Ceasefire: Can this be a 'victory' for US or Iran? — Global News Podcast

[0:00] Welcome to the Global News Podcast from the BBC. I'm Pete Ross. With me today is the BBC's [0:05] diplomatic correspondent, Paul Adams. Paul, thanks for joining us. Let's dive right in. [0:10] After more than six weeks of conflict, Iran and the US have agreed a two-week ceasefire, [0:15] both sides claiming victory. But how can that be? [0:18] I mean, I think, you know, the thing to remember is that both sides need to be able to call this [0:22] a victory for their own audiences and for their own sense of esteem and self-worth and all the [0:28] rest of it. From the United States point of view, you know, there's a pretty phenomenal list of [0:33] things that they have achieved over the course of this past month, along with their Israeli allies. [0:39] You know, there was a press conference in which Pete Hegseth and his military counterpart [0:45] rattled off a whole long list of things that they've done. 80% of Iran's air defences, [0:51] hundreds of missile and drone facilities, 2,000 command and control nodes, 90% of weapons factories [0:57] all destroyed. You know, they clearly believe that they have dealt a phenomenal blow to Iran. [1:03] From Iran's point of view, the regime, and, you know, it is still fundamentally the same regime [1:09] with the same ideology, that survives. And it has achieved a strangled hold over the Strait of Hormuz, [1:18] which has not yet been completely dealt with in terms of Iran's ability to exert control, [1:24] whether it's military control or force people to pay tolls to go through. We'll have to see how that [1:31] issue is resolved. We don't know what a future sort of protocol will mean. But the very fact that it is [1:38] still there and it has demonstrated to the world that it has this weapon, this ability to choke off [1:45] traffic through one of the world's most important waterways, that is a significant achievement for the [1:50] Iranian regime. You talk about some fairly significant sticking points there, and we'll get into those in [1:55] more details in a moment. But what exactly has been agreed by both sides to get us to this two-week [2:00] ceasefire right now? Well, I mean, in a sense, nothing has yet been agreed. All that has been agreed is [2:06] that the guns will fall silent. And yes, there's been a slightly messy beginning to the ceasefire with [2:13] the Iranians continuing to fire. Interestingly, Pete Hegseth was quite sanguine about that. He said, [2:20] it's going to take a while for the message to get through to all the units. And I think one of the [2:23] points the Americans make is that the command and control is so fragmented now in Iran that not [2:29] everyone necessarily is getting the message rapidly. The Strait of Hormuz will open, although the [2:37] Iranians are saying that it's going to be in coordination with the Iranian military and with [2:42] due considerations of technical limitations. That was the phraseology used by Iran's foreign [2:48] minister. We don't know exactly what that means. So that is fundamentally all that has been achieved [2:56] so far, and a possible agreement for the two sides to meet in Pakistan to start talking about the [3:04] nitty gritty. Although so far, I think we only have the Iranians saying that they're definitely [3:09] going to be there. Paul, four weeks ago, Donald Trump was demanding an unconditional surrender [3:14] from Iran. Now he said that he's going to take a 10 point plan put forward by the Iranians as a basis [3:22] of negotiation. So where do we go from here? What's actually in that 10 point plan? Well, there are [3:26] various versions of that around. So that's the first thing to say. But they all include elements like [3:33] complete cessation of the war, not just in Iran, but also across the region, including crucially in [3:40] Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the full payment of compensation for damage done [3:46] in the course of the war, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, the release of frozen Iranian assets held in [3:54] the United States and elsewhere. And with Iran fully committing to not seeking possession of a nuclear [4:01] weapon while retaining the right under the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to enrich [4:07] uranium for civilian use. That essentially is the outline of the plan. We have these two documents. [4:15] One is the 10 point plan. And as I say, there are a few versions of that knocking around this morning. [4:20] And the other is the 15 point American document, which was released a little over two weeks ago. [4:26] Again, not formally released. And we haven't got a kind of, you know, an authoritative version of [4:32] that. But that essentially read like a kind of surrender document where Iran had to give up [4:37] everything and didn't get a whole lot in return. Somewhere in the midst of all of that is the deal [4:44] that will be done. The question is, can that be done in the two weeks? And it is only two weeks [4:51] of time available before this ceasefire runs out. What do you think might be the biggest sticking [4:57] point? I guess perhaps the Strait of Hormuz or on the on the US side, this idea that they want [5:03] their uranium out of the country, the enriched uranium? I think these are both huge issues, [5:07] the nuclear issue and the Strait of Hormuz. One, an issue that we've been aware of and talking about [5:13] for decades. The other, something that has just come up in the course of this war as a as a really [5:18] crucial issue on the Strait of Hormuz. Essentially, what the Iranians are saying is you need to [5:23] recognise our sovereignty over that water and that we have a right to control and and and have [5:32] authority over the traffic that moves through that waterway. Now, that is totally anathema to, [5:37] frankly, the rest of the world. Certainly, the Gulf states which rely on it for the export of their [5:42] petroleum and other products are deeply unhappy at the notion that Iran, as a result of this war, [5:50] will have established some kind of right to determine what goes through that waterway. [5:54] So that is something that is going to have to be dealt with on the nuclear issue. In one sense, [6:00] the Americans seem to believe that they've done so much damage both last year in the 12 day war, [6:06] Operation Midnight Hammer, which dealt this very substantial series of blows to key nuclear [6:12] facilities and to a lesser extent during the course of the past month as well, where nuclear sites [6:17] have been hit. They believe that Iran's programme has been pushed back, you know, very considerably. [6:25] Now, there is the question of the fate of this 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium thought to [6:31] be under the rubble at Isfahan. The Americans are being asked about that a lot. It's what Donald Trump [6:38] and Pete Hegseth both refer to as the dust. There is a feeling that it is it is buried. It is possibly rather [6:46] inaccessible. The Americans say we're watching that 24-7 and that one way or another, it'll either remain buried [6:54] or we will have it. In other words, the Iranians will be forced to give it up. Now, there was a talk of a deal, but just [7:01] before literally in the 24 hours or 48 hours before this war broke out, brokered by the Omanis. And they [7:08] were they were incandescent when the war broke out because they said, look, we had a deal which addressed [7:12] all of these issues. It was on the table. It was ready to be signed. And the Americans simply didn't [7:18] understand it or chose not to understand it and chose to go to war instead. That deal would address [7:25] the issue of the highly enriched uranium in one way or another, whether it would be downblended, to use the [7:31] technical term, to get it back down to a level of low enrichment or taken out of the country or just [7:37] dealt with in some way or another, but that Iran would insist on its continued right to enrich uranium [7:43] for civilian purposes. Now, that goes to the heart of the issue that which has divided the world about [7:48] Iran's nuclear ambitions for such a long time. Does Iran want to hold on to that right because it wants [7:54] to build a bomb at some point in the future? Or is it is it going to be can we trust it to use that for purely [8:02] civil civil purposes? The JCPOA, the deal that was done during the Obama years, did address all of that, thought it [8:09] had successfully tackled that issue. It was it was deemed to be the worst deal in history by Donald Trump and his supporters. [8:18] But we may have to get back to something that is a little bit akin to that if the United States is going [8:24] to agree to Iran's continued right to enrich uranium. Pete Hegseth was asked about that at the press conference [8:32] today. And frankly, he dodged the question merely saying that Iran would have no nuclear capability. [8:38] That is not the same as saying that Iran would have no nuclear enrichment. [8:42] We've heard a lot recently about the fact from the US side that they say Washington says that there has [8:49] been significant regime change. Some might say that that might not be the case. [8:54] Well, look, you know, there is a long list of people who have been killed, just as there is a long list of [8:58] military facilities that have been bombed. You know, everyone from the Supreme Leader on down. And we still [9:04] have not seen or heard directly from the new Supreme Leader, the old Supreme Leader's son. So in one sense, [9:11] there has been a change of personnel. Now, does that amount to regime change? Well, you've heard in [9:19] American rhetoric in the last week or so from Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth and others, a constant [9:26] reference to a changed regime. They want the world, primarily perhaps the American audience, to believe [9:35] that what they have done has fundamentally changed the Iranian regime and that it has learned lessons [9:43] from the past month that will be reflected in its course going forward. I think most other people [9:51] would say this is a regime that is fundamentally organized in the same way, has the same structures, [9:57] has the same ideology, the same determination to confront the United States and Israel, and that [10:04] we have seen very little so far to suggest that it is going to be a different kind of regime going [10:11] forward. That would have to involve a changed attitude on its on its nuclear program. And crucially, [10:17] from Israel's point of view, a changed behavior on on the regional front, you know, an end to its [10:23] sponsoring of proxies and allies around the Middle East, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, [10:30] and so forth. All of that is still to be tested. For everything that we see for the time being, it is [10:37] still the same regime. What's Israel's role in this? It's declared support for this two weeks ceasefire, [10:43] but that's also as it's continued to launch attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon. So could they possibly derail [10:49] the whole thing? Well, they are clearly saying that they are not part of this deal. In a statement [10:56] from the Israeli government today, there is the stark phrase, the two-week ceasefire does not include [11:02] Lebanon. Now, that runs absolutely counter to what the Pakistani Prime Minister Shabazz Sharif was saying, [11:08] and again, I'm quoting, the United States of America, along with their allies, have agreed to an immediate [11:12] ceasefire everywhere, including Lebanon. So we've not heard anything from Washington to suggest that [11:20] they take issue with Benjamin Netanyahu's determination to carry on the fight in Lebanon. [11:29] I suspect that there is some understanding of Israel's desire to deliver a significant, [11:36] lasting blow to Hezbollah once and for all. I think there will be a lot of attention on how Israel [11:42] continues to prosecute this campaign, because it has been hugely costly for the people of Lebanon [11:49] already, and promises to be even more costly as the Israeli military goes in and destroys villages [11:56] wholesale. That could become a bone of contention between Israel and the United States, particularly if [12:02] it threatens further retaliation from elsewhere, whether it's the Houthis in the Red Sea, or indeed [12:09] the Iranians themselves. So that's definitely one to watch. Sounds like we're at a very significant [12:14] moment, but with lots of unknowns as the next two weeks progresses. A huge number of unknowns. And I [12:20] think one thing that is, you know, we're going to need to see some intensive diplomacy. And I think one of the [12:27] things that worries observers is that the Americans have yet to show that they are willing to kind of [12:34] throw the required diplomatic resources at solving these issues. Its ability and its determination to [12:43] throw military resources has been very, very vividly demonstrated over the past month. But they've not [12:49] shown a willingness to kind of invest in the time and effort and detail required to deal with these issues. [12:56] If they don't, then none of the issues that we've just talked about will actually have been properly [13:00] resolved. Thanks, Paul. Our diplomatic correspondent, Paul Adams. If you'd like to hear more from the [13:06] Global News Podcast, click the link below. Thanks for joining us.