Has Iran exposed the limits of what US can achieve by force? — The Bottom Line

[0:00] Hi, I'm Steve Clemens, and I have a couple of questions. Iran and the U.S. are still talking, [0:05] but can they strike a deal? Or does this war turn into a frozen conflict? Let's get to the bottom [0:11] line. Talks between Iran and the U.S. are back on the table after President Donald Trump declared [0:22] an open-ended ceasefire. Both sides say time is on their side and not on their opponent's side. [0:29] And despite the saber-rattling from both countries, it seems, for the moment at least, [0:34] that they prefer their shaky truce to an all-out war. So how do Iran and the United States get out [0:39] of the purgatory they find themselves stuck in? Today, we're talking with Vali Nasser, [0:44] professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins University, and he's author of Iran's Grand [0:49] Strategy, A Political History. Dr. Nasser, thank you so much for joining us yet again to help us [0:55] unpack what's going on between the United States and Iran and Israel as well. The president is [1:01] dispatching his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Steve Witkoff, his favorite negotiator, [1:06] to Pakistan. I'm just wondering what you think of this moment and whether you think this time [1:12] makes a difference. Well, we're in a situation that it's happening minute by minute. Until yesterday, [1:20] the Iranians were not following up on any overtures by the Pakistanis to re-engage with the United States. [1:27] Now, we actually have the Iranian foreign minister going to Islamabad. Whether that parlays into a [1:33] direct meeting with the president's envoys remains to be seen. But even if he does, I think this is a [1:40] longer road to getting back on track. Because I think last time around, they had a relatively good [1:45] meeting, 21 hours in Islamabad. After that, they had a few steps that were supposed to establish some [1:52] degree of confidence between them. Ceasefire in Lebanon, Iranians saying that they were going to [1:56] open the Strait of Hormuz. But then things went off the rails. The president doubled down on his [2:02] blockade. And then he said a series of tweets that claimed the Iranians that agreed to things [2:07] that they hadn't. And that, in a way, led the Iranians to come. But let's set that up for a minute. I don't [2:12] mean to interrupt. But the president did a late night tweet using a lot of cuss words telling the [2:18] Iranians to open the Strait, to open it no matter what happened or face essentially hell. And then the [2:26] United States closed the Strait. That's right. So the president's answer to Iran closing the Strait was to [2:33] close it further. But then in that situation, when they went to Islamabad, the idea was that they would [2:39] arrive at a point where Iran would lift its hold on the Strait and the U.S. would end its blockade. And the [2:46] precondition for that was a ceasefire in Lebanon. So when the president delivered on that, then the [2:51] Iranians said, we're going to open the Strait. And then Trump said, but I'm not going to lift [2:55] the blockade. And then he set out a series of tweets in which he claimed the Iranians [3:00] that agreed to things on the nuclear issue, which they hadn't. The Iranians came to the [3:05] conclusion that perhaps this whole exercise in Islamabad is a waste of time. They cannot count on [3:13] President Trump sticking to his word. They cannot count on him delivering anything. And so they basically backed off from [3:21] from engaging diplomatically. So what we're seeing right now, Steve, is at least an opening that potentially could get them [3:28] back on track. But it's going to be difficult because instead of the first round of negotiations giving a momentum, they [3:34] almost have to start on the trust issue from scratch. Do you think the Iranians take Witkoff and Jared Kushner [3:42] seriously? No, I don't think so. Particularly after the Geneva talks, they came to a conclusion that either they didn't [3:49] understand what they were being told in Geneva or they misrepresented it in Washington because the Iranians came to [3:56] Geneva with a lot more on the table that they had ever offered before. And it would have been a good deal for [4:04] President Trump. But what happened instead is President Trump decided that nothing is moving forward. This is a waste of [4:10] time and you should just go ahead with Israel's suggestion and start bombing Iran. So the Iranians basically put the blame for the [4:16] failure of Geneva on those two envoys. And they thought they were unprepared. They didn't have the right team. They'd have the right [4:23] attention. And they're not the right interlocutors for Iran. That's why they've insisted on meeting Vice President Vance. Now, President Trump is not known for [4:32] consistency. But that said, he did say previously he was going to send Vice President Vance, J.D. Vance, to Pakistan to negotiate this deal. He is thus far [4:42] mixing missing from this negotiation package. Do you think something's going on there? No, I think this is not a negotiation. I think what [4:50] ultimately Whitcoff and Kushner are going to achieve is actually to set up a bigger trip that requires Vice President Vance [4:57] Cohen. Because if President Trump wants to keep it at Whitcoff and Kushner level, the Iranian conclusion would be this is not serious. [5:05] This is just a window dressing for another military attack on Iran, just as happened in February. And they won't think that actually this is a [5:11] serious diplomatic process. So having the right interlocutor at the table in Islamabad is a statement of seriousness on the part of [5:20] President Trump. Let me ask you a question about something that President Trump raised. He said, right on the eve of when the last ceasefire was [5:30] going to expire, he writes, Iran is having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is. They just don't know, exclamation point. The [5:39] infight fighting is between the hardliners who've been losing badly on the battlefield and the moderates who are not very moderate [5:46] at all, but gaining respect. And this is crazy, et cetera, going through this. But he raises questions about the coherence of [5:53] leadership in Iran right now. My question to you is, do you believe that Foreign Minister Arakshi is empowered to be a negotiator? [6:00] Does he have the confidence and the role from the Iranian regime right now? Oh, absolutely. [6:09] I think this is a narrative that President Trump concocted in order to cover the fact that his own behavior has [6:16] created confusion in Tehran. Whatever divisions emerged in Tehran about the negotiations was over how to [6:22] interpret his 20 tweets claiming that they had done things, agreed to things that they hadn't, and how to respond to the [6:30] fact that he basically went against what the expectation was, which is to lift the blockade. So, no, I think even the [6:39] tweet that Foreign Minister Arakshi made was already approved by the system. But then when they got egg on their face because the [6:48] president doubled down on the blockade, they basically tried to distance themselves from that tweet. But I think there is cohesion in [6:56] Iran in terms of how they react, what they want out of Islamabad, what they want out of negotiations, why they [7:05] should go and why they shouldn't go. There's no paralysis because there is factional infighting in Tehran. I think there is [7:13] paralysis because they are trying to size up what is President Trump up to. Is he preparing for another big war on Iran or is he serious about the [7:23] negotiations? Are they ready for another big war? I think they don't have a choice. It's just like they didn't have a choice in [7:30] February. Their preference is that there won't be war. But if the president really is preparing for it, then they would have to [7:38] basically survive that war. And see, they're also not listening only to what the president says or whether Kushner and [7:45] Witkoff are ready to go, et cetera. They're also looking at troop buildup in the Gulf itself. They're looking at the [7:52] movement of the U.S. military ships, et cetera. And they're trying to sort of make conclusions about whether U.S. is really [8:00] serious about talks or is it preparing for war. I'm interested in how the president himself in his language has really moved away from the [8:06] language about Iranians rising up against their regime. Do you think that continues to be an illusion in this situation? [8:18] Is the Iranian government steadfast, strong, strongly? And do you think this attack has unified them? [8:24] I think it's an illusion. In fact, the idea that Iranians would rise up against their own government if the United States attack was already a fallacy in February. [8:35] Since then, we have seen no evidence of them wanting to rise up. In fact, the more we bombed and destroyed hospitals, universities, schools, entire [8:45] neighborhoods, the more they become anti-American, anti-Israeli. And the more they are basically thinking that this is not a fight against the [8:53] regime. This is a campaign to destroy Iran. So when President Trump says, I'm going to erase your civilization, average Iranian basically takes [9:03] him at his word. And this is not about rising up against the regime. I think that kind of analysis, that kind of new conservative [9:13] analysis, is basically playing an old playbook again and again and again, regardless of whether actually facts on the ground [9:21] support it. I mean, thus far, the American bombing campaign has strengthened the Islamic Republic, has unified the country around the flag, and it [9:31] actually has not achieved any of America's goals. The regime hasn't fallen. It hasn't yielded at the table. It has actually become able to [9:40] be able to exercise power by going after the Gulf countries, by going after energy resources in the Persian Gulf, by going [9:49] after the Strait of Hormuz. I mean, you know, it's to say more bombing will do it is basically very unimaginative, if you would. [9:58] You know, the latest gossip piece about Iranian leadership in Washington, and I have to tell you, I don't know how to measure it. [10:04] You're my guide. Is that somehow Donald Trump has won in changing the character and nature of Iranians' leadership, that it's not the [10:13] mullahs, the theocratic leaders that are in control. A new breed of leader has grown and is taking over inside Iran. Is there any truth to [10:21] that? Well, definitely there's a new leadership in Iran. It's younger. It's far more aggressive. It's far less restrained on the [10:28] battlefield. And it actually has concluded from two wars that have been happening that actually the only way you're going to get ahead is by [10:37] being more fierce than the previous generation. So we got regime change, but worse regime change. Well, at least as far as U.S. [10:44] objectives were. In other words, they got it. They got a regime that is much more willing to to escalate with escalation. The [10:52] previous supreme leader didn't want to talk to America was very difficult to deal with, but he was not willing to escalate on [11:01] pace. So when the United States bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, when they killed the Iranian general Soleimani, Iran only reacted [11:09] symbolically. Now the mantra in Tehran, as one of the advisers to the new supreme leader has put it, is that it's not an eye for [11:17] an eye. It's an eye, a head, a neck, and a hand for an eye. In other words, we're willing to escalate and escalate beyond your [11:25] escalation. And so this is the kind of regime that as now President Trump has facilitated take over in Iran. [11:32] So listening to you, I get a little bit of a chill because it's something I've been wondering about. A lot of people write about this. Oh, if we just get the [11:38] truce, if we get the deal, Iran will behave. Things will be back. The Strait of Hormuz will be opened. It's almost like a magic [11:45] wand comes in and solves a lot of situations. I think there have been reasons why for 40 years U.S. presidents didn't take the [11:53] action to to do what we're doing today, because in part there was fear of consequences, escalation and long term impacts. And do you see any [12:03] way that these long term impacts that Iran's vendetta in this moment are going to easily be solved by a negotiation in [12:13] Pakistan or even a deal? Do you see this being neatly packed in a box and solved? I mean, ultimately, I believe in [12:19] diplomacy. I believe that there is there's always a good deal to be had. But, you know, and it's not always easy to get there. It is [12:27] possible but it also requires the United States to be able to pay a price that would change the behavior in Tehran. In other [12:36] words, the Iranians are willing to negotiate. That's why they went to Islamabad. They're willing to give up a lot of their nuclear [12:42] program. They're willing to talk about the future of the Strait of Hormuz. But they also have a certain number of asks on the [12:48] table, which is economically the lifting of sanctions, allowing Iran to be able to trade with the rest of the world, if not with [12:57] the United States. The U.S. is not willing to those to do those things. You know, in some remarkable tweets that or truths, they [13:06] call them in the White House, they don't call them tweets. They call them truths issued on on truth social by the president. He goes through and [13:12] basically says the Democrats are doing everything they can to undermine him, undermine negotiation. He calls them for the [13:19] inaction on Iran over previous years before he was in their traitors, traitors all in large capital letters. Very, very strong words. But does it look to [13:28] you like he may very well end up in a similar position as President Obama, as other presidents dealing Iran with a JCPOA like deal that he might in [13:35] fact, you know, have something that he has to negotiate and the Democrats will say, we told you so. I think so. I think, you know, President [13:45] Trump came to office particularly this time with the belief that either the Iranians completely surrender at the table or that I'm just going to bomb [13:55] them and then they will either come to the table on their knees or they will just collapse. And twice he's tried it with Israel and both [14:05] times it has failed. So and now close to 55 days into this war, he still does not have a military solution to this war, regardless of what [14:13] he says. And so unless he wants to really destroy Iran and then own the mess that that would leave behind. But if he comes to the [14:24] conclusion that after 55 days of fighting, there is no military solution, I have to go back to the table. Then at a table, he has to get to a deal. You don't go to the [14:34] table to demand surrender. The other side is not going to surrender because they haven't lost. So you have to cut a deal. OK, some terms [14:42] may be better. Some terms may be worse. End of the day, you have to end up with a new with a nuclear deal with Iran, which means that [14:49] Iran has to give up certain things. But you also have to give up certain things like sanctions. So he can then begin to put out a lot of [14:57] truths about how his deal is better than Obama's. But in but in the end, he was not able to solve the Iran nuclear program [15:04] militarily. And he in the end will be forced to do so diplomatically. And the third option is that he fails to do so and Iran can [15:12] march towards nuclear capability. So this is not just the United States attacking Iran. It's the United States and Israel that have [15:20] attacked Iran. But I'm just interested in whether Israel is going to play along or is Israel ultimately a spoiler of any new equilibrium, call it [15:31] stability or stabilization between the United States and Iran. I think Israel has no interest in an American Iranian deal because it would keep the [15:40] Islamic Republic in place and it will relieve economic pressure on it. That's the definition of a deal. That will be the outcome of a deal. [15:48] It wants the United States to finish Iran off militarily. But it can see it sees that the United States is not going to do that. And I think the [15:57] Israelis are right now trying to calibrate and recalculate what they do because the strategy that they followed of bringing the United States into a war to finish [16:06] Iran for them has now failed. Whatever they promised President Trump to make him think this is a four day war and he's going to come out of it [16:13] glorious has basically already. It's a power point, you know. It's already been disproven. So now Israel cannot defeat Iran on its own. Now it's [16:23] created a situation that Israel and the United States cannot defeat Iran on their own. Do you think there's a consequence to that to the Israeli [16:32] Israeli presentation to the president drawing President Trump into this seeing such I hate to call it failure but lack of results [16:41] around the issues they cared about. What do you think that does structurally for the future of U.S. Israeli security relations in [16:50] deals like this. And I just ask you politically does this rupture when you see the politicization of Israel in a way I've never seen in my time in [16:57] Washington. What are your thoughts on that. Well I mean I can't say with a crystal ball what happens but I think Israel is is in a place it has not [17:04] been in the United States for a very long time. You read the polls of disapproval of Israeli policies among young Americans Democrats or [17:16] Republican and you and you see something very very new or you you read that the majority of Democratic senators in Congress would not vote for a [17:26] arming Israel any further. And even you know you have stalwart Democratic leaders who you would have assumed they're very [17:35] sympathetic to Israel like Rahm Emanuel saying that the United States should no longer use taxpayer money to support Israeli military. So there is [17:45] clearly ground shift has happened. But I also think that Israel has followed maximalist policies in the Middle East in Lebanon in Syria with [17:54] Palestinians with Iran that for a country of that size it's too much to fathom. It can control it. It can handle it. And it has the image of a [18:09] of somebody who's driving a large truck at 100 miles an hour in a very narrow road. And a strategy can very easily go over the rails with the [18:21] United States in the region. And I also think that the Iran war has shown the limits of what Israel can do militarily. This has not [18:28] been quite yet internalized in Israel in the region. But Israel has gone twice to war with Iran with the objective of destroying the [18:38] Islamic Republic. And it has come up short both times. And so it would it would obviously cause rethinking in Israel. Maybe Netanyahu's strategy of how he's going to [18:49] defeat Iran and put all of Israel's cards on the table. Put everything on the table risk everything including [18:56] relations with the United States has not paid off. And that and I think you know setting Iran aside setting U.S.-Iran [19:03] conversation aside just for Israel as a nation state. I think there will be reckoning with the strategy that it has followed. What do you [19:12] think Iran is thinking about what it needs to do to to either restore deterrence or to enhance deterrence from [19:19] where it was before. So this was much bigger question after the June war. It's a lesser question now. So they have a [19:25] deterrence now called the Strait of Hormuz. You attack us again we'll shut it down. That's what control means. It doesn't [19:31] mean that. That's their nuclear bomb. That's their nuclear. It's actually much more effective and is much more compelling to the [19:37] international community than the nuclear bomb. They obviously have missiles etc. But that's not going to be sufficient deterrence. [19:45] Secondly they're hoping that the pain that the United States and the international economy went through in this war will convince them that all [19:53] options are not on the table at all times. That war with Iran is not easy. It should not be your you know step one of choice. And thirdly I think when the war is over they're going to go after with the [20:05] Chinese and the Russians in a serious manner try to get much more serious air defense system etc. So for Israel for the United States this window of [20:14] Iran's weakness that Hezbollah collapse Syria collapse they're vulnerable was supposed to give them definitive result in Iran and it has not given a [20:24] definitive result. So I so I think that the ways in which we imagine that the Islamic Republic can be taken down is no longer operative. And so [20:34] I think the Islamic Republic is there to stay unless the United States going to put boots on the ground and have a much much larger [20:41] war. It's going to be there to stay. It's going to figure out how to survive how to deter the United States. And so we're going to enter a [20:50] completely new Middle East after this. Do you think the Israeli Lebanon talks will amount to anything. Not not in the I mean in the short term it may [20:58] keep keep the ceasefire. But ultimately Israel is not looking for a peace with Lebanon. It's looking to annex southern Lebanon. It's looking again for maximal goals in Lebanon. Right. So what it's really looking for is for the Lebanese government to surrender. I mean behind this facade that this is all about. The Lebanese government would have to surrender and would have to basically completely walk away from Hezbollah. [21:28] Yes. I mean this in other words this idea that this is all about Hezbollah's disarmament is true. But behind it is a much bigger thing. Israel is openly saying I'm never going to leave your territory. I'm going to permanently occupy. [21:45] So what government in the world can basically say oh that's great. Thank you very much. Right. And so this is not a peace treaty. They're basically dictating that the only way the only way in which we will not attack you will not keep bombing Beirut will lay off is essentially a situation in which our annexation or our control of southern Lebanon becomes established. [22:06] And same with Syria. That's what we're already seeing is a territorial expansion of Israel into Lebanon and Syria. And that's what really is at play here. Let me just ask you one last final question on timing Valley. [22:22] Are we going to see the hangover of this economically for far longer than anyone is really publicly intimating right now. Right. I mean the Iranian part of this is not mine. It's mostly the Omani part of it is mine. [22:35] But that's a much smaller channel compared to the entirety. So ships can start going back and forth at least much more than they are going now. Now is maximally five ten ships a day. [22:44] But you could go back to orders of magnitude larger. But you know there is a there's been a knock on effect. In other words there's a lot of oil that was on the market that is not there anymore. [22:54] There's a there's a there are tankers that are not able have not been able to get into the Gulf to to to to fill up. There are oil fields that actually are going to be permanently damaged or be very difficult to bring back because they have not been pumping and they had to be shut down because there was no storage facility. [23:12] And then there's all other areas of supply chain around the world. Urea petrochemicals etc. Fertilizer food and all of these things will take a very long time to to settle back in. [23:26] And so the rest of the world is already experiencing this at a much higher level than the United States. The rate of inflation recession in Asia in Africa in Europe is of course much higher than the United States. [23:39] But as we know with these economic shocks just like with pandemic with other things it takes a while for it to actually go back to to normal. [23:48] Well we'll have to leave it there. Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Professor Vali Nasser. Thank you so much for joining us. [23:55] So what's the bottom line? The way that the U.S. looks at warfare and peacemaking is really problematic. Emboldened by a lightning strike in Venezuela the month before and sold on an Israeli idea that total victory over Iran would be quick and easy. [24:11] President Trump rolled the dice. But back in the real world the facts are just really clear. [24:16] This war will have long-term repercussions, renewed cycles of violence, vendettas, and instability for years to come. [24:24] Iran was bombed twice in the middle of diplomatic talks with the U.S. [24:28] And in 2015 it signed a deal with the U.S. that put limits on its nuclear enrichment. [24:33] It took almost three years of tough discussions and it was torn up by Trump three years later. [24:38] So that distrust is mutual and palpable. [24:41] If the White House keeps thinking the Iranian government wants to surrender and that everything's just going to be really fine after one more round of talks, that's the opposite of reality. [24:51] That's going to take much more time. [24:53] And that's the bottom line.