House holds hearing on UFOs, government transparency — full video

[0:03] The Subcommittee Hearing on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena, or UAPs, will come to order. [0:09] Welcome, everyone. Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any time. [0:14] Additionally, without objection, the following members are waived onto the Subcommittee [0:18] for the purpose of participating in today's hearing. Mr. Burchard of Tennessee, Ms. Luna of [0:24] Florida, Mr. Getz of Florida, Mr. Burleson of Missouri, Mrs. Ocasio-Cortez of New York, [0:29] and Mr. Ogles of Tennessee. Without objection, so ordered. For today's Subcommittee Hearing, [0:36] both the Chair and Ranking Member will have 10 minutes for opening remarks. We may both be [0:41] giving some of those minutes to other members of our party. I'm now going to recognize myself [0:47] for 10 minutes. I'm actually going to try to get out of here in about four, and then we'll [0:51] give it to some of my friends over here. Good morning and welcome to the most exciting [0:57] Subcommittee in Congress this week, the Subcommittee on National Security of the Border and Foreign [1:02] Affairs for discussion of unidentified anomalous phenomenon. I'd like to thank the brave military [1:08] pilots and personnel, such as the witnesses on the panel today, for sharing their stories [1:15] on how they've engaged UAPs, which has brought attention to this matter. Curiosity and speculation [1:21] from all walks of life have generated interest in studying what UAPs are and what threats they may [1:28] pose. I will say that when I was younger in school, I read a book, a 1966 book called Flying Saucers, [1:36] Serious Business, and for a while, when I was a little bit younger, I thought it was the most [1:40] important issue out there. The lack of transparency regarding UAPs, which was one of the themes of that [1:49] book. In any event, it's led interest in studying what UAPs are and what threats they pose. The lack [2:04] of transparency regarding UAPs has fueled wild speculation and debate for decades, eroding public [2:10] trust in the very institutions that are meant to serve and protect them, as is evidenced by the large [2:15] number of people we have here. I also want to point out in 1966, President Gerald Ford claimed to have [2:21] seen a UFO, and in 1969 in Georgia, Jimmy Carter claimed to have seen a UFO. So this has led Congress [2:30] to establish entities to examine UAPs. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2022 established the [2:37] All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARRO, to conduct or to coordinate efforts across the [2:44] Department of Defense and other federal agencies to detect, identify, and investigate UAPs. However, [2:51] AARRO's budget remains classified, prohibiting meaningful oversight from Congress. In addition [2:58] to AARRO's efforts, Nassau is leading an independent study on UAPs that will identify [3:04] how UAP data is gathered from both civilian and government entities that can be analyzed to shed [3:11] light on the topic. However, despite these offices being established, there lies a pressing demand for [3:16] government transparency and accountability that cannot be overlooked. And that's been a problem [3:21] that's been around for 50 years. The Biden administration handling of the Chinese spy balloon [3:26] that violated U.S. air space is one example of how the government is not prepared for these. [3:32] The Biden administration's description of events has shown that the government continues not to be [3:38] forthright. Between the Chinese balloon being shot down and two UAPs subsequently shot down [3:43] following the event earlier this year, the U.S. government spent one and a half million dollars [3:47] in taxpayer dollars on missiles, yet we have seen little clarity from the Biden administration. [3:53] We must demand transparency from the Department of Defense, our intelligent community, and our defense [3:57] industry on the UAP work. We're going to ask some questions about that today. Congress recognizes the [4:03] subject of UAPs as multifaceted and requires a careful data-driven approach. Today, we will seek clarity [4:10] from these witnesses' testimonies. We will seek clarity as to what can be done to improve reporting for [4:16] military and civilians and remain committed to objective inquiry. Congress should work to ensure that [4:23] knowledge is not driven by fear. Today, we are not just debating the existence of UAPs. We are deliberating on the [4:29] principles that define our republic, which is a commitment to transparency and accountability. [4:34] I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about ways we can improve government efficiency and [4:39] openness when it comes to UAPs. I thank each of you for your presence here today and for your dedication [4:45] to safeguarding the interests of the American people. I look forward to your testimony. Now, I'm going to [4:50] turn it over for two and a half or three minutes to Representative Burchard from Tennessee. [4:54] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. I want to thank everybody for [5:01] making this happen today, and I want to remind everybody this is a nonpartisan issue. This has [5:05] nothing to do with party politics. I think the cover-up goes a lot deeper than that. I also want to [5:11] thank my colleagues, Representative Anna Paulina Luna, sitting beside me here, Jared Moskowitz, my friend [5:19] across the aisle. He has an incredible mind, and I'm anxious to hear his questions. My buddy Eric Burleson. [5:25] And it's not in my notes here, but Matt Gaetz. If it hadn't been for Matt Gaetz, myself, [5:30] him and Luna would still be down at Eglin Air Force Base trying to get some answers. He's [5:35] got an incredible legal mind. Also, I know I saw it in the crowd there, George Knapp, [5:40] my buddy Jeremy Corbell. They're not witnesses, but they've provided some statements on this subject, [5:48] and I seek unanimous consent to enter those statements into the record, Mr. Chairman. [5:52] Without objection. Also, I'd like to enter in. I understand now that this is unclassified and [5:58] it's public record, but as we all know, that's sometimes difficult for the public to get a hold [6:02] of. A report, defense intelligence reference documents, advanced space propulsion based on [6:08] vacuum, space-time metric engineering, some light reading for some of our members. [6:13] Without objection. Thank you. You know, Mr. Knapp wrote, [6:17] since 1969, the position our military has been that UFOs pose no threat to national security [6:23] and are not worthy of further study. I'd say that's the biggest understatement of the decade. [6:29] He also goes on to talk about the dismissive attitude and set odds with what was revealed [6:34] in documents, reports, and internal memos. Mr. Cabral says, as he writes these words, [6:40] the UFO is emerging as a major topic of global importance. I can state that as a fact out there. [6:48] I met a fellow who came in here all the way from Denmark to be here for this meeting. So this is [6:53] huge. This is worldwide. I think we suspect what's going on, but I'd also like to thank the members of [6:59] Congress who have supported our efforts to make this hearing happen. Some have even confided to me [7:03] that they've had UFO sightings of their own. Those members, of course, some of them wish to remain [7:08] anonymous, and I'll keep it that way. But also, finally, I'd like to thank these three brave witnesses [7:13] here. They took an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, and, [7:18] dadgummit, they're doing it. And we owe them a debt of gratitude. [7:22] Y'all quit clapping. You're cutting in on my time. Just kidding. These folks, they've got nothing to [7:42] gain from this, and I think you're going to find out that they've endured quite a few slings and arrows. [7:47] We need to remember them in our prayers and their families. And I'm thankful for them for their [7:51] honest testimonies. They have done interviews and appeared in documentaries like Accidental Truth [7:56] to get their stories out there. And now they are all here to testify under oath for Congress. [8:03] It's been so difficult to get here today. I've said, you know, in the Baptist Church, [8:06] we'd say that the devil's in our way. And the devil has been in our way through this thing. We've [8:12] run into roadblocks from members, from the intelligence community, the Pentagon. I proposed [8:17] legislation to go in the FAA reauthorization that just said if an airline pilot has a sighting, [8:25] that when he makes that report to the FAA, that it would come to Congress. But I was told that the [8:29] intelligence community did not like that, and the bill was – the amendment was not even heard [8:34] in committee. I think it's time for this country to take back our country. We need to tell the folks [8:39] at the Pentagon they work for us. Dadgummit, we don't work for them. And that's exactly the point. [8:45] This is an issue of government transparency. We can't trust a government that does not trust its [8:50] people. We're not bringing little green men or flying saucers into the hearing. Sorry to disappoint [8:56] about half of y'all. We're just going to get to the facts. We're going to uncover the cover-up, [9:01] and I hope this is just the beginning of many more hearings and more people coming forward about this. [9:06] And I yield back the remainder of my time, I think, is it to Representative Luna, Mr. Chairman? [9:11] Yeah, we'll call Ms. Luna for her statement. [9:13] The circumstances surrounding UAPs have captivated the intention of the American people for decades, [9:21] ingrained in even the minds of our nation's leaders from Jimmy Carter to Barack Obama, [9:25] Hillary Clinton to Donald Trump, Marco Rubio to Chuck Schumer, John Radcliffe to National Security [9:31] Council officials. Yet from Roswell, New Mexico to the coast of Jacksonville, Florida, [9:35] the sightings of UAPs have rarely been explained by the people who have first-hand accounts of these [9:40] situations. This is largely due to the lack of transparency by our own government, [9:45] and the failure of our elected leaders to make good on their promises to release explanations [9:49] and footage and mountains of over-classified documents that continue to be hidden from the [9:53] American people. This isn't just how I feel. In fact, the American people largely believe that the [9:59] government has actively covered up the truth about UAPs. One poll in particular found that 68 percent [10:05] of Americans believe that the government is hiding information about UAPs and not being honest about [10:10] what we know about them. And from my personal experience, I believe the same thing. [10:14] Another poll found that nearly half Americans believe that the federal government is doing a [10:18] very bad or somewhat bad job of dealing with reports of UFO sightings. As Representative Birchett just [10:24] referenced on the FAA bill that just went through, you can tell that that's exactly happening. [10:29] Considering the thousands of testimonies and videos taken on people's phones and eyewitnesses accounts [10:35] made by credible witnesses such as doctors, pilots, scientists, and active duty service members, [10:40] is unacceptable to continue to gaslight Americans into thinking that this is not happening or that [10:45] the potential of intelligent life forms exists other than humans. Even more alarming is the fact [10:52] that these eyewitnesses are many of times service members and have no assurance that their lives will [10:56] not be negatively impacted or even harmed by their experiences. In being an active duty service member [11:02] working on an airfield, I've had conversations with many pilots where they were in fear of coming [11:07] forward for retribution and or being taken off flight status. How do we know this? Because the [11:12] government has said nothing to assure us otherwise. They have also did nothing to calm the concerns of [11:19] over 20 percent of Americans who have reported to have seen UFOs or UAPs. We are simply told not to [11:25] question the government and that the government has it under control. Today is the first hearing of its kind [11:29] where we will attempt to get down to the bottom of what is actually happening with UAPs, but we will [11:34] hear from people who have had personal sightings rather than Pentagon bureaucrats who have always been [11:38] sent to Stonewaller investigations. Just so that the press knows and the people know, we were even [11:44] denied access to a classified briefing in a skiff prior to this hearing due to the amount of hoops that we [11:48] had to jump through to grant temporary clearance to witness Grush, who has knowledge of classified information. [11:55] It is time to have an open-minded discussion on this topic, to hear the evidence and understand [11:59] the magnitude of what this means, not just for our nation, but for humanity. Thank you, Chairman. [12:04] I yield back the rest of my time. Thank you very much. And I'd like to thank you [12:08] thank you and Mr. Burchett for bringing this topic to my attention. Now we'll recognize National Security [12:14] Subcommittee Ranking Member Garcia for 10 minutes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank first [12:22] our witnesses for joining us today. I want to begin by thanking you all for your service to our country. [12:28] And for sharing your voices today and your courage to be here as well. To Mr. Graves, [12:33] I'm particularly grateful to you to spend some time that we had for you to share with candor some [12:38] of your experiences. So I appreciate that as well. I do want to thank all the members of our subcommittee [12:44] today and also those that are here and have waved on for their incredible interest in this issue, [12:50] particularly to Congressman Burchett. I know that your leadership has brought us to this place today, [12:54] and I want to thank you for that, as well as everyone else that's been engaged in this work. [12:59] I also want to thank the oversight staff, who I know has been working very hard to ensure [13:03] that today's hearing is serious, that it's transparent, and that it also provides appropriate [13:08] answers, as our oversight body always demands. Now, it's really important that we're here in a [13:13] bipartisan way to have this conversation, which really to the heart of it is about national security [13:18] and key to the subcommittee's core purpose. This is the Subcommittee on National Security of the [13:23] Oversight Committee. Now, our witnesses will testify today that UAPs have posed a serious safety [13:29] threat, and we must understand this. More broadly, we're dealing with real questions that get to the [13:34] heart of our faith in government. Faith in our institutions, as we all know, is at an all-time low. [13:40] Partisanship and alternative facts make it too easy to doubt narrative or our institutions. But this [13:45] hearing will offer the public unique perspectives, building on years of reporting by both federal [13:50] agencies and the independent media. Now, some of the earliest reporting on this issue was a [13:55] groundbreaking 2017 New York Times report, which we – which revealed research, as we know now, [14:01] on unidentified anomalous phenomena, or as many call UFOs, by the Defense Intelligence Agency. [14:07] Mr. Graves and Commander Faber's experiences with UAPs have also been documented by the public, [14:12] not just by The New York Times, but CNN and many other national news outlets. Now, the Office of [14:17] the Director of National Intelligence has published public reports documenting UAPs, [14:21] and on June 9, 2022, NASA announced that the agency is commissioning a study to, of course, [14:26] examine unidentified anomalous phenomena. Now, the sheer number of reports, whistleblowers, [14:31] and stories of unidentified anomalous phenomena should raise real questions and warrant investigation [14:36] and oversight. And that's why we are here today. Now, pilots have reported encounters for years. [14:41] Now, because of the stigma around reporting these incidents, we still don't have a complete picture [14:46] of actually what's going on, particularly as our witnesses will testify on the civilian side, [14:52] and that is a real problem that we have today in the country. Now, it's very important that we show [14:56] that Democrats and Republicans in Congress can come together in a bipartisan way to cut through [15:02] misinformation and to look at the facts in a serious and thoughtful manner. If we are to advance [15:06] oversight and public disclosure, we must also gain the broad support of the public. We will succeed [15:13] getting facts out to the public faster if there is a broad public support as part of the process. [15:18] Now, I understand fully that the Department of Defense is hesitant to share information [15:22] that could also undermine our national security by revealing information on the capabilities of our [15:27] own aircraft, our sensors, and other sensitive material. At the same time, many people believe that [15:33] we're withholding information from them, and that is dangerous also. I believe in openness and [15:38] transparency. That is also the role of Congress, and I want to trust that the American people will [15:44] be able to weigh the evidence and make up their own minds. Now, we have incidents where sensors, [15:49] sometimes even multiple types of sensors detect things that we cannot explain. UAPs, whatever they may [15:55] be, may pose a serious threat to our military or civilian aircraft, and that must be understood. [16:01] Now, my career and training as a long-time and career educator and teacher and researcher tell me that [16:07] we should never rule anything out. We know that our space, of course, is vast and undiscovered. [16:14] I also want to note that Mr. Sean Kirkpatrick, director of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office, [16:18] the component of the DOD office that investigates UAP data, has testified before the Senate this year [16:24] that his unit has found no evidence of extraterrestrial activity. NASA has also stated they don't have [16:29] evidence of extraterrestrial life either, and we have heard this, of course, from some of our [16:34] government agencies. And we should remind viewers and witnesses, which I think is really important, [16:38] that we also cannot share classified information in public settings. But questions, of course, remain [16:45] that people want to see data and information for themselves. The enormous interest in the hearing [16:49] today underscores the importance of a fair and open look at the evidence from witnesses who can share [16:54] their unique perspectives. Now, I know I certainly have a lot of questions, and I know that all the members of our [16:59] committee do as well. We should come to this hearing with an open mind, and we should not let our [17:05] existing ideas restrict us on either side. I hear over and over from many agencies the stigma around [17:10] reporting and investigating UAPs prevents us from getting real answers. We know that whistleblowers have [17:16] reported harassment, intimidation, or stigma as well, and this is not acceptable. If people can't report [17:22] incidents which would have national security or safety implications, then that also has serious [17:26] consequences for us. As a ranking member of this subcommittee, I know my job would be completely [17:32] impossible if whistleblowers or others feel intimidated to come before this committee. [17:36] We can't be afraid of asking questions, and we can't be afraid of the truth. I'm proud to say that this [17:41] hearing builds upon bipartisan work by members of the House and Senate, dating many years back, [17:46] which has sought to increase awareness within the Department of Defense and to mandate more of Congress, [17:51] of UAPs. We know the Senate is taking up an amendment to their defense authorization bill, [17:56] which will create a commission with broad declassification authority, and we should all [18:00] agree that that is an important step. Members of both parties and senior officials in multiple [18:04] administrations have taken an interest in this issue, and we're proud to carry and build that [18:09] confidence in the American people. This hearing will also not be the end of this discussion, but a new [18:14] chapter and start to years and years of work that many folks both in the public and within government [18:20] have been working on. We should encourage more reporting, not less, on UAPs. The more we understand, [18:27] the safer we will be. We will hear testimony from witnesses today with a long record of service [18:32] to the American people and with subject matter expertise. Our witnesses have a unique opportunity to [18:37] share their perspective, insights, and their experiences with the American people. I encourage all of my [18:43] colleagues to engage with these difficult questions with an open mind and to follow the facts on behalf [18:48] of our country. I also just want to say more broadly that we should look at this hearing and believe that [18:54] everything is on the table as it relates to UAPs. I think an open mind is absolutely the best. I want to [18:59] yield two and a half minutes of the remainder of my time to the representative from Florida, Representative [19:04] Moskowitz, for an opening statement. He also has been very much engaged in this issue, and I want to thank him [19:09] for his leadership. Congressman. Thank you, Ranking Member Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to [19:15] thank Tim Burchett and Ana Paulina Luna for their leadership in pushing this hearing forward. I want [19:22] to thank, obviously, committee staff and their staff working on this on a bipartisan basis, because many [19:27] Americans are deeply interested in this issue, and it shouldn't take the potential of non-human origin to [19:34] bring us together. Additionally, I want to thank the witnesses for coming forward to share your [19:38] perspectives, your thoughts, and the sightings of UAPs. Unlike other hearings many times in Congress, [19:45] you're not here to help a political party, but you're here to share information with the American [19:50] people. And it's not something that is just going on in this administration. It's something that's [19:55] spanned many administrations. For decades, many Americans have been fascinated by objects mysterious [20:01] and unexplained, and it's long past time that they got some answers. The American public has a right [20:07] to learn about technologies of unknown origins, non-human intelligence, and unexplainable phenomena. [20:15] Those are not the words of a UFO Twitter account, though that is a direct quote from Majority Leader [20:21] Chuck Schumer, that the American public has a right to learn about technologies of unknown origins, [20:26] non-human intelligence, and unexplainable phenomena. In an interview with Fox News, [20:31] recent former Director of National Intelligence John Radcliffe confirmed the U.S. government is [20:36] aware a lot more sightings of UAPs and that they have not made that information public. I quote, [20:43] there are a lot more sightings that have not been made public, Radcliffe said to Fox News. [20:48] For me, this hearing is about transparency. We unfortunately live in a time in which many people [20:54] distrust government and our institutions. An over-classification of information away from the [20:59] American public or even Congress contributes to today's politics. The American people have [21:04] regular questions. What are UAPs? How come the media doesn't report more on them? Are they foreign [21:09] adversaries? Are they U.S. technology? Are they something else? They ask themselves, how come when a [21:15] Russian jet shoots flares at one of our drones, we have perfect pictures and videos to show the American [21:21] people and the world. But when it comes to UAPs, nothing. Of course, we must always protect our [21:28] national security to maintain our superiority, like when stealth helicopters were only rumored to exist [21:36] but were used in the Osama bin Laden raid in 2011. But we can't allow that to be used as a shield to [21:43] keep the American people completely in the dark from basic truths. The American people deserve to hear [21:50] more about special access programs. Congress has a right to know if there's any unsanctioned weapons [21:55] development, satellite imagery that has not been provided to Congress. Congress created the All [22:01] Domain Resolution Office in the NDAA of 2022. In its initial analysis, there are 171 uncharacterized [22:11] UAP reports, and this is the words from the report, that appear to have demonstrated unusual flight [22:17] characteristics or performance capabilities. I believe more information is known about the 171 [22:23] instances. It's time for Congress to reinsert ourselves. I call on our military leaders and [22:29] intelligence officials to release more information to the American people about UAPs. And to our military [22:36] leaders, if there's nothing to conceal, let Congress go to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, the Dugway [22:42] Proving Ground, or even Groom Lake in Nevada. We should have disclosure today. We should have [22:48] disclosure tomorrow. The time has come. Thank you, Ranking Member. Thank you, Mr. Moskowitz. And I will [22:55] yield back now to our chairman. Thank you. Right. Now I'd like to introduce our witnesses. Our first [23:01] witness is Lieutenant Ryan Graves. He's the executive director of Americans for Safe Aerospace. Lieutenant [23:06] Graves is also a former U.S. Navy F-18 pilot with his own UAP experience. The next witness, David Grush, [23:15] is a former senior intelligence officer with the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and was [23:20] a senior technical advisor for UAP issues. And finally, retired Navy Commander David Fravor, [23:29] squadron leader who worked as a naval aviator for 18 years. Mr. Fravor has his own UAP experience, [23:36] known as the TikTok event. I look forward to hearing from all three of you today. [23:41] Pursuant to Committee Rule 9-G, the witnesses will please stand and raise their right hands. [23:46] Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, [23:54] and nothing but the truth? So help you God. Let the record show that all the witnesses answered in the [24:01] affirmative. You may be seated. We appreciate you all being here today and look forward to your testimony. [24:07] I remind the witnesses that we have read your written statements and they will appear in full in the [24:11] hearing record. Please try to limit your oral statements to five minutes. As a reminder, [24:16] please press the button on the microphone in front of you so that it's on and the members can hear you. [24:21] When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After four minutes, it will turn [24:26] yellow. And the red light, when that comes on, it tells you your five minutes have expired. I'll now [24:32] recognize Mr. Graves for five minutes for your opening statement. Thank you. Chairman Grothman, [24:39] Ranking Member Garcia, distinguished members of the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, [24:44] Representatives Burchette and Luna. My name is Ryan Fobbs Graves, and I'm a former F-18 pilot with a [24:49] decade of service in the U.S. Navy, including two deployments in Operation Enduring Freedom and [24:54] Operation Inherent Resolve. I have experienced advanced UAP firsthand, and I'm here to voice the [24:59] concerns of more than 30 commercial aircrew and military veterans who have confided their similar [25:03] encounters with me. Today, I would like to highlight three critical issues that demand our action. [25:10] As we convene here, UAP are in our airspace, but they are grossly underreported. These sightings [25:15] are not rare or isolated. They are routine. Military aircrew and commercial pilots, [25:19] trained observers whose lives depend on accurate identification, are frequently witnessing these [25:24] phenomena. The stigma attached to UAP is real and powerful and challenges national security. [25:31] It silences commercial pilots who fear professional repercussions, discourages witnesses, and is only [25:36] compounded by recent government claims questioning the credibility of eyewitness testimony. Parts of our [25:42] government are aware of more about UAP than they let on, but excessive classification practices [25:46] keep crucial information hidden. Since 2021, all UAP videos are classified as secret or above. [25:53] This level of secrecy not only impedes our understanding, but fuels speculation and mistrust. [25:59] In 2014, I was an F-18 Foxtrot pilot in the Navy Fighter Attack Squadron 11, the Red Rippers, [26:06] and I was stationed at NAS Oceana in Virginia Beach. After upgrades were made to our jets' radar systems, [26:11] we began detecting unknown objects operating in our airspace. At first, we assumed they were radar [26:17] errors, but soon we began to correlate the radar tracks with multiple onboard sensors, including [26:22] infrared systems, eventually through visual ID. During a training mission in warning area Whiskey 72, [26:29] 10 miles off the coast of Virginia Beach, two F-18 Super Hornets were split by UAP. The object, [26:35] described as a dark gray or a black cube inside of a clear sphere, came within 50 feet of the lead [26:40] aircraft and was estimated to be 5 to 15 feet in diameter. The mission commander terminated the [26:45] flight immediately and returned base. Our squadron submitted a safety report, but there was no official [26:50] acknowledgement of the incident and no further mechanism to report the sightings. Soon, these [26:55] encounters became so frequent that aircrew would discuss the risk of UAP as part of their regular [27:00] pre-flight briefs. Recognizing the need for action and answers, I founded Americans for Safe Aerospace. [27:08] The organization has since become a haven for UAP witnesses who were previously unspoken due to the [27:12] absence of a safe intake process. More than 30 witnesses have come forward and almost 5,000 [27:17] Americans have joined us in the fight for transparency at safeaerospace.org. The majority [27:23] of witnesses are commercial pilots at majority major airlines. Often they are veterans with decades [27:28] of flying experience. Pilots are reporting UAP at altitudes that appear above them at 40,000 feet, [27:34] potentially in low earth orbit or in the gray zone below the Karman line, making inexplicable [27:39] maneuvers like right-hand turns and retrograde orbits or J hooks. Sometimes these reports are [27:45] reoccurring with numerous recent sightings north of Hawaii and in the North Atlantic. Other veterans [27:51] are also coming forward to us regarding UAP encounters in our airspace and oceans. The most compelling [27:57] involve observations of UAP by multiple witnesses and sensor systems. I believe these accounts are only [28:02] scratching the surface and more will share their experiences once it is safe to do so. In closing, [28:08] I recognize the skepticism surrounding this topic. If everyone could see the sensor and video data [28:13] I witnessed, our national conversation would change. I urge us to put aside stigma and address the [28:18] security and safety issue this topic represents. If UAP are foreign drones, it is an urgent national [28:23] security problem. If it is something else, it is an issue for science. In either case, unidentified [28:29] objects are concerned for flight safety. The American people deserve to know what is happening in our skies. [28:34] It is long overdue. Thank you. Mr. Grush. Mr. Chairman, ranking members and congressmen, [28:48] thank you. I'm happy to be here. This is an important issue and I'm grateful for your time. [28:52] My name is David Charles Grush. I was an intelligence officer for 14 years, both in the U.S. Air Force, [28:59] both active duty Air National Guard and Reserve at the rank of major and most recently from 2021 to 2025, [29:07] or 2023, at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, NGA, at the GS-15 civilian level, which is [29:16] the military equivalent of a Fulbert colonel. I was my agency's co-lead in unidentified anomalous [29:22] phenomena and transmedium object analysis, as well as reporting to the UAP task force, UAPTF, [29:29] and eventually, once it was established, the All Domain Anomaly Resolution Office, ARO. I became a [29:36] whistleblower through a PPD-19 urgent concern filing in May 2022 with the Intelligence Community [29:45] Inspector General. Following concerning reports from multiple esteemed and credentialed current [29:51] and former military and intelligence community individuals that the U.S. government is operating [29:57] with secrecy above congressional oversight with regards to UAPs. My testimony is based on [30:05] information I've been given by individuals with a long-standing track record of legitimacy [30:11] and service to this country, many of whom also have shared compelling evidence in the form of photography, [30:18] official documentation, and classified oral testimony to myself and my various colleagues. [30:25] I have taken every step I can to corroborate this evidence over a period of four years while I was [30:31] with the UAP task force and do my due diligence on the individual sharing it. This is because of these [30:38] steps I believe strongly in the importance of bringing this information before you. I am driven by a [30:45] commitment of both to truth and transparency, rooted in our inherent duty to uphold the United States [30:51] Constitution and protect the American people. I am asking Congress to hold our government to this [30:58] standard and thoroughly investigate these claims. But as I stand here under oath now, I am speaking to [31:04] the facts as I have been told them. In the U.S. Air Force, in my national reconnaissance office, NRO, [31:11] reserve as capacity, I was a member of the UAP task force from 2019 to 2021. I served at the NRO [31:18] operations center on the director's briefing staff, which included the coordination of the presidential [31:23] daily brief and supporting variety of contingency operations, which I was the reserve intelligence [31:29] division chief backup. In 2019, the UAP task force director asked me to identify all special access [31:39] programs and controlled access programs, also known as SAPs and CAPs. We needed to satisfy our [31:46] congressionally mandated mission. And we were direct report at the time to the DepSec Def. At the time, [31:53] due to my extensive executive level intelligence support duties, I was cleared to literally all [31:59] relevant compartments and in a position of extreme trust, both in my military and civilian capacities. [32:06] I was informed in the course of my official duties of a multi-decade UAP crash retrieval and reverse [32:14] engineering program, to which I was denied access to those additional read-ons when I requested it. [32:21] I made the decision, based on the data I collected, to report this information to my superiors and [32:29] multiple inspectors general, and in effect becoming a whistleblower. As you know, I've suffered retaliation [32:36] for my decision, but I am hopeful that my actions will ultimately lead to a positive outcome of increased [32:43] transparency. Thank you, and I'm happy to answer your questions. Thank you. Commander Fravor? [32:50] Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, Congresswomen. I want to first thank you for the [33:00] invitation to speak to the committee on the UAP topic that has been in the news for the past six [33:03] years and seems to be continuing to gain momentum. As you know, my name is David Fravor. I'm a retired [33:08] commander in the United States Navy. In 2004, I was a commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 41, [33:13] the world-famous Black Aces. We were attached to carrier wing 11, stationed on board the USS Nimitz, [33:18] and had begun a two-month workup cycle off the coast of California. On this day, we were scheduled [33:24] for a 2v2 air-to-air training with the USS Princeton as our control. When we launched off Nimitz, my [33:29] wingman was joining up. We were told that the training was going to be suspended, and we were [33:34] going to proceed with real-world tasking. As we proceeded to the west, the air controller was [33:39] counting down the range to an object that we were going to, and we were unaware of what we were going [33:43] to see when we arrived. The controller told us that these objects had been observed for over two [33:51] weeks, coming down from over 80,000 feet, rapidly descending to 20,000 feet, hanging out for hours, [33:57] and then going straight back up. For those who don't realize, above 80,000 feet is space. [34:01] We arrived at the location at approximately 20,000 feet in a controller called Merge Plot, [34:06] which means that our radar blip was now in the same resolution cell as the contact. [34:10] As we looked around, we noticed that we saw some whitewater off our right side. [34:14] It's important to note that the weather on this day was as close to perfect as you could ask for off the [34:18] coast of San Diego. Clear skies, light winds, calm seas, no whitecaps from waves, so the whitewater [34:23] stood out in a large blue ocean. All four of us, because we were an F-18F, so we had pilots and [34:28] WIZO in the back seat, looked down a small, saw a white tic-tac object with a longitudinal axis [34:33] pointing north-south and moving very abruptly over the water like a ping-pong ball. There were no rotors, [34:39] no rotor wash, or any sign of visible control surfaces like wings. As we started clockwise towards [34:44] the object, my WIZO and I decided to go down and take a closer look with the other aircraft [34:48] staying in high cover to observe both us and the tic-tac. We proceeded around the circle about 90 [34:54] degrees from the start of our descent, and the object suddenly shifted its longitudinal axis, [35:00] aligned it with my aircraft, and began to climb. We continued down another 270 degrees nose low [35:07] where the tic-tac, or we considered 270 degrees, and we went nose low to where the tic-tac would have [35:13] been. Our altitude at this point was about 15,000 feet, and the tic-tac was about 12,000. As we pulled [35:18] nose onto the object within about a half mile of it, it rapidly accelerated in front of us and [35:22] disappeared. Our wingmen, roughly 8,000 feet above us, lost contact also. We immediately turned back [35:28] to see where the whitewater was at, and it was gone also. So as you started to turn back towards the [35:32] east, the controller came up and said, sir, you're not going to believe this, but that thing is at your [35:35] cap point, roughly 60 miles away in less than a minute. You can calculate the speed. We returned to [35:41] Nimitz. We were taking off our gear. We were talking to one of my crews that was getting ready to launch. We [35:44] mentioned it to them, and they went out and luckily got the video that you see, that 90-second video. [35:49] What you don't see is the radar tape that was never released, and we don't know where it's at, [35:53] of the act of jamming that the object put on an APG-73 radar. And I can get into modes later if [35:58] you're interested. What is shocking to us is that the incident was never investigated. None of my crew [36:03] were ever questioned. Tapes were never taken, and after a couple days, it turned into a great story with [36:06] friends. It wasn't until 2009 until Jay Stratton had contacted me to investigate. Unbeknownst all, he was part of the [36:13] A-Tip program in the Pentagon led by Lou Elizondo, and there was an unofficial official report that [36:19] came out that's now on the internet. Years later, I was contacted by the other pilot, Alex Dietrich, [36:23] and asked if I'd been contacted, and I said no, but I'm willing to talk. I was contacted by Mr. [36:28] Elizondo, and we talked for a short period of time, and he said we'd be in contact. A few weeks after that, [36:34] I was made aware that Lou had left the Pentagon in protest and joined forces with Tom DeLonge, Chris Mellon, [36:39] Steve Justice, and others to form Two Stars Academy, an organization that pressed the issue with [36:43] leading industry experts and U.S. government officials. They worked with Leslie Keen, who [36:47] was present today, Rob Blumenthal, and Helene Cooper to publish the articles in the New York Times, [36:51] 2017 New York Times, and it removed the stigma on the topic of UFOs, which is why we're here today. [36:58] Those articles opened the door for the government and public that cannot be closed. It has led to an [37:03] interest from our elected officials who are not focused on little green men, but figuring out where [37:07] these craft are, where are they from, the technology they possess, how do they operate. It also led to the [37:13] Whistleblower Protection Act and the NDAA. There are multiple witnesses coming forward to say, [37:18] that have first-hand knowledge, and Mr. Grush just covered that. What concerns me is that there's [37:22] no oversight from our elected officials on anything associated with our government processing or [37:26] working on craft, believe not from this world. This issue is not a full public disclosure that [37:32] could undermine national security, but it is about ensuring that our system of checks and balances [37:35] works across all work done in the government using taxpayer funds. Relative to government programs, [37:40] even unacknowledged wave programs, have some level of oversight by the appropriate committee members [37:44] in the House and Senate, and this work that is said to be occurring from whistleblower testimonies [37:48] should not be exempt. In closing, I would like to say that the tic-tac object we engaged in 2004 was [37:53] far superior to anything that we had on time, have today, or are looking to develop in the next 10 years. [37:58] If we, in fact, have programs that possess this technology and needs to have oversight from those [38:02] people that the citizens of this great country elected in office to represent what is best for the United [38:07] States and best for the citizens, I thank you for your time. Thank you very much. [38:11] Thank you very much. I know it's very difficult for all of you, all you've done in the past, [38:15] to try to illuminate this issue. Call on myself first for some questions. I'm going to start with Mr. [38:20] Graves. Are your pilots, or pilots that you interact with as part of your organization, [38:26] do you feel adequately trained and briefed on how to handle encounters with UAPs? [38:31] No. Right now, military witnesses to UAP have limited options for reporting UAP, [38:38] but more concerning is that commercial aviation sector has not adapted to the lessons that the [38:44] military has implemented. The military and Department of Defense has stated that UAP represent a critical [38:51] aviation safety risk. We have not seen that same language being used in the commercial markets. [38:57] They are not acknowledging this risk. Okay. What steps do you think you have to be [39:01] taken to improve a pilot's UAP reporting, be it military or commercial? Right now, we need a system [39:08] where pilots can report without fear of losing their jobs. There is a fear that the stigma associated [39:14] with this topic is going to lead to professional repercussions, either through management or perhaps [39:18] through their yearly physical check. So having a secure system, reducing the stigma, and making this [39:24] information available through the public is going to reduce the concerns that aircrew have. [39:29] Please give me a little idea that the degree to which reports in the past are not made public right [39:35] now. Well, I don't think there has been a proper reporting system to gather those reports and thus not [39:41] report them. So to answer your question, I think there is a dearth of data due to the fact that the [39:45] reporting has been limited up to this time. Could you tell me why you believe it's kind of to play the [39:51] devil's advocate, a reason why some of this stuff should not be available to the public? There's certainly some [39:57] national security concerns when we use our advanced sensors and our tactical jets to be able to [40:01] identify these objects. However, there's no reason that the objects themselves would be classified. [40:07] I would be curious to see how the security classification guideline actually spells out the [40:12] different nuances of how this topic is classified from the perspective of UAP, not national security. [40:18] I'll give you a follow-up on that. Assuming that there are reasons why not all this should be made public, [40:23] this has been around for a long period of time. Can you think of, can any of the three of you think of [40:30] any reason why anything related to UAPs say 15 years and back should not be immediately made public? [40:42] I think one of it is acknowledging a vulnerability, both from a collection and I'll just say a, you know, [40:48] countermeasure perspective. So it's not, we haven't cracked for many years. Yeah. Even say 20 years back. [40:54] Is there any reason why when you go back that far, things shouldn't be made public? [40:59] Unless it shows a specific national security vulnerability as it relates to weakness and [41:04] particular defenses. Okay. Mr. Fravor, the tick tock incident that you and that, [41:09] that you were engaged occurred in 2004. What kind of reporting took place after that incident? [41:16] None. We had a standard debrief where the backseaters went down to our [41:19] carrier Intel center and briefed what had happened. And that was it. No one else talked to us. [41:25] And I was in the top 20 in the battle group. No one came. The captain was aware, the admiral was [41:29] aware, nothing was done. Your commanding officers provide any sort of justification? [41:35] No, because I was the commanding officer of the squadron. So no. [41:39] Was this incident the only UAP event that you encountered while you were a pilot? [41:45] Yes, it was. Okay. Um, this is for anyone of you based on, based off of each of your experiences [41:51] and observations. Do you believe UAPs pose a potential threat to our national security? [42:00] Yes. And here's why. The technology that we faced was far superior than anything that we had. [42:08] And you could put that anywhere. If you, if you had one, you captured one, you reverse engineered it, [42:13] you got it to work. You're talking something that can go into space, go someplace, drop down in a matter [42:19] of seconds, do whatever it wants and leave. And there's nothing we can do about it. Nothing. [42:25] Okay. Either the other, you two. [42:28] I would also like to add from commercial aviation and military aviation perspective, [42:32] we deal with uncertainty in our operating space as a matter of, of our protection, professional [42:37] actions. Identifying friend from foe is, is very important to us. And so when we have unidentified [42:43] targets and we continue to ignore those due to a stigma or a fear of what it could be, [42:47] that's an opening that our adversaries can take advantage of. What, what, what steps should be [42:51] taken to better understand and respond to UAP encounters in the interest of national security? [42:56] There needs to be a location where this information is centralized for processing, [43:00] and there needs to be a two-way communication loop. So the operators on the front end have a feedback [43:04] and can, can get best practices on how to process information, what to do, uh, and to ensure that they, [43:11] they, their reporting is being listened to. Right now, there is not a lot of back and forth. [43:15] Mr. Grush, in your complaint to the intelligence community inspector, you inspector general, you [43:20] claim that you believe information is being hidden. What kind of information do you think was hidden [43:25] and do you think it should remain hidden? Yes, I can speak to that very briefly in [43:29] unclassified manner. As you know, the preponderance of my complaint was classified to the intelligence [43:33] communities, uh, both, uh, material acquisition and exploitation activity, um, also, uh, baselining the UAPs, [43:42] but not sharing it with, you know, intelligence professionals that are actually doing step briefs [43:46] to pilots, uh, that, that kind of information. Okay. Thank you very much. Now we'll go to Mr. Garcia. [43:54] Thank you. Um, again, thank you all for, for your service and for testifying today. Um, [43:57] want to just, uh, talk about, uh, UAPs as relates to what we're seeing in the pilots interaction with UAPs, [44:03] particularly Mr. Graves. One of the concerns that for members of this committee is this idea that pilots, [44:08] there's no system to actually report UAPs and the stigma around pilots. And so could you, [44:13] can you just briefly, you mentioned that there, you working with 30 pilots right now that have had [44:17] encounters with UAPs, uh, but you've also, I believe, um, discussed and know of many more pilots. [44:24] This is just those that you're currently working with. Is that correct? Can you expand on that? [44:27] Certainly. I'll break that down two ways. First, when we were first experiencing these objects off [44:32] the Eastern seaboard in the 2014 to 2015 time period, anyone that had upgraded their radar systems [44:38] were seeing these objects. So there was a large number of my colleagues that were detecting these [44:43] objects off the Eastern seaboard. They were further correlating that information with the [44:47] other onboard sensors. Uh, and many of them also had their own, uh, eye sightings as well of these [44:52] objects. Now that was our personal first, uh, firsthand experience at the time. Since then, [44:57] as I've engaged this topic, uh, others have reached out to me to share their experiences, both, uh, [45:02] on the military side, as well as a commercial aviation side on the military aviation side, uh, [45:07] veterans that have recently got out have shared their stories and have expressed how the objects [45:11] we were seeing in 2014, 2015, uh, continued all the way to 2019, 2020 and beyond. And so it became [45:18] a generational issue for Naval aviators on the Eastern seaboard. This was something we were briefing, [45:23] uh, to new students. This is something that was included in the notice to airmen to ensure [45:27] that there was no, uh, uh, accidents. Um, and now with commercial aviators, they are reaching out [45:33] because they're having somewhat similar experiences as our military brothers and sisters, but they do [45:37] not have any reporting system that they can send us to. And let me just add to, and both to, to, um, [45:43] Mr. Fravor, uh, as well as Mr. Grace, not having this system for, for reporting, um, would you both [45:49] agree that is harmful to not just our national security interests, but to understand this phenomenon [45:54] of what's happening with UAPs? I think it's, it's, uh, it's a, it's actually, it's a travesty that [46:01] we don't have a system to correlate this and actually investigate, you know, so if you took [46:06] the East coast, you know, there's, there's, there's coastal radars out there that monitor [46:09] our air defense identification zone. So out to 200 miles, uh, they can track these, you know, [46:15] so when you see them, they could actually go and pull that data and get maneuvering. And instead of [46:19] just having the airplanes, there's other data sources out there. And I've talked to other government [46:23] officials on this. So you need a centrally located repository that these reports go to. [46:28] So if you just stuck it in DOD, you wouldn't get anything out of the intelligence committee [46:31] because they have a tendency to not to talk, but if you had a central location where these [46:35] reports would come in, not just military, but also commercial aviation, because there's a lot [46:38] of that going on, especially if you talk to anyone that flies from here to Hawaii over the Pacific, [46:42] they see odd lights. So I think you need to develop something that allows you a central point to collect [46:49] the data in order to investigate. Mr. Graves. I will concur with everything Mr. Fravor said. [46:55] I'll continue to say that the commercial pilots that have reached out to me through Americans for Safe [46:59] Aerospace are doing so because they don't feel there's another way for them to report this safety [47:02] issue. And I think one of the clear outcomes of this hearing already is that there has to be a [47:07] safe and transparent reporting process for pilots, both on the commercial side and the military side, [47:13] to be able to report UAPs in a way that's also transparent, but also understands the scope of our [47:18] national security interests and what may be classified or not. But I think there has to be [47:23] some sort of system. And so that's something that I hope can be an outcome that this committee can [47:27] work on. Is there anything else for just for the two of you briefly beyond this reporting system that [47:32] you think that we can do with the government to encourage and facilitate more civilian reporting? [47:37] I think we're doing it right now. I think this hearing is going to show the American people that [47:42] their government takes this topic seriously. And how about civilians that may not be pilots? [47:47] What kind of process could be in place for civilians who are not pilots, who may have UAP encounters? [47:52] Do either of you have any suggestions that could facilitate that? My recommendations would [47:56] make – would be to make that a sensor-centric operation in order to make it as objective as [48:01] possible. Okay. Sir, Mr. Fravor? I agree with Mr. Graves on that. [48:06] Okay. Just briefly, I also just want to note for – particularly for the two pilots, [48:12] I have a question for Mr. Grush. One of the things that I found fascinating in our discussion with Mr. [48:15] Graves last night as well is that you both described UAPs and formations and the way they are observed in [48:23] space or in our air. And the way that they move is essentially ways in which current technology or [48:30] aircraft that we know of are unable to actually function or move. And so will you just, for the [48:34] public record, again, once again, just briefly just either describe or note that aircraft that [48:43] are being witnessed, particularly by the 30 folks that you're working with, are essentially outside the [48:48] scope of anything that we know of today and the technology we have today. Mr. Graves, Mr. Fravor? [48:51] Yes. The objects that are being seen by commercial pilots are performing maneuvers that [48:57] are unexplainable due to our current understanding of our technology and our capabilities as a country. [49:02] And that applies for the military as well. Mr. Fravor? [49:05] Yeah, I concur with that. We have nothing that can stop in midair and go the other direction, [49:09] nor do we have anything that can, like in our situation, come down from space, [49:13] hang out for three hours and go back up. Thank you. My last question. And sometimes, [49:16] I know you have also said some of these answers in the past, but we're trying to get them on the public [49:21] record as well, which is really important. Mr. Graves, finally, do you believe that our [49:24] government is in possession of UAPs? Absolutely, based on interviewing [49:29] over 40 witnesses over four years. And where? I know the exact locations, and those locations [49:36] were provided to the inspector general and some of which to the intelligence committees. I actually had [49:41] the people with the firsthand knowledge provide a protected disclosure to the inspector general. [49:46] Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, I would just say that I think that these questions are important [49:49] questions, and I look forward to being involved in the process to get those answered. I know there'll [49:53] be a lot of questions from other committee members, so I yield back. Thank you. We'll go to Mr. [49:57] Burchard himself. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Garcia. I would like to have you on my [50:03] legislation to do just that, on the reporting, and we'll get together on that. Maybe you can be my [50:10] co-sponsor on that. That'd be really cool. Thank you for those great questions. Mr. Graves, [50:18] again, I'd like to know, how do you know that these were not our aircraft? Some of the behaviors [50:25] that we saw in a working area, we would see these objects being at 0.0 Mach, that's zero airspeed, [50:33] over certain pieces of the ground. So what that means, just like a river, if you throw a bobber in, [50:37] it's going to float downstream. These objects were staying completely stationary in category four [50:42] hurricane winds. These same objects would then accelerate to supersonic speeds, 1.1, 1.2 Mach, [50:48] and they would do so in very erratic and quick behaviors that we don't, I don't have an explanation [50:53] for. Okay. Have you spoken to commercial and military pilots that have seen these off of our [51:00] east coast? I have. Mr. Fravor, I noticed that in the tic-tac video, it's tic-tac like the candy, [51:14] not tic-tac like the Chinese communist app. That's correct. Yes, sir. I just want to make that [51:20] because my daughter corrected me on that and called me a boomer and say boomer. And I said, [51:26] no, baby, it's tic-tac like the candy. You're going to have to just look it up. [51:29] And, but now I would also like to say today is a, is a day of many firsts. It's a miracle that we're [51:35] having this, this meeting. And it's also a miracle that my wife has put up with me for nine years [51:41] today. Today is my anniversary. So I want to tell my wife happy anniversary and that I love her very much. [51:46] Um, as she likes to say, this nine years have been the best two years of her life. So thank you. [51:53] Um, Mr. Fravor, what, what astonished you the most about the, the flight capabilities of these tic-tac [52:02] very briefly? Uh, the performance, absolute performance. It was, and you're, you're not [52:08] aware of any other objects that anybody in the world has in this world that has those capabilities. [52:14] No, I think it's far beyond actually our material science that we currently possess. [52:20] Are you aware of any other reconnaissance platforms that attract or recorded the tic-tacs maneuvers, [52:25] maybe the NORAD system or any of the others? I am not. [52:29] Mr. Grush, thank you for being here, brother. Thank you all very much. Um, [52:34] have you faced any retaliation or reprivals for any of your testimony or anything on these lines? [52:41] Yeah. Uh, I have to be careful what I say in detail because there is an open, uh, whistleblower [52:47] reprisal investigation on my behalf. And I don't want to compromise that investigation by providing [52:52] anything that may, uh, help provide somebody information, but it was very brutal and, uh, [52:59] very unfortunate. Some of the tactics they used to, um, hurt me both professionally and, and personally, [53:06] to be quite frank. Yeah. [53:07] That's very unfortunate. As they say, when you're over the target, that's when they do the most [53:11] fight firing at you. Do you have any personal knowledge of people who've been harmed or injured [53:16] in efforts to cover up or conceal these extraterrestrial technology? [53:19] Yes, personally. [53:23] Have you heard, have anyone been murdered that you would think that you know of or have heard of, [53:29] I guess? [53:29] I have to be careful asking that question. I directed people with that knowledge to the appropriate [53:34] authorities. [53:34] Maybe in a, um, if we could get it, get in a, um, confidential area, a skiff, we could talk about [53:41] that. But unfortunately, um, we were denied access to the skiff and that's very unfortunate in this, [53:49] in this scenario. Um, Mr. Favor, do you believe that you witnessed an additional object under the water [53:59] in relation to your encounter? [54:00] I will say we did not see an object. There was something there to cause the whitewater. [54:05] And when we turned around, it was gone. So there was something there that obviously moved. [54:09] Okay. It was, it was not the same object though, that you were, you were looking at, correct? [54:13] No, we actually joked that the Tic Tac was communicating with something [54:16] when we came back and because of whitewater disappeared. [54:19] Uh, we were in, in another instance, were told about the capabilities of, of a jamming [54:27] during viewing of some, when there were some people chasing some of these objects. Did you [54:31] experience any of that jamming or interrupting your radar or weapons system? [54:35] My crew that launched after we landed experienced significant jamming to the APG 73 radar. [54:40] Which was what we had on board, which is a mechanically scanned, very high end, uh, [54:44] system prior to the APG 79. And yes, it did pretty much everything you could do. Range, velocity, [54:50] aspect, and then it hit the lock and the targeting pod is passive. That's what we were able to get the [54:55] video on. I'm about to run out of time, but, um, are you aware of any of our enemies that have that [54:59] capability? No. I would also like to know for the record that, um, like George Knapp, [55:07] breaking area 51. He's the reason I knew about that. And the reason I know about the, the tick [55:11] tax is, uh, is Leslie Keen, um, from New York Times article. And I would encourage everybody to read [55:17] that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back to you for no time. Very good. Mr. Raskin. Thank you, [55:24] Mr. Chairman. Um, Mr. Graves, um, you reported UAP encounters, um, during training flights, I think, [55:33] and have since come forward to warn the Pentagon that, uh, these encounters may be putting pilots [55:40] at risk. Um, my first question is, um, you've identified these as taking place on the East [55:49] Coast. Is it just on the East Coast where these encounters, uh, have been reported? [55:54] No. Since, uh, the events initially occurred, I've learned that the objects have been detected [55:59] essentially where, uh, all operations, uh, Navy operations are being conducted across the world. [56:04] Uh, and that's from, uh, the all domain anomaly resolutions office reporting. [56:09] All right. Can you describe your experience after you decided to come forward and, um, [56:14] go public with your, um, experience? [56:17] Certainly. Uh, like many others, uh, in 2017, I saw the New York Times article come out, uh, as well. [56:23] And for me, it was, it was special because I recognized the voices on the video. Uh, I recognized the video [56:29] itself. I had seen it when it was taken. I seen it when it was debriefed. Um, and so that was kind [56:35] of shook me because I realized that this problem was still ongoing. And so I reached out to colleagues [56:40] back on the East Coast, uh, and realized that this was still a safety risk that they were dealing with, [56:44] that they had essentially hit a wall with how they could move forward on this conversation. [56:48] It was at that point when I decided to try to move the conversation forward myself. [56:51] Um, are there common characteristics to the UAPs that have been cited by different pilots? And can [56:58] you describe what the convergence of descriptions is? [57:02] Certainly. Uh, we were primarily seeing dark gray or black cubes inside of a clear sphere. [57:07] I'm sorry, dark gray or black cubes? [57:10] Yes, inside of a clear sphere where the apex or tips of the cube were touching the inside of that sphere. [57:16] And that was primarily what was being reported when we were able to gain a visual tally of these [57:20] objects. And that occurred over almost eight years. And as far as I know, it's still occurring. [57:25] Um, so the, I take it that you're arguing what we need is real transparency in a reporting system [57:34] so we can get some clarity on what's going on out there, because there are many pilots in your [57:39] situation. Um, but we should have a way of developing assist systematic inventory of all of such [57:46] encounters. Is that right? Yes. And I think we need both transparency and the reporting. We have [57:51] the reporting, but we need to make sure that information can be promulgated to commercial aviation as [57:55] well as the rest of the populace. Um, Mr. Grush, what, what about you? What was your experience [58:00] after you came forward? Well, uh, it's only been about two months or so. So I guess my experience [58:06] has been, you know, overwhelming support from, uh, former colleagues of mine that have, you know, [58:11] privately messaged me and, and I do appreciate that. Uh, but I, I do have knowledge of, um, active [58:19] planned, uh, reprisal activity against myself and other colleagues. And it's very, very upsetting to me. [58:24] Coming from where? Uh, certain senior leadership at previous agencies I was associated with, [58:30] and that's all I'll say publicly, but I can provide more details in a closed environment. [58:35] Okay. Well, I, I hope you understand that, um, there would be bipartisan rejection of any attempt, [58:42] uh, to vilify, demonize, or engage in other reprisals against our witnesses and people who are [58:49] telling the truth from their perspective. Yeah, there were certain colleagues of mine that were [58:53] brutally administratively attacked and, uh, you know, actually makes me very upset to, [58:58] as a leader to see that happen to other coworkers and actually superiors of mine over the last three [59:03] years. How do you account for that response? That, that seems like a bizarre response. [59:07] Uh, I call it administrative terrorism. That's their, their quiver, their tool in the toolbox, [59:12] uh, to silence people, especially, you know, the, uh, career government service cares about their [59:18] career, cares about their clearance, uh, their reputation to climb the ladder. And when you [59:22] threaten that, uh, flow career path, uh, a lot of people back off. Um, but I'm here to represent [59:29] those people. So, um, Mr. Fravor, what about you? Um, what has your experience been since you've come [59:38] forward with your perspective on this? Actually, I've been treated very well. And the six people that [59:43] were involved, myself included, all of them have, or will be retiring from the military as 05s or 06s. [59:50] And all my friends that are very senior, three and four stars, I've talked to them. They, [59:55] they believe, they, they understand there's a problem, but no, I've, I was actually treated really [59:58] well. And, and what is your general interpretation, um, of these phenomena or what is your [1:00:09] current thinking of trying to make sense of them? Well, I'll say, you know, [1:00:13] I'm not like a UFO fanatic. It's not, it's not me, but I will tell you that what we saw with four [1:00:20] sets of eyes over a five minute period, still there's nothing. We have nothing close to it. It [1:00:26] was, it was amazing to see. I told my buddy, I wanted to fly it, but yeah, it's just an incredible [1:00:31] technology. All right. Uh, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'll yield back to you. Uh, thanks. [1:00:37] And Ms. Luna, Mr. Grush, uh, in speaking to you yesterday, um, I just wanted to follow up on [1:00:47] Representative Raskin's questions. In the last couple of years, have you had incidences that have [1:00:54] caused you to be in fear for your life for addressing these issues? Yes, personally. [1:00:59] Okay. I just want everyone to note that he's coming forward in fear of his life to put in perspective, [1:01:06] if they were really not scared about this information coming out, why would someone be intimidated like [1:01:10] that? Um, to your knowledge, are NHIs working with adversarial foreign governments in either [1:01:17] technology exchange programs or back engineering programs? I don't have data on that. I'm not sure. [1:01:23] Have you heard, or you had people come forward to present that evidence? [1:01:27] Not that particular evidence that you just espoused. Okay. On the 19th of April, Dr. Kirkpatrick, [1:01:33] head of Arrow, had said that he did not find any evidence of UAPs. You also stated that [1:01:38] you had, um, in your interview that you had briefed him on information that you were uncovering, [1:01:42] but that he did not follow up with you. Were the items that you divulged to him pertinent to national [1:01:48] security? Yes. Uh, him and I had a classified conversation in April, 2022, before he took over [1:01:54] Arrow in, uh, July 2022. And I provided him some concerns I had. Do you know why he might not have [1:02:02] fallen up with you? Uh, um, I, unfortunately I cannot read his mind. Um, I wish he did. Uh, I was, [1:02:09] I was happy to give sage counsel to him on, uh, where to look when he took the, the helm of Arrow. [1:02:14] Okay. And then my last question for you before I move to Mr. Graves is, um, you received prior [1:02:20] approval from the defense department to speak on certain issues, correct? Correct. Through, uh, DOPSER, [1:02:25] DOD pre-publication and security review. And I just want to remind the public, uh, they're just looking [1:02:30] from a security perspective. Uh, these are my own personal views and opinions, uh, not the department's. [1:02:36] Okay. I'm asking that though, mainly because I think that there are many people that would like [1:02:40] to discredit you. So it does bring a certain amount of credibility to your testimony. I'm [1:02:45] required by law to do that as a former intelligence officer, or I go to jail for revealing classified [1:02:50] information. Yeah. We don't want you to go to jail. Um, my next question would actually be for [1:02:55] Mr. Graves. Um, can you please explain to me in detail the event that occurred at Vandenberg Air [1:03:01] Force Base? Certainly. Uh, in the 2003 timeframe, uh, a large group of Boeing contractors were operating [1:03:11] near one of the launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base when they observed a very large hundred [1:03:16] yard sided, uh, red square, uh, approach the base from the ocean and hover at low altitude over one of [1:03:25] the launch facilities. Um, this object remained for about 45 seconds or so before darting off over [1:03:31] the mountains. Um, there was a similar event within 24 hours later in the evening. Uh, this was a morning [1:03:36] event, uh, I believe 8 45 in the morning, later in the evening post sunset. Uh, there were reports of [1:03:44] other sightings on base, including some aggressive behaviors. Uh, these objects were approaching some [1:03:48] of the security guards at rapid speeds, uh, before darting off. Uh, and this is information that was [1:03:53] received through one of the, uh, witnesses that have approached me at Americans for Safe Aerospace. [1:03:58] Was this documented in any official form, whether it was a police blotter? [1:04:03] Yes. They had official documentation and records from the event that the witness, uh, held over the [1:04:07] years. And I'm not going to ask you to do it right now for time reasons, but you'd be able to sketch [1:04:12] what was witnessed, correct? And you've, have you seen that before on any other equipment and or during [1:04:17] your flight time? I have not seen what they've described. Um, this object was estimated to be almost [1:04:22] the size of a football field. Um, and I have not seen anything personally in that large. [1:04:26] Okay. And then, um, another question on follow-up, referencing the gimbal video, [1:04:29] go fast incident. Um, can you just clarify because to our understanding, the footage was actually cut [1:04:35] off at a certain point, but what happens at the end of that video, just for those Americans specifically [1:04:39] there that are wanting to know about the rest of that footage? Certainly, uh, there was some uncertainty [1:04:43] or, um, you know, instability with the object. It seemed to rock a bit. Uh, and that's the last, uh, [1:04:48] last I had seen in the video. Much of the data that I would recommend be analyzed would consist of [1:04:53] radar data, uh, that would provide precise kinematics on the object, as well as the fleet of objects that [1:04:58] were operating nearby. Okay. And follow-up, uh, in regards to the reporting procedures that Mr. [1:05:03] Garcia had addressed on, as well as, uh, Representative Burchett, with the FAA, to your understanding, [1:05:08] pilots that are seeing this commercial airline pilots, are they receiving, um, cease and desist letters [1:05:13] from corporations for coming forward with information in regards to safety for potential [1:05:18] air airline passengers? I have been made privy to a conversation with commercial, uh, aviators who [1:05:23] have received cease and desist orders. So the American public should know that corporations are [1:05:28] putting their own reputations on the basic, not the line, but ahead of the safety of the American [1:05:34] people. And I think, would you agree with that statement? It appears so. Okay. Um, and I guess this [1:05:39] would be my last, oh, I'm out of time. I yield. I'll be back. Good. Mr. Moskowitz. Uh, thank you, [1:05:49] Mr. Chairman. Uh, gentlemen, let's talk about the laws of physics for a second. Uh, Mr. Graves [1:05:56] and, and Commander Faber, I heard you talk about speed. When, uh, those objects broke, uh, the sound [1:06:03] barrier, did they make a sonic boom? I was in a jet. You can't hear anything. It's kind of loud in there. [1:06:10] Yeah. You, you're not able to actually, uh, personally tell within the vehicle. I will say the [1:06:14] objects that we were seeing, they were spherical, uh, and they were observed up the Mach 2, uh, [1:06:18] which is a very, uh, non-aerodynamic shape. What about G-forces? Let's talk about G-forces [1:06:23] of those vehicles. Could a human survive those G-forces with known technology today? No. No, [1:06:29] not for the acceleration rates that we observed. Okay. What about what they look like? How close [1:06:34] did you get? Did you see a seam or a rivet or a section? And what I mean is obviously the jets [1:06:40] you're flying have all those things. Did these objects have those? Do you want to go around? [1:06:46] I didn't have, I didn't have the detail to be able to tell that. So we got within a half mile [1:06:50] of tic-tac, which people say that's pretty far, but it's in airplanes, that's actually relatively [1:06:54] close. No, it was perfectly white, smooth, no windows. Although when we did take the original [1:07:00] FLIR video that is out there, when you put it on a big screen, it actually had two little objects that [1:07:04] came out of the bottom of it. Um, but other than that, no, no windows, no seams, no nothing. Mr. Grosh, [1:07:10] as a result of your previous government work, have you met with people with direct knowledge [1:07:14] or have direct knowledge yourself of non-human origin craft? Yes. I personally interviewed [1:07:19] those individuals. Mr. Grosh, as a result of your previous government work, have you met with people [1:07:24] with direct knowledge or have direct knowledge yourself about ATs, advanced technologies that [1:07:29] the US government has? Uh, based on, uh, conventional, uh, advanced tech, I was briefed to, uh, the preponderance [1:07:38] of the defense departments, both space and aerospace compartmental programs. Yeah. Do you have [1:07:43] knowledge or do you have reason to believe that there are programs in the advanced tech space that [1:07:48] are unsanctioned? Uh, yes, I do. Okay. Yeah. And, and when you say that they're above congressional [1:07:54] oversight, what do you mean? Uh, complicated question. Uh, so there's, you know, some, I would call [1:08:02] it abuse here. So congressional oversight of conventional special, special access programs, [1:08:07] so I'll use title 10. So DOD as an example, right? So 10 us code section 119 discusses congressional [1:08:14] oversight of SAPs discusses, uh, the, the depth sec defs ability to waive congressional reporting. [1:08:20] However, the gang of eight is at least supposed to be notified if, uh, you know, waived or waived bigoted [1:08:25] unacknowledged SAP is created and that's public law. Well, so that how does, I mean, I don't want to [1:08:30] cut you off, but how does a program like that get funded? I will give you generalities. I can get very [1:08:36] specific in a closed session, uh, but, uh, misappropriation of funds and, uh, does that [1:08:41] mean that, does that mean that there is money in the budget that is said to go to a program, [1:08:45] but it doesn't, and it goes to something else? Yes. I have specific knowledge of that. Yep. [1:08:49] Do you think U S corporations are over, overcharging for certain tech they're selling to the U S [1:08:54] government and that additional money is going to programs? Correct. Through something called IRAD. [1:08:59] Okay. Um, satellite imagery, let's talk about satellite imagery. We have satellites all over the [1:09:06] place. Some that we're aware of and many that we're not aware of, right? We're taking pictures [1:09:12] of everything at every point and second. Uh, Mr. Grush, are you aware? Do you have direct [1:09:17] knowledge? We've talked to people with direct knowledge that there are satellite imagery of [1:09:22] these events. Uh, that was one of my primary tasks at NGA since we, uh, process exploit and [1:09:28] disseminate that kind of information. I've seen multiple cases, some of which to my understanding, [1:09:33] and of course I left NGA in April. So that's my information cutoff date. Uh, but I personally, [1:09:38] um, reviewed both, uh, what we call overhead collection and from other strategic and tactical [1:09:44] platforms that were, I could not even explain prosaically. And I have a degree in physics, [1:09:48] by the way, as well. And I had, uh, I am aware that you guys have not seen these, um, reports, [1:09:56] unfortunately. And I don't know why it is. Do you have direct knowledge? We would spoken people [1:10:01] with direct knowledge that this imagery applies to crash sites, crash, crash imagery? I can't [1:10:09] discuss that in an open session. Okay. Uh, do you have any information that the U.S. government [1:10:16] is involved in a disinformation campaign to deny the existence of certain UAPs? I can't go beyond [1:10:24] what I've already stated publicly in my News Nation interview, uh, because it touches other sensitivities. [1:10:29] Okay. I'll yield the balance of my time, um, uh, back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Fox. [1:10:39] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our witnesses for being here today. Um, [1:10:47] Mr. Grush, in your sworn testimony, you state that the United States government has retrieved [1:10:53] supposedly extraterrestrial spacecraft and other UAP-related artifacts. You go so far as to state [1:11:03] that the U.S. is in possession of, quote, non-human spacecraft, end quote, and that some of these [1:11:10] artifacts have circulated with defense contractors. Several other former military and intelligence [1:11:17] officials have come forward with similar allegations, albeit in non-public settings. However, [1:11:25] Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick, the director of AARO, previously testified before Congress that there has been, [1:11:35] and I quote, no credible evidence thus far of extraterrestrial activity or of, quote, [1:11:46] off-world technology brought to the attention of the office. To your knowledge, is that statement correct? [1:11:55] It's not accurate. I believe Dr. Kirkpatrick, um, mentioned he had about 30 individuals that have [1:12:02] come to AARO thus far. A few of those individuals have also come to AARO that I also interviewed. [1:12:08] Okay. And I know what they provided Dr. Kirkpatrick and their team. Okay. [1:12:12] I was able to evaluate that information. Okay, I need to go on. Sure. But, um, [1:12:17] um, my understanding that this, his statement is accurate, uh, came from a direct quote. And this [1:12:28] contradiction is a perfect example of why we need to inject transparency into our government. And for [1:12:36] another example, look no further than the pitiful response to the Chinese spy balloon debacle earlier [1:12:43] this year. You may remember the mass confusion that ensued when the balloon was first spotted over [1:12:49] Montana, four days after it first entered U.S. airspace over Alaska. The Biden administration's [1:12:56] initial inability to address the object grew into a continuous series of embarrassments. After news of [1:13:04] the balloon reached the mainstream media, we were assured that the balloon posed no threat to our [1:13:11] security. However, after the balloon was allowed to transit the entire continental United States, [1:13:17] fighter jets were scrambled off the coast of South Carolina to shoot it down. This flip-flopping and [1:13:24] obfuscation caused needless confusion, fear and panic across the country. It's my hope, Mr. Chairman, [1:13:32] that this sort of confusion will not be repeated. We should investigate the extent to which elements [1:13:39] of our government possess or do not possess information that is of critical value to the [1:13:46] American people. We owe it to the citizens of this nation to make sure that our government is transparent [1:13:53] and accountable. We must make sure that our government provides answers and Congress must do [1:14:00] its duty to solicit those answers. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. [1:14:06] Yeah, Mr. Frost. [1:14:09] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2022, NASA announced that it was commissioning an independent study [1:14:17] team to examine UAPs. The NASA team is comprised of scientists across different fields, as well as [1:14:23] former astronauts and pilots. In May, the independent study team held at its first public meeting, [1:14:30] which included the perspectives from NASA senior leaders, as well as perspectives from the Department [1:14:35] of Defense and intelligence agencies. The NASA study team is also expected to release its first report [1:14:42] pretty soon, and I think it's safe to say that we all eagerly await its results. Mr. Graves, how might [1:14:49] NASA's research influence the commercial industry regarding safety and UAP? [1:14:53] I think NASA has a big role to play as far as commercial aviation safety, and it's one of their [1:14:58] original charges as an organization. One of the recommendations that have been put forward is to [1:15:03] utilize their existing aviation safety reporting system to serve as a short-term fill and trusted [1:15:09] platform for pilots that want to report on UAP. It also has built-in analytics capability and is funded [1:15:15] by Congress. Gotcha. And also, Mr. Graves, are there any other industries that may be influenced by the NASA [1:15:20] research on UAPs? And if so, how so? Well, I think there is a large swath of commercial [1:15:26] capabilities that could be brought to bear on this topic from space-based or ground-based sensor [1:15:31] systems that are available open source or through commercial marketplaces. And I think NASA's work, [1:15:36] as they work to identify and highlight specific parameters that can be found, we can take that [1:15:40] information and promulgate this through the public sector so that we can have more open conversation [1:15:45] about what we're seeing. You know, in 2020, the Department of Defense released several videos of [1:15:51] UAPs, including Mr. Freyer's experience, U.S. Navy pilots that recorded footage. In 2021, the Office of [1:16:00] the Director of National Intelligence released a preliminary report on UAP events. NASA Administrator [1:16:06] Bill Nelson stated that NASA would begin to investigate these events. In fact, I sit on Science, Space and [1:16:12] Technology Committee. And when we were doing a hearing with the NASA Administrator, Bill Nelson, [1:16:17] I asked, you know, why NASA needed to be fully funded. And there were many great reasons, but one of them [1:16:23] was actually had to do with UAPs. He actually mentioned, you know, is there life out there? I don't [1:16:29] know. And so either way, these actions ultimately led NASA to assemble the independent study team that I [1:16:36] mentioned earlier. Also in 2021, Harvard University stood up the Galileo Project to research and examine [1:16:43] the origins of UAP. So it seems like both, you know, from NASA and in the higher education community, [1:16:51] because of the work that you all have done and people standing up, you know, I think we're seeing [1:16:55] some of that stigma slowly going away. Mr. Freyer, do you believe that military pilots feeling empowered to [1:17:03] share their UAP experiences has directly impacted the scientific community's research goals on this [1:17:10] topic? I would say yes. I would say that, you know, starting in 2017, when it actually came out, [1:17:16] it took that stigma away. I mean, I've talked to multiple senators who said prior to that, [1:17:20] if you'd mentioned UAP, you'd have been laughed off the hill. And now you were sitting here today [1:17:26] for a public testimony on what's actually going on. You know, I'm hoping that this curve will be more [1:17:31] of an exponential, and we'll get more and more transparent to the level that we can. [1:17:36] Yeah, yeah. And yeah, I mean, it's important. I couldn't imagine, you know, I'm not a pilot, [1:17:41] but I used to fly gliders in Civil Air Patrol. Yeah, I got it. Yeah. And so either way, I mean, [1:17:50] I couldn't imagine, you know, being in the glider and seeing something, and then not feeling like I [1:17:57] had the agency to talk about it. Mr. Graves, can you discuss the importance of seeking scientists [1:18:03] to sit on your advisory board? Absolutely. I think ultimately, this is going to be a scientific [1:18:08] problem. And not only that, it's also an engineering problem. I've been working with American Institute [1:18:13] of Aeronautics and Astronautics to help them stand up a UAP integration committee to help integrate [1:18:18] their engineering prowess into this problem. And so yes, very much, I think this is an engineering and [1:18:23] scientific problem as much as national security problem. And how might Congress help to facilitate [1:18:28] partnerships between the scientific community and the UAP focus groups within government? [1:18:33] Well, I think one of the things they can do is to have these types of hearings to communicate to [1:18:37] the public that this is a topic of interest. I think that there is a pseudo market, if you will, [1:18:42] of interested capabilities and talent that want to approach this topic. And we're seeing that start [1:18:47] to grow now. So I think continued conversation reduction of stigma is going to allow that to [1:18:51] flourish and allow answers to help generate themselves. [1:18:54] A hundred percent. Well, thank you all for being here. Thank you for your work. I think it's [1:18:57] important that we keep our top scientific minds focused on this issue and look for ways to increase [1:19:03] collaboration. Thank you so much. I yield back. Mr. Comer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say, [1:19:08] I want to thank you for having this hearing. I want to thank Mr. Burchett, Ms. Luna for leading this [1:19:13] hearing. And with that, I yield by five minutes to Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to [1:19:19] direct this, I believe, to Mr. Grush. But if any of you all feel like you need to jump in, [1:19:24] just jump right in. We're good. Has the U.S. government become aware of actual evidence of [1:19:29] extraterrestrial, otherwise unexplained forms of intelligence? And if so, when do you think this [1:19:34] first occurred? I like to use the term non-human. I don't like to denote origin. It keeps the aperture open, [1:19:41] both scientifically. Certainly, like I've discussed publicly previously, 1930s. [1:19:49] Okay. Can you give me the names and titles of the people with direct first-hand knowledge [1:19:55] and access to some of this crash retrieval, some of these crash retrieval programs, and maybe which [1:20:01] facilities, military bases that the recovered material would be in? And I know a lot of Congress [1:20:06] talked about we're going to go to Area 51 and, you know, and there's nothing there anymore anyway. [1:20:12] It's just, you know, and we move like a glacier. As soon as we announce it, I'm sure the moving vans [1:20:17] would pull up, but please. I can't discuss that publicly, but I did provide that information both [1:20:23] to the intel committees and the inspector general. And we could get that in the SCIF if we were allowed [1:20:27] to get in a SCIF with you. Would that be probably what you would think? Sure, if you had the appropriate [1:20:31] accesses, yeah. What special access programs cover this information and how is it possible that they [1:20:38] have evaded oversight for so long? I do know the names. Once again, I can't discuss that publicly and [1:20:46] how they've evaded oversight. I, in a close setting, I can tell you the specific tradecraft use. All [1:20:51] right. When did, when do you think those programs began and who authorized them? I do know a lot of that [1:20:59] information, but that's something I can't discuss publicly because of sensitivity. All right. If [1:21:03] any of y'all want to jump in on any of this, you're more than welcome to. What level of security [1:21:08] clearance is required to fully access these programs? Well, anybody who has- And I say that [1:21:15] because myself, Representative Gates and Representative Luna were basically turned away at one point [1:21:22] at Eglin. So please go right ahead. Certainly difference between member access and say somebody [1:21:27] like me, but anybody who has a, you know, TSSCI clearance and meets the eligibility criteria, [1:21:32] the access adjudicative authority should be able to grant you access. [1:21:36] Ms. Burchard, if you'll yield. So just to be put a fine point on that, [1:21:40] there's nothing that you're aware of that's above special access program classification. [1:21:45] It's a misnomer that there's anything actually above top secret. Executive Order 13-526 delineates [1:21:51] the classification levels. Right. But I draw a point on that because we can have access to those [1:21:56] programs. And so the notion that we're not being given that access sort of defies our typical muscle [1:22:02] memory here in Congress. Thank you, Mr. Burchard. I'll yield back to you. [1:22:05] Thank you, Mr. Gates. Along those lines, Title 10, you might not know this or not, [1:22:09] but Title 10 and Title 50 authorization, they seem to say they're inefficient. So who gets to decide this, [1:22:18] in your opinion, in the past? It's a group of career [1:22:24] senior executive officials. Okay. Are they government officials? [1:22:28] Both in and out. Do what? Both in and out [1:22:32] of government. And that's about as far as I go there. I got you. All right. Well, that's, [1:22:36] it leads to my next question. Which private corporations are directly involved in this [1:22:41] program? How much taxpayer money has been invested in these programs, to your knowledge? [1:22:47] Well, we know, we know we audit the Pentagon every year. And I've been here five years and [1:22:52] they failed the dadgum thing every year. They lose over a billion dollars a year, we think. And I've [1:22:59] told the Department of Defense maybe 60% of their assets are unaccounted for, whatever the heck that [1:23:03] means. In the public sector, you go to jail for that kind of crap. So tell me. Yeah, I know when I'm [1:23:11] a dollar off of my DTS travel voucher, I get hammered, but it seems like it doesn't work the other way. [1:23:15] If you sell over six, if you sell over $600 worth of stuff on eBay, now you get a call from the IRS. So [1:23:21] please, what corporations? Yeah, I don't know the specific metrics towards the end of your question. [1:23:25] The specific corporations I did provide to the committees in specific divisions. And [1:23:32] I spent 11 and a half hours with both intel committees. Okay. Has there been any, [1:23:36] has there been an active U.S. government disinformation campaign to deny the existence [1:23:41] of unidentified aerial phenomena? And if so, why? I can't go beyond what I've already [1:23:47] exposed publicly about that. Hey, I've been told to ask you what that, what that is and how to get it [1:24:07] in the record. Which, uh, what have you stated publicly in your interviews for the congressional [1:24:14] record? Uh, yeah. If you reference my News Nation interview and I talk about a multi-decade, [1:24:21] you know, campaign to disenfranchise public interest basically. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, [1:24:28] I yield back negative 21 seconds. Thank you. Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. [1:24:34] Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for coming here today. Um, I do concur [1:24:39] with the ranking member as well as several other members here on this committee that this is a [1:24:43] committee for whistleblowers and for the protection of whistleblowers as well. So we understand what [1:24:48] you're putting, um, on the table here and we're putting on the line here and we thank you for that. [1:24:53] Uh, Mr. Grush, you sat on the unidentified anomalous phenomenon task force created in the 2020 NDAA, [1:24:59] correct? Yes. Uh, there have been some things that, uh, that have been mentioned here during [1:25:03] this hearing that I wanted to pick up on. Um, Mr. Graves, you mentioned specifically during the [1:25:09] answers to one of your questions, you named Boeing contractors, um, being engaged in an incident [1:25:15] regarding this red cube about a football, um, a football field wide. I was wondering if you could [1:25:21] speak a little bit about the interaction or Mr. Grush, either of you, the interactions between defense [1:25:27] contractor companies and any UAP related programs or activities. So I'll just say that the information [1:25:33] about, uh, the contractor himself were provided by a witness and I have no particular detail in [1:25:38] that relationship. Mr. Grush. Uh, the kind of general unclassed wavetops, uh, certainly the contractors, [1:25:44] you know, are the metal benders, so to speak, the ones actually, uh, doing specific performance on [1:25:50] government contracts. Are they required, um, to issue any disclosure regarding UAP sightings or do they [1:25:56] engage in any, uh, reporting around this? Uh, in terms of the contractors? Yes. Not that I'm aware [1:26:01] of. They do not. Okay. Now, when it comes to notification that you had mentioned about, um, [1:26:09] IRAP programs, I-RAD programs, we have seen, uh, defense contractors abuse, uh, their contracts [1:26:17] before through this committee. Um, I have seen it personally, um, and I have also seen the notification [1:26:23] requirements to Congress abused. Um, I am wondering, one of the loopholes that we see in the law is [1:26:30] that there is, at least from my vantage point, is that depending on what we're seeing is that there are [1:26:36] no actual definitions or requirements for notification. Are there, what methods of notification did you [1:26:44] observe? Like when they say they notified Congress, how did they do that? Do you have insight into that? [1:26:49] Uh, for certain I-RAD activities, uh, that'd be, uh, I can only think of ones conventional in nature. [1:26:56] Um, sometimes they throw, uh, flow through certain, I'll just say SAP programs that have cognizant [1:27:03] authority over the Air Force or something. And those are congressionally reported compartments, but [1:27:08] I-RAD is literally internal to the contractor. So as long as it's money, either profits, private [1:27:14] investment, et cetera, they can do whatever they want. To put a finer point on it, when there is a requirement [1:27:19] for any agency or company to notify, or any agency to notify Congress, do they contact the chairman of [1:27:26] a committee? Do they get them on the phone specifically? Is this through an email to [1:27:31] hypothetically a dead email box? A lot of it comes through what they call the PPR, periodic program [1:27:38] review process. If it's a, you know, a SAP or controlled access program equity, and then those go to the [1:27:44] specific committees, whether it be the SAS, PASC, HSE. Thank you. Um, I apologize. I just, my time is [1:27:50] limited. Um, Mr. Graves, one of your main concerns that the FAA currently does not have an official [1:27:56] process to receive reports of UAP from pilots or others, correct? Correct. And, um, in your experience, [1:28:03] what data should the aero program prioritize for potential collection? We have, you know, location, date, [1:28:09] time, but are there other specific activity, uh, characteristics that should be included in these [1:28:14] reports? Certainly. Uh, I think that there's two categories that would be important. Uh, one would [1:28:19] be kinematics and understanding the specifics of how the vehicle or objects are moving. Uh, and the second [1:28:24] would be a more zoomed out approach of being able to, uh, look at origin and destination, uh, after, before [1:28:29] the incident, as well as getting a better contextual understanding of how these, uh, these objects are [1:28:34] interacting with each other. Thank you. Now, uh, because I only have a minute left, I apologize. [1:28:40] We only have five minutes today, but, um, for the record, if you were me, where would you look? [1:28:47] Titles, programs, departments, regions, if you could just name anything. Um, and I put that as an open [1:28:58] question to the three of you. I'd be happy to give you that in a closed environment. I can tell you [1:29:03] specifically. Thank you. Um, commander Fravor? I would say, and I've told people that you, you have [1:29:11] to know where to look. They're not going to divulge it to you because of the classification levels, [1:29:14] but if you know where to look and who to talk to, which is exactly what Mr. Grush can point you, [1:29:18] then you, then you have them. Okay. Mr. Graves? I was an operator, so I was defending on folks like [1:29:23] Mr. Grush to do that homework. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back to the chair. Mr. Beggs? [1:29:30] Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here today. I'm over here. [1:29:33] Thank you so much for being here. Um, I, I want to get into, uh, specifics here. And, and the reason [1:29:46] I'm going to go this way is because you've talked a bit about, um, what I would call misdirection by, [1:29:55] um, official US government with regard to UAPs, right? And so I'm going to get to that in a second, [1:30:02] but last week, White House NSC spokesman John Kirby stated that UAPs are having an impact on our [1:30:08] training ranges and needs to be treated as a legitimate issue. Do you concur with the statements? [1:30:12] That's for each of you. Yes. Yes. Yes. Okay. Um, now having said that, I'm going to take you to [1:30:23] specific instances around the Phoenix Valley, because that's where I, I live. And in 97, [1:30:29] we had the famous Phoenix light case. I don't know if any of you are familiar with that. [1:30:36] Uh, there were, there were two things that went along with that. And the explanation was military [1:30:42] training range off Luke and the Berry Goldwater range. Do you know anything different other [1:30:47] than the official explanation of those lights? Only what's in the public vernacular about it. [1:30:53] That was outside the scope of my duties. And if we wanted to just my question along [1:30:59] with my colleague from New York, Ms. Ocasio-Cortez, if we wanted to find out more about that, [1:31:04] where would we go to find the files and where, and who would we address? And are you going to tell [1:31:10] me we need to go to a skiff so you can tell us in a skiff? I could potentially give you a vector [1:31:15] on that, that specific case. I'm not, I mean, I'm familiar with it in terms of public, but, uh, [1:31:20] I give you a vector in close environment. Yeah, that would be good. Thank you. So if, if it's true [1:31:26] that UAPs are having an impact on training ranges and this administration considers it to be a [1:31:32] legitimate issue, what steps can Congress take to address training range impacts? And I say that having [1:31:37] two very large training ranges in my state. And so we'll start with Mr. Graves and go on down the, [1:31:43] the panel. Some of the initial procedures have been implemented, uh, such as within the United [1:31:49] States Navy that have a range follow report that gathers information from pilots. Uh, I understand [1:31:54] that a service-wide reporting mechanism is still pending. However, that would be a great next step, [1:32:00] not only for gathering information, but for showing the troops that is an acceptable topic and [1:32:04] reducing the stigma. Okay. Please all of you continue. Yeah. As a recipient of a lot of those [1:32:10] training range reports, uh, sometimes we only get contextual kind of, um, oral, uh, reporting. [1:32:16] It'd be nice if they attached all sensor data and there's a system in place that can handle multiple [1:32:21] classifications of data. And that's an issue with the F 35, right? That jet was never built to be an [1:32:27] ISR platform and it's a pain in the, we'll say, but, uh, to get that data off. So great. Thank you. [1:32:34] Yeah, I would agree with the previous two being a user of those training ranges, [1:32:38] uh, that the data has to be out there. You have to acknowledge that you're seeing them and then [1:32:42] you have to collect the data right now. You get the report. Someone says, I saw something, [1:32:45] but no one collects the radar data to back it up and do research. Okay. Uh, do you believe that the [1:32:50] 2019 classification guidelines for UAPs interferes with the federal government's ability to be [1:32:55] transparent with the American people? And do you think we need to be more transparent with the [1:32:59] American people? All of you. Yeah. I'll say yes to that. Yeah. I'm familiar with the, [1:33:06] the, at least the UAP task force 2019, uh, security classification guide. I think it's fair. Um, [1:33:12] I did actually help, uh, author that with the, uh, you got, you got a bias that way then. [1:33:17] But I will say, uh, I'll call it a lazy attitude about declassifying videos. I mean, [1:33:22] I've seen some of the videos of, uh, you know, the recent shoot down and I saw no reason that couldn't [1:33:27] have been released as long as they mask, you know, some data. Uh, the American people deserve to see that, [1:33:32] that imagery and full motion video. Uh, I would think, well, in my opinion, I will say [1:33:41] things are overclassified. I know for a fact, the video or the pictures that came out in the 20, [1:33:46] I think it was 2020 report that had the stuff off the East coast. They were taken with an iPhone [1:33:50] off the East coast. A buddy of mine was one of the senior people there. And he said they originally [1:33:53] classified to TSSCI. And my question to him was what's TSSCI about these? They're an iPhone, [1:33:58] right? Literally off the vacates. That's not TSSCI. So they're overclassified. And as soon as they do [1:34:03] that, they go in a vault and then you all have to look for them. Yeah. So with the overclassification, [1:34:08] that may be one way, are there other ways that the, uh, DOD or intelligence agencies are keeping [1:34:13] this information from the American people or even from Congress? I think part of that has been, uh, [1:34:20] not encouraging reporting. Uh, if the problem is not something that can be measured, it's not [1:34:23] something that's going to be fixed. Okay. Very good. Well, I'm out of time and I thank you, [1:34:28] Mr. Chairman. And you'll bet. Uh, first of all, without objection, [1:34:33] representative Nick Langworthy of New York is waved down the subcommittee for purpose of [1:34:37] questioning witnesses at today's subcommittee hearing. And then we go to Mr. Burleson. [1:34:45] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, appreciate you guys coming out today, testifying. Look, [1:34:50] I've been here for six months and I'm pretty skeptical. I don't trust anything in this town. [1:34:56] And, um, and so I, and I think that's because I'm from Missouri, you've got to show me, right? [1:35:01] Right. Um, with that being said, um, there's been a lot of things that have been said, um, [1:35:07] in, in the public, uh, Mr. Grush. And, and so I want to get down to, if we can, some specifics, [1:35:13] right? So, um, at one point you had said that there, there, there, there, uh, has been harmful [1:35:20] activity or progressive activity. Has any of the activity, um, been aggressive, been, um, hostile [1:35:28] now in your reports? Uh, I know of multiple colleagues of mine that got physically injured [1:35:34] and, uh, the activity. By, by UAPs or by, by people within the, the federal government? Both. [1:35:45] Okay. So there has been activity by, by alien or non, non-human technology and, or beings that has [1:35:55] caused harm to humans. Uh, I can't get into the specifics in an open environment, but at least the [1:36:02] activity that I personally witnessed, and I have to be very careful here, uh, because you don't, [1:36:09] you know, they tell you never to acknowledge tradecraft, right? So what I personally witnessed [1:36:12] myself and my wife was very disturbing. Okay. Um, one of my constituents actually sent this [1:36:21] next question and I figured I'd ask it since I had the same thought. You've said that U.S. has [1:36:28] intact spacecraft. You said that the government has alien bodies or alien species. Have you seen, [1:36:37] have you, have you seen the spacecraft? I have to be careful to describe what I've seen firsthand and [1:36:44] not in this environment, but I, I could answer that question behind, behind closed doors. And have [1:36:48] you seen any of the bodies? That's something I've, I've not witnessed myself. Okay. And so with that being [1:36:56] said, you know, and the other, the other statement that has been made that was intriguing to me because, [1:37:01] and it's intriguing because my, my view has been that we are billions of light years away from any, [1:37:09] any other system. And the concept that an alien species is technologically advanced enough to travel [1:37:16] billions of light years gets here and somehow is incompetent enough to not survive earth or crashes is, [1:37:24] is something that I find a little bit far-fetched. And with that being said, [1:37:30] you have mentioned that there's interdimensional potential. Could you expound on that? [1:37:34] I'll get to answer your first question. And you know, I'm here as a fact witness and expert, [1:37:39] but I will give you a, a theoretical framework, at least to work off to kind of espouse, uh, crashes, [1:37:45] uh, regardless of, uh, you know, your level of sentience, right? You know, planes crash, cars, [1:37:50] crash, and number of sorties, what, however high, a small percentage are going to end and, [1:37:55] you know, mission failure for, well, as we say in the, in the air force. Uh, and then in terms of, [1:38:00] uh, multi-dimensionality, that kind of thing, the, the framework, uh, that I'm familiar with, [1:38:06] for example, is something called the holographic principle, uh, both, uh, it's, it derives itself [1:38:12] from general relativity and quantum mechanics. And that is, if you want to imagine, uh, 3d objects, [1:38:18] such as yourself casting a shadow onto a 2d surface, uh, that's the holographic principle. [1:38:24] So you can be projected, quasi projected from higher dimensional space to lower dimensional. [1:38:28] It's a scientific trope that you can actually cross literally, as far as I understand, [1:38:32] but there's probably guys of PhDs that we could probably argue about that. [1:38:36] But you have not seen any documentation that that's what's occurring. [1:38:39] Uh, only a theoretical framework discussion. [1:38:42] Okay. Um, okay. [1:38:44] Okay. Occam's razor is that this, these aircraft, um, have they been identified that they are being [1:38:55] produced by, by domestic, um, you know, military, um, contractors? Is there any evidence that that's [1:39:03] what's being recovered? [1:39:04] Uh, not to my knowledge, plus the recoveries predate a lot of our advanced programs that I [1:39:10] previously am winning of. So, um, would it be safe to say that there could be a scenario today [1:39:16] where you have, um, an aircraft that crashes and because it's been involved in one program from [1:39:24] one federal agency and the, but the, but the agency that retrieves it does, is not aware of that [1:39:31] program and to them it appears alien in origin. [1:39:34] I mean, that's a hypothetical situation. I'm not aware of any, uh, historical situation that [1:39:41] would match that, that you described. So you're not aware. It has not happened that you're aware [1:39:46] of, that I'm aware of. Um, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [1:39:51] Several months ago, my office received a protected disclosure from Eglin Air Force Base indicating that [1:40:03] there was a UAP incident that required my attention. I sought a briefing regarding that episode and [1:40:09] brought with me Congressman Burchett and Congresswoman Luna. We asked to see any of the evidence that had [1:40:16] been taken by flight crew in this endeavor and to observe any radar signature, uh, as long as, [1:40:22] as well as to meet with the flight crew. We were not afforded access to all of the flight crew. And [1:40:29] initially we were not afforded access to images and to radar thereafter. We had a bit of a discussion [1:40:38] about how authorities flow in the United States of America. And we did see the image and we did meet [1:40:45] with one member of the flight crew who took the image. The image was of something that I am not able [1:40:51] to attach to any human capability, either from the United States or from any of our adversaries. [1:40:58] And I'm somewhat informed on the matter, having served on the Armed Services Committee for seven [1:41:02] years, having served on the committee that oversees DARPA and advanced technologies for several years. [1:41:08] Um, when we spoke with the flight crew and when he showed us the photo that he'd taken, I asked why [1:41:14] the video wasn't engaged, why we didn't have a FLIR system that worked. Here's what he said. They were [1:41:21] out on a test mission that day over the Gulf of Mexico. And when you're on a test mission, you're [1:41:26] supposed to have clear airspace, not supposed to be anything that shows up. And they saw a sequence [1:41:32] of four craft in a clear diamond formation for which there is, uh, a radar sequence that I and I [1:41:42] alone have observed in the United States Congress. One of the pilots goes to check out that diamond [1:41:48] formation and sees a large floating, what I can only describe as an orb. Again, like I said, [1:41:54] not of any human capability that I'm, that I'm aware of. And when he approached, he said that his radar [1:42:01] went down. He said that his FLIR system malfunctioned and that he had to manually take this image, [1:42:08] um, from one of the lenses and it was not automatic automated, uh, in collection as you would typically [1:42:15] see in a test mission. So, uh, I guess I'll start with Commander Fravor. What in how, how should we think [1:42:23] about the fact that this craft that was approached by our pilot, uh, had the capability of disarming a [1:42:31] number of the sensor and collection systems on that craft? Well, I think this goes to that national [1:42:37] security side and you can go back through history of things showing up in certain areas and disabling [1:42:42] our capabilities, which is disheartening. And for us, I mean, like I said, it, it completely disabled [1:42:48] the radar on the aircraft when I tried to do it. And the only way we could see it is passively, which [1:42:52] is how he got that image. So I think that's a, that's a concern on what are these doing? Not only how do they [1:42:57] operate, but their capabilities inside to do things like this. And, and how should we think about [1:43:02] four craft moving in a very clear formation equidistant from one another, um, in a diamond [1:43:12] in all of the phenomenon, perhaps Mr. Grave, that you've analyzed, um, have we ever seen multiple craft [1:43:17] in a, in a single formation? I have one particular case and that was, uh, during the gimbal incident. [1:43:23] Um, the recording on the AT FLIR system shows a single object that rotates. Um, you hear the pilots [1:43:29] refer to a fleet of objects that is not visible on the FLIR system. And that was something that I [1:43:35] witnessed during the debrief as part of the radar data on the situational awareness page. [1:43:39] I would like to add whoever, Congressman, uh, there's a small, uh, small bit of, uh, uh, anger. [1:43:45] I would say I would feel that those pilots are still, uh, facing that difficulty in reporting this [1:43:49] topic and they don't have the tools to be able to mitigate this issue. It just goes to show how serious [1:43:54] this is and why this is such an important issue for our pilots and for our nation. [1:43:58] It was stated explicitly to me by these test pilots that if you have a U of AP experience, [1:44:04] the best thing you can do for your career is forget it and not tell anyone because any type [1:44:10] of reporting either above the surface or below the surface, uh, does have a perceived consequence [1:44:16] to these people. And that is a culture we must change if we want to get to the truth. [1:44:21] Uh, Mr. Chairman, I would observe that perhaps as we, uh, as we move forward from this hearing, [1:44:26] there are some obvious next steps. Every person watching this knows that we need to meet with [1:44:32] Mr. Grush in a secure compartmentalized facility so that we can get fulsome answers that do not put [1:44:38] him in jeopardy and that, and that give us the information we need. Second, I would suggest that the [1:44:45] radar images from, um, that were collected of this formation of craft out of Eglin Air Force Base, [1:44:51] and specifically the actual image taken by the actual flight crew that we can actually validate, [1:44:57] um, be provided to the committee, subpoenaed if necessary, um, so that we're able to track how to [1:45:03] get this type of reporting and analysis done in a more fulsome way. That would be my recommendation, [1:45:08] humbly, as a guest here of the Fine Oversight Committee. I yield back. [1:45:11] Ms. Maes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to our witnesses who are testifying today. [1:45:21] I want to thank each of you for being here to discuss a topic of grave importance to our national [1:45:25] security. Earlier this year, a Chinese spy balloon was shot down off the coast of my home state of [1:45:30] South Carolina. Since the Roswell incident in 1947, many Americans have wondered about the dangers of [1:45:37] unknown objects crisscrossing our skies. Whether these are UAPs or weather phenomena, advanced technology [1:45:44] from American allied or enemy forces or something more out of this world. So my first question, [1:45:50] I have several questions, and I'll, I, if we can just be quick on these first two, I'm going to ask [1:45:54] each of you the same question, um, and then I'll get to each of you individually. Uh, the first one, [1:45:59] when you reported your experiences with a UAP, did any of you face any repercussions with your [1:46:04] superiors? Yes or no? No. No. I've actually never seen anything personally, believe it or not, so. [1:46:13] All right. Um, and then do, do you believe there's an active disinformation campaign [1:46:18] within our government to deny existence of UAPs? Yes or no? I don't have an answer to that. [1:46:25] As previous, previously stated publicly, yes. I think previously with like Project Blue Book, [1:46:31] yes, but currently I don't speak for the United States government. Okay. Thank you. Um, [1:46:35] I have a few questions for Mr. Graves. Um, what percentage of UAP sightings in your belief go [1:46:40] unreported by our pilots? This is an approximation based off of my personal experience speaking with a [1:46:46] number of pilots, but I would estimate we're somewhere near 5% reporting perhaps. So like 95% [1:46:51] basically don't report seeing UAPs? That's just my personal estimate. Um, in the incident off [1:46:58] Virginia Beach, do you believe the Navy took the danger to your aircraft seriously after it was [1:47:02] reported? Absolutely. Um, a few questions for Mr. Favor. As an expert naval aviator, have you ever [1:47:09] seen an object that looked and moved like the Tic Tac UAP? No. Did the Tic Tac UAP move in such a way [1:47:16] that defied the laws of physics? The way we understand them, yes. Many dismiss UAP reports as classified [1:47:25] weapons testing by our own government, but in your experience as a pilot, does our government [1:47:29] typically test advanced weapons systems right next to multi-million dollar jets without informing our [1:47:36] pilots? No, we have test ranges for that. It took over 15 years for your encounter with the Tic Tac to be [1:47:44] declassified. Do you feel there was a good reason to prevent lawmakers from having access to this footage? [1:47:49] No, I just think it was ignored when it happened and it just sat somewhere in a file. Never got [1:47:55] reported. In a drawer. It happens a lot up here. Shocker. Um, Mr. Grush, a couple of questions for [1:48:01] you too, sir, this morning. Um, what percentage of UAPs do you feel are adequately investigated by [1:48:06] the U.S. government of the 5% that are reported? Um, I can only speak for my personal leadership over at [1:48:14] NGA. I tried to look at every report that came through that I could triage, so. Do you believe that [1:48:19] officials at the highest levels of our national security apparatus have unlawfully withheld [1:48:24] information from Congress and subverted, uh, our oversight authority? There are certain elected [1:48:31] leaders that had more information that I'm not sure what they've shared with certain gang of eight [1:48:36] members or et cetera, but, uh, certainly I would not be surprised. Okay. You've stated that the [1:48:43] government is in possession of potentially non-human spacecraft. Based on your experience and extensive [1:48:49] conversations with experts, do you believe our government has made contact with intelligent [1:48:54] extraterrestrials? Something I can't discuss in public setting. Um, okay. I can't ask when you think [1:49:04] this occurred. Um, if you believe we have crashed craft, uh, stated earlier, do we have the bodies of [1:49:10] the pilots who piloted this craft? As I've stated publicly already in my News Nation [1:49:15] interview, uh, biologics came with some of these recoveries. Yeah. Um, were they, I guess, human or [1:49:23] non-human biologics? Non-human, and that was the assessment of people with direct knowledge on the [1:49:29] program I talked to that are currently still on the program. And was this documentary evidence, [1:49:33] this video, photos, eyewitness? Like, how would that be determined? The specific documentation I would [1:49:40] have to talk to you in a SCIF about. Gotcha. Um, okay. So, and you may or may not be able to answer my [1:49:47] last question, and maybe we get into a SCIF at the next hearing that we have, but who in the government [1:49:51] either, what agency, sub-agency, what contractors, who should be called into the next hearing about [1:49:59] UAPs, either in a public setting or even in a private setting? And you probably can't name names, [1:50:04] but what agencies, organizations, contractors, et cetera, do we need to call in to get these [1:50:09] questions answered? Whether it's about funding, what programs are happening, and what's out there? [1:50:13] I can give you a specific cooperative and hostile witness list of specific individuals, uh, [1:50:20] that were in those. And how soon can we get that list? I'm happy to provide that to you after the [1:50:25] hearing. Super. Thank you. And I yield back. Now we have Mr. Langworthy's here. Thank you very much. Uh, [1:50:41] I'd like to thank, uh, all of the witnesses for being here today, uh, to discuss this very unique [1:50:46] topic. Uh, and I'd like to jump right into my questions if you don't mind. Uh, Commander Fravor, [1:50:51] can you briefly describe your background? Yeah, I was an enlisted Marine, Naval Academy graduate, [1:51:00] Navy, flew for 18 years, got a master's from University of Houston. Uh, and I've worked in [1:51:05] the private sector for the last, what now, 19, 16 years, 17 years. I do a lot of defense work. [1:51:12] So really gold-plated credentials. Uh, Commander Fravor have, uh, we've all seen the floating tic-tac [1:51:19] video, uh, that you engage with on, uh, November 14th, 2004. Can you briefly talk about why you were [1:51:26] off the coast of San Diego that day? Yeah, we were at a workup with all the battle groups. So we [1:51:32] integrate the ships with the carrier, the air wing with the carrier, and we start working. So we're [1:51:35] doing an air-to-air defense to hone not only our skills, but those of the USS Princeton when they had [1:51:40] been tracking them for two weeks. The problem was that there was never manned aircraft airborne when [1:51:44] they were tracking them, and this was the first day, and unfortunately, we were the ones airborne [1:51:48] and went and saw it. Do you remember the weather that day? Was it cloudy or windy or anything out [1:51:54] of the ordinary on the Pacific coast? It was actually, if you're familiar with San Diego, [1:51:58] it was a perfect day. Light winds, no white caps, clear skies, not a cloud. It was, for flying, [1:52:04] it was the best. Now, is it true that you saw, in your words, a 40-foot flying tic-tac [1:52:10] shaped object? That's correct, or for some people that can't know what a tic-tac is, it's a giant [1:52:15] flying propane tank. Fair enough. Did this object come up on radar or interfere with your radar or the [1:52:23] USS Princeton? The Princeton tracked it, the Nimitz tracked it, the E2 tracked it. We never saw it on our [1:52:29] radars. Our fire control radars never picked it up. The other airplane that took the video did get it [1:52:34] on a radar. As soon as it tried to lock it, it jammed the radar, spit the lock, and he rapidly [1:52:38] switched over to the targeting pod, which you can do in the F-18. From what you saw that day and what [1:52:44] you've seen on video, did you see any source of propulsion from the flying object, including on any [1:52:49] potential thermal scans from your aircraft? No, there's none. There's no IR plume coming out, [1:52:56] and Chad, who took the video, went through all the EO, which is black and white TV and the IR modes, [1:53:01] and there's no visible signs of propulsion. It's just sitting in space at 20,000 feet. In your [1:53:05] career, have you ever seen a propulsion system that creates no thermal exhaust? No. Can you [1:53:12] describe how the aircraft maneuvered? Abruptly, very determinant. It knew exactly what it was doing, [1:53:20] it was aware of our presence, and it had acceleration rates. I mean, it went from zero to matching our speed [1:53:25] in no time at all. Now, if the fastest plane on earth was trying to do these maneuvers that you saw, [1:53:32] would it be capable of doing that? No, not even close. And just to confirm, this object had no wings, [1:53:40] correct? No wings. Now, was the aircraft that you were flying, was it armed? No, it never felt [1:53:47] threatened at all. If the aircraft was armed, do you believe that your aircraft or any aircraft in [1:53:54] possession of the United States could have shot the Tic Tac down? I'd say no. Just on the performance, [1:54:03] it would have just left in a split second. It looks like we have a problem here that needs further [1:54:11] investigation. Yes. In your belief, is this flying Tic Tac, I mean, is it capable of being the product [1:54:24] of any other nation on the earth? No, actually, like I said earlier, I think it defies current [1:54:30] material science and the ability to develop that much propulsion. And I know there's been some [1:54:34] physicists have done calculations, which is beyond anything that we have. Well, either the United States [1:54:40] has an adversary here in this world that we don't know, or we really have some serious investigations [1:54:46] to do. I really appreciate you being here. Is there anything else about the November 14th, [1:54:53] 2004 incident that you think is important for this committee to know that you haven't been asked here [1:54:58] today? No, you know, it's been said it's probably the most credible UFO sighting in history based on all [1:55:04] the sensors that we're tracking it. And then for us to get visual and to go against the naysayers, [1:55:09] it's something on the screen or whatever. I mean, there's four sets of human eyeballs. We're all very [1:55:14] credible. Of the six of us that were involved in the thing, including the video, every one of us is [1:55:18] going to do 20 plus years in the military in very responsible positions. So I'd say the world needs to [1:55:23] know that. It's not a joke. Thank you very much for your testimony here today for all of you. And I yield back, [1:55:30] Mr. Chairman. Mr. Elvis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here in the [1:55:37] courage it took to come forward. And again, the sacrifice that each of you have made. [1:55:42] I serve on the national security subcommittee for the financial services committee. So I really want [1:55:47] to stay in the national security lane, if I may. So when we think about traditional adversaries and [1:55:53] both us towards them and them towards us, you know, we probe their capabilities, we look for weaknesses, [1:56:00] and we collect that data that reconnaissance for in the event we need it in the future. [1:56:06] For each of you, yes or no question. Based off of your own experience or the data that you've been [1:56:14] privy to, is there any indication that these UAPs could be essentially collecting reconnaissance [1:56:21] information? Mr. Graves? Yes. Mr. Grush? Fair assessment. Mr. Fravor? Very possible. Again, [1:56:29] in the national security vein, is it possible that these UAPs would be probing our capabilities? Yes or no, [1:56:36] Mr. Graves? Yes. Rush? Yes. Fravor? Definitely. Is it possible that these UAPs are testing for [1:56:43] vulnerabilities in our current systems? Yes. Yes. Possible. Do you feel, based off of your [1:56:52] experience and the information that you've been privy to, that these UAPs provide an existential [1:56:59] threat to the national security of the United States? Mr. Graves? Potentially. Yes, sir. [1:57:03] Potentially. Same answer. Potentially. I'd say definitely. Potentially. Mr. Graves and Fravor, [1:57:10] you know, in the event that your encounters have become hostile, would you have, would you have had [1:57:15] the capability to defend yourself, your crew, your aircraft? Absolutely not. Sir? No. Is, based off of [1:57:25] the information that you've been privy to, is there any indication that these UAPs are interested in our [1:57:30] nuclear technology and capabilities? Yes. External observation. Sure. That could be a fair assessment. [1:57:38] Yeah. Yes. Is there any indication that Department of Energy is involved in UAP data collection and [1:57:46] housing? I don't have an answer. I can't confirm or deny that in a public setting. And could you do it [1:57:52] in a secure setting? Yes. Mr. Fravor? No, I don't know. Mr. Chairman, you know, I think I'm the last [1:58:03] member to go, but there clearly is a threat to the national security of the United States of America. [1:58:10] As members of Congress, we have a responsibility to maintain oversight and be aware of these activities [1:58:18] so that, if appropriate, we take action. I would encourage the chairman to demand that we have [1:58:26] any and all, but in particular Mr. Grush, talk to us in a skiff. And if that access is denied, I will [1:58:34] personally volunteer to initiate the Holman rule against any personnel or any program or any agency [1:58:43] that denies access to Congress. Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield the remainder of my time to [1:58:49] my fellow colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, [1:58:56] Mr. Ogles, for the great questions, brother. Mr. Grush, I might have asked this before, [1:59:01] but I want to make sure. Do you have any personal knowledge of someone who's possibly been injured [1:59:05] working on legacy UAP reverse engineering? Yes. Okay. How were they injured? Was it, [1:59:16] is it something like a radioactive type situation or something we didn't understand? I've heard people [1:59:21] talk about Havana syndrome type incidences. What was your recollection of that? I can't get into [1:59:30] the specifics, but you can imagine assessing an unknown unknown. There's a lot of potentialities [1:59:36] you can't fully prepare for. How do you think we ought to handle UAP whistleblower complaints like [1:59:41] yours in the future? Yeah, there was some issue with mine. So, you know, PPD 19 process, [1:59:47] it goes to the intel committees, either through PPD 19 or ICD 120. There's not a good way for the [1:59:54] intelligence community inspector general to provide that to other committees. And I asked my [2:00:00] information to be sent to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee because there are [2:00:05] Title 10 equities at play, but there was no smooth process to do so. Yeah. That's a trash can. [2:00:13] Are you aware of any individuals that are participating in reverse engineering programs [2:00:17] for non-terrestrial craft? Personally, yes. Do you know any that would be willing to testify [2:00:23] if there were protections for them? Certainly closed door and assurances that breaking their NDA, [2:00:30] they're not going to get administratively punished for sale. Yeah. I yield, Mr. Chairman. [2:00:37] Thank you. I'm going to do something a little bit out of the ordinary here. [2:00:41] We're going to give three people a chance at an additional three minutes. So, Mr. Birchett, [2:00:47] do you want to keep going? Why don't you come back to me, Mr. Chairman? Ms. Luna, [2:00:55] is she on that list? Chairman, I'd like to submit for the record an article by News Nation, [2:01:04] and it follows Mr. Grush's full interview for the record. Without objection. Thank you. [2:01:11] Mr. Grush, why is it that you refer to the phenomenon as non-human intelligence? Why deviate [2:01:18] from the basis of extraterrestrial life? I think the phenomenon is very complex, [2:01:26] and I like to leave an open mind analytically to specific origin. When you say specific origin, [2:01:33] are you referring, can you elaborate on that for those that might not? If it's a traditional [2:01:38] extraterrestrial origin or something else that we don't quite understand from either a biological or [2:01:45] astrophysics perspective. Yeah. I just like to keep an open mind on what it could be. Yeah. Okay. And [2:01:51] referring to your News Nation interview, you had referenced specific treaties between governments. [2:01:57] Article three of the nuclear arms treaty with Russia identifies UAPs. It specifically mentions them. [2:02:02] To your knowledge, are there safety measures in place with foreign governments or other superpowers [2:02:07] to avoid an escalatory situation in the event that a UAP malevolent event occurs? [2:02:14] Yeah. You're referring to actual public treaty in the UN register. It's funny you mentioned that. Yeah. [2:02:20] The agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak a nuclear war sign in 1971. [2:02:26] Unclassified treaty publicly available. And if you cite the George Washington University national [2:02:31] security archives, you will find the declassified in 2013 specific provisions in the specific red line [2:02:41] flash message traffic with the specific codes pursuant to article three and article also situation two, [2:02:48] which is in the previously classified NSA archive. What I would recommend, and I tried to get access, but [2:02:56] I got a wall of silence at the White House, was the specific incidents when those message traffic was [2:03:05] used. I think some scholarship on that would open the door to a further investigation using those publicly [2:03:12] available information. Thank you. And then my last question with 51 seconds remaining. You mentioned [2:03:17] white collar crimes potentially being taking place in regards to a cover up. Can you please elaborate? [2:03:24] I have concerns based on the interviews I conducted under my official duties of potential violations of [2:03:32] the federal acquisition regulations, the FAR. Thank you very much. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. [2:03:39] Okay. We'll go to Mr. Raskin for three minutes. Thanks, Mr. Chair. I thank the witnesses for their [2:03:46] endurance and service today. Mr. Fravor, you've described your episode in detail now, and you call it [2:03:54] the most credible UFO sighting in history. But I wonder, was this the first time that you encountered [2:04:05] a UFO or a UAP in 2004? Yes. And what was your general attitude or perspective on the UFO discussion [2:04:19] before that happened? I never felt that we were alone with all the planets out there, but I wasn't a UFO [2:04:26] person. I wasn't watching History Channel and MUFON and all that. And have you had experiences or [2:04:35] encounters since that happened? No. And so have you formed any general conclusions about what you think [2:04:45] you experienced then? Yes. I think what we experienced was, like I said, well beyond the material science and [2:04:52] the capabilities that we had at the time that we have currently or that we're going to have in the next [2:04:56] 10 to 20 years. Very good. Mr. Grush, you've been able to answer in great detail on certain questions [2:05:04] and then other things you say you're not able to respond to. Can you just explain where you're drawing [2:05:09] the line and what's the basis for that? Yeah, based on my DOPSER security review and what they've [2:05:16] determined that is unclassified. I see. So you're answering any questions that just call upon your knowledge [2:05:23] of unclassified questions. But anything that relates to classified matters you're not commenting [2:05:30] on in this context? In an open session, but happy to participate in a closed session at the right level. [2:05:35] Yeah. Okay. And Mr. Graves, you said that there are dozens of fellow pilots, military pilots. Are there [2:05:44] also commercial pilots who've encountered the same kind of sightings that you described before? [2:05:52] They are similar. Pilots, commercial pilots have less range and less sensors to be able to [2:05:58] reach out and look for objects over wide swaths of airspace. And so pilots are seeing them, [2:06:03] commercial pilots are seeing them, and they're typically closer. And the range of what they're [2:06:07] seeing is pretty large. What is the most vivid concrete sighting with the naked eye [2:06:15] of the objects that you described before, the cube-like objects? Certainly. I think the most vivid [2:06:21] sighting of that would have been near a near midair that we had at the entrance to our working area. [2:06:25] One of these objects was completely stationary at the exact entrance to our working areas, [2:06:31] not only geographically, but also at altitude. So it was right where all the jets are going, [2:06:36] essentially, on the eastern seaboard. The two aircraft flew within about 50 feet of the object, [2:06:41] and that was a very close visual sighting. And you were in one of the aircraft? I was not. I was [2:06:46] there when the pilot landed. He canceled the mission after, and I was there. He was in the ready room [2:06:51] with all his gear on, with his mouth open. And I asked him what the problem was, and he said he [2:06:56] almost hit one of those darn things. He said he was 50 feet away from it? Yes, sir. And his description [2:07:01] of the object was consistent with the description you gave us before? A dark gray or a black cube inside [2:07:08] of a clear sphere. Inside of a clear sphere? Yes. And with no self-evident propulsion system? No wings, [2:07:17] no IR energy coming off of the vehicle, nothing tethering it to the ground. And that was, that was [2:07:22] primarily what we were experiencing out there. I'm over time. Thank you very much for your service, [2:07:27] and I yield back to Mr. Chairman. Very good. Mr. Burchett? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for all [2:07:33] three of y'all, starting with Mr. Graves. Why did you come forward on this issue? I came forward because [2:07:39] I felt that my colleagues did not have a way to mitigate the safety threat, and I wanted to help them. [2:07:43] I was trained as an aviation safety officer by the Navy, and this seemed, it just, it just felt [2:07:49] right. I felt like I had to help the folks that were still flying and dealing with this. Mr. [2:07:53] Grush? Purely a sense of duty. I first swore an oath when I was a cadet 18 years ago, and I still [2:07:59] uphold that even out of the uniform. Commander? Pestered by a friend, and I asked why, and he said, [2:08:08] you're the one person that they can't discredit, and you'll add credibility to the New York Times [2:08:12] article. And so after about six times, I said, okay. This town isn't made, unfortunately, [2:08:24] by people like y'all. We thank y'all. And I do want to also thank the people in the audience and [2:08:29] the people that are watching this that can't be, people all over the world that have kept this issue [2:08:33] alive. You've endured criticism and derogatory remarks, and we're trying to get to the bottom [2:08:40] of it. And so God bless y'all. Thank y'all so much. We really appreciate you guys and gals. [2:08:50] That's why we need term limits. Y'all keep clapping. Those politicians just keep talking. So [2:08:54] let me ask y'all, how can the public contribute to UAP reporting? And what avenues you think are [2:09:00] available to the public to report these sightings? Well, right now, I don't think there is a lot of [2:09:05] public options for that every man to be able to report on this. I think even for professionals [2:09:11] that have sensor data that are seeing these on a regular basis, they're still hesitant to come [2:09:15] forward. And so for the general public, I think encouraging the conversations that we're having [2:09:20] today, looking for technology solutions that can be distributed, so that objective data can be [2:09:24] gathered is the first place to go. Mr. Grosh. I'll just touch on the whistleblower side of it. [2:09:30] I do encourage, you know, current former military intelligence community and industry contractors [2:09:35] to come forward in a legal way, either through the IC or DOD or whatever the cognizant IGs are [2:09:41] to lead, you know, lead, you know, join me in this discussion. Commander, and I guess I should [2:09:49] say this for the record. My daddy was United States Marine Corps, 1st Marine Division. So [2:09:54] Hoorah. Yes, sir. He was old school, him and Chesty Puller on Pelelu. So thank you, brother. [2:10:00] Wow. Yes, sir. I'm not, I'm not anything like my daddy. He was incredible. I'm [2:10:05] very mediocre to say the least, but go ahead. You seem to be doing fine. Yeah. [2:10:09] Uh, for me, uh, you know, I was an accident investigator. So the biggest thing that you [2:10:13] learned and I think that witnesses need to do is one, don't try and make the fish bigger than it [2:10:18] was. Stick to the facts, write it down and don't speculate what you think it is because it will [2:10:23] square your decision. Just write the facts down. We can get all the facts together and we can start [2:10:26] to investigate and get a real honest story instead of it was this big. Thank you all. And I want to [2:10:31] thank everybody. We made a history today. Mr. Chairman, I yield. Thank you much, Mr. Garcia. [2:10:38] Thank you. I know now we're going to be making some closing, uh, remarks. And so I just wanted [2:10:42] to say a few things first, uh, to our witnesses, I want to thank all of you for, uh, for being here [2:10:47] with us today. Uh, I know that, um, it takes a lot, a lot of courage. Um, you're telling, um, uh, [2:10:53] really important information to this committee. And I just want to thank you also for your, [2:10:57] all three of your service to our country. Um, I also want to just note that today's hearing, [2:11:01] um, was both important, but also serious. And I want to thank our, uh, subcommittee chairman, [2:11:07] Mr. Groffman, I think for, for running a very fair and substantive hearing. I do want to thank [2:11:12] the committee staff, uh, on both sides for, uh, the amount of work that it took to put this hearing, [2:11:17] uh, in place. Um, and certainly to all the members that have been, uh, involved in this issue prior to, [2:11:22] prior to the hearing. I also want to note for our witnesses and for the public that I'm, I'm a [2:11:27] freshman member of Congress and I've only been here for seven months, but this is by far the most, uh, [2:11:32] bipartisan, uh, conversation and, uh, discussion that I have seen happen, um, in the Congress. [2:11:37] And I think that, um, a topic of this significance as it relates to our national security, um, as it [2:11:43] relates to information that we're trying to gather for the, for the, for the American public, uh, does [2:11:48] bring people together. And I think that's been really great to see. Um, I think it's also important [2:11:54] to note for the public. We, today in our hearing, we had on our side, also both our full, um, ranking [2:12:00] member, which is Mr. Raskin and our vice ranking member, which is Ms. Ocasio-Cortez, uh, both here [2:12:06] at our hearing. I think it shows the importance and seriousness that, um, our side of the aisle [2:12:10] is taking to this important hearing, but also the broader issue as, as it relates to working [2:12:16] with our Republican counterparts, uh, on this committee. Um, I want to, um, additionally add [2:12:21] that I think, and I encourage, I think it's really important that we have and continue these discussions [2:12:26] and these hearings. Clearly, uh, there's a lot of information that we don't know. [2:12:31] Um, but it's also very clear that we have to continue our investigation and accountability [2:12:35] on asking the right questions and ensuring that they're part of the public record. [2:12:39] One thing that was important today is, um, some folks might wonder, um, you know, [2:12:43] why are we asking questions that might already be out there or that have been asked before? [2:12:47] It's important that they're asked and put into the public record as it relates to this committee. [2:12:51] And so I want to thank you for, um, you know, answering some questions multiple times. [2:12:55] I know not just in maybe meetings you had with some members, but also here, uh, in, [2:13:00] in the public. Let me also just add an additional note that I, it's, it's important also that our, [2:13:06] um, our, our friends in the media and those that are not just reporting on this hearing, [2:13:10] but that have reported on this topic and that may in the future, [2:13:13] the media has an important role, uh, in this process. And it's very important that the media engages, [2:13:19] does independent investigation, uh, and reports on not just what happened today, but what they, [2:13:25] what they see independently as what is happening around UAPs in the broader community. Um, that is [2:13:31] also an important, um, public benefit that we have in trying to get the information and the facts as [2:13:37] it relates, uh, uh, to this. Uh, let me also just say finally that as a, as a teacher and an educator [2:13:44] and a long time, uh, uh, a long time teacher and researcher, um, that I also really believe in [2:13:51] following facts in doing your homework and making sure that you follow science, uh, as we, as we try [2:13:58] to get as most information as possible. And so I want to thank you all for, for agreeing to do that [2:14:02] today. Um, transparency is a cornerstone of government. Uh, we live in a, in a vast galaxy, [2:14:07] uh, a lot of unanswered questions and thank you all for being here today, Mr. Chairman. [2:14:11] Thank you. Um, I'd like to one more time thank, uh, Mr. Birchin, Ms. Luna for bringing this to [2:14:20] our attention. It's a topic that has interested me since I was in school. Uh, it was a very [2:14:25] illuminating, uh, hearing. Obviously, I think several of us are going to look forward to, uh, [2:14:31] getting some answers in a more confidential setting. I assume some legislation will come out [2:14:37] of this. Uh, sure. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I need to compliment the folks in my office that did [2:14:46] a lot of the work on this. Um, Rachel and Noah sitting behind me here, they're very quiet and [2:14:51] humble, but if without them, this thing would not have come off like it did. So I apologize. [2:14:56] Thank you. Um, I think we're going to want to look into what we can do to make more of this [2:15:01] information public. Uh, I think there's certainly a time period after which it should always be made [2:15:06] public and people have been concerned about these issues, like I said, since I was in high school. [2:15:12] Um, but in any event, I'd like to thank everybody who was here sticking through, [2:15:18] through the entire hearing. Without, uh, objection, the members will have five legislative days to [2:15:23] submit materials and to submit additional written questions for the witness witnesses, [2:15:28] which will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. If there's no further business [2:15:32] questions, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.