Gulf states risk becoming ‘collateral’ in US–Israel war on Iran, analysts say

[0:00] A Bahraini resolution at the U.N. Security Council to address Iranian attacks on shipping [0:04] in the Strait of Hormuz has failed after Russia and China both used their veto power. Bahrain's [0:10] foreign minister told the council that Iran's attacks in the strait endanger the well-being [0:14] and livelihoods of millions of people around the world. [0:21] The Islamic Republic of Iran's disregard for international resolutions and its insistence [0:26] on threatening the security of international navigation is neither a sudden emergency [0:30] nor a spur-of-the-moment occurrence. Rather, it is part of a well-documented pattern of [0:35] negative conduct. Indeed, the Security Council has previously addressed threats to the security [0:41] of navigation in the Arabian Gulf, unequivocally condemning them in resolutions. [0:45] Well, let's discuss all of this with our guest. Mark Feifley is the founder and president [0:50] of Off the Record Strategies. He's also a former White House official and Republican [0:55] strategist. [0:56] He's from Washington, D.C. And here in the studio, we have Sultan Barakat, a professor [1:01] of public policy at Hammabin Khalifa University. We also have Dania Thaffer. She's the executive [1:05] director of the Gulf International Forum, a think tank based also in Washington, D.C., [1:11] but luckily to have you here in Doha. [1:13] Let's start with you, Mark, if I may. I mean, there's so much at stake here. It's almost [1:19] impossible to know where to begin. But let me ask you this. Does the White House understand [1:25] that by hitting crucial points in the White House, the security of navigation is going [1:26] to be a crucial Iranian infrastructure, that it will cause financial pain, economic turbulence [1:34] across the United States' closest Middle Eastern allies, the allies here in the GCC? [1:41] So the the career people at the National Security Council, the political people, I think they [1:48] foresee what's going on. But I think that the president has so stretched the rhetoric, [1:55] so stretched the language. [1:56] I mean, I think that the president has so stretched the rhetoric, so stretched the language, [1:57] that it takes this to the just this point of escalation ladder that is very difficult [2:03] to return from. [2:04] So I think that from a Washington or a political establishment standpoint, what they've got [2:09] to do is hope for the best, plan for the worst, which means enormous challenges up ahead, [2:16] whether it's potential refugee issues of people coming out of Iran and going to Pakistan, [2:23] to Iraq, to Turkey, to Azerbaijan. None of these kinds of things are going to happen. [2:25] None of these countries are ready for that type of an impact. The potential of proxy [2:30] elements that are being initiated even further, such as Houthi, such as Hezbollah, Iraq, that [2:37] sort of thing. [2:38] Then, as you mentioned, the economic shock. Yes, I think a increase in oil prices is also [2:43] quite possible, which will have a dramatic impact across the global economy. [2:49] Then you have Iran likely launching a blister of attacks. Many of the missiles that is still [2:55] remains in the launch pads, sending them to the Gulf countries, the neighbors and trying [3:00] to hit their infrastructure as quickly as possible. [3:03] What I'm trying to get at, Mark, is whether or not the GCC state should be regarded as [3:08] kind of an acceptable collateral in all of this. Let me put this to Sultan. [3:13] Well, I think to answer your question, they certainly know and they know that Iran, also [3:18] by experience over the last few weeks, if it's going to go down, it won't go down on [3:21] its own. It's going to take the whole region down with her. But the question is whether [3:25] they really care. And I think they don't. And I think they don't because the United [3:30] States decision is not in its hands. It's in the hands of Israel and Netanyahu. And [3:35] you could see today the president is threatening attacking infrastructure. And Netanyahu, what [3:40] does he do? He goes and he does it. He attacks infrastructure. So it's not the U.S. president [3:46] who is really calling the shots at this moment. And it's really sad to see the U.S. with its [3:51] power being hollowed out in this way. [3:53] You think that decision was made without the U.S. knowing? [3:55] The U.S. knowing it? The Israeli decision to already start hitting bridges and energy [3:58] plants? [3:59] Well, of course, I think. Well, I hope. We think out of wanting to think good of the [4:06] United States that they've not authorized these attacks. But I think based on experience, [4:11] the previous attack on the gas fields, the attacks on hospitals, et cetera, et cetera, [4:18] I would say the United States would want to distance itself as much as possible because [4:22] their president has been publicly threatening to go for it. [4:25] But it's a good thing. [4:26] Well, I think that's good. [4:27] I think the U.S. government has been very clear about the importance of infrastructure. [4:28] And now you hear Netanyahu, he hit. But Netanyahu has the cunning ability to present it slightly [4:34] differently. He immediately came out with a statement that we took out the bridges [4:39] that are used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Of course, that's nonsense because [4:44] there are no bridges or railways exclusively used by the guards. [4:49] But you can see an unhinged president, who obviously seems extremely frustrated, who, [4:54] Well, I think in his own way, he seems to have come to a settlement with himself, an [5:02] agreement that this is morally correct. [5:04] And you could see this in the build-up to Easter, all this spiel of religious talk around [5:11] him, comparing him to Jesus, et cetera. [5:13] The man, I think, now is at a stage where he feels he has been chosen to do a job that [5:19] is difficult. [5:20] No one else can do it but him. [5:22] And this is extremely worrying, I think, at this stage, particularly if we consider what [5:27] Israel could do next, which I hope I'm mistaken, but I think they're almost certain going to [5:33] go for tactical nuclear weapon to show the world and to come out as a nuclear power. [5:38] And this is what Netanyahu says. [5:39] That's a very dark Rubicon that could potentially be crossed. [5:42] Let's not go there in this conversation right now. [5:45] But I hear you, I hear you, Sultan. [5:47] There was a degree of weariness coming from the foreign ministry. [5:52] The foreign ministry spokesperson here in Qatar, he made it very clear that he fears [5:56] the situation could spiral out of control and couldn't really say much more on the situation [6:01] at the moment. [6:02] The Gulf countries, we know, and the reason why I think most of us live and work here [6:07] is because they are shaping new futures for this region, economically, politically, the [6:14] list goes on. [6:15] Does a war tonight, Dania, essentially, does it jeopardize those plans? [6:21] Indeed, it does. [6:22] The fact is... [6:23] The fact that Dr. Majid Al-Ansari, the spokesman for the foreign ministry of Qatar, said that [6:29] this could escalate out of control is very concerning because, you know, usually when [6:35] the ministry sends messages, they're usually very measured and calculated. [6:40] And therefore, it's not a good sign for the Gulf states. [6:45] I know that they're very careful also not to cause any sort of panic as well. [6:50] This is very dangerous for the Gulf. [6:53] As you can see, there are concerns across the region about critical infrastructure, [6:59] such as water desalination, energy facilities, electricity grids. [7:07] And even Pakistan today came out and made a statement that they're willing to protect [7:12] Saudi in case of an escalation. [7:15] And for Pakistan, as the mediator or the facilitator of talks to say something like that, when it [7:21] also has a lot of conflict of interest... [7:23] If there was an escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, really shows that it's going [7:29] into a dangerous direction. [7:32] Right. [7:32] Well, let me put that back to you, Mark. [7:34] Look, I've heard two sobering comments from Sultan and Dania here. [7:40] How does it feel to know that the decisions of the Trump administration right now are [7:46] being perceived in the Middle East with so much deep concern and consternation? [7:53] Well, I think that that's natural. [7:54] I think that they... [7:55] They have taken so many of a barrage of missiles and drones over the past five weeks that they [8:03] can be nothing but extraordinarily worried. [8:06] I think that there's really, really only one thing that could potentially stop this right [8:11] now, other than the collapse or some sort of a moderate voice coming out of Iran. [8:16] That would be either China or China and Russia going to the IRGC and saying, let's figure [8:23] out a way to stop this. [8:24] Because they have a... [8:25] They have a financial and a political interest in keeping some form of a regime stable and [8:32] working. [8:32] If it is completely annihilated, then that hurts their ability for whether it's military [8:37] sales or oil sales or other things. [8:40] So that's the one thing that I hold out hope for. [8:43] Right. [8:43] You hold out hope for it. [8:44] But we've seen China and Russia already use their veto powers at the UN Security Council [8:49] to block that resolution by Bahrain. [8:51] Just to remind our viewers, that resolution sought to establish a formal... [8:55] international legal basis for protecting shipping, demanding an end to attacks, coordinating [9:01] defense, and a readiness to impose sanctions on any party undermining maritime security. [9:07] It seems like pretty basic stuff. [9:09] But clearly, China and Russia have come to Iran's aid here. [9:14] I think that's right. [9:16] But so from a Russia standpoint, they are more than happy to see the Strait of Hormuz [9:21] stifled because it allows them to move more of their resources into the marketplace. [9:25] That helps them to continue. [9:27] Their war in Ukraine and to kind of alleviate some of the sanctions challenges they have. [9:34] So and then China, from that same degree, Iran has said that they want to use the Chinese [9:41] currency in the movement of these ships. [9:44] So they have a financial play in it. [9:45] But for a long term, to keep this three-part alliance together, if Iran is taken back to [9:55] the Stone Age, they're not as much... [9:57] use to Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi. [10:01] That's the only thing that I think in the end. [10:03] I don't think a negotiation in this network that we have right now of going from Pakistan [10:09] to Egypt to Turkey to these other places and having some sort of a telephone diplomacy [10:16] type thing is going to have any effect right now. [10:18] Or Mr. Trump, maybe he does say end of the day, I'm going to take out one or two things [10:24] and then live to fight another day. [10:27] That's... [10:27] That's the other possibility. [10:28] But his rhetoric is so strong, so over the top right now that I understand the extraordinary [10:33] frustration of your guests and what they represent across the Gulf. [10:37] OK, thanks for that, Mark. [10:38] Back to you, Sultan. [10:39] I mean, Mark seemed to imply in your fields that the Pakistani mediation efforts are just [10:44] sort of shuffling papers around and lots of sort of confused hand-wringing at the moment. [10:49] What do you think? [10:51] Well, I think they're trying their best, as had the region tried in the past. [10:54] But the track record of the United States of engaging... [10:57] in negotiations has not been great. [11:00] They do not engage in goodwill and with the intention of reaching an outcome. [11:04] And we've seen this many times, which undermined a lot of mediators. [11:07] So I wouldn't want also to undermine the Pakistanis in their first attempt. [11:11] Let them try. [11:12] But I think what's going on with the Security Council is quite important. [11:15] China and Russia objecting to that resolution is because I think it includes language about [11:20] the use of power, the coordination of power, the coordination of security. [11:25] That implies that it will... [11:27] be open for other countries to organize and come to help themselves to open the strait, [11:33] which, of course, is not acceptable to either. [11:36] But in terms of interest, I think the Chinese will probably stand better chance working with them [11:42] rather than the Russians. [11:43] Russians are now living a dream. [11:45] I mean, they're back in the oil market. [11:47] Right. [11:47] Prices are going up. [11:48] They are voices potentially waiting in the wings. [11:51] Unfortunately, we've run out of time. [11:53] It's been a pleasure to hear from all three of you, Mark Feifle, founder and president of [11:57] Off the Record. [11:57] Strategies, Sultan Barakat, as you know, from Hamad bin Khalifa University, and Dania Thaffer, [12:02] executive director of the Gulf International Forum. [12:05] Pleasure. [12:05] Thank you.