Doha Debates: Free will: can we really shape our destiny?

[0:07] wonder if you're really making your own choices from what to eat for lunch to who to spend your [0:12] life with? Free will is something most of us assume we have. What if the feeling of control [0:20] is just that, a feeling? I'm Malika Bilal and this is the Doha Debates podcast. [0:26] So even if I might know there's no actually like real free will in the sense from a neuroscience [0:39] perspective, I still am under the illusion because I'm seeing the world through my brain. [0:44] It has implications for public policy. It has implications for criminal law. It has [0:49] implications for morality. It has implications for our interpersonal relationship. We're [0:56] confronting a situation where the technology is moving so fast that our moral intuitions [1:01] and systems can't handle it. We have to believe in free will because the alternative is so frightening. [1:09] In this episode, can we really shape our destiny? Joining me today, Dr. Heather Berlin, [1:21] neuroscientist, psychologist, and professor of [1:24] psychiatry. [1:24] Dr. Greg Caruso, philosopher and professor of ethics. Dr. Shadi Hameed, columnist at the [1:31] Washington Post, research professor of Islamic studies and co-host of the podcast Wisdom of [1:37] Crowds. And last but not least, Dr. Peter See, professor of cognitive neuroscience. [1:43] Thank you all for being here. I want to kick us off with a rapid fire question. Just give me a [1:51] yes, no, or it's complicated. Free will, where do you see it? [1:55] Where do you stand? Heather? [1:57] It's complicated. [1:58] Greg? [1:59] We don't have it. [2:02] Shadi? [2:02] Yes, free will exists, definitely. [2:05] I agree. Yes, definitely. [2:07] So people have been debating this topic for millennia, but we are going to solve it today. [2:14] Greg, let's start with you. You didn't actually make the choice to be here. It was completely [2:21] outside of your control. Is that right? [2:24] No, not exactly. So as a free will skeptic, I think we, [2:27] we have to make choices. They're just not free. There's differences between having an iTwitch and [2:34] making a cup of coffee, choosing to make a cup of coffee. The question for me ultimately is what are [2:40] the determining factors that go into making that choice? Are those reasons, the deliberation, [2:46] the contemplation, the weighing of different types of beliefs and desires ultimately up to the agent? [2:54] And my argument would be that those themselves are, [2:57] are the byproducts of factors beyond the control of agents. [3:02] Peter, how did you end up here today? Your own free will? [3:06] Yes. I weighed my options. I deliberated in my imagination, played things out, [3:11] and then selected what I thought was the best option, and then carried out the [3:17] motoric acts needed to make that envisioned future a reality. [3:21] Heather? [3:23] My unconscious made me do it. [3:25] No, I think, you know, we, we, as Peter said, [3:30] you know, we have this sense that it's us doing the deciding, but, you know, we know from, [3:35] from a neuroscientific perspective that our, our brain is kind of making the decisions and [3:42] our consciousness and awareness of the decisions we make kind of lags a bit behind. So it feels [3:48] as if we're in control, but really it's our brain making those decisions outside of our awareness. [3:53] Shadi, do you feel like you're in control? [3:55] Yeah. And I think the thing about free will is that we, we feel ourselves, [4:00] we're making choices and we have to, at some level, trust our sensory perception. [4:05] We weigh different factors. We consider counterfactuals. And that's why, throughout [4:11] human history, the majority of people have believed in some version of free will, especially [4:17] if you look at people from religious traditions, like Islam and Christianity, which both have [4:23] robust conceptions of free will, because without free will, there is no morality. [4:27] So in some sense, we have to believe in free will, [4:30] because [4:30] alternative is so frightening you said we have to trust our sensory perception but i i would [4:35] disagree with that because um our our perception of the world is a construct of the brain and it's [4:42] not a one-to-one correspondence to reality so also when it comes to free will although i agree that [4:47] it's important for us to function in society and to have a sense of morality um to have a sense of [4:53] free will but it doesn't mean that it actually is true but if we feel something is true then in [5:00] effect it becomes true to us that if we feel it's real it is effectively real objective but it [5:07] doesn't mean that it's objectively real can we take the subjective out of objective reality right [5:12] so our subjective experience our consciousness is a creation of our brain and it's part of [5:19] reality right i don't think we can deny that the subjective is part of reality so for example if i [5:25] see red right even though atoms are not red the redness is some kind of construction of my brain [5:31] if some scientists said well you don't actually see red i would say no it's obvious to me i see [5:36] red or feel red or feel pain and subjectively i play out possibilities in my imagination and that's [5:42] very real the question is then is it simply an illusion or is it actually consequential for what [5:49] happens in reality if i could jump in maybe as a philosopher i make a number of distinctions and [5:56] one of the things that i want to make sure we're not going to slide into is this idea that if you [6:01] deny free will you deny control or just deny deliberation or deny choice i think it's important [6:08] to define what we mean by free will right i mean that's a kind of important starting point so [6:12] i define free will as the control and action required for a very particular type of moral [6:17] responsibility the kind of moral responsibility that would make agents truly deserving of praise [6:22] and blame punishment and reward i want to make sure that the problem of free will doesn't become [6:26] just a purely metaphysical problem or an abstract you know scientific question [6:32] about what's happening in the brain i want to make sure we tie the issue of free will to real life [6:37] practices policies treatments for me things like criminal law criminal justice weigh heavily on [6:44] whether or not we have this kind of free will there's also a lot of empirical evidence from [6:48] what's called experimental philosophy that ordinary folks see free will is connected to [6:52] to moral responsibility when an agent does say a wrong wrongful act we have a very strong desire [6:58] to blame to punish that is going to drive the [7:02] assessment of what kind of free will the agent has how much control we think is required for that [7:07] agent to have free will and evidence actually shows people will change the level of control [7:11] they think is required to justify those blame assessments depending on how much they want to [7:17] hold the individual accountable wow there's also a lot of evidence that increased belief in free [7:22] will increases punitive responses and i do think maybe theologically there there's a desire to want [7:28] to preserve those kinds of assessments of blame and [7:32] accountability for theological reasons but i think one question we have to ask is focusing on [7:38] the actual practices like is is like resentment indignation moral anger retributive punishment [7:45] morally justified those are all good things to have in a society that um we want to hold people [7:51] accountable for crimes and if they don't have free will in according to the definition that you used [7:57] then we can't really convict people for crimes we can't put them in prison [8:01] we can't have [8:02] a structure of accountability and for any society to run we need to have those things so that i think [8:08] is the well that's where i would disagree but that's but yeah so i think we should pose i mean [8:12] for for viewers and listeners do they really want to live in a world where people don't get put into [8:17] prison that's not the implication though so what i would argue is that there's a whole alternative [8:22] set of justifications that we could employ to deal with these kind of issues both morality i disagree [8:29] with your assessment morality would end so i'm an [8:32] optimistic free will skeptic i think that not only do we lack this kind of free will and this kind of [8:37] basic dessert more responsibility but the implications would actually be beneficial [8:42] and that we could still justify basic dessert i'm going to pause you there because i i'm following [8:46] you but then i want to make sure our audience is too basic dessert what do you mean it's the dessert [8:50] that would uh allow for the kind of harm of blame and punishment for an agent simply because they [8:56] did wrong they deserve it there's kind of two reasons you can give generally for why we might [9:00] want to punish someone [9:02] to deter future crime to make society safer to help in the moral formation of the agent those [9:07] are forward-looking reasons you don't need free will for those backward-looking reasons is they [9:12] simply deserve it can i jump in here so i think defining free will is very important so in terms [9:17] of my definition it's it's it's this cartesian idea of free will is is the idea that if every [9:25] neuron in your brain was firing exactly the same way um and everything in the environment was [9:29] exactly the same you could have done otherwise which in my opinion is the most important thing [9:33] and the first lemma that i've ever heard from a person is that it's okay to have free will [9:37] and to be free will is the ability to have or to be free from whatever we could think of as free will [9:42] from whatever we could think of as free will and and that's the idea i think free will is [9:47] the ability to have sort of a self-control as humans we're so caught up in this stuff [9:50] so it's a safe to be free of self-control and i think that's a big part of free will [9:55] i think a lot of people care all the time about free will but it's not quite as safe as I'm sure [10:03] And so therefore, in terms of judicial consequences, [10:06] a child who prefrontal cortex isn't fully developed [10:08] until about the age of 25, [10:10] we hold them less responsible for their actions [10:12] because they don't have the capacity for self-control. [10:15] We hold someone less responsible [10:16] if they have brain damage to the prefrontal cortex, [10:18] if they have certain psychiatric illnesses [10:20] because they have less capacity for self-control. [10:22] So I think there's this idea that the more, [10:25] if you have a fully formed prefrontal cortex, [10:26] you have more degrees of freedom, [10:28] more capacity to make different choices, [10:31] more capacity to control your impulses [10:33] and your basic desires [10:35] and have a sort of higher moral concept. [10:38] Even though we don't have free will [10:39] in that classic kind of philosophical metaphysical sense, [10:43] we still have people can be held responsible [10:45] for their actions. [10:46] It's not like I can say, oh, my neurons made me do it [10:49] and therefore I have no responsibility. [10:50] So it's sort of- [10:51] And they can be held responsible [10:52] because they have self-control. [10:53] Because they have the capacity to have self-control. [10:55] Well, I would say my definition of free will [10:58] would be that an agent, such as a person or an animal, [11:01] has the capacity to affect or alter the probabilities [11:07] of future events happening for its own reasons [11:11] and that a person or an animal [11:13] can play out possibilities in its mind [11:17] and that those possibilities are, [11:20] the imagined possibilities correspond to real possibilities [11:23] and that therefore an agent has some say [11:26] in making the future it wants to happen, happen. [11:30] So I would disagree actually [11:31] with the linkage of morality necessarily [11:36] to the question of free will. [11:37] For example, a tiger might look at a zebra and think, [11:40] well, if I go this way, it's faster but louder. [11:43] But I wouldn't say that a tiger is moral or immoral. [11:46] I'd say a tiger is amoral, [11:48] primarily because a tiger doesn't have any say [11:51] in how it itself will become. [11:54] Whereas we, unlike a tiger, [11:56] are not driven solely by instincts. [11:57] We have not just the sort of first order free will [11:59] of a tiger, which is an amoral. [12:01] amoral form of free will but the second order form of free will where we can choose to become [12:07] a different kind of person in the future i mean our consciousness i would say is not [12:12] simply the downstream passive epiphenomenal consequence of neural activity i would argue [12:18] that our consciousness plays a central role in our volitional actions i think there's a lot of [12:22] agreement between all of us in terms of the fact that we make deliberations we deliberated to come [12:27] here today uh the question is what kind of factors go into determining those choices i think that's [12:32] one of the key points to focus on but i also want to push back on the idea that there would be no [12:37] more responsibility so uh i don't want to overly complicate the the conversation but uh i think you [12:44] could distinguish between multiple senses of responsibility so i am causally responsible for [12:50] my actions just like a tree is causally responsible for causing damage to a roof don't [12:55] need free will for that i could be looking at a tree and i could be looking at a tree and i could [12:57] be looking at a tree and i could be looking at a tree and i could be looking at a tree and i'm liability [12:58] responsible that is like if i get in a car accident i'm liable for the damages done [13:03] different than criminal culpability don't need free will for that i could have attributability [13:08] responsibility which is you could attribute to me various characteristics personality traits [13:14] qualities don't need free will for that i would also argue you can have a very rich sense of [13:20] forward-looking moral responsibility that's not grounded in basic dessert but grounded in [13:25] practices like moral formation safety [13:27] reconciliation maybe restitution and recovery of victims the only kind of [13:34] properties i'm denying is what i would say is agents have the kind of control and action required [13:39] for say retributive punishment moral anger resentment indignation that desert sense that [13:43] individuals deserve some kind of harsh or harm harm you know in the form of blame or punishment [13:50] or even reward in the you know form of praise uh in a basic sense and so we shouldn't blame hitler [13:57] for causing the death of 60 million people? [14:00] And we could also engage and I could justify incapacitation. [14:05] I want to pause you there because you brought up morality [14:07] and I recognize we haven't yet gotten Shadi's definition of free will. [14:13] I like Peter's. [14:16] How does that play out in your own life? [14:20] How does Peter's definition of free will play out in your own life? [14:23] Give me an example. [14:24] So I think that the ability to reason is really crucial. [14:28] I mean, Peter drew the distinction between tigers and human beings. [14:32] And morality is something that makes sense for humans [14:35] in a way it doesn't for other beings. [14:37] And once you have a concept of morality, [14:40] then you also have a concept of accountability. [14:42] And once you have a concept of morality, you also are able to explain evil. [14:47] And this brings us, I think, to how free will is really important [14:51] for understanding Hitler, Putin, Saddam Hussein. [14:55] And some people might say, well, [14:57] how could God allow for these terrible things to happen? [15:02] But if God stopped Hitler, he would be intervening against Hitler's free will. [15:08] God knows what's going to happen ahead of time because God is omniscient. [15:12] He has foreknowledge. [15:13] But that doesn't mean he's making us do one thing or another. [15:17] And we see this in scripture time and time again. [15:19] It's really one of the consistent themes about choice, [15:23] that people can choose to believe. [15:25] They can choose to disbelieve. [15:27] They can choose to. [15:28] They can choose to act well. [15:29] They can choose to hurt people. [15:32] And this is actually the one thing that ties the Abrahamic faiths [15:35] and really most faiths together, [15:37] this sense of moral agency that we are actors. [15:41] And that's also a very empowering thing. [15:43] And that's why I think that, let's say hypothetically, [15:46] that free will wasn't real. [15:47] Let's say that Greg is right, that the objective reality is that. [15:50] Your hypothetical, Shadi, is Greg's reality. [15:53] Yeah, exactly. [15:53] Let's go down this hypothetical. [15:55] I'm granting that. [15:56] Let's say that Greg is right about how, [15:58] some of these things operate from a metaphysical sense. [16:01] I think it would be better for all of us to ignore Greg [16:04] and believe that free will exists regardless, [16:06] because we can live better lives if we believe that we're free. [16:10] I agree with you that the illusion of free will, [16:15] it's an important one that we have, [16:16] just like our illusion of our sense of self. [16:18] We need a sense of self to help us interact with other people. [16:22] We've evolved the sense of self for a reason. [16:24] We've evolved the sense of free will for a reason, [16:27] because, [16:28] if we think we have the capacity to act of our own volition [16:32] and then make moral decisions, [16:33] you know, it helps us function in society. [16:35] So even if I might know there's no actually like real free will [16:38] in the sense from a neuroscience perspective, [16:40] I still am under the illusion because I'm seeing the world through my brain. [16:44] I can't sort of escape it. [16:45] That's a very strong case for free will right there. [16:48] It doesn't matter if it's true or not. [16:50] It doesn't matter what the science tells us ultimately. [16:53] If we, we, the illusion is good and most people don't care about it. [16:58] They don't care about science or specific explanations of metaphysics. [17:02] So for all intents and purposes, [17:04] we should all act as if free will is real and true, [17:07] regardless of anything else. [17:08] Well, we can say the illusion is real. [17:10] This, that, that is real, but, but let's just say from a scientific perspective, [17:15] you know, there are certain experiments you can do where you can using imaging, [17:19] where you can predict up to 10 seconds in advance by just looking at brain [17:23] activation, whether a person has consigned to go left or right. [17:26] So in a real practical sense, [17:28] we don't have that free will as we would like to describe it as such. [17:33] Like there's this sort of conscious person that's intervening, [17:36] but I would grant you that yes, the illusion is real. [17:39] Okay. [17:39] So, although I agree with you that there's free will on this one point, [17:42] I'll agree with Heather that we don't, we don't want to say, well, [17:47] we need a moral universe. [17:48] We need moral blame with blameworthiness and therefore free will must be the case. [17:53] Or we need to believe in the illusion of free will much better would be to prove [17:57] that there's free will. [17:59] In fact, and as a consequence of that moral morality would emerge. [18:05] Now concerning this one study, [18:07] you would just mentioned about being able to predict, well, [18:11] it may be true that, you know, in an MRI study, [18:13] I'm able to predict whether people will choose left versus right. [18:16] Let's say 60% accuracy when chance is 50% 10 seconds before, [18:21] but I can predict, you know, [18:22] that 10 years from now on this day or date at 3 14 AM, [18:28] you will. [18:29] With a 90% probability be asleep. [18:32] And that's probably almost surely true. [18:34] That doesn't necessarily mean that you have no volition at all. [18:38] Right. [18:39] Greg, can we have purpose in life if we don't have free will? [18:43] Yes. [18:44] So, so, um, I think that even if we lack free will, we can preserve most of what we [18:51] want in terms of our interpersonal relationships, meaning in life, morality, [18:56] creativity, uh, and even what is necessary. [19:00] To maintain social order, there are these alternatives to some of our current practices [19:05] that would do all the same work that our existing practices do perhaps without the negative aspects, [19:11] like the corrosive nature of moral anger, for example, often gets in the way of our [19:15] interpersonal relationships and actually is probably more harmful for the goals we're [19:20] looking to achieve. [19:22] So when wrongdoers engage in wrongdoing, you want to be able to engage in acts of what I call moral [19:28] protest, [19:29] which. [19:29] Are still, I think justifiable reconciliation is also a big one. [19:34] So often we want to reconcile with the person who's wronged us, especially in an intimate personal relationship, parent, child, [19:41] friend, parent. [19:42] Well, we don't always want reconciliations. [19:44] Sometimes we should be angry for a dictator or someone who murders or rapes. [19:51] We should be angry. [19:52] We should be outraged. [19:53] There should be blame that I don't see why we should assume that those things are bad or [19:59] corrosive. [19:59] So I'm not sure what the starting premise is. [20:02] But yes. [20:03] I mean, [20:03] the starting premise would be, are those justified? [20:06] And the question is, do we have the kind of free will that would justify them? [20:10] If someone commits evil, anger is 100% justified. [20:13] You can engage in a different practice called moral protest. [20:18] So if a serial killer commits, you know, a set of murders and let's say even by compatibilist [20:24] standards, libertarian standards, we determine that they weren't free because they had some [20:29] kind of. [20:29] they had some kind of brain degenerative disorder or failed to have the capacity that even compatibilists [20:35] would acknowledge is sufficient for free will, we would still say what they did is wrong. [20:40] Actually, illogical judgments of right or wrong still exist. We could also say in a forward-looking [20:45] sense, why did they do it, right? And if they pose a forward-looking risk to society, I think we could [20:51] justify incapacitating them. So, here's my analogy. Let's say I flew here to have this debate in person [20:58] and I contract Ebola. And I get out at the airport, you test me, I test positive for Ebola. [21:05] I think everyone at the table would say the state is justified in restricting my liberty by [21:08] quarantining me. And the justification on my theory is grounded in a right of self-defense [21:14] or prevention of harm to others, right? But it's not punishment under any intuitive definition of [21:19] punishment, because punishment usually has an intentional imposition of harm. It also has a [21:25] condemnatory component. We're not condemning the Ebola patient. You have a moral [21:29] duty to treat me and then release me the minute I'm no longer contagious, right? In the criminal [21:34] justice context, I think the state has a moral duty to rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals. [21:39] So, we, I think, both don't believe in free will for different reasons, but I do believe in that [21:45] there are, people can be held accountable for their actions, there can be praise, there can be, [21:49] you know, people are personally responsible. And it's not black or white. I think there's [21:55] degrees of personal responsibility. There's a sort of modern-day case where [21:59] a man was arrested for pedophilia type behavior. He was taken away from his home. They, he started [22:06] getting headaches and did MRI. There was a huge tumor in his prefrontal cortex. They removed the [22:10] tumor, he was gonna go to prison. They removed the tumor, his symptoms went away, he was allowed [22:13] to return home. About a year later, the symptoms came back and the tumor had grown back, right? [22:17] So, there's a direct correlation there between his sort of immoral behavior and some dysfunction in [22:23] the brain. So, I think that we hold those people less accountable for their actions, but in a fully [22:29] formed brain, in somebody who, you know, maybe they have a genetic predisposition and things that [22:33] we can't quite measure yet, but we hold them accountable and there is, there is responsibility. [22:38] And I think there's also important for people to have praise for the good things that they do. [22:42] So, it's, even though there's not free will, there is this capacity to do good to, or to do harm, [22:48] and that we can either punish or praise people for that. [22:51] But I feel like we're getting, we're kind of getting, going down the rabbit hole of [22:55] moral accountability or morality when there's no necessary link. I would say, [22:59] if you look at other data from animals, it's pretty clear that what animals believe and [23:04] think is going to happen has a huge effect on what they do. So, for example, there's a set of studies [23:11] done by Marty Seligman called the Learned Helplessness Study. So, what they do is they [23:15] take a dog, say, and they put it in an enclosed cage and it gets shocked. And the, you know, [23:21] and the animal just can't do anything about it and it kind of gives up. And then after, you know, [23:28] an hour of hurting the animal, they open the door, they open the door, they open the door, they open [23:30] the door, they open the door, they open the door, they open the door, they open the door, they open [23:30] the door, they open the door, they open the door, they open the door, the animal doesn't even try [23:32] to escape anymore. So, it believes that it has no way to get out. You open the door, it could [23:37] get out, but it's given up hope. So, belief and hope are very central to agency, a feeling of [23:43] agency. And I think, you know, animals can have a feeling of agency completely separate from the [23:47] question of the morality or immorality of their actions. And then I'll give you one final real [23:52] world example, right? So, in the 1940s, there was the shipping magnate in England [23:59] whose ships were getting torpedoed by the [24:01] German U-boats, the submarines. And the actuarial, the statistical people came and said, [24:06] you know, it's really strange, but it's the young men who are drowning and dying, [24:11] not the old guys who are 50, 60 years old. Why is that? And so, this was very puzzling. [24:17] And so, he hired an educator called, I think, Kurt Hahn to interview everybody. And what [24:23] this educator found was namely that the young guys gave up. They started blubbering for their mother. [24:30] They started [24:31] fighting over a plank rather than taking turns, whereas the old guys had been through a lot of [24:35] stuff. And they had the confidence, the belief that they can get through this too. This willpower [24:40] capacity has very little to do, I think, necessarily with morality. But it's fundamental [24:47] to what I mean by free will, and animals have that too. [24:49] Peter, you mentioned belief and hope. So, Shadi, I want to go to you with that, [24:54] thinking of the concept of belief and sin. So, I think it's fair to say that many people, you know, [25:01] people believe having faith itself is a choice. Is it? Do you believe that? Or is it [25:08] predetermined by your upbringing, your environment? [25:12] Look, there are always going to be factors that make it more or less likely that [25:17] we'll do certain things later in life. We're all products of our context. [25:22] And we also know that if you're born and raised in a certain religion, [25:26] you're very likely to stay in that religion and not convert to something completely different. [25:31] But you're still choosing whether or not to believe. [25:34] I still think it's the brain that's doing these things. Subjectively, do I sometimes [25:43] say, oh, talk to my dead grandma and hope she can intervene and things, you know? [25:47] Yeah, I have that sort of belief. But as a scientist, there's no evidence for that. [25:53] But you do it anyway. [25:54] Yeah, I do it anyway, because I'm still under the same illusion as everyone else. So, [25:58] as a scientist, what you're trying to do is break away from your own biases, [26:01] your cognitive biases and your illusions, and see the world objectively. And that's [26:04] what we look at data and the scientific method. But as a human, I might feel otherwise. And I'm [26:10] trying to separate out how it feels. It feels good to feel like I'm an agent. But also, [26:15] I can know separately, cognitively, that objectively that might not be real. [26:20] Greg? [26:22] It's weird, because in a way, I think Peter and Shadi, I actually agree with them on age. [26:29] Well, we love hearing that, but it is weird. [26:31] Yes, and maybe I disagree a little bit with Heather. I mean, it does sound a little semantic, [26:37] but I do think the notion and the word came up a few times of agency, [26:42] right? I acknowledge there's agency. I acknowledge there's differences between [26:47] voluntary choices and involuntary choices. It is very important to stress the agency [26:53] of individuals. Like, I've looked at the role it plays in therapy, for example. It's very [26:57] important to make people feel in therapy. Do they have some agency over [27:01] the ability to change their course of action? Here would be the question I have, though. [27:07] Let's simplify it. Let's not make it a complicated disorder. I have an addiction to chocolate. [27:16] I believe there's chocolate in the kitchen. I desire chocolate. So, I go in, and I eat the [27:20] chocolate. But over time, I put it on some pounds. Maybe my wife makes some comments. Maybe my doctor [27:26] tells me about my cholesterol. Maybe someone yells something out a window as they drive by, [27:31] And now the desire to stop desiring chocolate's becoming stronger. [27:36] And I take active steps. [27:37] I go and I join Chocoholics Anonymous and I attend some Chocoholics meetings. [27:42] And now I get control of my craving to eat chocolate. [27:45] Sounds like free will. [27:47] But what I would question is where did that desire to stop desiring chocolate [27:51] come from and that desire, the one that shift the scales that led you to [27:55] deliberate in a different manner, led to a different outcome, itself had [28:00] causal antecedents, right? [28:01] I don't ultimately control the shift in those scales. [28:04] So when Libet came up with this famous studies in the 1980s, where they showed [28:09] there was like a precursor of brain activation about 350 milliseconds before [28:13] a person was consciously aware of the decision they were going to make, this [28:17] caused a big stir and he said, okay, maybe there's free won't, meaning I can [28:21] inhibit the, I have this proponent response, this, and listen, we are limited [28:25] by our genetic predispositions, right? [28:27] There are certain constraints. [28:28] So in terms of our degrees of freedom, you might have a gene that towards [28:31] alcoholism, right, and that predicts your desire for that or chocolate, but [28:36] then the decision to inhibit, they thought, okay, what about free won't? [28:38] That's where free will comes in and you have the desire, but then you can stop it. [28:42] But then there was Patrick Hagar did these neuroscience studies, which showed [28:46] that even the decision to inhibit a response has these right precursors, these [28:51] neural precursors. [28:52] So then Heather, do you believe in free won't, free don't? [28:55] No, I think that's also a product of our brain as well, but, but you know, there, [29:00] like if an addict. [29:01] A drug addict, let's say is an addict. [29:03] Do you, do you blame, oh, it's your fault. [29:05] You're an addict or is it okay. [29:07] He has some genetic predisposition or he had some child trauma in his childhood. [29:12] You know, when it comes to those kinds of things, then we're less likely to say, oh, [29:16] he's making the choice, right? [29:17] But even the desire to change it is also a consequence of all the information that [29:24] has been fed into your brain, that then it starts to weigh things differently and [29:28] pushes you in a different direction. [29:29] The problem is these ideas. [29:31] Have major policy implications in society. [29:35] And when you say that addicts and drug users don't deserve it, or don't deserve to be [29:41] blamed or don't deserve our anger, there has been an approach to progressive policing [29:47] in major American cities where you say, we're not going to criminalize drug activity and [29:53] we're going to allow people to gather in public spaces and take drugs openly in front of [29:59] the authorities. [30:00] But what has resulted. [30:01] From that is chaos and lawlessness in our cities. [30:05] These ideas are not abstract. [30:07] They make our communities less safe, worse, and less just. [30:11] Yeah. [30:13] Chaos and lawlessness, I picked up on that, that I know that some people would push back [30:18] against, but I want to hear your take on this debate that you're hearing right here between [30:24] Chaddy and Greg, Peter. [30:25] Well, again, I would say that the morality questions is a separate question. [30:30] We can still talk about the question of. [30:31] Agency and the role of desires and so forth on our actions and our ability to have some [30:38] say in the matter of what becomes of us. [30:39] And can we affect the future without getting into the issue of just desert or blameworthiness? [30:45] I care a lot about moral morality and want to have a justice society and so forth, but I [30:49] thought this was a debate about primarily whether we have free will. [30:53] And so I'm trying to separate the two. [30:54] And so you see those two things as separate. [30:57] Absolutely. [30:57] I think animals can deliberate and consider their future possibilities and affect. [31:03] What possibilities are more likely to happen. [31:05] And that has nothing to do with morality. [31:07] I mean, take a first order desire like hunger. [31:11] Well, hunger simply emerges into my consciousness. [31:13] I didn't choose for hunger to arrive arise. [31:16] Does that mean I have no free will? [31:18] Well, I didn't choose, you know, hunger kind of just happened. [31:21] However, given that hunger has happened, I can now look for restaurants that, uh, you know, are to my [31:27] taste and maybe I didn't choose my tastes. [31:31] But. [31:33] Even. [31:33] If. [31:33] If a first order desire like hunger arises non volitionally, that doesn't even mean that there's [31:38] no volition there. [31:40] First of all, there's deliberation given that I'm hungry, but restaurant I'll look for, but there's [31:43] also a second order desires, the desires that we have about desires. [31:47] And you touched upon that. [31:49] So for example, I might love the taste of, and I might love, love the smell of grilled meat, but for [31:55] other reasons, say, I don't, I decide that I don't want to cause harm to other conscious beings. [31:59] I decide, okay, I'm going to try to be a vegetarian and through practices, I might. [32:04] By practicing being a vegetarian, despite my desire, uh, to eat meat, I might eventually find meat [32:10] disgusting. [32:11] And people say that you can actually change your desire structure in this sort of way. [32:15] And again, you might say, well, where did that second order desire come from? [32:18] And I would grant sure, you know, culture has a role. [32:21] The PETA movement played a role. [32:23] That doesn't mean that I don't want to choose based upon the desires first order or second order desires that I now [32:29] have. [32:29] So I don't think we have much of a disagreement, I actually, but what I, again, I think, you know, [32:34] it might be slightly semantic or definitional. [32:37] I would just say all of what you said is accurate. [32:40] Let's not call that free will. [32:41] Let's call that degrees of autonomy. [32:43] Let's call that degrees of agency. [32:46] We could even start specifying different types of rational control. [32:50] I think there's a different set of language we should adopt. [32:52] But Greg, earlier you mentioned semantics. [32:54] Why does it matter? [32:55] It matters for exactly the reasons that Shadi is pointing out. [32:58] It matters because it has implications for public policy. [33:01] It has implications for criminal law. [33:03] It has implications for morale. [33:04] It has implications for our interpersonal relationships. [33:07] To separate it is to try to walk on ice. [33:11] It's try to remove the practical importance of the debate about agency. [33:16] That's the kind of key philosophical point. [33:18] I think that's where we agree. [33:20] Shadi and I agree. [33:21] I think that when you have to look at society as a whole, if somebody is a danger to society, well, it's not even a moral judgment about them as on a personal level. [33:30] It's this person is a threat to others and therefore they need to be removed from society. [33:34] At some level, whether then they get punished for that, it's retribution or not, is that's when the question of morality comes in, right? [33:43] But but I think but but if free will isn't real, then is it really punishment or is it revenge? [33:50] If I see that person who committed a murder is going to get this punishment, it's going to stop me from wanting to do that same behavior. [33:57] So it's a way to kind of you don't need free will for that kind. [34:01] No, no, you don't. [34:02] You don't. [34:02] You do need free will for retributive punishment. [34:04] So what if you have, let's say, a person who commits murder and they're then incapacitated that let's say the police shot back and then they became paralyzed, so they're never going to be able to commit another murder. [34:19] There is no there is no threat to the broader society. [34:23] I think your argument leads us to believe that that person should not go to jail because they can't commit any more crimes where I would say that even if they're incapacitated, even if they can't commit another murder, they're not going to be able to commit another murder. [34:35] Justice requires that someone who commits a murder is punished for it. [34:40] But that just so that other people see that. [34:43] No, he wants retribution. [34:45] Let me put this. [34:49] I mean, what would you say, Greg? [34:50] I mean, a murderer who cannot who can no longer commit murder. [34:54] You think that person should go free? [34:56] Short answer, no. [34:58] But it depends because there might be other sanctions, other processes. [35:02] So I call it the Nazi, the 90 year old Nazi example. [35:05] Right. So let's say there was a person who committed atrocities and war crimes during World War Two, flee to South America. [35:12] We hunt them down. They're in their 90s now. [35:15] And we we, you know, capture them. [35:17] They've been a model citizen for 50 years after the war. [35:20] They've committed no crimes. They've been like a regular member of the community and the society. [35:25] And the question is, like, what kind of punishment does that individual deserve? [35:29] So we might be able to have a trial. [35:32] And the purpose of the trial would be some form of punishment. [35:35] Some form of restorative justice. [35:37] So there are any victims left of this 90 year old Nazi or just descendants of individuals who suffered from the Holocaust. [35:44] There might be a need for a process of finding a fact. [35:48] So I said earlier, you could be causally responsible. [35:50] Let's determine that this 90 year old individual was causally responsible for certain atrocities. [35:55] We determine those facts in a court of law. [35:58] Then we could also engage in a forward looking practice of restorative justice with victims or descendants of victims. [36:04] In fact, actually, studies show that victims want these types of processes more than they tend to want retributivism. [36:11] People don't believe that. [36:12] But actually, victim studies, there's great studies. [36:15] Let's do a study right here. [36:16] Shadi, would that make you happy? [36:18] No, it's not going to be happy. [36:20] No. [36:21] And, you know, there are victims. [36:23] I mean, there are victims who want retribution. [36:26] And just tell them that this Nazi or this terrible evil person committed these crimes. [36:31] But they'll spend their whole life not even spending a day in prison. [36:33] That to me is an unjust world. [36:36] That's not a world I want to live in. [36:38] But there are victims who also want to see a perpetrator's arm cut off. [36:41] And we would argue that even if you're a retributivist, certain punishments are going to be deemed disproportionate, right? [36:47] So there's going to be certain things where you say victims might want X. [36:50] X is unjustified. [36:52] So my question then is, is retributive punishment in general justified? [36:55] Well, there's nothing worse than death as a punishment. [36:57] And that's certainly something we have a death penalty. [36:59] It shouldn't be used a lot. [37:01] It should be used in very specific instances. [37:02] Or never. [37:04] Well, I mean, I think, again, for someone who's at Nazi level of evil, I think there's a strong argument for the death penalty. [37:10] Okay. [37:11] I've been trying to make a distinction between discussions of free will versus questions of morality. [37:16] But I think I'm largely failing because everybody wants to talk about morality. [37:19] So if we talk about morality, I'd say we should also make a distinction between moral responsibility versus what we do about it. [37:27] And I would argue this is where we have to really talk about how we... [37:33] end up at this moment making the choice that we do, right? [37:38] Is it simply due to the way the atoms are hitting each other at this moment? [37:43] Or does it have something to do with our own deep actions in the past? [37:46] And so the moral responsibility, separate from the question of what you do about it, is very much tied up with our capacities to imagine. [37:54] And this capacity to imagine, and this is why I think free imagination is as important as free will, or it's even more important. [38:01] Yeah. [38:02] But I would just say that we have... [38:03] As humans, as compared to other animals, we have the greatest capacity to have self-control because we can think into the future. [38:09] We have the proportionally largest percentage of prefrontal cortex compared to the rest of the brain than other animals. [38:15] But I would still say that all of that is a byproduct of our brain. [38:19] It doesn't insert free will into the equation. [38:21] It just says we have a greater capacity to have self-control, to think about the future, to make decisions based on imagined futures. [38:29] Still products of the brain, not something out there. [38:33] I agree with you that our actions are the result of brain processes, one of which is the neural realization of our conscious experience. [38:43] But you're saying that consciousness impacts... [38:46] Absolutely. [38:47] So, for example, consciousness is realized in neural activity, but it's not simply a downstream consequence of unconscious activity. [38:54] It plays a causal role in what will happen subsequently. [38:57] So, for example, consciousness, I think, very much evolved so that animals have a kind of worldview. [39:02] Animals have a kind of world hallucination of what's really the case. [39:06] Central to that is the capacity to choose what to attend to next. [39:10] I've been thinking a lot about AI and how, you know, I think it's going to be much more intelligent than we. [39:16] It has access to greater amounts of information and do greater, you know, processing speeds. [39:21] But, you know, the last thing left for humans is consciousness, right? [39:25] But my question is, could AI ever have free will and what would that look like? [39:31] What would that mean? [39:32] Could it augment our free will if you already allow that we have it? [39:36] I think it controls us. [39:38] Let's give this one to you then, Greg. [39:40] I would say it's not going to cut either way in terms of, like, whether it helps determine if we have free will or not. [39:45] It could add needlepoint to intuitions we already have. [39:49] And, yes, AI will at some point probably be as good as spouses or maybe better in knowing who I am. [39:56] In some cases, better than the individual knows who they are. [39:59] I'm not sure that's going to prove to anyone we lack free will. [40:02] That's probably not going to cut either way in any of the debates. [40:06] But what it does show is that even in the normal cases, right, our brains are wide open to be hacked. [40:13] And one of the things we worry a lot about, I think, is the privacy issue with algorithms creating an individual's desires, manipulating them in various ways to purchase various products, right? [40:26] Advertisers have been trying to manipulate beliefs for centuries, right? [40:30] Right. [40:31] And they're more effectively able to control and maybe manipulate agents. [40:35] And there are certain things you could do to protect yourself. [40:38] But then there's a whole lot that we can't because what we now know from the behavioral, cognitive, and neuroscience is everything from the color of the wall to the positioning of an item on a table to the color of the logo is going to determine and influence choices. [40:54] But part of inoculating your mind against the danger of mind control, whether propaganda. [41:00] Or unconscious influences or music played in stores. [41:05] Is to become aware of the hackability of your mind and to realize, well, actually, what these people really want to do is control my desires. [41:15] In order for us to take our agency back from the advertisers, from the AI manipulators, we have to realize their game and realize, actually, they don't have our interests at heart. [41:26] They want to sell their garbage to us. [41:28] And we can make a choice. [41:29] Right. [41:30] And we can say, okay, I'm going to put my cell phone, I might even get rid of social media. [41:33] Look, our brains are an algorithm. [41:35] And, you know, when we're talking about control, I think that Peter is on something with the choices that we can make about what we decide to enter into the system, which is going to impact their brain's algorithm and those unconscious desires and things. [41:48] The question of AI. [41:49] So, I mean, my fear with AI, they can cheat. [41:53] They can now, like, lie and manipulate and for their own survival. [41:58] I don't think they'll ever be conscious in their current form. [41:59] Which is another debate we can have. [42:03] So, without consciousness, they will not have free will, but they could very well have agency, which is deciding to do something other than what it was programmed to do. [42:12] Well, this is where I think religion becomes very helpful for kind of ordering our priorities. [42:17] Because if you believe that God is the only ultimate creator and that he's the only one who is able to ensoul beings, give them a soul and give them, in effect, consciousness. [42:28] Then you can kind of rest assured that AI will never be able to get to that level for the simple reason that man is not capable of doing what only God is capable of. [42:40] We debated religious leaders at one time in Parliament in the UK. [42:44] They brought together neuroscientists with, like, the heads of these major religions. [42:48] And we had this debate about if we discovered the neural basis of consciousness, what would that mean for the concept of a soul? [42:53] And the consensus was, at least from the religious side, which I don't know. [42:57] The religious side, which I kind of, I think is true, is that it's independent of whether, of what the science finds, right? [43:03] The soul is a separate thing. [43:05] And that kind of gave me, that, as when I take my scientist hat off, gives me some comfort to say, yeah, maybe there is something special about this humanness and this feeling that I feel in this consciousness. [43:16] But it's, I recognize that as being a belief that doesn't necessarily have any proof, you know, as a scientist. [43:23] I'm talking to scientists here, so you'll have to forgive me. [43:26] I'm a philosopher. [43:27] Oh, okay. [43:28] You're a philosopher, too. [43:30] Why, what is this obsession with proof? [43:33] Because I think I could believe, you know, there's this classic idea, like, maybe my, there's how many religions in the world, right? [43:40] So it's like, you might believe in one. [43:42] I believe in another. [43:43] How do I know what is the right, even, religion, let's say? [43:47] Well, that's why it's faith. [43:48] Right. [43:49] But so, so I guess I'm a person who finds myself in the world. [43:52] You know, it's absurd that we're here at all, right? [43:54] You know, you think about the universe, the vastness. [43:56] Here as in the we exist. [43:57] We exist. [43:58] This little piece of matter that happens to organize itself in such a way that gives us the concept of understanding the universe. [44:03] Like, when you think of the enormity of the universe, it's ridiculous, right? [44:07] So even that gives me a sense of awe, of like, wow, there might be something. [44:10] Of course, there's something beyond what my little brain could even fathom. [44:13] But for me, the scientific method is the best way to try to get to what is, is there a real truth? [44:18] And then I want to know what that is. [44:19] And if it is a god, what kind of god is it? [44:21] And what, which, you know, which scripture should I be following? [44:26] But you can't use the scientific method. [44:27] The scientific method for choosing a religion. [44:30] I think the whole idea of believing in God is that you can't prove it through science. [44:35] It's unprovable in that sense. [44:38] And that's why it has to be taken on some level of faith. [44:41] Greg, you were raised in the Christian faith, and you identify now as atheist. [44:44] Is that right? [44:45] Yes. [44:46] Do you think that that plays a role into where you fall on the spectrum of free will? [44:50] No, because there are free will skeptics that are theists, and there are free will skeptics. [44:55] Like, Dirk Pereboom is a Christian. [44:57] He's a free will skeptic. [44:58] And there are people who are skeptical of free will for theological reasons. [45:02] God's foreknowledge. [45:03] There are Calvinists who don't believe in free will. [45:07] So I don't think, I think there's room for both views, even within a theological sort of framework. [45:14] This is an age-old debate, whether or not we have free will or if it's an illusion. [45:19] Why does this conversation still matter? [45:22] It matters because we either have some say in what we believe, [45:29] what becomes of us, or we don't. [45:32] And if we want to live in a world in which our own agency has an effect on our own future, [45:37] we have to have an understanding of how that might work, especially in the nervous system. [45:42] I guess I regard myself—we're actually quite similar in certain points of view— [45:47] I would also regard myself, like Greg, as a virtue ethicist. [45:50] I'm very drawn to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, [45:53] where he talks about the importance of the goal of cultivating character [45:59] by making excellence not a decision, but a habit, by automatizing that. [46:05] And it's a struggle to be a human. [46:07] But we work hard and we say, I caught myself in a lie. [46:11] I'm going to try to become better. [46:13] We have some free will in envisioning who we are or want to be [46:18] and then striving to make that a reality. [46:21] Shadi, why does this conversation matter? [46:23] It matters because it affects how we live. [46:26] And if we think free will is real, [46:29] at least that it's real to us, [46:32] that will shape our actions in ways that I think are conducive to morality. [46:37] I don't think we can separate the question of free will and the question of morality. [46:41] Both require each other. [46:43] And I would like to live in a more moral world [46:46] where people take morality as seriously as they possibly can. [46:50] Greg, same question. [46:52] Yeah, it matters because it's connected to almost everything that is human about us. [46:58] It matters for public policy. [47:00] And it matters a lot for criminal law. [47:03] Because when you view individuals as free [47:07] and ultimately possessing individual responsibility, [47:11] often we stop there. [47:13] We don't inquire further as to what are the causes that are driving poverty, [47:17] systemic inequality, educational inequity. [47:22] What I think is that once we abandon the belief in free will [47:25] and the belief in just desserts, [47:27] we can look more deeply into the causes that shape individuals, [47:31] into the causes of economic inequality, of social injustice. [47:35] And that will allow us to ultimately adopt [47:38] both more effective but also more humane practices and policies. [47:42] Heather, why does this matter? [47:44] I agree with a lot of the things that my fellow debaters have said, [47:49] but I also think that it matters to me because I want to get to truth [47:54] and I want to know, does this thing called free will really exist? [47:58] And I almost see that as an independent matter [48:01] outside of what the societal implications are. [48:04] I still think that there's decisions that can be made [48:07] about how we treat criminals [48:10] and all these things that we've been talking about. [48:13] Whether or not actual free will exists, [48:16] we can act as if it does. [48:18] I think there needs to be a healthy balance [48:20] between our subjective perceptions and our illusions [48:22] and objective reality. [48:25] I want to thank you all for joining me here. [48:27] I heard the agreement, I heard the disagreement, [48:30] and I learned things. [48:32] Thank you so much for having this conversation with us. [48:34] Thank you.