'He's worried about the TACO charge': Bolton on Trump's Iran ultimatum

[0:00] The president has made a lot of threats, but hasn't followed through. He keeps extending [0:02] deadlines. If this deadline comes and goes without the straightforward moves being open, [0:07] what do you think should happen? I mean, do you think the president should follow through? [0:11] Otherwise, do you think he risks just sending messages that all of his threats are empty? [0:18] Well, I think he's worried about the taco charge. Trump always chickens out. I think this is a [0:23] result of poor planning on his part. I think it's important that he consult with the Gulf Arab [0:29] countries. And if they don't like this approach going after energy infrastructure in particular, [0:36] associated with oil and gas produced by Iran, then we should hear what their alternatives are. I [0:41] don't know whether that consultation has gone forward or not. But the end result, in my view, [0:46] ought to be regime change. I don't know what Trump's objective is. I know what my objective [0:51] would be. And all the talk about ending the nuclear program, ending the terrorist threat, [0:56] ending the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, [0:58] all depends on the president's decision. [0:59] It all depends on getting a different regime. All we're doing right now, and we're doing it [1:02] very effectively, is what the Israelis call mowing the lawn. I don't want to mow the lawn anymore. I [1:08] want this threat removed. If you were advising the president now, would you encourage him to [1:12] follow through with those specific threats to civilian infrastructure if tomorrow's deadline [1:16] comes and goes? Well, let's take a look at the phrase civilian infrastructure. There's less [1:23] there than meets the eye. First off, the Revolutionary Guard is typically thought to hold [1:30] control over about 40 percent of Iran's economy, from which they derive revenues. Their generals [1:36] derive revenues. The Guard itself derives revenues. They're part of the war machine, [1:40] 40 percent of the economy. Next, the prohibition is against attacking civilian targets. But, [1:49] for example, a power plant that provides energy to a military base, to a military facility, [1:55] to a military manufacturing operation, is a legitimate target. [1:59] There's collateral civilian damage, that's true, but it's a legitimate target. And what we've seen [2:04] is that Iran, like Hamas, has spent a lot of effort building a military machine underground, [2:12] but it's left the power for that machine on top of the ground. And I think it's perfectly obvious [2:19] that highways can be used to move men and equipment for military purposes. So the words [2:26] civilian infrastructure are not talismanic. [2:29] You have to look at specifics. And presumably, that's what the lawyers in the Pentagon are doing [2:35] as they go down the target list. I think we have very high priority in not violating that [2:41] prohibition against hitting civilian targets. And let's see what happens. [2:45] Right. But, I mean, the president has mentioned, for example, desalination plants. It's not just [2:50] the military that would rely on that, right? It's the civilian population for clean drinking oil and [2:56] power infrastructure that would give the civilian population a lot of energy. And so, you know, [2:58] you have to look at specifics. And presumably, that's what the lawyers in the Pentagon are doing, [2:59] desalination power, even though the military also relies on it. So how do you untangle the two here? [3:04] Look, well, the first thing to say is there's a lot of untangling to do. You cannot say civilian [3:11] infrastructure and say home free. That's not the way it works. Second, if you want examples in [3:17] practice of how the United States behaves, consider the bombing of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. [3:23] Unless people are prepared to say we committed war crimes in the bombing of Japan and Germany, [3:30] then they can expect something like that as justifiable over Iran. [3:34] President Trump today said, you know, regime change wasn't our goal, but there has been [3:39] regime change because we took out the first round of leadership in the second round. And this round [3:42] is much more pragmatic and smart, he said. But the bottom line is this ideology against the U.S., [3:49] against the West, is pervasive in Iran, as you know. And the world's two most capable [3:53] militaries, the U.S. and Israel, have been working together to kill off Iranian leaders in the IRGC. [3:59] And the IRGC is still in control in Iran six weeks in. Then what is the likelihood that there will be [4:07] regime change, that they will be wiped out at this point? [4:12] Well, first off, the regime has not changed. It's still the same regime for the reasons you state. [4:16] It's the ideology that controls. Second, it took the Ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard 47 [4:22] years to build this state. We're six weeks in. People are in a hurry. It's like a bunch of kids [4:29] in the backseat of a car saying, are we there yet? Are we there yet? [4:31] No, we're not there yet. The people in Iran need to be able to have flexibility to help pull this regime [4:39] apart at the top. And I think fractures at the top of the regime are already underway. And I think [4:45] there are people, even in the regime, who are saying, this ship is going down and I don't want to go [4:50] down with it. That doesn't mean the people go out into the streets to be indiscriminately machine [4:54] gunned, but there's a lot going on. I thought the most important thing the president has said in the [4:59] past day is that we gave weapons to the Iranians. We gave weapons to the Iranians. We gave weapons to [5:02] the Kurds in northwestern Iran to transmit to other opposition forces. Apparently, they didn't get past [5:08] the Kurds. I'd like to know more about that. But I say if the opposition wants weapons, we should get in [5:13] as many as we can. [5:15] But if the United States and Israel can't take out the IRGC, then what would guns in the hands of [5:21] Iranian protesters, what would... [5:24] Let's define take it out. Let's define take it out. The regime announced, and many people said with [5:31] great glee who were present. [5:32] The IRGC, as opposed to the war, the IRGC decentralized its control structures into each of the 31 [5:38] provinces. There's no real indication the regime has its act together. I think there are still [5:44] elements of repression that exist, but we are systematically taking them apart. At least I hope we're [5:49] still doing that. Six weeks is not a lot of time. It's not a lot of time. And that may be politically [5:57] difficult for Trump. That's a political consideration he should have weighed before. [6:01] Somebody said World War II took over three years. Does that mean we shouldn't have fought it? [6:07] I think if you want to remove the threat, you have to face the logic that after 47 years, the regime has [6:14] not changed its behavior. And it's not going to change it in year 48. If you want to be free of the nuclear [6:20] threat, free of the terrorist threat, free of the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz, the logic is [6:26] change the regime. [6:27] I don't think there is anybody in this regime at the level of Golovkin. [6:30] At the level of Golovkin and dozens of others, frankly, that is any different in their fanatical [6:37] Islamist ideology that would treat with the United States. And I think this frantic idea to find [6:44] Iran's equivalent of Delcy Rodriguez was a fool's errand to begin with. None of these people are going [6:50] to make any change in policy if for no other reason at this moment than they're in fear of their own [6:56] life from their compatriots still in Tehran. [7:00] So the deadline runs out on April the 6th for the negotiations, if they've even taken place other than sending [7:07] notes through intermediaries, which you can parse the word negotiation. That's not negotiation to me. [7:13] If Iran gets to this missing American crew member before the U.S. does, does that change this war in your view? [7:22] Not at all. I mean, we're all concerned to get that crew member back. There's no question about it. I wouldn't want [7:29] to see any American become a POW. [7:32] It's a great show of the power of this regime. But let's see what the situation is right now. Iran has now [7:39] shot down two of our aircraft. Kuwait has shot down three. This happens. It's unfortunate. And it's a propaganda [7:48] victory for Iran only if we let it become one. This is something that tests our resolve, and we should have had a [7:58] reserve of resolve before we started the war. And if the President or the White House are shaky because they're [8:03] because of this, then it indicates, yet again, that they had not thoroughly thought through [8:09] what it meant to launch these attacks. [8:12] Does it undermine what the White House has been saying about how degraded Iran's [8:17] capabilities? [8:18] I mean, the president said this week that Iran had no anti-aircraft equipment, that [8:22] their radar was 100 percent annihilated. [8:24] Sure. [8:27] It absolutely degrades White House credibility, and that's a self-inflicted wound by the White [8:32] House, not by the Iranians. [8:34] If you overstate what you've accomplished and evidence comes that shows that you've [8:39] overstated, you look foolish. [8:43] Why do you think the president hasn't spoken about this on camera today? [8:48] Does that stand out to you at all? [8:51] No, it sounds to me like he's probably back in a panic mode, wishing he could find [8:57] a way to declare victory and get out of this war, regardless of whether or not he opens [9:02] the Strait of Hormuz before he does it. [9:05] I think that's a mistake, too. [9:06] I think... [9:07] If there had been an effective decision-making process before the war started, and these [9:13] concerns were raised and they bothered the president, he had the option then not to initiate [9:19] the attack. [9:20] But apparently he was satisfied. [9:22] Now if things are upsetting him that he either didn't think about or didn't pay any attention [9:26] to in the run-up to the war, that's a problem for him, and therefore it's a problem for [9:32] the country. [9:33] But it was easily avoided and should have been avoided. [9:36] Yeah. [9:38] I mean, the president has gone from saying it's not America's problem, that U.S. allies [9:43] should just take it, that it would be easy, this would open up naturally once the war [9:47] is over. [9:48] Now, he said today, with a little more time, we can easily open it, take the oil and make [9:52] a fortune. [9:53] It would be a gusher for the world. [9:56] I mean, do you have any sense of what he plans to do with the Strait of Hormuz based on that? [10:03] No, I don't. [10:04] But I'm not bothered because I don't think he does either. [10:07] I think this is just more rhetoric. [10:09] Yeah. [10:10] You know, I don't think it's helpful. [10:13] We have an interest in the Strait of Hormuz being opened because that region produces [10:17] 20 percent of the world's oil. [10:20] And it doesn't matter that we import very little of it ourselves because oil is priced [10:27] in a global market. [10:28] And anybody with their hand on the spigot on the Strait of Hormuz determined to turn [10:33] it off is going to have a devastating effect on the world economy. [10:36] That's why we became concerned about this region. [10:39] Yeah. [10:39] In the late 1970s. [10:41] And that concern has not changed. [10:43] Should others be doing more? [10:44] Yes. [10:45] I think the Europeans have made a big mistake in the way they reacted to Trump. [10:49] But that doesn't lessen our interest in opening the Strait for our partners, the Gulf Arabs. [10:55] We're not getting any oil out. [10:56] I think we should blockade Iranian vessels from getting out until and apply pressure [11:02] until they allow the Gulf Arabs to ship as well. [11:06] Is that something you believe the United States is capable of doing with the forces in the [11:09] area? [11:10] They may need additional forces, but I think it beats trying to land on Karg Island or [11:17] some of the other things that have been suggested. [11:20] The Iranians are selling oil on the global market and presumably receiving payment, which [11:25] is a resource they can use in the war to help kill Americans. [11:28] What sense does that make?