Examining a potential deal between the U.S. and Iran

[0:00] For additional perspective on the latest developments, we turn now to two of our experts. [0:04] Alan Eyre worked in the State Department focusing on Iran and was a senior member of the Obama [0:09] administration's negotiating team for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. He's now at the Middle East [0:14] Institute. And Miad Maliki was born and raised in Iran until last year, was associate director [0:20] for sanctioned targeting in the U.S. Treasury Department with a focus on Iran. He's now a [0:25] senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Welcome back to you both. [0:28] Thank you. You heard Nick lay out the outline there of what we believe is in this deal. Also, [0:33] Miad, an Iranian official telling him that progress has been made. What's your assessment of how close [0:37] the two sides are to a deal? Well, I think both sides really want to have a deal. That's very clear. [0:42] What I would say is the Iranian regime has never faced a level of pressure that they're facing [0:48] right now since 1979. So I would say they're way more desperate to get a deal than the U.S. side. [0:54] And I think on the U.S. side, I think there is a realization that this is a leverage that we have, [1:00] that we haven't had since again, since 1979. This is a time to get a deal if you want to get a deal. [1:06] But then at the same time, what we're hearing is Iran trying to go back to the playbook of dragging [1:12] out negotiations, have the blockade lifted, and then get U.S. engaged in negotiations that could go [1:18] on forever, understanding that the U.S. administration is probably unwilling to go back [1:23] to another round of strikes. Alan, what do you make of that? [1:27] I'm glad that both sides are at least saying that they're going to negotiate. [1:31] I think it is improbable that it will result in a detailed, comprehensive agreement that both sides [1:38] will abide by over time. But if it just gets the Strait of Hormuz open and prevents further [1:44] hostilities, that's probably the least bad option. So it's good that we've gotten this far, [1:52] but basically this one-page document is just saying, we agree to negotiate. So not a heavy [1:57] lift at all. The real work lies ahead of an agreement on a one-page document. [2:02] So let me ask you about the phasing then, as Nick had reported, that Iran moves to reopen [2:06] the Strait, the U.S. ends its blockade, all parties declare an end to the war. Is that the right phasing, [2:12] you see? Here's what's left out. Yeah, Iran is willing to reopen the Strait, but they didn't say [2:19] they're going back to the way it was before. All indications are Iran has got this new system. [2:25] They've got the Persian Gulf Strait Authority. They've got new lanes that go through Iranian [2:30] coastal waters. So the question is, sure, they're willing to let maritime traffic resume, [2:36] get back up to 130 ships a day, but is that under the new Iranian system, which seems to be [2:42] a vermilion line, if not a red line, for Iran now, or less probably going back to the old system, [2:48] which everyone in the world other than Iran wants? [2:52] Mead, what do you make of that? [2:52] You know, I would disagree on, you know, well, here's the thing. [2:56] The closure of Strait of Hormoz by the Iranian regime is affecting their own economy more than [3:02] any other economies in the world. It was a nuclear option that they deployed, and it's hurting [3:06] them more than any other nations right now. So the problem here is if the blockade is lifted, [3:12] Iranians definitely want to open up the Strait of Hormoz. I mean, they're losing $435 million [3:16] a day in trade, import, export altogether. The problem here is domestically, it would be [3:24] a very heavy lift for this regime to agree to any kind of long-term agreement with President [3:30] Trump administration. What they've lost as far as layers and layers of the political figures, [3:36] including the supreme leader, the fact that they have to give up their nuclear enrichment program, [3:40] which they've spent hundreds of billions of dollars on, that is going to be a very heavy [3:44] lift for them. I think they're just going to go back to dragging their feet in negotiations, [3:48] then we're going to find ourselves kind of Iranians waiting for the next U.S. administration. [3:52] So, Elin, this next phase is where all the more contentious issues live, right? What happens [3:56] with the highly enriched uranium? What kind of freeze Iranians agree to on the enrichment program? [4:02] If it is a five-year freeze, as they have offered before, is that in the U.S. interest to sign? [4:09] Well, we're back to square one, first of all. Again, what, as Secretary Rubio said yesterday, [4:16] we're fighting to get the Strait open. The Strait was open before the war. And if we do get the [4:20] Strait open, either under a tolling or non-tolling system, we're just back to the same set of issues [4:26] that existed February 26th, plus a bunch of new issues, because both sides are less trusting of [4:33] the other because of the war. Now, yes, you don't need to prevent Iran from indigenous enrichment [4:40] to prevent a nuclear weapon. The key is IAEA verification. If the IAEA gets back in Iran and [4:48] can do the safeguards agreement, the additional protocol, have eyes and ears on the Iranian nuclear [4:53] activity, everything else is dealable. How long the enrichment is, how much uranium they have. [5:00] But the key is having Iran live up to its obligations under the NPT. [5:05] It's almost, from my point of view, this regime would not commit to something and then would [5:11] kind of stay, would be in compliance with it. IAEA, I understand they can go in, they can have [5:17] inspections done on some sites. But you have robust intelligence agencies of not just the U.S., but [5:25] many different countries that fail to capture and trace Iranians' underground nuclear operations. [5:31] I have doubts that IAEA has intelligence capacity to really watch out what this regime would be doing [5:37] next on nuclear enrichment program. So putting that aside, the five-year ban on the enrichment, [5:44] you know, they probably need 10 to 15 years to rebuild what they've lost, you know, post-war. [5:50] Plus, they don't have the economy to throw another rounds of hundreds of billions of dollars in [5:55] rebuilding the nuclear facilities. So five years is probably the time they need before they reach [6:00] the point of going back and rebuilding the nuclear program anyways. So a 15 to 20 year makes sense. [6:06] We've heard President Trump say again and again, we're close to a deal, we're close to a deal. [6:10] In the few seconds we have left, do you see this happening in the next few days? [6:13] He said it seven times in the last 21 days. Each time there's been some serious market manipulation. [6:17] I'm not saying he's doing it. I'm not saying his people are doing it. But again, the reality is [6:23] we're not close to a deal. It will take long negotiation to get a deal. And you're not going to get a deal [6:28] just by saying we're close to a deal. [6:30] I think we're close to a deal if Iranians, you know, kind of show some, you know, compromises in some of the [6:37] some of the assets they have. But I agree with Alan that, I mean, the gap is so wide that an Iranians [6:45] having domestic political issues. I mean, I don't think they have one supreme leader anymore who would [6:50] be willing to accept, you know, that drinking the poison as supreme leader Khomeini did in the 80s [6:56] after the end of Iran-Iraq war. So they also have a political dilemma that no one is probably willing [7:02] to go to Pakistan or Geneva and give away their enrichment, nuclear, you know, nuclear enrichment program. [7:07] Mead Maliki, Alan Eyre. We'll have you back again another 24, 48 hours. See where this turns next. [7:13] Thank you both support journalism. You trust support PBS news. Donate now or even better start a monthly [7:21] contribution today.