Sahel region, [2:36] which has been really unstable for years now, to the point where it's been dubbed the coup belt. [2:43] And today, we're going to zoom in on Mali. Mali has been in crisis for more than a decade. [2:50] But last Saturday, it made international headlines again. [2:54] What were you hearing from people you know in Mali? [2:57] So, I woke up on Saturday to a flurry of WhatsApp messages, both from people who I have [3:03] previously worked with, who are based in Bamako, the capital, but also from people who would be [3:08] sharing information with us on what is going on at any given time. [3:11] It was very chaotic. At first, it was about the fact that there had been some attacks being carried [3:18] out by militant groups. One of my friends was actually moving out of their house on that [3:23] particular day. And I asked him if he was okay, if he thinks he'll be able to move. And he was quite, [3:28] you know, this is just how things might be. So, he will try and get his things together. [3:32] Wow. And then, obviously, within our own network here in Senegal, many of us are always [3:37] found in the situation in Mali and in the wider Sahel region. So, we were texting each other to [3:41] see if we have checked in on people that we know, who were aware that there had been simultaneous [3:46] attacks in various parts of the country. And before that attack took place, or this incident took [3:52] place, there had been some warning signs that things had been building up. And sometimes you kind of [3:57] adapt to certain risks because you've been watching something happening for a very long time. [4:02] But of course, there's always the disruption to people's lives. [4:05] Mm. Okay. So, the signs were there. But that doesn't necessarily mean, of course, [4:11] that you knew that this was going to happen, that the defense minister was going to be killed. So, [4:15] walk us through, if you could, what actually went down once you got clarity between [4:21] the flurry of WhatsApp messages from people in Mali. [4:24] Well, yeah. So, on Saturday, there are two groups that launched simultaneous attacks in [4:30] different parts of Mali. So, that is in Bamako, near the airport, where the airbase is, in the [4:36] military headquarters in Kati, which is about 15 kilometers north, in the central town of Sivare, [4:41] where there is a large military base. And then, there are two key towns in the northern region, [4:46] Kidal and Gao. The groups involved were Al-Qaeda's junim outfit. It is the [4:51] Sahel branch, and the Azawad Liberation Front, which is a separatist movement based on the north. [4:57] They carried out simultaneous attacks against military and security forces. [5:02] And then, eventually, it emerged that there had been a suicide car bomb that was driven at the [5:06] home of the defense minister, which led to his death. There was uncertainty about the whereabouts [5:12] of the interim president, Asimi Goita, and also his intelligence chief, who had eventually been [5:19] injured by these attacks. The news coming out was quite unclear. The government did issue several [5:25] statements. One, to reassure the public that they were actively fighting against the groups that had [5:31] attacked them. Another, to just call for calm and for people not to panic. The Malian army has said the [5:38] situation is under control and urged citizens to remain calm. Clean-up operations were underway, [5:44] it said, adding that several attackers had been neutralized. [5:47] OK. So, to make sure I have this right, the two groups who carried out these attacks [5:55] together should, by most measures, be enemies, because it sounds like they have two very different [6:01] aims. Janem is the Al-Qaeda affiliate whose stated goal is to impose its interpretation of Islamic law [6:08] across Mali. The Azawad Liberation Front, which is also known as the FLA, is this Touareg separatist [6:16] movement that describes itself as secular and republican. They have fought each other in the past, [6:23] but they've also coordinated before. And you're saying they're doing it again, or at least they [6:26] did it again during these attacks. Why did they coordinate in these attacks, and why is the government [6:32] their common enemy? Well, yes. I mean, as you pointed out, the government is their common enemy. [6:39] For Janem, the militant group, they have constantly challenged successive governments in Mali ever since [6:45] they formed in 2017. It's an offshoot of four different groups that had been based in northern [6:50] and central Mali, so they're able to draw support and recruit from these two regions. [6:56] For the FLA, it has had a long-standing call for the independence of the northern region. [7:01] This softened towards calling for autonomy, representation in the northern part of the [7:06] country. When the military government came into power, so first seizing power in 2020 in a coup, [7:11] and then again in 2021, initially their plan had been to implement a peace agreement that had been [7:17] signed between the FLA, as it had been formed before, and the government. Part of it was for fighters [7:24] in the separatist group to move into the military ranks. But as there were divisions over how this deal [7:31] would be implemented, the government decided that they will do away with it, and so confrontations [7:36] began again. Now, these confrontations meant that there were a new flashpoint of violence. The [7:42] government was not just fighting against Janem, but now also fighting against the FLA. Over time, [7:49] it did seem as if there was some loose coordination between the FLA and Janem, especially when the [7:56] government was moving towards the north. There was one particular incident in 2024 which seemed to [8:02] suggest strong lines of coordination, where Janem and the FLA separately claimed a massive attack [8:09] against Russian paramilitaries in Kidal, in Tinzawaten. And then afterwards, in 2025, it seemed [8:15] as if they were formalizing a form of cooperation to oppose the government. And they do need each other in [8:21] some ways tactically because, of course, Janem entirely on its own would not be able to take [8:27] on the government. The FLA on its own is not able to take on the government. But if they can coordinate [8:32] logistically, military support, even not necessarily ideologically, but in terms of their opposition [8:38] to the government, then that gives them more leeway to then fight against this military government, [8:44] which is what we now saw culminating this past weekend. [8:47] Oh, wow. It's complicated, but you broke that down so well, um, that it makes sense what we have [8:55] just seen take place. But you mentioned a country that some might be wondering, what is Russia doing [9:01] here? And we should talk about it. Because one of the countries currently right now calling for [9:06] stability in Mali is Russia. Russia has had a presence in the country since the military government [9:12] expelled France and the United Nations from Mali after that first coup. And there was real support [9:20] for this taking place in Mali. [9:22] Thousands of people rallied in Bamako on Wednesday to voice support for Mali's army rulers. [9:28] The protesters chanted slogans denouncing former colonial ruler France, [9:32] while some were seen waving Russian flags. [9:35] People were exhausted by over a decade of French intervention that had left them less safe. [9:42] The military called on Russia to help fill this gap. Based on what we're seeing, though, [9:47] how would you describe Russia's role in this? Is it doing what it was intended to do? [9:54] I mean, not so far. Russia came in at a point where they presented themselves as being able to plug [10:01] in a gap that had been there when the UN and the French were asked to leave the country. [10:05] But Russia's presence in the country actually stretches back to 2021. [10:11] The newly installed Junta turned its back on long-standing strategic alliances with former [10:15] colonial power France and sought new partnerships. And the Russian mercenary group Wagner stepped in, [10:22] presenting itself as a solution to the country's security woes. [10:26] But it hasn't been the case. There were 2,000 forces who were deployed into the country, [10:31] compared with 20,000 UN and French forces and other European forces. [10:36] That's a really big gap. Initially, they were focused on the central regions of Mali, [10:41] trying to discharge militants. They progressively moved to the north. But that left the cover gap [10:46] in the south, which is where it is economically important for Mali. There are mining operations [10:52] there. This is where most of the exports coming into Bamako would be going into to serve the rest of [10:57] the country. When this gap emerged, it allowed Janim to be able to tilt towards this region. [11:03] So as the army in Russia were focusing on the north, Janim was able to start making inroads [11:09] further into other parts of the country, which hadn't been the case before. Now, the Russian paramilitaries [11:15] are interesting. When they came in as the Wagner group in late 2021, they had been accused of being [11:21] very heavy handed in their tactics. You know, there were allegations of human rights abuses. [11:26] The Malian government did deny this. They said that they are working with Russian instructors to [11:32] train the military forces. They now modified into what is called the Africa Corps, which is directly [11:39] under the interim president, Asimi Goita. They've become more risk averse. They often apparently need [11:45] guarantees before they can be deployed to high risk zones. And so this past weekend, one of the most, [11:52] I suppose, devastating aspects of that counterinsurgency with the Russians was that they [11:57] easily ceded ground in Kidal. Now, it shows you that Russia is quite flexible. Ultimately, I think that [12:04] whichever party prevails, whether it's the military government, whether it's the armed groups, [12:09] Russia would fold itself to suit its operations there as long as it still has its own interests in place. [12:16] Oh, man. You know, Beverly, you said they easily ceded ground. There are videos [12:21] of this happening that we can see that are circulating online over the weekend of the Russian [12:27] mercenaries leaving that northern town, Kidal, that they had held since 2023. And they were granted [12:33] safe passage in exchange for handing their weapons to the fighters. Russian mercenaries, once feared [12:41] and portrayed as powerful, driven out after surrendering their weapons to local Tuareg rebels [12:47] and armed groups linked to al-Qaeda. Watching, the Tuaregs wave the flag of Azawad, the homeland [12:54] they want to create in northern Mali. Have you seen those videos? What do you make of them? [12:59] Yes, I did see the videos. I mean, the first thought for me was this is self-preservation because they would, [13:06] as I said, they're very risk-averse. They do not want to be engaged in all-out confrontations [13:10] with the armed groups. They're not real stakeholders in the Malian conflict, if you think about it. [13:15] These are Malian groups, Malian individuals. Russia can willingly step away and leave it to them and [13:22] leave this war for them to try to either reconcile, negotiate or fight. So in this case, it was an issue [13:29] of flight. But it tells you a lot about the kind of broader strategy we're likely to see with Russia. [13:34] There might be some thinking around, maybe Russia is not the only answer to this insurgency. [13:38] You know, Beverly, as you're talking, I'm just thinking none of this sounds safe. None of this [13:45] sounds good for the civilians, the everyday people, the people like your friend who's in the middle of [13:49] a move when all of this went down. So I want to talk about who is supposed to be keeping them safe, [13:56] because the current military government came into power, as you mentioned, in a couple of coups starting [14:00] in 2020 and then 2021. And their entire justification for seizing power and then [14:06] delaying elections has been security, protecting people from armed groups. But as a part of that [14:12] protection, human rights organizations say that in the last few years, government forces in Mali have [14:19] killed up to twice as many civilians than the groups they claim to be fighting, something that the [14:25] government has previously denied. So how has the military government actually been delivering [14:32] on the promise of security? [14:34] I mean, that's been challenging for the government, certainly. Partly because [14:39] being able to build the capacity of the army, being able to acquire enough equipment, being able to [14:45] recruit, being able to deploy, has been constrained by various issues, key among them financial factors, [14:51] and a limitation of partners. By getting rid of the Western coalition and forces, whether it was France, [14:57] whether it was the UN, it meant that there was a bit of a deficit and it was an acrimonious handover. [15:03] It had been planned for a long time, but the circumstances under which it happened made it quite [15:07] difficult for there to be a clear handover so that these armies are ready to take on defense for their own [15:14] people. In the long run, civilians will likely be caught in the crossfire. What is interesting about [15:20] the latest pattern of violence, in particular by the al-Qaeda group Janim, is they have overtly asked [15:25] civilians to stay away. Abu Hudayfi al-Bambari, an al-Qaeda-linked commander speaking in Bambara, [15:33] issues a stark warning to residents. He says he's not here to fight civilians, but Malian forces. [15:41] Anyone who wants to leave can take their belongings and go. [15:44] But it's very difficult for you to stay away when you're caught between forces that are trying to [15:49] fight against militants and armed groups or militant groups that are also targeting [15:54] you if they perceive you to be working with the government. And then there's also the fear of [15:58] reprisals, right? Part of the reason why the insurgency in Mali and across the Sahel [16:02] has been extremely difficult is it does lead to tensions between communities that would ideally [16:08] coexist. But because of their alignment, it then puts them in crossfire with one another. [16:14] Well, staying with the people, we know that the overall humanitarian need in Mali is really [16:24] astounding. The United Nations puts the number of people in need at around 5 million people. [16:30] There'll definitely be more pressure, humanitarian pressure, especially if people do find themselves [16:36] being displaced by subsequent incidents of violence taking place. And this is particularly like the [16:41] central region where displacements have been quite frequent as a result of the continuous fighting [16:47] between the military and with the militant groups. And in a world where now we're seeing [16:52] humanitarian aid in and of itself is changing, whereby governments are not making, especially [16:57] Western governments, are reducing their contributions. The pressure goes back down to the government. [17:03] For the Malian government, their big priority has been spending on defence. So social issues such as health, [17:09] education sometimes may fall on the wayside. And it's interesting also because these are the dynamics [17:15] that either feed back into violence because then people are marginalised and not able to get [17:20] sustenance, do not have socio-economic opportunities. And this is another thing that militant groups like [17:27] Janim then use to capitalise, to recruit people into their ranks because they then pledge beyond just their [17:33] ideology, they offer payments, they offer certain benefits. So it feeds into a whole cycle of violence in and of [17:40] itself. [17:41] Mm. Well, Beverly, it also begs the question, where is that money coming from? And so I want to tackle [17:48] that for a bit if we can, because the Prime Minister of Mali, Abdoulaye Maiga, went to visit the injured, [17:56] and he condemned these attacks. And he also said in this statement that it's clear without the support of [18:03] sponsors, these attacks couldn't have been carried out. [18:18] And I bring this up because there is this claim that's circulating on social media right now, picked up by Russian [18:25] state media. It boils down to this. France had a hand in these attacks. French intelligence was somehow involved in [18:33] planning or enabling them. Of course, we cannot independently verify those claims that are circulating on social media, [18:39] as I said. But what does the evidence actually show about where that financing could be coming from? [18:45] I mean, it's very complex. And a lot of it is both circumstantial and also just the way that these groups operate. [18:53] And I think Janim has a fairly, it's a very opaque, but robust financial model. Beyond, again, ideology, [19:02] they are economic stakeholders in certain places. So gold mines in the northern parts of the country, [19:08] they oversee security there. So they are able to get concessions and they're able to trade that in the [19:13] legal markets. They do have active ways of generating income. These allegations are tied to [19:21] some of the perceived links between France in particular and groups like the FLA, whereby when [19:28] France did come in in 2013 in Mali to intervene against the insurgency at the time, there were some [19:35] perceptions that they had favorable treatment towards the separatist groups in the north. [19:41] That it limited the government's own entry into this region to assert state authority. And these [19:48] are fed into some of the resentment that is seen in how these groups have either continued to be pushed [19:53] out of national political processes or to underpin the view of how Janim and the FLA are operating. [20:00] Well, finally, Beverly, you know, we mentioned at the beginning that you consult organizations on [20:06] political risk. And you've been very busy over these last few days, of course, because the risk is very [20:14] high when it comes to the events that have just unfolded in Mali, with no end in the foreseeable future. [20:23] So what would it take for there to be an end for people in Mali, for the organizations that you work with [20:28] who work there, for the friends that you have there, for them to get what they actually want most, [20:35] which is a government that delivers real security and economic prosperity? [20:39] I mean, ultimately, it does hinge back on the government that is in place and whether they [20:45] are willing to be able to either concede power and concede institutional control, which is one thing [20:51] that this particular military government has not really been very open to. But another is also the [20:56] kind of support that this government gets both from the regional and international community [21:02] in order to then build its own capacity to govern in a way that is broadly acceptable. [21:09] One of the things that we've been playing out is the scenarios of what's likely to happen in the [21:12] coming days and how do people then adjust themselves to those scenarios. The worst case is obviously if [21:18] we do have a real siege on the capital in Bamako, where people are not able to get supplies [21:24] for periods of time, where there's periodic incidents between the militant groups and the army, [21:30] and what risk this poses to people who might be just moving around trying to get, maybe it's their [21:34] daily supplies for that moment, or maybe they're moving through a checkpoint, or they're trying to [21:38] get to the airport to travel somewhere. These are risks that will remain. Another issue is whether [21:45] businesses can continue to operate, because social economic well-being is still important for stability. [21:50] You need to have people engage in activities which then make their lives worthwhile. There's also [21:57] the pragmatic thinking around what happens if there is a rupture in the government itself. One of the [22:02] things that could be brewing in the background is a change in power, which then allows the Malian [22:07] government to either negotiate with the groups that are behind the recent weekend of attacks and find [22:14] the political mediation. But that's also very long term. When a group like Janim has so violently [22:20] occupied various parts of the country, it's a bit of a bitter pill to swallow for you to say that [22:25] it's okay. We can coexist side by side, especially if there's no clarity on how do we reconcile [22:31] some of the things that you have done that may have harmed us or may have harmed the country's [22:36] reputation and view in the world. [22:37] Mm. Beverly, thank you for walking us through all of that. [22:44] Thank you as well for having me.