Try Free

How far is Iran willing to go to protect its friends and allies? — Inside Story

April 10, 2026 28m 4,068 words
▶ Watch original video

About this transcript: This is a full AI-generated transcript of How far is Iran willing to go to protect its friends and allies? — Inside Story, published April 10, 2026. The transcript contains 4,068 words with timestamps and was generated using Whisper AI.

"Iran is demanding an end to attacks on Hezbollah, while Israel and the U.S. say Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire. Iran's regional allies have already been degraded. So with the future of Hezbollah at stake, can Tehran afford to compromise? And what does that mean for its influence? This is..."

[0:00] Iran is demanding an end to attacks on Hezbollah, while Israel and the U.S. say Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire. [0:08] Iran's regional allies have already been degraded. [0:11] So with the future of Hezbollah at stake, can Tehran afford to compromise? [0:16] And what does that mean for its influence? [0:18] This is Inside Story. [0:35] Hello again, I'm James Bayes. [0:37] For decades, Iran has been cultivating what it calls the axis of resistance. [0:42] It's a coalition of armed groups backed by Tehran's money and weapons. [0:48] They aim to tip the scales of regional power in Iran's favour. [0:52] But that influence looks to be on shaky ground. [0:54] Israeli forces are expanding their invasion in southern Lebanon and bombarding Beirut. [1:00] They say it's part of a campaign to eliminate Hezbollah. [1:03] So could Hezbollah be a sticking point in ceasefire negotiations between the U.S. and Iran? [1:09] And how far is Iran willing to go to back its allies? [1:12] We'll put those questions and others to our panel of guests in a moment. [1:16] But first, this report from Michael Appel. [1:20] The Israeli military says it hit more than 100 targets across Lebanon on Wednesday. [1:27] Daylight revealed the aftermath of one of its heaviest bombardments since early March, [1:32] when Hezbollah attacked Israel in response to the assassination of Iran's supreme leader. [1:37] Ostensibly, a ceasefire had been in effect in Lebanon since November 2024, [1:43] but the Israeli military violated it daily. [1:47] And despite Iran's objection, the ceasefire with the U.S. [1:51] hasn't stopped the Israeli assault on Hezbollah or its invasion of southern Lebanon, [1:57] putting Tehran in a difficult position, [2:00] caught between support for its ally and a path out of the war. [2:03] Our choice is to confront them to the utmost degree of self-sacrifice. [2:10] We will not surrender. [2:12] We will defend ourselves with our capabilities and our faith, no matter the sacrifice. [2:17] It's that resistance to Israeli occupation that led to the founding of Hezbollah, [2:23] with Iranian funding and training 44 years ago. [2:27] Israel assassinated its longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, [2:31] in an airstrike in September 2024. [2:34] Hamas in Gaza is another armed group that's received significant Iranian support. [2:41] Israel killed its founders, Ahmed Yasin and Abdulaziz Al-Rantisi, back in 2004, [2:48] and more recently several senior officials during the war on Gaza, [2:52] among them Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. [2:57] Instrumental in Iran's ability to build up these proxies in the region [3:00] was the Quds Force, led for decades by Qasem Soleimani. [3:06] Qasem Soleimani has been killed and his bloody rampage is now forever. [3:15] Iran also maintains influence in neighboring Iraq through a network of armed groups, [3:21] including Qatayb Hezbollah, established after the 2003 U.S. invasion. [3:26] Many of these groups are interwoven into the Iraqi government and security forces [3:33] under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces. [3:37] Another lever of influence at Tehran's disposal is the Ansarallah movement, [3:43] known as the Houthis. [3:44] Their location in Yemen places them within striking distance of Israel [3:48] and enables them to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea through the Babal-Mandab choke point. [3:54] Collectively, these Iranian-backed groups are known as the Axis of Resistance. [4:00] Although degraded by years of Israeli and U.S. attacks, [4:04] they have proved they're still capable of waging asymmetric warfare against military superpowers. [4:10] Mike Lappel, Al Jazeera, for Inside Story. [4:17] Well, let's take a closer look at that relationship between Iran and its regional allies now [4:22] with our panel of guests who are joining us. [4:24] And with me in the studio is Hassan Ahmadiyan, Associate Professor at the University of Tehran. [4:30] He specializes in Iranian foreign policy. [4:34] From Bologna in Italy, we're joined by Rob Geist-Penfold. [4:37] He's a lecturer in international security at King's College London. [4:41] And in Paris, Nadine Khoury, the Executive Director of the Arab Reform Initiative. [4:46] Thank you all for joining us on Inside Story. [4:49] Let me start with you, Hassan. [4:52] And let's start with a big picture question. [4:54] How important is what we know as the Axis of Resistance? [4:59] How important is that to Iran and in its foreign policy strategy? [5:04] Well, it's very important, taking into account that Israel and the United States, [5:10] two nuclear powers, with obvious hostility towards Iran and the war that we saw just, [5:17] you know, the ceasefire starting, but not in Lebanon. [5:21] All of that is very important to Iran because these two don't hide their intentions towards Iran. [5:28] Also, they don't hide their intentions towards Lebanon, towards the Palestinians, [5:32] towards many of these parties that are party to the axis of resistance. [5:38] So there is a common goal of standing up to U.S. impositions in the region and Israeli occupation [5:47] in Palestine, but also around it in southern Lebanon, in Syria, elsewhere. [5:52] And so that common goal brought these groups together to balance off the threat of Israel [5:58] and, in extension, the Israeli, the American threat. [6:02] And so it's, you know, strategically very much important to Iran, [6:06] but also to these parties who have their national agenda. [6:10] In Lebanon, Hezbollah has the South that is under occupation. [6:14] In Palestine, Palestinian struggle, you know, it dates way earlier than the Iranian Revolution of 79. [6:23] So to call them proxies defies the logic that they have their own national agenda. [6:29] But they are connected to Iran because there is a common and shared goal of standing up to occupation [6:35] and also U.S. presence that is, that has been harmful to all of them. [6:41] Nadim, I mean, this is at the center right now of the diplomacy that is supposed to take place [6:48] because the war with Iran, the bombardment by the U.S. and Israel, has ended for now. [6:56] But the war in Lebanon has not. [6:59] And Iran says the deal was that that had to end too. [7:06] Exactly. [7:07] And I think that the real point of tension here is for these groups, [7:12] between the agenda that is Iranian versus the agenda that is national, [7:19] how much weight is given to each one of these elements. [7:24] Sometimes they may be aligned, for instance, when Hezbollah was liberating southern Lebanon. [7:30] But there have been other instances since then where it clearly, Hezbollah has favored points [7:38] that go more, you know, has prioritized the Iranian part of its strategy as opposed to a purely national strategy. [7:46] So, for instance, when Israel was violating the ceasefire after 2024, [7:51] Hezbollah did not respond almost for a year and a half. [7:56] And it was only when the Supreme Leader Khamenei was actually assassinated that Hezbollah entered into the force. [8:05] And of course, same issue happened in 2000 when the Israeli army receded. [8:10] Hezbollah should have turned at that point to the Lebanese state and said, [8:13] look, I did all of this, but now we need to build a national strategy of defense. [8:18] They didn't do that. [8:20] And I think that's the core point. [8:22] And again, the different groups are not the same. [8:25] So maybe where the balance is with Hezbollah is different than where the Houthis are, [8:29] which is also different where some of the Iraqi groups are. [8:32] Rob, I mean, one of the reasons we're talking so much about this is obviously the bombardment in Lebanon. [8:39] I'll come to that in a moment. [8:40] But the fact that Trump accepted the Iranian plan, not accepted the points in it, [8:47] but accepted it as a basis for negotiation in Islamabad. [8:52] These 10 points, which are pretty maximalist if you look at them in full, that Iran wants. [8:59] But Trump said, and I quote, we received a 10 point presupposal from Iran. [9:04] And I believe it's a workable basis on which to negotiate. [9:07] Now, among those 10 points, an end of the war against all components of the axis of resistance. [9:14] That's one of the things that Iran is demanding in these points. [9:17] Well, this goes way further than the Iran deal back in 2015. [9:22] This is something that the U.S. wouldn't discuss then, would it? [9:25] It was only going to discuss the nuclear side of things. [9:31] Right. [9:31] And this is the issue with this so-called ceasefire overall, in that not only is it contentious in itself, [9:40] what remains even more contentious is the fact that no one seems to agree about what everyone agreed about or didn't agree about. [9:49] So, yes, you know, you're right to mention, James, that Trump said that these 10 points were the basis for negotiation. [9:55] We've since heard from Caroline Levitt, the White House press secretary, [9:59] saying that the 10 points that the U.S. agreed to were not the 10 points that Iran presented publicly. [10:06] So the fact of the matter is, is that we don't know what Iran and the U.S. actually agreed to. [10:11] We don't know what both sides think they agreed to. [10:15] And then you have the added complication, which is particularly pertinent to Lebanon, [10:20] that various parties to the conflict were not represented at the table. [10:25] The Gulf states were not represented at the table, but also Israel was not represented at the table. [10:30] Now, you had Netanyahu come out in a face-saving press conference and say, you know, [10:35] we were consulted, we were involved, we agreed to this ceasefire. [10:38] But looking at reality, the reality in Lebanon, this looks like another case of Israel agreeing to something verbally or on paper, [10:48] but then in practice imposing facts on the ground that seek to change that status quo. [10:53] So I think it's particularly significant that Israel's attacks on Lebanon yesterday were fiercer than we've seen for a very, very long time, [11:01] leading to a significant death toll, the majority of them civilians. [11:04] This is not just about going after Hezbollah. [11:08] You could argue there's a broader strategy at play here. [11:12] That is to put so much stress on the ceasefire that it collapses. [11:16] And I think that is Israel's game plan. [11:19] And unfortunately, Lebanon is once again a pawn in this broader game, [11:25] this power play between Israel and, of course, Iran. [11:29] And it's the Lebanese people who are once again paying the high price. [11:32] Hassan, would you agree with that? [11:35] I mean, the bombardment that we've seen, the worst so far in the war, [11:40] the bombardment of Lebanon led to criticism from some of the U.S.'s close allies. [11:46] France and the U.K. and the European Union have condemned the scale of the bombing. [11:52] I mean, is Israel now trying to destroy the ceasefire with this bombing? [11:58] I think, as we had a discussion before, Israel is bombing the ceasefire through Lebanon. [12:03] By bombing Lebanon, it wants to derail everything. [12:07] And I think we have two parties in the negotiations, not negotiations, [12:12] the back and forth between Iran and the United States with Pakistan as the mediator. [12:18] Pakistan, the mediator, and Iran put Lebanon's name as part of this ceasefire. [12:25] So we are seeing a clear violation of that ceasefire. [12:28] The Americans are saying, no, it wasn't. [12:30] But according to the prime minister in Pakistan, it was. [12:35] And according to the Iranian, it was. [12:37] And so the Iranians are talking about stopping the process that started yesterday, [12:43] that is the ceasefire. [12:44] That's a hard call because that would be giving Israel what it wants. [12:50] But I think the Iranians have made it clear they will not leave Lebanon [12:55] and let it suffer under Israeli bombardment constantly. [13:01] Either the two countries go out of the war together, [13:05] or I think we are up for more escalation. [13:08] Because strategically, Iran has seen, after 7th of October, [13:14] Israeli expanded from one file to the other, to the other, [13:18] until reaching Iran and imposing a war and yet another war after eight months. [13:23] Because there was no unity in this action against Israel [13:30] and its provocations around Palestine and Lebanon and elsewhere. [13:34] And so that strategic mentality is telling the Iranians, [13:39] we cannot leave Lebanon under bombardment. [13:43] We have to do something about it. [13:44] Ergo, you could hear talks about closure of the Strait of Hormuz, [13:49] even worse than before. [13:51] And then, of course, threats by Majid Mousavi, [13:55] the head of the Aerospace Division, [13:57] responsible for the missiles and drone programs, [13:59] the main pillars of Iran's military capabilities, [14:04] that hitting Lebanon is hitting Iran and we will not stand aside. [14:08] And so we are going, I think, towards escalation unless [14:12] and until the United States leashes Israel. [14:16] Nadim, I think it's worth giving a little bit of context for our viewers on this, [14:21] because Hezbollah was already damaged and degraded. [14:26] Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, killed in 2024. [14:30] And the rest of this so-called axis of resistance [14:34] is nowhere near as powerful as it once was, [14:37] because it used to include the Assad regime in Syria until that fell. [14:43] And, of course, in Gaza, Hamas has been seriously weakened. [14:47] Yes, the axis of resistance has been weakened. [14:53] And it's also been weakened, frankly, [14:55] because there is less support outside of its usual supporters in the Shia community, [15:04] in large part because Hezbollah, for instance, [15:07] intervened in the war in Syria against Syrians by supporting Assad and others. [15:13] And also in Lebanon, Hezbollah, for instance, is accused. [15:19] And there is a lot of evidence that they were definitely part [15:22] or facilitated some of the assassinations about 10 or 15 years ago. [15:28] And they stood up against the protesters in Lebanon in 2019 [15:31] that wanted to see a reform of the system. [15:33] So the axis of resistance gets a bit more complicated, the story. [15:42] In part, no one wants, I mean, everyone recognizes Israeli war crimes. [15:46] Everyone recognizes the harm that Israel has done to all of Lebanon, [15:51] continues to do, and the occupation. [15:53] And the Lebanese want to see their land liberated. [15:56] The problem is Lebanon does not want to see its sovereign decision [16:00] of entering war and peace, being hijacked by Iran. [16:04] And this is what's happening here. [16:06] So Hezbollah decided first to enter war against Israel [16:10] to support Hamas after October 7th, [16:15] and now to re-attack Israel while the, you know, [16:20] in support and in revenge for the assassination of Khamenei. [16:23] Now, no one is denying that Israel has, as well, [16:28] aggressive intentions towards Lebanon. [16:30] But the best strategy, the sovereign strategy, [16:33] is something that Lebanon should decide. [16:36] And Iran is acting as if there is no Lebanese government. [16:40] The actual Lebanese government, where Hezbollah is represented, [16:43] took a decision to declare the Iranian ambassador persona non grata. [16:48] Now, Iran may like this decision, or it may not like this decision, [16:52] but this is a democratically elected, legitimate government [16:56] where everyone is represented. [16:58] And what does Iran do? [16:59] They decide to ignore that decision. [17:02] OK. [17:03] This is the real fundamental issue. [17:05] Iran has to respect Lebanon as a state. [17:07] You made some important points there, Nadeem. [17:08] Let me bring in Hassan there. [17:10] So Hezbollah is not the Lebanese government. [17:15] It's just one element of Lebanese society. [17:18] It's very powerful militarily, but it can't make decisions for all of Lebanon. [17:23] It's wrong, isn't it? [17:24] Of course. [17:25] I mean, the Lebanese went for a ceasefire eight months ago, [17:29] nine months ago, after Israel... [17:32] I'm sorry, before the Iran war. [17:35] They went for a ceasefire, and it continued for 15 months. [17:39] And during all this time, the Israelis never cease to attack Lebanon. [17:46] We have Israel cats, the Israeli defence minister, talking about Israel getting ready to attack [17:54] Lebanon, but Lebanon started it before their timing. [17:59] And so, you know, talks of Lebanon, Hezbollah putting all Lebanon at risk, I think, defies that [18:08] So why did Hezbollah fire this time, Hassan, at the beginning of the war, 2nd of March, [18:13] when it didn't during the war last year, the 12-day war? [18:17] And is that because the orders came from Tehran? [18:19] It didn't. [18:20] Actually, my understanding of why they entered is that violations kept ongoing. [18:28] Roughly 400 people were assassinated during this so-called ceasefire. [18:34] It was a one-sided ceasefire. [18:35] They wanted to be in this with Iran, to be part of the negotiations afterward. [18:42] And the Iranians seem to be listening to that and insisting on it, that Lebanon is part of it. [18:48] We won't go for a ceasefire without Lebanon. [18:51] We hear all Iranian officials. [18:53] There seem to be no daylight within Iran on the need to support Lebanon against Hezbollah, [19:00] against Israel, because that would defy the logic of this alliance. [19:07] But another point that was mentioned, I think after the war last year and the year before against Hezbollah and against Iran, [19:16] the talks of Iran and Hezbollah being weakened was proliferated in the media. [19:22] And I think that was part of the logic that the Americans were convinced by the Israelis to attack them [19:28] because they were on their knees, they needed the final blow. [19:31] And so we saw what they did in this war, including Hezbollah and Iran. [19:35] Let me bring in Rob, if I may. [19:38] Rob, there's a big question here of how independent these groups that are the axis of resistance are from Tehran. [19:47] Would you say when you look at them that Hezbollah is the most loyal of these groups? [19:54] Because there are reports that there are Iranian officers in Hezbollah. [20:02] Absolutely, James. [20:03] Hezbollah is, you know, the original, I guess, minister, client or ally of Iran, [20:09] whatever you want to call it, within the axis of resistance. [20:12] Remember, it was started, as you mentioned earlier in the program, [20:15] because of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. [20:18] So it was a way for Iran to project its power and its influence. [20:24] They are also, of course, they share an ideological affinity, too, [20:30] more so than other groups, for example, like Hamas, who are Sunni Muslims, [20:35] or the Houthis, who are Zaidis, who, despite being Shia, [20:38] is a very different type of Shia to the predominant religion in Iran, for example. [20:44] So there is an ideological component here and a very, very long history. [20:49] Both sides have fought together in, for example, the Syrian civil war. [20:54] So this goes back a very, very long way. [20:57] But I just want to stress here that when we're talking about the axis of resistance, [21:02] the axis of resistance is something that I think is less important in Iranian strategic planning lately. [21:08] We saw in 2024, in April and October, Iran directly attack Israel for the first time [21:16] in order to defend the axis of resistance. [21:19] This was Iran completely inverting the entire strategy here, [21:23] because the whole point of the axis of resistance is to project power and deter Israel [21:28] without inviting retaliation on itself. [21:30] Those attacks, that attempt by Iran to project deterrence, spectacularly failed. [21:35] They did not do enough damage on Israel, and they painted a target on themselves. [21:40] That led us to the 12-day war, and of course, that led us to the most recent conflict as well. [21:45] And that explains Iran's behavior in that recent conflict. [21:49] It is a direct response to the failure of the axis of resistance, [21:53] in that you now have Iran trying to cause so much chaos, [21:56] using U.S. base as an excuse to attack all the GCC states, [22:00] that is causing so much chaos in order to try and restore its deterrent at a state-on-state level. [22:06] It is no longer reliant on the axis of resistance. [22:09] It is trying to do as much damage as it can itself. [22:12] Nadim, we had a discussion when we were planning this program [22:15] of which was the most powerful of these groups. [22:19] Is it Hezbollah? [22:20] Is it the forces in Iraq, because there's a very long border [22:25] and very shared interests with Iraq and Iran and the Shia community in Iran? [22:31] Or is it actually the Houthis? [22:33] Now, the Houthis are further away geographically, [22:36] but strategically, they have real power, do they not? [22:43] They do. [22:43] But look, even a weakened Hezbollah remains, I think, for Iran, the crown jewel [22:49] because of the organic links that exist between Hezbollah and Iran, [22:53] which don't exist with the Houthis. [22:56] So you can't, you know, you're not fully comparing apples to apples. [23:00] Hezbollah believes in the wilayat al-faqir, [23:02] which is a challenge for Lebanese sovereignty [23:04] when you have a key political party that ultimately believes [23:08] in a political entity that is supranational [23:10] and doesn't share the rest of the sort of pact with the rest of the Lebanese. [23:15] But clearly, Hezbollah historically was the most disciplined. [23:21] It actually, Iran was able to use it to train many of the militias in Iraq. [23:27] There were also clear reports of Hezbollah going to train the Houthis. [23:33] So I think Hezbollah remains a formidable power. [23:38] The relationship, you know, there's a lot of discussion going on [23:41] about the autonomy of decision-making within Hezbollah and vis-a-vis Iran. [23:46] Clearly, someone like Hassan Nasrallah had, [23:50] I think, was widely respected by the Iranian leadership, [23:53] could find a way to reconcile between Iran's interests [23:57] and what he perceived to be Hezbollah [24:00] and, to a certain extent, Lebanon's interests at the time. [24:04] But even in, you know, at Nasrallah's height of power, [24:09] there were reports, actually by Qasem Soleimani himself, [24:12] that in the middle of the 2006 war, [24:15] and this is something that Qasem Soleimani recounted, [24:17] I think, on Iranian TV shortly before his death, [24:20] he was saying he was there in the bunker with Hassan Nasrallah, [24:24] took him by hand to rush away. [24:27] So as a Lebanese, it makes us wonder, [24:29] who was running the war in 2006? [24:31] Was it Qasem Soleimani? [24:33] How many IRGC officers were there on the ground? [24:36] Who are they accountable to? [24:38] We know that in 1982, in the chaos of the Lebanese civil war, [24:42] there were, by some reports, at least 1,500 IRGC members [24:46] that came through Lebanon to the Bicca to form Hezbollah. [24:51] Now, Hezbollah is Lebanese. [24:53] I'm not one of those who says that, you know, [24:54] they're an intricate, essential part of Lebanon today. [24:58] But this organic link to Iran is constantly eroding [25:05] Lebanon's ability to rebuild a state project. [25:11] And today, it's no longer just about rebuilding a state. [25:15] It has deeply affected national cohesion in Lebanon. [25:18] And this has to be addressed. [25:21] If I may, Nadim. [25:22] Hassan, I mean, now the 10 points are there [25:27] and may form a basis for further negotiation in Islamabad, [25:32] if the talks even proceed. [25:35] If they're on the agenda, [25:37] are they something that Iran is prepared to make compromises on? [25:41] If Iran gets other security guarantees, [25:44] the war won't start again. [25:45] Will it make compromises on these regional groups [25:48] and perhaps even give them up completely? [25:50] I don't think so. [25:51] I think some of the points that are in this proposal [25:56] are not for negotiations, [25:58] according to the Iranian rhetoric at this point, [26:01] the official line. [26:02] There are three elements that I think, [26:05] generally taken from these 10 points, [26:08] three elements that are essential to Iran. [26:11] Firstly, I think the economics, sanctions, [26:14] the Strait of Hormuz, [26:16] one of them or one based on the other, [26:18] guaranteed by the other. [26:20] Secondly, the security guarantees, [26:23] which again is not about the U.S. giving guarantees [26:26] because the U.S. words mean nothing to Iran [26:29] due to its past commitments that were all violated. [26:33] Their main guarantees, [26:34] their capabilities and the Strait of Hormuz, [26:38] that's the main guarantee. [26:39] And that's why Iran is insisting on managing it [26:43] because it doesn't want it to see it being used [26:46] by the United States or Israel in the future [26:49] if there is any other conflict. [26:52] The third element that guarantees also, [26:55] and is guaranteed by the Strait, [26:57] but also in the other way around, [27:00] it guarantees is the unity of fronts. [27:04] That is, there's a regional war, [27:06] we need a regional ceasefire [27:08] or there won't be a ceasefire. [27:10] The Iranians are insistent on this. [27:12] There are two out of the 10 points [27:15] that are based on this. [27:17] Lebanon is named in one specifically. [27:19] Lebanon is that point. [27:22] The second is the ceasefire should include [27:25] all Iran allies, [27:26] which I think Iran will not give up. [27:29] Thank you very much, [27:30] Hassan Ahmadiyan, Rob Geist, Penfold, [27:32] and Nadim Khouri. [27:33] And thank you too for watching. [27:35] If you'd like to get more context and analysis [27:37] and detail on all aspects of the war, [27:39] remember to check out our website, aljazeera.com. [27:42] We always want to know what you think too. [27:44] Post your views on our Facebook page. [27:46] That's facebook.com forward slash AJ Inside Story [27:49] or on X, tag us with your comments. [27:51] We are at AJ Inside Story. [27:54] From me, James Bayes and the team here. [27:55] That's it for now. [27:56] Al Jazeera's coverage from across the Middle East [27:59] and around the world continues in a moment.

Transcribe Any Video or Podcast — Free

Paste a URL and get a full AI-powered transcript in minutes. Try ScribeHawk →