'A prolonged state of managed instability': Analysts on US–Iran talks, Hormuz blockade

[0:00] U.S. President Trump says that Iran's nuclear ambition is, quote, the single most important [0:06] issue. As we've been reporting, he has ordered a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. [0:11] Now, Iran wants recognition of its authority over the straits, collect transit fees, and [0:16] control access. The United States says fully opening the Strait of Hormuz to oil tankers [0:21] is a prerequisite, including unrestricted traffic without any fees. But for more on [0:28] all of this, let's bring in our guests. From Islamabad, Moshahid Hussain Syed is a defense [0:32] and foreign policy specialist. He's also the former Pakistani minister for information and [0:36] culture. From New York, Marco Vincenzo joins us, a global strategy advisor and geopolitical [0:41] risk specialist. Minister Syed, do you think there is still a possibility for talks at the [0:52] moment? I ask you this because the U.S. has said we're done, but then we are still in the [0:58] middle of a ceasefire. The U.S. isn't striking Iran and Iran isn't striking Israel or the region. [1:07] I think that there's still a possibility of talks because the ceasefire is still in place [1:11] and neither side, neither the American side in their parting statement, nor the Iranian side in [1:18] their concluding statement in Islamabad slammed the door shut for dialogue. They laid out certain [1:24] conditions and it was left to further discussion. So I think there is still a window open and [1:31] right now also we see the shifting in goalposts because it started as if the issue is all about [1:37] nuclear weapons, which Iran doesn't have at the moment and they don't have any nuclear weapons [1:42] program by the name, which Trump said had been obliterated several times. But now it's about [1:49] straight up homos and that's a different situation, which is the consequence of the conflict, not the [1:56] cause of the conflict. So I think that there is still the opportunity for a dialogue because both [2:02] sides know that once there's no dialogue, then the consequences would be a destruction on both sides [2:09] and it's going to be an unwinnable war. Marco Vincenzino, the United States wants Iran to agree [2:17] to American terms. That's what the American vice president said when he left Islamabad. We've made [2:22] our final offer. It's now up to them. I'm quoting almost directly. It's now up to Iran to decide [2:27] whether they accept it. So the U.S. has the same bargaining position now that it had before the [2:33] conflict, which is we want what we want. Iran didn't accept to their terms. It didn't accept [2:38] their terms before the conflict. And for the moment, Iran is still not unconditionally accepting [2:43] their terms. Do you think at some point this U.S. bargaining strategy ends up working? [2:47] Basically, it's we got to look at it in a broader historic context. We're talking about 24 years [2:55] of much of the same song. When 2002, when an Iranian opposition group brought the nuclear program to [3:03] the attention of the rest of the world, we've seen a process of negotiations over ups and downs, [3:08] processes that have ebbed and flowed. But what they've been marked with is by a lack of trust, [3:13] deep suspicions. And you have now, what the difference is now is that you've had a meeting at the [3:18] highest level of a U.S. vice president meeting with a high-level delegation from Iran in Islamabad. [3:25] You have stakes are higher than ever compared to, if you look relatively compared to the past 24 years, [3:31] and trust is at its lowest. So if we look over a 24-year period, we've reached the height now [3:36] in terms of tensions and stakes being at the highest, as I mentioned. But a lot of it is, [3:43] obviously, you have the Hormuz factor, which is relatively a newer dimension. But overall, [3:48] with that lack of trust, I think, in my opinion, what you're going to be seeing happen, [3:53] even if they come back to the table, you still have a two-week, you know, there's about a bit [3:57] less than two weeks left of this. And the things they share in common is no one wants to go back [4:02] to war. Principally, Trump has midterm elections in November. Netanyahu has got to have elections [4:08] before October of this year. Iran itself is struggling to survive, although it's in a fairly [4:15] stronger position, although it's been depleted in terms of its Navy and its Air Force. We all know [4:19] the rest in terms of facts. But the rest of the world, the Gulf region, Asia, the Americas, Europe, [4:25] everyone's sitting on edge. It'll be catastrophic if there's a return to armed force. So although both [4:31] may not have agreed yet on any, and there's a trust still, it's still a wide gap, I think they agree [4:36] that they don't want to have a return to armed force. And basically, I think in the longer term, [4:41] even if something may be signed, what you're going to see is basically, we're not going to see any time [4:46] in the foreseeable future, we're not going to see a stable peace. We're not going to see, I think, [4:50] an uninterrupted war. What we're going to have is a prolonged state of managed instability. [4:55] Minister Syed, is trust needed to actually get a breakthrough in negotiations? You heard [5:04] Marco Vincenzino there saying that there's no trust between the parties, and I think everyone [5:08] agrees on this. Iran says it, the U.S. says it. But is trust actually a precondition for some kind [5:16] of deal or agreement to be reached or not? Yes, I think there has to be a modicum of trust, [5:24] because ultimately the two sides feel that what is signed, what is said, is going to be implemented [5:32] if they feel that the other side is engaged in a war of deception, of deceit, and based on untruths [5:41] or lies, which the U.S. has been doing. They've fought two wars against Iran based on deception [5:47] and lies, same with Netanyahu. So the Iranians feel that even coming to Islamabad was, for them, [5:54] a security risk, because there was a feeling they might be even shot down. And you have articles [5:58] in the Washington Post calling for the assassination of negotiators, which is unprecedented [6:03] in, frankly, modern negotiating history. So given that there's a yawning chasm. [6:09] That's not U.S. government policy. I just want to make clear that what you're referring to [6:12] is an op-ed in the American press. It in no way represents U.S. official policy. [6:17] Yes. But even a serious newspaper, because the U.S. has already assassinated people. [6:23] So assassination is part of American and Israeli policy. So when they talk of assassinating [6:28] and negotiators, it's not that far-fetched. So given that context, I think trust is very, [6:32] very important. And that trust can only be achieved, perhaps, not by the two sides directly. [6:38] It can be done by outside elements of friendly forces of countries like Pakistan or China or other [6:44] guarantors who can come into the situation and bridge the gap. So trust, I think, is a paramount [6:50] factor in finally having a deal. And I agree that the option to the current scenario is a war, [6:58] and nobody wants that, because at least Trump, when he launched the war, is based on a monumental [7:04] miscalculation. And he now realizes that it's going to be politically costly for him also. [7:09] So that's why he wants to cut a deal and call it quits. What can Pakistan do? Because Pakistan has [7:15] been an intermediary. Pakistan can pass messages. But if the two sides simply disagree, as appears [7:21] to be the case right now, I'm just not sure, Minister, what more Pakistan can do at that point. [7:29] I think that I was listening to your statements. You've had two statements from Iranian leaders. [7:34] Both are quite reasonable. Iran was just supposed to be the hardliner party, the intransigent or [7:41] obdurate, and their approach is very flexible. I think the U.S. is the problem. And the problem, [7:47] frankly, for me, is Netanyahu. He is the spoiler. If Netanyahu can be leashed by Trump or the Trump [7:54] administration, because he has a vested interest in continuing this conflict. Otherwise, when the [8:00] conflict ends, it's his political demise. He'll either end up in jail in Israel or because he's [8:06] already has corruption charges and he's also a wanted war criminal. So I think Netanyahu is the [8:12] only one who has stakes in continued war, not Trump, not the Iranians. So I think you have to first [8:17] leash Netanyahu. It is not Israel first. It has to be America first. And unfortunately, this war has [8:25] been driven by Netanyahu. And the New York Times story confirmed that on 11th February, it was [8:30] Netanyahu who sold the war to Trump and he bought it hook, line and sinker. Well, actually, that story, [8:36] it was very interesting. And I think many of us read it. What that story says is certainly that [8:40] Netanyahu made a full court press to Donald Trump himself about why he thought the U.S. should join [8:45] Israel in a war against Iran. But the article also stated essentially that Donald Trump agreed with [8:50] that line of thinking more than he agreed. That's what the article reported with with anything that [8:55] anyone else in the room was saying that included his secretary of defense, his chairman of the [8:59] Joint Chiefs, etc. So in other words, it reflected what Donald Trump felt and thought. Marco Vincenzino, [9:10] negotiations are about leverage. And at the same time, pretty much that the U.S. said Iran has our final [9:16] offer. It's up to them to take it or leave it. They announced a new tactic, right, on Donald Trump's [9:21] Truth Social, which was the U.S. is now going to fully blockade the Strait of Hormuz. No ships go on, [9:28] no ships go out. That is their plan. That appears designed to give the U.S. more leverage. Do you [9:33] think it can work? Unilaterally, it'll be a challenge, not impossible. But in order to work [9:42] effectively, I think you would need the help in terms of other nations in participating, European [9:48] allies or the allies from Asia or the willing. We hear about the term coalition of the willing over [9:54] the years. This would be, I think, such a case. Ultimately, the U.S. Navy would be the one to [9:59] enforce it. But to have that support, not just from an asset perspective, but also from a political [10:05] diplomatic perspective, I think would be very, very helpful to go at it unilaterally on its own, [10:10] possible but far more difficult. And with the help of other, like I said, of other allies, [10:17] it's like I said, it's not just the assets that they have. The U.S. has most of the assets. [10:21] But in terms of credibility and perception, global perception, it's important also to have your [10:26] allies on board to participate. Even if some countries have limited assets, even if it's a [10:31] single minesweeper, part of that helps in the entire effort. But I think what's important here is [10:37] to realize is that if we're looking at a chess game, looking at 24 years of being played, [10:42] and now we're escalating, Trump has now moved the piece on the chessboard, escalating technically, [10:49] yes, but not elevating it to the level of the use of armed force. And once again, I think that's what [10:54] both sides for now, there's a dance going on. Each one is trying to check the other one. But the thing [11:01] is that the question is, will there be a return to the use of armed force? And I think for now, [11:07] within this two-week ceasefire that several days have already passed by, I think during that time, [11:14] neither side is going to make a move in terms of use of armed forces. But after that, the situation, [11:20] once again, this ceasefire offers something very temporary. It's limited relief, but much [11:27] uncertainty. And what comes after, that chess game continues. Now, the U.S. makes a move with Trump, [11:33] that he just made, and how the Iranians will counter that. Will they counter with the one [11:38] that gets close to the use of armed force or not? So the dance continues in the next few days. But [11:44] once again, once we reach that two-week ceasefire limit, what's going to happen after that? And at [11:50] the stage we're at right now, once we're going to refer to that lack of trust, we refer to that, [11:55] you know, it's that 24-year period of on-and-off negotiations reaching a maximum high level with [12:02] both sides generally taking maximalist positions. Is there room in between? And even if they reach [12:08] something, I'll make that same case. We're going to have a prolonged state of managed instability, [12:14] which the private sector needs to be prepared for. A prolonged state of managed instability. [12:19] Okay. Listen, thank you very much. Moshahid Hossein Syed, defense and foreign policy specialist, [12:25] also Pakistan's former minister of information and culture. And Marco Vincenzino, global strategy [12:30] advisor, geopolitical risk specialist. Thanks to both of you. Thank you. Thank you.