Hezbollah’s absence blocks real progress : Analysis

[0:00] Well, we're joined now by Mark Kimmett, who is a retired U.S. general and the former assistant [0:03] secretary of state for political military affairs. He's right in the studio with us [0:06] in Doha. So we've got southern Lebanon very much in play in this whole conflict naturally here as [0:13] well. We've had, of course, one journalist sadly being killed this evening. And also the U.S. [0:20] embassy, at least reports, the U.S. embassy is urging Americans to leave Lebanon following the [0:24] escalation between the Israeli army and Hezbollah. But this is on the eve of the second [0:30] round of talks, which a message like that to Americans in Lebanon can't be very encouraging [0:37] for this dialogue. Well, there are some functional flaws, in my opinion, on this whole notion of [0:43] dialogue. The fact is we have Israel there. We have Lebanon there. We have the United States there. [0:48] We don't have Hezbollah there. And this, clearly there's a difference between de facto and de [0:56] jour. De jour, Beirut has sovereign control over the entire country. De facto, we know that for years [1:03] and years, Hezbollah has been the de facto leader of the southern part of the country. So their absence [1:11] from this political discussion, as well as their connection to Iran, would indicate that we're not [1:18] going to see any movement on this in the near term. Well, I mean, this is something which we had a [1:24] 2024 ceasefire as well, which was also repeatedly, of course, broken. And this now, this ceasefire is on [1:32] top of that other ceasefire. So what gives? Well, the important thing is, what is it going to take [1:37] for a peace agreement between the nation of Lebanon and the nation of Israel? And the fact is, as far back [1:45] as Resolution 1701, the disarmament of Hezbollah. And Hezbollah seems to have absolutely no interest [1:54] in ending this war. They're being candidly encouraged by their masters in Iran to continue [2:01] the resistance. So it's hard to see a situation where Lebanon either is willing or is able, the [2:09] government in Beirut is willing or able to restore sovereignty over the southern part of their country. [2:14] General, so let's move to the wider conflict and move to what's happening with Iran and the U.S. [2:20] now. And, you know, we were talking this time yesterday. We haven't moved on much from there. [2:25] Where are we? Well, I think it's very simple. There are back channel talks going on, negotiating on [2:32] returning to negotiations. They're front channel messages coming from all sides. Different elements [2:40] inside of Iran have different views and are not shy about announcing them, which we haven't seen in [2:46] the past within Iran because there was always message discipline. A bunch of different views, [2:51] a bunch of different opinions from a bunch of different organizations. By contrast, in the United [2:57] States, we only have one person who can make the messages and tell the messages without any fear [3:05] of contradiction. Unfortunately, he's got many opinions on a daily basis. Yes, exactly. So, General, you know, [3:11] the thing there is, you know, who's the biggest obstacle to getting these negotiations, to get to the [3:17] negotiations? Who's the biggest impediment? Well, it certainly is the case that the United States has [3:23] agreed to opening the strait three times and the Iranians have always backtracked on the conditions. [3:32] For example, a simple one, if it was closed by Iran until there was a ceasefire in Lebanon. There's a [3:40] ceasefire in Lebanon. President Trump then announced that the Iranians have agreed to open it. But in no [3:46] case have we seen full compliance or a willingness on the part of Iran to try to change the conditions for [3:54] opening it up. They still want to control entry and exit. They still want to turn it into the [4:01] tribunal bridge and charge tolls going in and out. And I think everyone agrees that there should be [4:08] unrestricted, unfettered access to the Strait of Hormuz, no different from any strait of consequence in [4:18] the world, like the Strait of Malacca. So one can only wonder how they're going to have the breakthrough. [4:24] Let's just hope that what we're hearing in public is not the negotiations that are having, hoping, [4:29] happening in private. Let's widen this even further now. And with the amount of assets that the U.S. has placed [4:37] into the region, there have been many concerns about overextension, that they're a bit thin on the ground, [4:43] particularly in East Asia. What are your thoughts on that? Look, the United States has always been able to conduct [4:49] major conflict simultaneously in different parts of the world. Would we rather, if we are China focused, would we rather have two of those three aircraft [4:59] carriers in that region? Of course. But we don't. We are able to juggle with both hands and more than one [5:07] crisis at a time. But right now, China is not a crisis. So I'm sure, listening to the chairman of joint [5:14] staff, who I think has the ear of a lot of people in the United States, he is concerned about the stress [5:22] on the force, but not to the point where he believes the force is in peril and unable to do their missions. [5:29] General Mark Emmett, thank you so much for joining us. There we go. [5:32] General Mark Emmett, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs.